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Foreword
Th is book was prepared under the “Local Government Policy Partnership” Program, 
a joint project of two donor organizations. Th e British Government’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) and the Open Society Institute, Budapest’s Local 
Government and Public Service Initiative (LGI) launched this regional program in the 
year 2000. Th e “Local Government Policy Partnership” (LGPP) projects are intended 
to contribute to policy development and innovation within the countries of Central 
and Southern Europe (http://lgi.osi.hu/lgpp/). 
Th e LGPP hopes to develop expertise and support professional cooperation among 
local government specialists throughout the region. Th e experiences of the countries 
participating in this program should be made available in other regions, such as in 
countries of Central Asia. Th e core partner countries are the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovakia. However, other countries have been invited to participate in the 
LGPP regional projects, in order to help facilitate direct information exchange and 
comparison of policy eﬀ orts. 
LGPP publications include policy studies and proposals that have been presented 
to government oﬃ  cials and experts in the countries involved. Targeted beneﬁ ciaries 
of LGPP projects are national government ministries, local government associations, 
research and training institutions, and individual local authorities. LGPP intends to 
publish three studies a year. 
In the ﬁ rst two years of the LGPP project, various policy areas were selected for 
analysis: education ﬁ nancing and management; regulation and competition of local 
utility services; public perception of local governments; the relationship between local 
government size, local democracy, and local services delivery; local government and 
housing; and capital investment ﬁ nancing. Th ese policy studies were widely disseminated 
in the region. Th ey supported policy dialogue (e.g., on education reform in Macedonia) 
and served as training materials (e.g., for regulatory experts). 
Topics for the third and last year of LGPP in 2002–2003 were as follows: 
a)   role of local governments in local economic development;
b)   local government borrowing, and; 
c)   regulation on conﬂ ict of interest in local governments.
Regulations on conﬂ ict of interest are analyzed in six countries: Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, and Slovakia. Th ese studies provide a comprehensive overview 
of the legal and administrative regulatory framework developed during the past decade. 
viii D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
Th ey focus on the new requirements originating from wide-ranging decentralization and 
rising privatization. In most of the countries studied, the European Union has provided 
the framework for national regulations. LGPP national teams have sought to broaden the 
traditional views on controlling corruption by presenting other non-legal instruments 
for regulating conﬂ ict of interest. Local codes of ethics, rules on declaration of private 
interest, and other similar techniques are yet to be developed in these countries.
Ken Davey           Gábor Péteri
November 2003
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Barbara Kudrycka
1.   INTRODUCTION
Th is summary report, and the six country reports that follow, were prepared as the ﬁ nal 
product of a program that was a donor cooperation initiative between the UK Depart-
ment of International Development (DFID) and the Local Government and Public 
Service Reform Initiative under the Open Society Institute (OSI/LGI). Th e project was 
administered by the Local Government Policy Partnership Program, and it consisted of 
legal and economic analyses from six Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries: 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Russia, and the Slovak Republic. 
Th e objective of this project was to analyze the legal framework and regulatory 
practices for conﬂ ict of interest situations, to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the 
existing legal and regulatory prevention framework, and to advise policy makers on the 
introduction of changes in the regulations and procedures. 
Th e problem of legal regulation of conﬂ ict of interest in local government is very 
complicated, and it is regulated by many diﬀ erent legal institutions, as well as by dif-
ferent levels of legislation and areas of laws—administrative mechanisms. Our plan 
was to take a step forward and to highlight the importance of non-legal mechanisms of 
regulating the conﬂ ict of interest phenomenon at the local level. Since the “traditional” 
regulatory mechanisms are still very strong in our region, even for our experts the main 
emphasis was on the legal institutions. 
Every area of conﬂ ict of interest, e.g., personal economic interest, duplication of 
power, nepotism, and cronyism, may be a subject of separate research. But our authors 
had the much more diﬃ  cult and complicated task of presenting the whole system of 
regulation. Th us the reports contain “a mass of details.” However, some of these reports 
do not contain details if these countries have not yet applied any legal regulation con-
cerning particular types of conﬂ ict of interest or particular administrative mechanisms. 
Due to the limited size of the reports, some administrative mechanisms—like internal 
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and external audit, civil service qualiﬁ cations, and training—are mentioned only to 
emphasize the most important and speciﬁ c elements.
Th e most important principle of the whole study was to identify recommendations 
for policy makers to counteract the weaknesses of the country’s regulation system. 
Research done by the country reports’ authors allow us to ﬁ nd answers to questions 
such as:
      •     Which countries have an incomplete regulation system?
      •     Which types of conﬂ ict of interest prevention have not yet been regulated?
      •     What are the weaknesses of already regulated types of prevention?
In the country reports, the existing legal possibilities for prevention of conﬂ ict of 
interest have been evaluated on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the development 
of the legislation and sub-legislation in the ﬁ eld. As a result, recommendations to policy 
makers at the central and local levels for the needed changes in the main legislation 
have been developed, and so have recommendations for the design of procedures that 
cover cases of conﬂ ict of interest Th e policy proposals have taken into consideration the 
opportunities for their application in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 
and they may be of interest for West European countries as well.
Corruption and conﬂ ict of interest prevention have become one of the European 
Union’s major and ongoing concerns in candidate states since the establishment of the 
“Copenhagen criteria” in 1993 and its initial 1997 assessment in the “Agenda 2000” 
report on CEE accession countries. 
Th e annual preparation of the regular reports to the European Commission follows 
a checklist of six criteria for monitoring corruption:1
      •     the existence and implementation of anti-corruption policy;
      •     institutional arrangements for implementation and division of tasks among 
institutions;
      •     codes of conduct for public servants;
      •     training programs for public servants;
      •     cases of corruption in government and public administration—and how the 
authorities have treated these cases;
      •     ratiﬁ cation and implementation of relevant conventions (Council of Europe, 
OECD).2
Th e measurement methodology and criteria implied by the Commission’s Regular 
Reports include criteria that are applied more or less consistently across all candidate 
states and criteria applied just in a few candidate countries.3 Without these criteria, it 
would not have been possible to describe in this volume, in a uniform structure, the 
system of conﬂ ict of interest prevention at local governments by means of each coun-
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try’s report.4 Only the Russian report is structured diﬀ erently, since it primarily focuses 
on institutional conﬂ icts associated with the provision of services by publicly owned 
enterprises.
Th is summary report will focus on systems preventing conﬂ ict of interest that the 
six CEE countries have developed. It is a part of a multi-country comparative study on 
the legislative and institutional measures. It presents the status of the matter for these 
countries, with regard to the legislative framework and implementation practices, by 
focusing on the measures directly related to local self-government. 
2.   CONFLICT OF INTEREST, CORRUPTION
A sustained decline of public trust in public institutions in the CEE countries has been 
reported by many international and domestic organizations. Public opinion surveys 
indicate that it is a popular belief that corruption is widespread and power resources 
are used for personal gain. But the public emphasizes not only corruption phenomenon 
but also “softer areas,” such as nepotism, cronyism, favoritism, ignorance, and using 
government property for personal beneﬁ t. According to public opinion polls on issues 
of bribes, speed-money, and extortion in Eastern Europe, oﬀ ering of gifts to public of-
ﬁ cials is a widespread phenomenon.5 Th e majority of people think that to receive timely 
administrative treatment, the giving of at least a small gift is needed. 
Corruption usually means a malpractice, with heavy sanctions, and it is characterized 
by the acquisition of ﬁ nancial beneﬁ ts, while conﬂ ict of interest has a wider scope of 
social relationships and behavior, the majority of which is not classiﬁ ed as a crime, and 
it aﬀ ects the unbiased exercise of oﬃ  cial duties. In the general sense, conﬂ ict of inter-
est means the use of power by public oﬃ  cials to promote their private interests, or the 
private interests of their relatives or commercial enterprises in which they participate.
Conﬂ ict of interest also has an institutional meaning. Institutional conﬂ ict of inter-
est appears between the roles of the local government oﬃ  cial as a defender of the public 
interest in the quality and eﬃ  ciency of municipal services and, at the same time, the 
owner or founder of local service providers, such as a school or heating company, or as 
the employer (direct or indirect) of its staﬀ . 
Th e legal and regulatory framework on conﬂ ict of interest might prohibit public 
oﬃ  cials, among others, from engaging in private business, require oﬃ  cials to disclose 
private interest in any issue under consideration, or require that they withdraw from 
participation in related decisions. In the institutional meaning, the legal framework 
might prohibit duplication of power of local government oﬃ  cials, e.g., prohibit staﬀ  of 
municipal companies or institutions from membership in elected councils or prohibit 
mayors from membership in municipal company boards. 
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Gerard Carney points out that:
“…as opposed to corruption, the term ‘conﬂ ict of interest’ has a wider 
scope and includes a wider sphere of social relationships. Corruption 
covers collision of personal and public interests in cases of public oﬃ  cials, 
where the acquisition of ﬁ nancial beneﬁ ts takes place most frequently, 
while conﬂ ict of interest presupposes any collision of public and personal 
interests with respect to public oﬃ  cials, which may cause doubts on 
the biased manner of performing their oﬃ  cial duties. In other words, 
corruption is the ﬁ nal stage of conﬂ ict of interest. It may be said that 
all cases of corruption include conﬂ ict of interest, whereas the opposite 
does not always hold good. Besides, corruption most often is a crime, 
conﬂ ict of interest incorporates a wide circle of various types of behav-
iour, the majority of which are not classiﬁ ed as crime...”6 
Th us, the essence of conﬂ ict of interest is violating the socially acceptable balance 
between the civil servants’ personal interest and the public interest. 
Most countries do not use the concept of conﬂ ict of interest literally, and the legis-
lation usually does not provide a legal deﬁ nition on conﬂ ict of interest. In general, the 
concept of conﬂ ict of interest as a legal term is relatively new. In most countries it has 
already been introduced in the legislation but mostly through the focus on the ﬁ ght 
against corruption.
As a result, the types of conﬂ ict of interest recognized in the CEE legislation pri-
marily include holding a public oﬃ  ce simultaneously with other private or public jobs 
or positions (“incompatibilities”) or economic conﬂ ict of interest. Nevertheless, in the 
theory of administrative science, there is great demand for a clear legal deﬁ nition of 
conﬂ ict of interest.
3.   THE RELATIONSHIP OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST REFORMS 
      WITH OTHER REFORMS IN CEE COUNTRIES
Th e conclusions of the reports show that all these countries have developed the neces-
sary legal basis for local government. Th ese laws proclaim local autonomy and establish 
local self-governance in a one-, two-, or three-level structure. 
Local government structures in the CEE countries are formed by councilors, elected 
directly by the citizens of the local territory, or by senior local government oﬃ  cials; 
mayors/heads of local governments, elected directly by the citizens or indirectly by the 
council; senior local government employees, appointed by the council or by the mayors; 
as well as local government staﬀ  employees. All mentioned oﬃ  cials may be involved in 
potential conﬂ ict of interest situations.
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Table 1.1
Th e Structure of Local Governments in the Six Countries7
Country Municipality County Local 
Governments
Regions
Bulgaria 262 municipalities — —
Latvia 58 towns 
459 rural municipalities 
16 amalgamated 
— 26 districts
Poland 2,478 communities 314 districts
65 urban communities
16 regions
Romania
(as of July 2001)
2,686 communities 265 towns and 
municipalities
42 counties
Russia 1,098 cities
1,850 towns and urban 
settlements
— 89
Slovak Republic 2,891 municipalities/
cities
— 8 regions
Th e legal position of local government employees is similar to that of civil servants 
since it’s regulated by the civil service law (Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia: 1995–20009), 
or it’s regulated by the law especially targeted at these employees (Local Government 
Employees Act in Poland, Public Service Act in the Slovak Republic). However, no mat-
ter what kind of act regulates local government employees’ legal position, civil service 
regulations have a substantial indirect or direct inﬂ uence on the performance of local 
government employees and institutions. If we compare the national, local, and internal 
regulations of the legal position of civil servants and local government employees, we 
come to the conclusion that civil servant regulations tend to address conﬂ ict of interest 
prevention more than provisions on local government employees.
Th e civil service acts in the six analyzed countries were established earlier, and, in 
some cases, they are accomplished by better developed internal regulations, like civil 
service codes of conduct (Latvia, Poland, Bulgaria), a better procedure of withdraw-
ing, as well as more developed rules regarding duplication of power (Latvia, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Russia, the Slovak Republic). As the Slovak and Latvian reports underline, 
self-government representatives strongly resist and protest against provisions regarding 
prevention of conﬂ ict of interest in local governments.10 Consequently, national eﬀ orts 
to regulate conﬂ ict of interest more eﬃ  ciently have met the opposition of the self-
governments themselves. 
10
C O M B AT I N G  C O N F L I C T  O F  I N T E R E S T  I N  LO C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  T H E  C E E  C O U N T R I E S  • •  PA R T  I
D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
Table 1.2
Mode of Selection and Status of Government Oﬃ  cials 
in the Six Countries’ Local Governments8
Country Councilors Executive offi cials Executive employees Regular employees
Bulgaria Directly 
elected 
Municipal mayors 
directly elected.
With the status 
of civil servants.
Status under 
contract.
 Latvia Directly 
elected 
Local government 
mayors elected by 
the council.
Executive directors 
appointed by the 
council.
Are not civil servants 
and their status is 
under contract. 
Poland Directly 
elected 
Mayors of 
municipalities 
directly elected by 
the population. 
Heads of the district 
and regions elected 
by the councils.
Executive secretary 
and treasurer 
appointed by the 
heads of local 
and regional 
governments.
Do not have the 
status of civil 
servants.
Romania Directly 
elected 
Mayors of towns, 
municipalities and 
communities directly 
elected by the popu-
lation. Presidents of 
the counties elected 
by the council.
Municipal, town 
and county general 
secretary. 
Have the status of 
civil servants if they 
hold a senior or 
expert position.
Russia Directly 
elected 
In total, 68 Russian 
federation heads of 
local governments/
mayors are elected 
directly by the 
citizens in 58 units 
and indirectly by the 
council members 
in 10 units.
Local government 
employees do not 
have the status of 
civil servants.
Slovak 
Republic
Directly 
elected 
Mayors of munici-
palities and heads 
of self-governments 
regions directly 
elected by the 
population.
Local government 
employees do not 
have the status of 
civil servants.
To phase out patronage in local-government appointments in a realistic and sys-
tematic way, a stable and well educated corps of local-government servants should be 
created. Th e idea of creating a corps of local-government employees will be an important 
11
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one to develop human resource management and to support strengthening ethics and 
professionalism independent from local-government oﬃ  cials. According to the Polish 
report:
“...the corps should be regulated similar to the corps of civil servants, 
with political neutrality, professionalism, impartiality and diligent opera-
tion. Local government employees should be appointed or contracted 
only by competition rules and their professional abilities. Th e introduc-
tion of a new ethical culture of public service in local governments is 
also needed.”
 
Insuﬃ  cient political commitment could be another reason for weak conﬂ ict of inter-
est legislation and poor legislative implementation in the CEE countries. Drafting any 
legislation is very important, as it creates the basis for future actions to be developed, 
but enforcement becomes crucial, too. Th e more extensive the reform gets, the more 
important political will becomes. As the Romanian report indicates, the development 
of successful public policies aimed at preventing conﬂ ict of interest in the Romanian 
public sector has proved to be a diﬃ  cult task. Th e fundamental obstacle that has to be 
overcome is still the need for suﬃ  cient political will to build a fully professional public 
service body protected from abusive political control. 
Th e lack of political will and the self-governments’ opposition to more eﬀ ective and 
systematic regulation on conﬂ ict of interest is very clear in Russia’s case, where there 
are no substantial rules applied to political positions in local governments (councilors 
and heads of local governments/mayors).11 Th e absence of provisions regulating local 
government oﬃ  cials’ personal behavior, rights, obligations, and responsibilities, creates 
the ground for conﬂ ict of interest and the various forms of corruption there. As the 
Russian report indicates:
 “…now, if the mayor of city, the head of local administration, or 
the deputy is engaged in enterprise activity, and this oﬃ  cial uses the 
service position or property in his management not for realization of 
the authorized powers, it is extremely diﬃ  cult to establish measures of 
prevention and responsibilities.”
And later:
 “Probably this may be explained by the traditional Russian mentality. 
Nevertheless, the high dependence of municipal administrative systems 
on executives’ personal and professional qualities makes these systems 
vulnerable and creates the negative tendencies of authoritarianism and 
criminalization of municipal structures. So, the election for mayor (the 
head of administration) of a city or region, of a dishonorable, incom-
petent, closed-minded person with a low level of administrative culture 
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and little sense of justice, or the election of a criminal, can discredit the 
idea of local self-government, and as a consequence, it leads to a strong 
alienation of the population from the local authorities.”
In other analyzed countries, the position and responsibilities of elected local govern-
ment oﬃ  cials are better regulated than in Russia, where, as a rule, councilors, as well 
as mayors and heads of local governments, use broader legal autonomy in performing 
their oﬃ  cial duties than local government employees. Moreover, elected oﬃ  cials’ obli-
gations and responsibilities are not subject to detailed and substantial national, local, 
and internal restrictions. When local government employees’ activities are subject to 
these more or less detailed restrictions, politicians are concerned about their freedom 
to act independently, and they prefer to play the political game without restrictions. 
Th e Slovak report stresses that legislation applying to representatives of self-govern-
ment councils, mayors, and heads of regional self-governments is not suﬃ  cient now. 
In the laws that established this position, there are provisions on the incompatibility of 
positions. However, the problem of conﬂ ict of interest is regulated insuﬃ  ciently. Th e 
obligation to submit property declarations, as well as a ban on participating in com-
mercial enterprises, does not exist. Although Poland and Latvia have regulations that 
oblige elected oﬃ  cials to ﬁ le ﬁ nancial statements, eﬀ ective conﬂ ict of interest provisions 
are more problematic. Since 2003, Poland has had new and relatively good regulations 
targeting elected oﬃ  cials in local government, but they are still far from ideal. 
Conﬂ ict of interest, both in terms of legislation and implementation, cannot be 
separated from the rest of public administration reforms and, as is sometimes said, 
the rest of the CEE transformations. Th ere are other very important areas, such as 
public institutions’ transparency (starting with the transparency of the decision-
making process), which need to progress following a similar timing. A comprehensive 
law on conﬂ ict of interest should be accompanied by the revision of other sectors, such 
as the electoral system, in order to empower voters to sanction politicians’ misconduct 
more eﬀ ectively. Political parties, while backing new regulations, are expected to bring 
more transparency to the area of party ﬁ nancing. Th e lack of existence of speciﬁ c legisla-
tion is deﬁ nitely an obstacle for institutional leaders in their eﬀ orts to build an ethical 
environment in local governments.
4.   THE QUALITY OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST REGULATIONS 
      IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Before drawing any conclusions in this respect, we shall investigate how diﬀ erently 
conﬂ ict of interest is regulated by national as well as local legislation. Potential sources 
of conﬂ ict of interest include duplication of power, involvement in business enterprises 
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Table 1.3
Th e Quality of Conﬂ ict of Interest Regulations 
Applicable to Diﬀ erent Public Oﬃ  cials in Local Governments
Bulgaria Latvia Poland Romania Russia Slovakia
Duplication of 
power
Good for:
•   councilors,
•   mayors, 
•   civil servants in 
local gov’ts,
•   local gov’t 
employees.
Strong for:
•   councilors, 
•   heads of local 
gov’ts,
•   senior positions 
in local gov’ts.
Strong for:
•   councilors, 
•   heads of local 
gov’ts,
•   senior positions 
in local gov’ts.
Good for:
•   councilors, 
•   heads of local 
gov’ts,
•   senior positions 
in local gov’ts.
Weak for:
•   municipal 
employees. 
Nonexistent for:
•   councilors,
•   heads of local 
gov’ts.
Good for: 
•   councilors,
•   mayors.
 Weak for:
•   local gov’t 
employees. 
Involvement 
in business 
enterprises and 
shareholdings
Weak for:
•   councilors,
•   local gov’t 
employees. 
Good for:
•   mayors,
•   civil servants.
Strong for:
•   councilors,
•   heads of local 
gov’t,
•   executive 
directors.
Strong for:
•   councilors, 
•   heads of local 
gov’t,
•   senior local 
gov’t servants,
•   their spouses.
Good for:
•   councilors,
•   heads of local 
gov’t,
•   senior servants,
•   their relatives.
Good for:
•   municipal 
employees.
Nonexistent for:
•   elected 
officials.12 
Weak for:
•   councilors, 
•   mayors,
•   local gov’t 
employees.
Acceptance of gifts 
and hospitality
Weak for:
•   civil servants in 
local gov’ts.
Nonexistent 
besides penal code 
for: 
•   councilors,
•   mayors.
Strong for:
•   councilors,
•   heads of local 
gov’ts,
•   senior civil
servants.13
Strong for:
•   councilors, 
•   heads of local 
gov’ts,
•   senior civil
servants.14
Good for:
•   civil servants in 
local gov’t.
No data for: 
•   councilors,
•   heads of local 
gov’t.
Good for:
•   local gov’t 
employees. 
Weak for:
•   councilors,
•   heads of local 
gov’ts.
Weak for:
•   local gov’t 
employees. 
Nonexistent for: 
•   councilors,
•   mayors, besides 
penal code.
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Table 1.3 (continued)
Th e Quality of Conﬂ ict of Interest Regulations 
Applicable to Diﬀ erent Public Oﬃ  cials in Local Governments
Bulgaria Latvia Poland Romania Russia Slovakia
Institutional 
conflict of interest
Weak, only in 
the form of the 
institution of 
incompatibility 
for councilors and 
mayors.
Good, in the 
form of the 
institution of 
incompatibility.15
Good, in the form 
of the institution 
of withdrawal and 
incompatibility. 
Good, in the 
form of the 
institution of 
incompatibility.16
Good, in the form 
of the institution 
of incompatibility 
and conflict of 
competence. 
Weak, in the form 
of the institution 
of incompatibility.
Use of municipal 
property
Weak, in the form 
of the code of 
conduct applied 
rather rarely to 
local gov’ts.
Good, only 
in the form of 
transferring l.g. 
properties and 
penal code. 
Weak, in the form 
of transferring 
gov’t property and 
penal code.
Weak, only in 
the form of 
transferring 
government 
property and 
penal code.
Weak, in the form 
of transferring 
gov’t property and 
penal code.
Good on 
transferring 
properties. 
Weak, in an 
inappropriate 
use of official 
equipment. 
Local public 
procurement 
process17
Good public 
procurement 
regulation.
Good public 
procurement 
regulation. 
Good public 
procurement 
regulation. 
Good public 
procurement 
regulation.
Good public 
procurement 
and privatization 
regulation.
Weak public 
procurement 
regulation.
Favoritism, 
nepotism
Good for:
•   councilors,
•   civil servants
in l.g.
Weak for:
•   mayors,
•   contracted 
employees.
Good for:
•   local gov’t  
   employees. 
Weak for:
•   councilors,
•   mayors.
Good for:
•   local gov’t 
employees,
•   heads of local 
gov’ts.
Weak for:
•   councilors,
•   mayors.
Weak, only in 
the form of 
legal restrictions 
addressed against 
employment of 
relatives.
Nonexistent Weak; only in 
the form of 
legal restrictions 
addressed against 
employment of 
relatives.
15
PR
O
B
LE
M
S A
N
D
 PR
O
SPE
C
TS O
F PR
E
V
E
N
TIN
G
 C
O
N
FLIC
T O
F IN
TE
R
E
ST IN
 LO
C
A
L G
O
V
E
R
N
M
E
N
TS IN
 TH
E
 C
E
E
 C
O
U
N
TR
IE
S
Bulgaria Latvia Poland Romania Russia Slovakia
Use of official 
information for 
personal benefits
Nonexistent for:
•   councilors, 
•   mayors, 
•   contracted 
employees, 
besides penal 
code. 
Weak without 
sanctions for civil 
servants.
Weak, there is no 
complete, detailed 
legal framework 
and control 
mechanism, 
besides penal 
code.
Weak, there is no 
complete, detailed 
legal framework 
and control 
mechanism, 
besides penal 
code.
Weak18, there is no 
complete detailed 
legal framework 
and control 
mechanism, 
besides penal 
code.
Exists only in 
the procedure 
of public 
procurement and 
privatization.
Weakly regulated, 
with no sanctions. 
Weak, restrictions 
and sanctions are 
developed in the 
penal code and 
in the National 
Security Act.
Partisan 
involvement in 
political party 
activities
Weak for:
•   civil servants in 
l.g.,
•   contracted 
employees.
No formal 
restrictions for 
employees to act 
and belong to 
political parties.
Weak for:
local gov’t 
employees against 
partisan activities.
Weak for:
civil servants in 
l.g.
Weak for:
municipal 
servants.
Weak for:
gov’t employees to 
work politically 
neutrally.
Table 1.3 (continued)
Th e Quality of Conﬂ ict of Interest Regulations 
Applicable to Diﬀ erent Public Oﬃ  cials in Local Governments
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and owning shares, acceptance of gifts and hospitality, use of municipal property, local 
public procurement process, favoritism and nepotism, use of oﬃ  cial information for 
personal beneﬁ ts, and partisan involvement in political party activities by local govern-
ment employees. Table  1.3 gives us a basic overview on preventive regulation of potential 
sources of conﬂ ict of interest in the six countries.
Th e data collected in Table 1.3 proves that conﬂ ict of interest regulation for local 
governments is quite well developed in Latvia and Poland. But even in these countries, the 
rules are not equipped with detailed sanctions, they only have the character of provisions, 
and their “blank character” results in problems with enforcement of this regulation in 
real life and causes diﬃ  culties with punishment of local government oﬃ  cials who violate 
these rules.19 Similar to Latvia and Poland, Bulgaria and Romania developed their own 
conﬂ ict of interest regulations at the beginning of the 21st century. Th e regulations are 
especially well developed for local public oﬃ  cials who have the status of civil servant, 
because the regulations were adopted both for the national and local levels of public 
authority. It is very interesting that, in the Slovak Republic, conﬂ ict of interest regula-
tion is comparatively weak, and better restrictions in this regard were included in the 
bill of a constitutional act, which was rejected by the Slovak Parliament in May 2002. 
However, the Slovak regulation is not as weak as the Russian regulation. Even if one 
quotes the results of research on the most corrupt bodies of government, with a special 
focus on local governments, presented in the Russian report, it seems that the problem 
of a lack of adequate regulation for the prevention of conﬂ ict of interest and corruption 
in Russia has not been solved yet. Although institutional conﬂ ict of interest as a conﬂ ict 
of competence is regulated quite well in Russia, it should be stressed that the greatest 
weakness of the Russian regulation is the lack of detailed rules, obligations, and restric-
tions addressed to elected local public oﬃ  cials and employees in local governments. 
Comparing the regulations of all the countries on the diﬀ erent forms of conﬂ ict of 
interest, one should add that fairly eﬃ  cient regulations have been adopted in the ﬁ eld 
of duplication of power—as well as economic conﬂ ict of interest, such as involvement 
in business enterprises and shareholding by public oﬃ  cials, regulations on transferring 
local government properties, and local public procurement procedures. 
On the other hand, regulation on the acceptance of small gifts and hospitalities, 
inappropriate use of local government equipment, cars, telephones, and trips, as well 
as rules against favoritism and nepotism in local governments, are relatively weak. Th e 
ineﬃ  cient regulation of the conﬂ ict of interest measures in these areas is attributed to 
the prevailing mentality of the people in the region. People are used to giving small gifts 
for public services in hospitals, schools, and kindergartens, and these gifts are considered 
an expression of gratitude for low-paid public oﬃ  cials. On the other hand, people in the 
CEE countries rely very much on strong family relations, and if a family member has the 
opportunity to provide another member of the family with a good job or education, he 
17
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will use his connections to favor his relatives for employment or training. Th at is why it 
is very important that administrative and political traditions in these countries should 
be changed, since present institutions carry a lot of weight in this respect.
 An additional weak regulation of potential conﬂ ict of interest is connected with 
the use of oﬃ  cial information for personal beneﬁ t, the involvement of local govern-
ment employees in partisan activities, and their loyalty to political superiors without 
reservations. Th e unlimited political loyalty of public servants, coupled with the strong 
inﬂ uence that political parties and their political interests usually have on the decision-
making process in local governments, regularly undermines the overall governing process 
at the local level. Th ese weaknesses may be ascribed to the weak political culture of local 
governments, which are comparatively new in CEE societies, as well as to the lack of a 
clear distinction between political party activities and local governments’ actions.
Th e most eﬀ ective tools to counteract and prevent conﬂ icts of interest include: 
declarations of private property by public oﬃ  cials, codes of conduct, withdrawal from 
the decision-making process, and reports on misconduct or suspected conﬂ ict of 
interest. 
5.   INSTRUMENTS FOR CONFLICT OF INTEREST PREVENTION
5.1 Declarations of Private Interest by Local Government Offi cials
Declarations of private interest by local public oﬃ  cials may be the best means for 
preventing conﬂ ict of interest if they oblige a public oﬃ  cial to declare their property 
and income and, according to a set procedure, control the oﬃ  cials. Th ese declarations 
can provide a litmus test for unjustiﬁ ed enrichment of local government oﬃ  cials. Th e 
procedure of submission and control of these declarations is given in Table 1.4.
Th e declaration mechanism is preferred by local governments of the CEE countries 
over withdrawals. Th ere are two forms that are used for declaration of private interest: 
a preliminary disclosure of interest and an annual disclosure. In Latvia, Poland, and 
Romania, declarations of private interest apply to local public oﬃ  cials, such as coun-
cilors, heads of local governments, and leading local government employees, while in 
Bulgaria and the Slovak Republic, declarations apply only to leading local government 
employees, and they are not mandatory for councilors and heads of local governments. 
In Latvia and Poland, declarations are partly open for the media and civil society, and 
only personal data is not available to the public. In Romania, according to the new 
Law on Anti-Corruption, all information is available to the public. In Bulgaria there is 
restricted access to the public register containing personal information. 
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Table 1.4
Declarations of Private Interest of Local Government Oﬃ  cials 
in the Six CEE Countries
Target group Access to 
declarations
Required 
information 
about private 
interests of relatives
Institution in which 
declaration should 
be submitted and 
frequency 
of submission
Sanctions for 
violation of 
declaration 
obligations 
Control mechanisms 
for enforcing 
the declaration 
Bulgaria Only for civil 
servants, 
not for:
• councilors,
• mayors.
Access restricted. 
Open for media and 
public bodies after 
official’s permission. 
None Appointing 
authority. 
Upon entering 
office and annually.
None Conducted 
by appointing 
authority.
Latvia For:
• councilors,
• heads of local 
gov’ts,
• gov’t employees.
Partly open, 
personal data not 
open. Publication 
electronically and in 
the newspaper.
Joint property of 
spouses.
Prevention and 
Combating 
Corruption Bureau 
(PCCB).
Annually.
Disciplinary 
sanctions and 
responsibility 
and penal sanctions.
Regular control 
mechanisms, 
conducted by the 
PCCB.
Poland For:
• councilors,
• heads of local and 
regional gov’ts,
• senior officials.
Partly open, 
personal data is not 
available.
Joint property of 
spouses has to be 
declared.
To superior agency 
and transferred to 
treasury office.
When entering 
office and annually.
Disciplinary and 
financial sanctions 
and penal sanctions.
Regular control 
mechanisms, 
conducted by the 
Fiscal Inspection 
Office.
19
PR
O
B
LE
M
S A
N
D
 PR
O
SPE
C
TS O
F PR
E
V
E
N
TIN
G
 C
O
N
FLIC
T O
F IN
TE
R
E
ST IN
 LO
C
A
L G
O
V
E
R
N
M
E
N
TS IN
 TH
E
 C
E
E
 C
O
U
N
TR
IE
S
Table 1.4 (continued)
Declarations of Private Interest of Local Government Oﬃ  cials 
in the Six CEE Countries
Target group Access to 
declarations
Required 
information 
about private 
interests of relatives
Institution in which 
declaration should 
be submitted and 
frequency 
of submission
Sanctions for 
violation of 
declaration 
obligations 
Control mechanisms 
for enforcing 
the declaration
Romania For:
• councilors,
• mayors,
• civil servants in 
l.g.,
• senior officials.
Public, published 
on the internet and 
available in the 
Official Gazette.20
Joint property of 
spouses and 1st 
degree relatives.
Councilors to the 
prefect, employees 
to the manager.
When a modification 
occurs and at the 
start or end of their 
job.
Legal disciplinary 
(with dismissal) 
and penal sanctions.
Special Control 
Commission 
formed by two 
judges and the 
prosecutor of the 
Territorial Court 
of Appeal.
Russia For:
• local gov’t 
employees,
• elected and 
appointed 
officials.
Not publicly 
available.
No request for such 
information.
Legal tax 
authorities.
No sanctions.21 There is no real 
control.
Slovakia For senior civil 
servants.
Not for: 
• councilors,
• heads of l.g.
Declarations are 
secret.22 
No request for such 
information.
To superior office. 
When entering 
upon office and 
annually.
No sanctions. Regular control 
mechanisms.
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Th e problem with declarations of private interest regulations is that they do not 
impose detailed sanctions for inadequate fulﬁ llment of disclosures. In recent years, only 
in Latvia were administrative penalties used (up to USD 400) for inadequate fulﬁ ll-
ment of declarations. Although the new amendments in Poland (2003) have introduced 
administrative and ﬁ nancial sanctions, and the new regulations in Romania (1996, 
1999) have incorporated these sanctions, for many years, the inadequate fulﬁ llment of 
declarations did not entail sanctions. And in Bulgaria, no sanctions have been provided 
for violating the obligation to declare private interest. 
Th e scope of private interest to be declared is diﬀ erent in each country. However, 
the current disclosure policy in the CEE countries is generally criticized as ineﬃ  cient 
and in need of substantial improvements. As the Latvian report points out:
“Th e declaration did not prevent legalization of criminally obtained 
funds and information by the oﬃ  cial’s relatives.”
In Poland, Romania, and Latvia, a local public oﬃ  cial should declare information 
about joint property of his/her spouses. Th is obligation does not exist in other coun-
tries. Veriﬁ cation of declared interests may be provided by the Fiscal Inspection Oﬃ  ce 
in Poland, by the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau in Latvia, and by 
the Special Control Commission in Romania. Other countries do not provide for such 
procedures. If inadequacies in ﬁ ling declarations are not subject to administrative control, 
they can only be the subject of public control. Such inadequacies of declaration may be 
subject to public pressure if the mass-media investigate and publicize them. One can 
say that the role of the mass-media and civil society in the CEE countries is crucial in 
using publicly available declarations of private interest as a tool to investigate potential 
and real conﬂ icts of interest and corruption.
5.2 Codes of Ethics, Codes of Conduct
Conﬂ ict of interest guidelines in local governments in the CEE countries have not been 
developed in national regulations in a systematic way. Th e regulations are still far from 
helping local government oﬃ  cials understand problems and ensure that that their private 
interests do not put them in a situation of conﬂ ict of interest. Some of these situations 
that are clearly illegal (like the use of conﬁ dential information for personal beneﬁ t) may 
be dealt with by penal codes, but they are still a “gray area” requiring guidance. 
Codes of ethics as “soft law” adopted by local governments may play this role 
by providing local government oﬃ  cials with guidance to “see and address problems” 
based on the assumption that they want to do what is right. It is expected that those 
who must work under the code will address potential conﬂ icts of interest before they 
become actual conﬂ icts. 
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Th e information included in Table 1.5 shows that codes of ethics are not a legal 
form well known in the CEE countries. Although, in modern times, codes of ethics 
have been adopted in Bulgaria, Latvia, Poland, and Slovakia, they only apply to civil 
servants. Civil servants’ codes of conduct or codes of ethics adopted by these countries 
provide ethical norms of conduct for civil servants, both in central and local adminis-
trations. However, due to their recommendatory character and the lack of sanctions, 
these acts have no legal force. 
Th e Administrative Procedure Act, passed in 1979 in Bulgaria, regulates admini-
strative procedure, similar to the Code of Administrative Procedure in Poland (passed 
in 1960) and Th e Act of Administrative Procedure in Slovakia (passed in 1967). Th e-
se codes of administrative procedure are applied to public administration employees 
who work for either national or local governments. Th e limitation of these procedural 
acts is that they established procedural rules only for one form of administrative
activities: making individual administrative decisions. Other forms of administrative 
actions, such as making general administrative acts with normative character, making 
civil contracts and institutional agreements, and all organizational and technical activi-
ties handled by government employees, remain without any procedural regulation. Ne-
vertheless, some aspects of making administrative decisions in the CEE countries are 
regulated with an approach that helps protect individual legal rights and interests. In 
Romania, no code of administrative procedure or code of ethics25 exists.
Since the idea of a code of ethics is quite diﬀ erent, and it helps government employees 
and elected oﬃ  cials protect public interest against their own private interest, this kind of 
code is hardly known in local governments of the CEE countries. It seems that elected 
oﬃ  cials in local governments are very resistant to the adaptation of any codes that may 
restrict their activity and provide a measure of what kind of behavior is acceptable in 
public life.
Isolated cases of practical implementation of codes of ethics by local government 
councils are rather rare, and they do not ﬁ gure as an inﬂ uential factor in the behavior 
of elected oﬃ  cials and local government employees. Some results in the adaptation of 
codes of ethics have been achieved by city councils in Russia and Poland, and they were 
based on diﬀ erent projects developed by international organizations. From this point 
of view, it is very important to introduce an obligation for the integration of codes of 
ethics into the national regulations on local government activities as part of the local 
“soft law” covering local government councilors and heads of local governments. Th is 
legislation should envisage minimum norms and standards that need to be incorporated 
within the codes, as well as sanctions on violations. If the sanctions on violations are 
incorporated into codes of ethics, this may convert them from “soft law” to “hard law” 
regulation—and could help to enforce ethical standards in public life.
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Table 1.5
Codes of Conduct and Codes of Ethics Applicable to Local Government Oﬃ  cials in the CEE Countries
Country Name Institution that 
established code of ethics
Local gov’t offi cials to 
whom code is applied
Local gov’t offi cials to 
whom code is not applied
Sanctions
Bulgaria Administrative 
Procedure Act
-------------------------------
The Civil Servants Code 
of Conduct
1979, Parliament
-------------------------------
2000, Minister of State 
Administration
Government employees
-------------------------------
Civil servants
Councilors
-------------------------------
Councilors, mayors, 
contracted employees
Sanctions related
to decisions
-------------------------------
None
Latvia Administrative 
Procedure Law
-------------------------------
Codes of ethics for civil 
servants
-------------------------------
The Codes of Ethics 
(as isolated action)
2001, Parliament 
-------------------------------
-------------------------------
City Council of 
Jekabpils23 
Government employees
-------------------------------
civil servants
-------------------------------
councilors 
Councilors
-------------------------------
employees of local gov’ts
-------------------------------
local gov’t employees
Sanctions related to 
decisions
-------------------------------
None
-------------------------------
None
Poland The Code of 
Administrative Procedure
-------------------------------
Code of Ethics for Civil 
Servants
-------------------------------
The Code of Ethics
(as isolated action)
1960, Parliament
-------------------------------
2002, Prime Minister
-------------------------------
2001, Krakow City 
Council
Local employees,
 civil servants
-------------------------------
Civil Servants
-------------------------------
councilors,
 local gov’t employees
Councilors
-------------------------------
Local gov’t employees, 
councilors
-------------------------------
Sanctions related to 
decisions
-------------------------------
In Civil Service Act
-------------------------------
None
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Country Name Institution that 
established code of ethics
Local gov’t offi cials to 
whom code is applied
Local gov’t offi cials to 
whom code is not applied
Sanctions
Russia Codes of ethics of 
elective representatives24 
(as an isolated action)
Izhevsk, Gatchina, 
Kaluga, Obninsk City 
Councils 
Councilors Local gov’ts employees,
 heads of l.g. 
None
Slovakia The Act of Administrative 
Procedure
-------------------------------
The Civil Service Code 
of Ethics
1967, Parliament 
-------------------------------
Head of Civil Service 
Office
Civil servants, local gov’t 
employees
-------------------------------
Civil servants
Councilors and mayors
-------------------------------
Local gov’t employees
Sanctions to decisions
-------------------------------
In Civil Service Act
Table 1.5 (continued)
Codes of Conduct and Codes of Ethics Applicable to Local Government Oﬃ  cials in the CEE Countries
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5.3 Withdrawal from the Decision-making Process
Th e institution of withdrawing oﬃ  cials from the decision-making process is needed to 
avoid real conﬂ ict of interest when a potential conﬂ ict of interest does not necessarily and 
by deﬁ nition create a conﬂ ict of interest situation for a given public servant. Th erefore, 
a distinction between a potential and real conﬂ ict of interest should be drawn. Certain 
relationships, especially in small communities, (such as membership in non-governmen-
tal organizations, managing public community utilities like municipal kindergartens, 
social care homes and museums) may become a real conﬂ ict of interest when the oﬃ  cials 
acting in their own concrete economic interest take part in a decision-making process 
that directly aﬀ ects the respective institution. For the remaining relationships (if the 
institution of incompatibility and duplication of power is not applied), it is required 
that they should be disclosed, the relevant information provided, and the institution of 
withdrawal from the decision-making process may be implemented in every case when 
it aﬀ ects the respective institution. Th en the institution of withdrawal helps to avoid 
any situation when a potential conﬂ ict of interest may be transformed into actual con-
ﬂ ict of interest. In this case, the withdrawal from the decision-making process ensures 
fair and impartial actions by public oﬃ  cials, since they have no private or institutional 
economic interest in the process. 
Th e analyzed countries use the institution of requiring withdrawal from the de-
cision-making process to diﬀ erent degrees. Th e countries that introduced the codes 
of administrative procedure (Bulgaria, Poland, Slovak Republic) have incorporated 
the rules of withdrawal into these acts. In Latvia the institution of withdrawal is 
regulated by the law “On Prevention of Conﬂ ict of Interest in Activities of Pub-
lic Oﬃ  cials,” and other countries have partly introduced these rules in diﬀ erent 
legislation acts. Although the institution of withdrawal is well developed in these 
countries, “there is still a lack of mechanisms to exercise and control the eﬀ ective-
ness and eﬃ  ciency of these provisions”—as the Polish report points out. 
Th at is why the institution of withdrawal is almost unused in Polish local govern-
ments’ actions. 
In countries like Romania and Russia, the withdrawal institutions lack a thorough 
legal foundation and rules of supervision for their eﬀ ective implementation. Not only 
codes of administrative procedure, but also codes of ethics and local acts are seen as 
appropriate extralegal instruments for ensuring withdrawal of oﬃ  cials with potential 
conﬂ ict of interest. 
In Polish administrative procedure there are two models of withdrawal:
      •     withdrawal of a government employee because of his/her personal interest in 
the case;
      •     withdrawal of a government oﬃ  ce because of its executive’s interest in the par-
ticular case.
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Table 1.6
Withdrawal from the Decision-making Process
Name of the Acts that Regulate 
the Withdrawal Institution
Local Government Offi cials to 
Whom the Institution 
is Applicable
Local governmentt Offi cials 
to Whom the Institution 
is Not Applicable
Character of Regulation
Bulgaria Local Self-Governance and Local Adm. 
Act, Administrative Procedure Act
Councilors, mayors, 
senior civil servants
Local employees 
under contract
Lack of concrete procedure 
for removal
Latvia Law of Prevention on Conflict of 
Interest in Activities of Public Officials, 
Administrative Procedure Law
All state and local 
government officials 
Lack of concrete sanctions
Poland Code of Administrative Procedure All state and local 
government officials
Councilors The institution 
is almost unused26
Romania Law on Local Public Administration Local elected officials Local government employees
Slovakia Act of Administrative Procedure, 
Code of Civil Procedure
All employees of 
administrative body
Councilors
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However, the necessity of requiring councilors and heads of government to withdraw 
from decision-making when they have personal interest in a speciﬁ c case is as important 
as developing diﬀ erent models of withdrawal. Th e withdrawal institution obliges them 
to withdraw from such a procedure. Applying sanctions for non-withdrawal in such 
cases may help to enforce such a regulation in real public life in local governments. Th is 
institution may be very useful to avoid conﬂ ict of interest by councilors and heads of 
local governments if they withdraw from the decision-making process voluntarily, should 
the public suspect them or their relatives of promoting a personal interest, or the interest 
of a political party or local institution which they represent. Nevertheless, the general 
conclusion is that, currently, the institution of withdrawal has not been regarded as a 
useful and practical tool that eﬃ  ciently helps to avoid conﬂ ict of interest in the CEE 
countries, and it has not yet been applied eﬀ ectively in the activities of government 
oﬃ  cials at the local government level. 
5.4 Reporting Misconduct or Suspected Confl ict of Interest
Th e CEE countries appear to have procedures to expose wrongdoing by public servants 
in state and local governments. Similar regulations are available in each country, such 
as complaint procedures, telephone hotlines, and the institution of the ombudsman. 
However, these avenues are used mostly by the public and not by government employ-
ees. It should be mentioned, nevertheless, that, in the CEE countries, a solid tradition 
of reporting conﬂ ict of interest by the public does not exist, since reporting by citizens 
was used to gather intelligence in the communist era. Th at is why current compliance 
mechanisms are not considered as useful tools for honest and socially oriented people 
today. In such a situation, the problem of reporting conﬂ ict of interest should be solved 
by completely new legislation that will regulate this phenomenon eﬀ ectively, since it is 
a powerful tool for the public’s control (including mass media) over decision-making 
and helps ensure transparent, impartial and ethical local activities.
In the six analyzed countries, there are no obligations adopted for local govern-
ment oﬃ  cials to report any misconduct by other local government oﬃ  cials. Detailed 
obligations for local government oﬃ  cials to report about potential or actual conﬂ ict 
of interest situations are regulated only in one analyzed country, in Latvia, by the law 
“On Prevention of Conﬂ ict of Interest in Activities of Public Oﬃ  cials.” Th ere is no such 
regulation in other countries, besides the institution of withdrawal, when the public of-
ﬁ cial is obliged to declare voluntarily that he or she has a private interest in a particular 
case. But this institution does not apply to reporting on potential conﬂ icts of interest by 
fellow oﬃ  cials. Of course, the institution of citizens’ complaints on unethical conduct 
by public oﬃ  cials could be used for this purpose. However, citizens receive information 
on the misconduct or conﬂ ict of interest of public oﬃ  cials only from publicly available 
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declarations of private interest, and they are not active in this respect, since their private 
interest is not recognized in administrative decisions when such a conﬂ ict appears. In this 
regard, the role of mass-media should be crucial for publicly reported potential conﬂ ict of 
interest, and journalists could play an important role in investigating such conﬂ icts. 
Table 1.7
Reporting Misconduct or Suspected Conﬂ ict of Interest
Special Institutions Where a Public Servant or 
Citizen May Report Confl ict of Interest Problems
Legal Protection of a Government 
Employee Who Reports on Misconduct
Bulgaria Four pilot institutions of municipal 
ombudsman, 
Public Administration Commission 
at the Council of Ministers
None
Latvia Bureau of Preventing and Combating 
Corruption27
None 
Poland National Ombudsman and isolated initiative 
of telephone hotlines
Weak protection under the 
institution of hierarchical recourse28 
Romania Prime Minister’s Control Department, 
National Ombudsman, isolated initiative of 
telephone hotlines
General protection against abusive 
dismissal
Russia None None
Slovakia National Ombudsman None
Latvian regulation obliges public oﬃ  cials to report on possible duplication of power, 
as well as on their own ﬁ nancial interests. Th is regulation is an important step towards 
motivating public oﬃ  cials to report on potential conﬂ icts of interest in the form of 
special internal procedures. Beside the fact that this procedure was introduced recently 
for the ﬁ rst time in the CEE countries, one can observe some weaknesses in this regula-
tion. Two of the most important shortcomings include:
      •     Latvian public oﬃ  cials who report on potential conﬂ icts of interest cannot 
report to an independent administrative body separated from the institutional 
hierarchy. Instead they have to ﬁ le the report with an agency that supervises 
their oﬃ  ce at the next higher level.
      •     Th e Latvian act does not regulate the legal protection of public oﬃ  cials who 
decide to report misconduct or potential conﬂ ict of interest of fellow public 
oﬃ  cials.
Analyzing this regulation, it seems quite clear that, in the CEE countries, there 
is an evident absence of legislation to protect oﬃ  cials who report cases of corruption, 
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misconduct, and conﬂ ict of interest. Since people of this region feel unprotected in 
this arena, they often refuse to report on conﬂ ict of interest situations, or they do not 
believe that reporting will have any eﬀ ect. It is necessary that reports be submitted to 
an independent body. If the body is within the structure of the local administration, it 
is possible that internal conﬂ icts among oﬃ  cials may arise. Anonymous reporting is not 
a good idea, because it may result in abuses. A personal report with name and address 
attached can help promote detailed investigation in the case, but solid legal protection 
of the person who makes the report is necessary. 
Th e Bulgarian report includes a recommendation on establishing a specialized body 
on ethics issues in local governments, like Commission on Ethics. Such a commission 
should be equipped with the necessary authority, duties, and responsibilities for inves-
tigation and guidance of conﬂ ict situations, and it should be able to make proposals for 
sanctions to be applied by relevant agencies. One can recommend the adoption of these 
commissions at the national, regional, and local levels in other countries as well. 
6.   CONCLUSIONS ON REGULATIONS TO PREVENT 
      CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
In the last 10 years, the CEE countries have made signiﬁ cant eﬀ orts to regulate prob-
lems like ﬁ ghting against corruption and preventing conﬂ ict of interest. Th e identiﬁ ed 
problems pose the necessity to improve the regulatory framework on conﬂ ict of interest 
at all levels of government, which will contribute to:
      •     creating the basis for strengthening the stability of institutions and earning the 
trust of civil society;
      •     accelerating the accession process to the European Union;
      •     supporting the accomplishment of governments’ missions in the ﬁ ght against 
corruption at all levels;
      •     building functioning local governments eﬀ ectively.
However, taking into consideration the analyzed legal regulations for preventing 
conﬂ ict of interest, the CEE countries are still in their formative period. Since special 
legislation on conﬂ ict of interest is comparatively new, there is no wide experience in 
its application. 
As the Latvian report underlines: 
“Major pieces of legislation ensure a detailed set of restrictions for public 
oﬃ  cials. Th e institutional system is very fragmented; the application of 
anti-corruption legislation is weak.” 
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Although the comprehensive proposal of constitutional law on conﬂ ict of interest 
submitted to the Parliament of the Slovak Republic in May 2002 has covered many 
diﬀ erent areas of conﬂ ict of interest, it was later rejected.
As for the Bulgarian report: 
“…due to the horizontal approach to the organization of the Bulgarian 
legislation, conﬂ ict of interest provisions may be found in diﬀ erent legis-
lative acts, depending on the sphere of regulated public relationship. Th e 
separate acts stipulate diﬀ erent bans and restrictions aiming to prevent 
the use of oﬃ  cial position for personal gain, or to prevent the creation 
of conditions for bias in the activities of public oﬃ  cers.” 
Th e situation is similar in Poland, Romania, Russia, and the Slovak Republic. In 
these countries, most issues concerning the regulation of potential conﬂ ict of interest 
situations are covered in various legislative acts, and there are almost no special laws 
particularly devoted to the resolution of conﬂ ict of interest in public policy institutions. 
In Russia:
“Various federal and regional legislative acts may contain bans and 
restrictions dealing with prevention of conﬂ ict of interest situations, 
especially in local governments.”
Nevertheless, legislators in the CEE countries have not deﬁ ned all the potential 
areas of conﬂ ict. Unlike in Western European countries, some problems are either not 
covered by legislation, or the laws are not exhaustive enough. 
In each analyzed country, a more detailed regulation on conﬂ ict of interest applies 
mainly to civil servants. As far as mayors, municipal councilors, and even employees 
under labor contract in municipalities are concerned, the regulation is incomplete. Th e 
legal position and ethical obligations of elected oﬃ  cials in local governments in Russia 
and Slovakia have not been regulated yet. Furthermore, the norms on conﬂ ict of interest 
prevention are not systematically grouped into divisions or separate sections of the acts 
but rather dispersed throughout the text. Legal shortfalls concerning some procedural 
regulations of more signiﬁ cant public interest also appear, such as granting concessions 
or licences, awarding municipal property, submitting ﬁ nancial declarations, etc.
It is hard to say which factor has contributed to the current situation the most. 
Th e absence of a unique, comprehensive law on conﬂ ict of interest and the resulting 
perpetuation of the current sequential regulations is one factor generating confusion, 
misinterpretation and, ultimately, superﬁ cial application of the law. Because of the 
insuﬃ  cient understanding of the terminology and the implications, regulations run 
the risk of remaining superﬁ cial. Today, we can say that, with the possible exception of 
Latvia, there is no general law regarding conﬂ ict of interest, and it remains an issue that 
is disparately and incompletely regulated by several acts of legislation.
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Th e authors of the Romanian report underline that:
“… only after incorporating all principles in one unique law should 
sectoral regulations be drafted in order to address particularities and 
expectations to all sectors. Stating the rules and obligations clearly should 
be the top priority for the public institutions’ leaders at all levels.” 
In general, in the CEE countries the content of procedures and internal rules are 
highly dependent on the provisions of the speciﬁ c laws. 
As a general rule, there is a reluctance of high public oﬃ  cials and managers to 
impose internal regulations that exceed legally binding provisions. Th is is what makes 
the general legal framework for conﬂ ict of interest extremely important, but it also 
leaves little room for expectations that local institutional initiatives would make up 
for the failures of the legal framework. Following the legislation’s spirit and principles, 
institutions in local governments need to have internal regulations, applicable to their 
members’ speciﬁ c activity. 
However, the most signiﬁ cant weakness of the CEE laws on preventing and detect-
ing conﬂ ict of interest is the fact that the provisions are not supported by sanctions. 
Th is means there is insuﬃ  cient authority to execute the sanctions, resulting in a rule of 
“blank concept”—a rule that does not work in real life. Th at is why cases of violation of 
conﬂ ict of interest restrictions are quite frequent in the CEE local governments. Since 
January 1, 2003, Poland is the only one of the six countries that has new regulations 
providing categorical restrictions on senior local government oﬃ  cials. Th e violation of 
these new Polish rules may entail the sanction of loss of a managerial, supervisory, or 
auditing position. However, there is no evidence of its eﬀ ectiveness yet.
Another problematic area the CEE countries have to deal with today is the absence 
of real implementation of existing regulations. Th is problem was underlined by the 
Romanian, Bulgarian, and Polish reports. Th e provisions are often vague enough to 
leave space for diﬀ erent interpretations, a situation that ultimately leads to the non-
implementation of the law. With respect to the growing number of legislative abuses, 
many citizens have complained about legislative incoherence and insuﬃ  cient law 
enforcement. 
7.  THE IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT TO PREVENT 
     CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS
Massive decentralization of public administration in the CEE countries, privatization, 
and intensiﬁ ed contacts of local governments with private ﬁ rms have changed the 
traditional relationship between the public and private sectors, which has blurred the 
line between what is acceptable or permitted and what is not. Consequently, conﬂ ict 
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situations in local governments appear when the objectivity and impartiality of public 
oﬃ  cials are endangered. Public procurement, privatization, membership and founding 
of political parties, and the use of public property for private interests were determined 
in country reports as very sensitive conﬂ ict of interest issues. Furthermore, personal 
interest and involvement in local government decisions, like zoning, land management, 
tax relief, economic subsidies, granting licences and concessions, and any misuse of 
conﬁ dential information are critical areas for conﬂ ict of interest. 
Special attention should be paid to provide redress against administrative decisions 
eﬀ ectively and eﬃ  ciently, according to the provisions regulated in the code of adminis-
trative procedure or code of conducting businesses. In two of the six analyzed countries, 
Romania and Russia, public bodies do not conduct administrative businesses according 
to general procedural regulation. Th erefore, it is very important to introduce general 
principles of administrative procedure in these countries to develop legal control of ad-
ministrative decisions (especially in granting local concessions and licences, or awarding 
economic subsidies or municipal property). Regulations are also necessary to sanction 
conﬂ ict of interest cases. Th e Romanian report points out that:
“Only after integrating all guidelines in one unique law, sectoral regu-
lations should be drafted in order to address all sectors’ speciﬁ cs and 
expectations. Clearly stating the rules and obligations should be top 
priority for the public institutions’ leaders at all levels. In Romania, 
the content of procedures and internal rules are highly dependent on 
the provisions of speciﬁ c laws. As a general rule, there is a reluctance of 
high public oﬃ  cials and managers to impose internal regulations that 
exceed the legally binding provisions. Th is is what makes the general 
legal framework regarding conﬂ ict of interest extremely important, but 
also leaves little room for expectations that local institutional initiatives 
could make up for the failures of the legal framework.” 
Th e indirect impact of private interests on the decision-making process is not easy 
to identify on all levels of public domain. Nepotism and cronyism, strong family ties, 
and kinship or informal relations play a signiﬁ cant role in making decisions. As a rule, 
people with a strong consumer attitude and personal economic interests are most likely 
to try to inﬂ uence these processes. Th at is why the legally regulated and eﬃ  ciently 
enforced control of these processes is so important, to provide the tools to protect the 
public interest from private inﬂ uences. For the implementation of an eﬀ ective control 
mechanism, the permanent evaluation of enforcement of legal provisions, as well as 
risk assessment of the areas susceptible to misconduct and conﬂ ict of interest, are very 
helpful.
 Besides the general problems discussed above, the following issues concerning the 
enforcement of conﬂ ict of interest regulation are important:
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      1)   systematic violation of public procurement procedure;
      2)   weak and fragmented audit mechanisms;
      3)   inadequate transparency and openness of local government activities;
      4)   violation of mass-media independence;
      5)   lack of human resource management instruments;
      6)   poor education and training of local government oﬃ  cials;
      7)   problems of small communities.
7.1 Systematic Violation of Public Procurement Procedures
Local government contracts for the procurement of goods and services have been 
legally regulated by public procurement acts in all analyzed CEE countries. Th ese acts 
regulate speciﬁ c conduct and controls of public procurement procedures, and they are 
meant to create conditions for competition, transparency, and guarantees for the un-
biased selection of private companies. Th ey also provide procedural rules for the preven-
tion of conﬂ ict of interest in awarding procurement contracts. Nevertheless, enforce-
ment of public procurement regulation has been under criticism by the media in these 
countries. As the report on Bulgaria points out, the problems of enforcement are:
“…due to the lack of established necessary organizational prerequisites 
for applying the principles of transparency in the procedures, on the 
one hand, and the incompetent implementation of the law by the 
procurers, on the other.” 
Th e Latvian report states:
“…complicated procurement procedures were prevalent in granting 
very small contracts. As a result, there was a substantial decrease in 
the eﬃ  ciency of public institutions that spent a lot of time and money 
for expensive bureaucratic procedures. Th e motivation behind such 
legislation was the mistrust of public oﬃ  cials and a priority on legality 
over eﬃ  ciency.
   At the same time, procurement procedures are strongly criticized in 
many studies for ineﬃ  ciency to achieve anti-corruption goals.29 Th e 
criticism mainly concerns insuﬃ  cient transparency and procedures that 
allow bidding where the requirements apply only to one pre-selected 
petitioner.” 
Th e author of the Polish report additionally stressed that:
“Signiﬁ cant abuses occur before the tender is announced, such as 
bribes to ensure early access to information on technical requirements, 
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speciﬁ cations, and other criteria crucial to the point system used in 
the decisions. Conditions for winning a bid can be set in such a way 
as to favor one particular bidder, and are sometimes subject to change 
after bidding has started. Procurement abuses are also made possible 
by weak bidding documents and poor evaluation practices… Access 
to conﬁ dential information in advance appears to be the key feature of 
these abuses. Collusion among bidders (for example non-competition 
deals between ﬁ rms that monopolize the local market) also serves to 
raise prices and subvert the procurement process.”
Substantial violations of the procedures in public procurement are mentioned in 
each country’s report, and there is no doubt that, in small communities, such violation 
occurs very often. In our opinion, it would be preferable for local communities to ensure 
elimination or limitation of such practices by adopting detailed and consistent guidelines 
for the implementation of public procurement provisions. Th ese guidelines could help 
contractors and bidders to understand the process and the concepts of competition, 
transparency, and objectivity and ensure a better control for contracting procedures. 
Provisions for bidding for public contracts should be implemented and clearly explained 
to the parties interested (e.g., the companies found guilty of corruption should be 
disqualiﬁ ed or suspended from future tenders/bids). 
It is self-evident that because the procedures for contracting for public procurement 
carry the highest risk of corruption, the eﬀ ectiveness of these guidelines need continuous 
evaluation, and enforcement should be under intense administrative supervision and 
legal control. It is of fundamental importance to implement an eﬀ ective system, since 
only consistently applied sanctions can demonstrate that the law on public procurement 
is properly enforced. 
 
7.2 Weak and Fragmented Audit Mechanism
It should be noted that, in areas requiring special attention to maintain the integrity 
of local governments (such as contract awarding, privatization, tax collection, land 
management, and giving licences), a system of eﬀ ective external and internal audit and 
inspection is necessary. If the public administration system is not equipped eﬃ  ciently 
to control the risk resulting from the new public-private relationship, the danger of 
misconduct and potential conﬂ ict of interest in local governments is also increased. 
In the analyzed six countries, there are no special institutions performing the auditing 
of local governments in cases of conﬂ ict of interest. Nor are there specialized agencies 
where citizens or local government oﬃ  cials can report cases of conﬂ ict of interest. Of 
course there are many institutions that exercise audit power over public administration, 
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like the prosecutor’s oﬃ  ce, state ﬁ nancial control bodies, national audit oﬃ  ces (in Slova-
kia, the chief auditor in municipalities’ regional self-governments; in Poland, the Regional 
Accounting Chambers), ombudsman (in Latvia and in Bulgaria the introduction of 
self-governments’ ombudsman is under discussion), as well as organizations to combat 
corruption (the Bureau of Preventing and Combating Corruption in Latvia). Currently, 
the control of conﬂ ict of interest in local governments is done by various external and 
internal public bodies and institutions that audit the authorities’ work one way or an-
other. Th ese auditing institutions are supposed to ensure legality and objectivity in the 
governance of local issues and ﬁ nancial matters. Th ey control administrative decisions 
and contracts of local authorities. Some of these control institutions, like audit oﬃ  ces 
or ﬁ nancial control inspections, may prevent illegal proﬁ teering by local oﬃ  cials.
In order to reduce conﬂ ict of interest situations in a systematic way, we recommend 
that the external and internal audit institutions be vested with signiﬁ cant authority to be 
able to investigate and sanction misconduct eﬀ ectively. However, at present this is not 
the case in the CEE countries, where audit mechanisms are very fragmented, and they 
perform their tasks without horizontal coordination of their activities. Th e Romanian 
report recommends:
“…fostering institutional reform in the area of conﬂ ict of interest control 
by unifying the competences of all bodies in charge...” 
Th e Latvian report underlines:
“Th e weakest point in this system of monitoring is the inadequacy of 
performance audits, because such management culture in Latvia has 
not been developed.”
Th ere are many forms of auditing that can help to evaluate the reform process 
undertaken by public organizations in each country and in each local government. 
Government agencies that are interested in identifying the consequences of anti-
corruption and conﬂ ict of interest reforms may use:
        •     structural assessments (internal and external);
      •     perceptual assessments
            –    customer and citizen assessments
            –    employee assessments;
      •     performance assessments;
      •     benchmarking;
      •     quality assessments;
      •     risk assessments.
Th e more audit assessments are performed, the better results will be achieved.
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Th ese types of assessment help us understand the current system and its performance. 
A thorough understanding of the current system and performance practices does not 
fully articulate which values should be embraced in the future, but the sound adaptation 
of new regulations and practices must be based on such an understanding.
 Inevitably, strong assessment strategies are the primary drivers behind fundamental 
changes. Rigorous investigation of regulations and practices leads to a genuine under-
standing of the need for new strategies. Conﬂ ict of interest assessments, sometimes called 
ethics assessments or ethics audits,30 may either determine what the stated legal norms 
are or probe the discrepancy between the stated legal standards and actual practice. Th e 
former is best done by a structural assessment of conﬂ ict of interest audit and the latter 
by a perceptual assessment of conﬂ icts of interest.31 
A structural assessment conﬂ ict of interest audit is either conducted externally or 
internally, by one or a few people. Th e researchers determine, through documents, review, 
interviews, and expert analysis, the status of control of general conﬂ ict of interest, and how 
operational areas that commonly lead to conﬂ icts of interest (business trips, nepotism 
etc.) are supervised, and what types of support for conﬂ ict of interest avoidance exist.
Th e perceptual assessment of conﬂ ict of interest focuses more on employees percep-
tion rather than on the controls and stated policies themselves. Th is is important because 
some organizations have few conﬂ ict of interest regulations and are nonetheless perceived 
to be highly ethical environments, while other organizations may have many rules but 
are considered to have many conﬂ icts of interest in practice. Perceptual assessments may 
survey overall conﬂ ict of interest issues and focus on operational issues, types of support, 
and proposals adequate to local governments and public organizations.
Th e mission of such auditing institutions is very delicate, as it directly touches on 
the issue of autonomy. Political interference in the administrative decision-making 
process in local governments was strongly criticized in the CEE countries. Th erefore, 
especially because of such suspicions, audit mechanisms need to be transparent, well 
coordinated, coherent, and well intentioned in order to prevent any potential conﬂ icts 
of interest and to sanction already existing ones.
7.3 Inadequate Transparency and Openness of
      Local Government Activities
Public scrutiny of local government aﬀ airs and access to information are key tools in 
the development of conﬂ ict of interest prevention. It is not possible to ﬁ ght corrup-
tion and conﬂ ict of interest in the absence of a culture of transparency. Building such a 
culture should begin through a legislative commitment to the public that breaks with 
many years of secretiveness, and through informing those who take an interest in public 
aﬀ airs. In a culture of transparency, the two concepts are interdependent: Th ere cannot 
be public scrutiny without access to information. 
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Th e reported countries have few constitutional provisions that guarantee the citizens 
access to government oﬃ  ces to receive information and obtain certain services. Recently, 
these countries have adopted special legislation ensuring access to information (Latvia in 
1998, Bulgaria, Poland, and Slovakia in 2000, Romania in 2001). Th ese relatively new 
freedom of information laws oﬀ er the right to obtain information and provide access 
to documents and admission to meetings of collective bodies, with the opportunity to 
make audio and video recordings. Access to information may only be limited as much 
as is necessary in a democratic society to protect the privacy of citizens, public order, 
and security, or important interests of the state. 
“Clearly, the freedom of information legislation seeks to do more than 
merely provide access to information or limit the data processing that 
local government employees must carry out in order to perform their 
duties and tasks. Most importantly, it seeks to strike a balance between 
the objectives of local governments and private interests in a spirit of 
pragmatic consent that widens the extent of citizen participation, both 
in monitoring the actions of the authorities and in making decisions 
on issues of local importance.”32 
Nevertheless, there are evolving traditions of civil society in CEE countries to utilize 
opportunities provided by law to get access to information. On the other hand, it should 
be noted that, due to institutional culture, mechanisms to keep the public informed 
at all times are being established very slowly by local authorities. As the Russian report 
underlines:
“Nowadays the employees of municipal structures do not place great 
value on citizens’ initiatives, determining this factor as the least im-
portant. An awareness of these issues of most municipal oﬃ  cials, as 
well as that of the general public, is very low. Although the right of 
each person to access information on the aﬀ airs of the municipality is 
theoretically supported, and there is a demand to base decisions at the 
municipal level on public consent, in practice, employees of munici-
pal administrations demonstrate little willingness for cooperation, and 
they take very few initiatives to adopt a system of inclusion of citizens 
in local community aﬀ airs. Th us the municipal authority loses basic 
social respect. Besides the situation when citizens are not involved in 
the process of  local self-government and are not its main subjects, it is 
fraught with another negative tendency. It has been expressed that local 
governments themselves, and speciﬁ cally mayors who assert their own 
and corporate interests, as well as certain social groups of the local com-
munity functioning in ‘the shadow,’ are considered the real beneﬁ ciaries 
of local self-government.” 
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7.4 Violation of Media Independence
Ensuring civil society partnership in mutual eﬀ orts to prevent conﬂ ict of interest is 
another important aspect of the proper functioning of local society. In our opinion, it 
would be preferable for local society to create a favorable social atmosphere in support 
of prevention measures, because the existence of widespread public intolerance toward 
these phenomena would be crucial for the eﬃ  ciency of the measures. In creating such 
a social atmosphere, the main role should be played by the independent mass-media. 
Unfortunately, the authors from Russia, Romania, and the Slovak Republic reported 
examples of the violation of the independence of local media by local public oﬃ  cials. 
Th e risk of violation exists when senior oﬃ  cials of local governments, mayors or execu-
tives take senior editorial positions at regional or local newspapers, television or radio 
stations, or when they subsidize local media. In such a situation, when the media are 
not really independent from local public authorities, they do not have a vested interest 
in informing the public and the auditing bodies about cases of conﬂ ict of interest, cor-
ruption or abuse of authority. And the media can lose the status of public advocates, 
since they become the mouthpiece of local oﬃ  cials, blurring the distinction between 
the interests of the community and the local governments. Th e abdication of the local 
media’s monitoring role may lead to a higher incidence of corruption and conﬂ ict of 
interest. As the Bulgarian report recommends:
“…Along with citizens and non-governmental organizations, the media 
are the third important corrective of the local authorities, promoting 
better accountability, transparency, and legality of the work of the 
municipal bodies. Th rough the participation of the media in the local 
democratic process, the public control of the performance of the local 
authorities is executed in practice.”
  
However, in the context of the Bulgarian, Polish, and Latvian reports, one should 
mention that, in recent years, we can observe a positive tendency of increased activity 
of local media and non-government organizations dealing with problems of availabil-
ity of information and transparency in public aﬀ airs. Th erefore, we’d like to stress the 
importance of the mass-media in mobilizing public opinion, by monitoring the daily 
functioning of local government, its expenditures and property management, and by 
requesting the timely and consistent disclosure of all relevant ﬁ scal and other kinds of 
information. Additionally, the newly undertaken eﬀ orts to implement the E-governance 
method of management by local governments in the CEE countries may help to achieve 
greater openness and transparency of such activities as local budget allocation, taxes, use 
of municipal property, public procurement, and land management. 
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7.5 Lack of Developed Human Resources 
      Management Instruments
Proper human resource management for local government employees plays a key role 
in promoting an impartial and ethical environment. If we want to enforce legislative 
rules and institutions in the daily activities of local governments, we need competent 
and well-trained professionals to implement these changes in everyday practice. People 
with strong ethical values and an altruistic approach to life, as well as eﬃ  cient manag-
ers, are needed to provide an insight into the activities of local governments, in order 
to build public trust in local democracy. To employ and retain such people in local 
governments, the recruitment, selection, and promotion processes should comply with 
the principles of open competition, merit-based selection, transparency, and equal op-
portunities for everybody. 
In the CEE countries, such procedures are provided by the civil service law, and they 
are adopted only for local government employees who have the status of civil servants, as 
in Bulgaria and Romania. In other countries, in Poland, for example, competition and 
selection procedures are provided only for top management positions, like directors and 
managers of local hospitals, schools, museums, and theaters. It should be noted that in 
local governments in Russia, the Slovak Republic, and Poland, the “spoil system” still 
exists, and the recruitment process is not generally based on the merits and capabilities 
of the candidates, i.e., not on the rules of competition. Instead, it often relies on family 
or friendship relations. We wish to stress that in such an environment, permeated by 
favoritism, local government employees do not feel safe in their labor relations, which 
is why they do not engage in long-term strategies and actions, and they often use their 
term in oﬃ  ce for maximizing their personal and ﬁ nancial interests. Such a working 
environment, without clear rules of human resource management and development, 
creates undesirable conditions for the depravation of the whole organizational system 
and has a strong impact on potential conﬂ ict of interest and corruption. 
Low salaries of municipal employees are also an apparent precondition for conﬂ ict of 
interest and corruption. Th e statistical analysis carried out in Russia concludes that:
      •     “Th e ﬁ xed level of interrelation between wages and corruption do not guarantee 
reduction in corruption and increase of wages.
      •     Wages aﬀ ect corruption only in a combination with other measures; however, 
low salary promotes corruption.” 
Besides “fairly” decent salaries and long-term contracts that motivate employees 
to work in the government sector as opposed to the private sector, regular and timely 
payment of wages should also be stipulated. 
A bonus system and rewards for good work performance are used as separate in-
struments by CEE local governments. In our opinion, it would be preferable for local 
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government leaders to use moral incentives for their staﬀ  in the form of various encour-
agements for good quality work and more frequent recognition of the eﬀ orts employed. 
Unfortunately, a clear procedure of human resource management as the main instru-
ment in the ﬁ ght against conﬂ icts of interest is not widely applied by public oﬃ  cials in 
CEE countries, or they do not have the political will to strengthen this internal sector 
of local governance yet. 
7.6 Weak Education and Training Delivered to 
      Local Government Offi cials
Although training and education of civil servants are more and more in the focus of 
national governments in the CEE, and national institutions were established in the 
nineties (in Bulgaria: the National Institute for Public Administration and European 
Integration, in Latvia: the State Administration School, in Poland: the National School 
of Public Administration, in Romania: the National Institute of Public Administration), 
they deliver education and training only for those local government employees who have 
the status of civil servants (like in Bulgaria and Romania). In other countries, education 
and training of self-government employees are available, but their range and consistency 
fall behind those for civil servants. Because there are no specialized institutions delivering 
education to local government employees, these tasks are fulﬁ lled mostly by diﬀ erent 
non-proﬁ t organizations, as well as by associations of diﬀ erent local governments (e.g., 
the Foundation in Support of Local Democracy in Poland, the Foundation for Reform 
in Local Government or the Federation of the Local Authorities in Romania). 
Apart from the problem of specialized institutions, which are well prepared and 
qualiﬁ ed to deliver good quality training services, there is another important problem 
of delivering training to councilors and heads of local governments. It is hard to say 
how many councilors and mayors take part in training programs, but there is no doubt 
that local government employees are more attracted to, and active in, training that 
improves their competency and professionalism. On the other hand, councilors and 
heads of local governments often do not have enough time for such activities. Th is 
problem, connected with in-service training, is crucial for small communities that lack 
in professionalism and competence. 
Another problem is that there are no well developed modules and separate cur-
ricula focused on conﬂ ict of interest problems in local governments. Although such 
separate training curricula are provided for civil servants (the course on Ethics in Public 
Service developed by the Civil Service Oﬃ  ce in Poland, the course on Anticorruption 
Strategies developed by the National Institute in Latvia) there is no evidence that such 
separate training services are developed and performed for local government oﬃ  cials 
in a systematic way.
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We emphasize that good professional education and socialization should enable 
local government oﬃ  cials to apply the core values under actual circumstances, and 
keep oﬃ  cials well informed of the expected standards of behavior. Additionally, they 
can develop the skills that would help them solve conﬂ ict of interest dilemmas. Some 
compulsory courses delivered to local government oﬃ  cials in the CEE countries by dif-
ferent non-proﬁ t organizations could perform these tasks. Consequently, we recommend 
that the CEE countries undertake a systematic training initiative for local oﬃ  cials on 
issues related to conﬂ ict of interest, based on the currently existing normative regulation, 
and on oﬃ  cial’s interpretation of developing professional and organizational ethics. To 
enforce conﬂ ict of interest regulation in everyday practice, such courses are also needed 
for journalists, businessmen, lobbyists—and every member of the local community. 
Society and mass-media socialization and monitoring of these issues by means of good 
communication and training may help to mobilize public opinion to scrutinize local 
governments’ daily practice and ensure an ethical environment. 
7.7 Problems with Small Communities
Conﬂ ict of interest and cronyism are much harder to avoid in small communities. In 
such communities in the CEE countries, this is due to a generalized lack of administrative 
and professional capacity. If, in small communities, only a few people are adequately 
qualiﬁ ed to be teachers, physicians or directors of kindergartens, they have enough 
prestige to be simultaneously elected as councilors or heads of local governments. In 
the context of such professional networks, institutional and personal conﬂ icts of interest 
are very diﬃ  cult to avoid. 
In addition, there are special social relationships in small communities where 
“everybody knows everybody else.” In such a familiar environment, informal family and 
friendship relations are very strong, and they have an impact or an informal inﬂ uence 
on local governments’ activities, such as awarding contracts and licences, land manage-
ment, and recruitment. Such strong informal family and friendship relations increase 
the potential for conﬂ ict of interest and nepotism and make prevention more diﬃ  cult. 
Even the mass-media’s role to monitor and investigate corruption or conﬂ icts of interest 
in such cases is relatively smaller.
People in small communities in the CEE countries, especially in poor regions with 
relatively high unemployment, want to improve their material circumstances using 
diﬀ erent means, for example through involvement in local politics and governance, 
or even through illegal activities. Th is creates a fertile ground for illegal, even criminal 
activities.  
Th e Russian report stresses that:
 “…the most corrupt bodies of the government are those that are:
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   •     constantly involved in direct contact with the population;
   •     vested with the greatest discretionary powers;
   •     the least responsible to citizens (through the institution of elec-
        tivity);
   •     in a position of monopoly in certain sectors of public aﬀ airs...”
In turn, the Latvian report underlines additionally that:
“...the main obstacles in small communities’ governance are beyond 
the reach of regulation. Too much legislation reduces ﬂ exibility, which 
is important for good local governance, and too many restrictions and 
permits increase potential conﬂ ict of interest situations. Th erefore a 
decrease in regulation is needed in small communities, and this should 
be complemented by adopting stronger rules ensuring openness of 
public institutions activities...” 
Some of these factors are typical for small community governments. In conclu-
sion, one can say that, as far as conﬂ ict of interest regulation and its enforcement are 
concerned, it seems very important to rethink and adopt special provisions that could 
be applied for small communities speciﬁ cally, if not in substantial material legislation 
then in procedural regulation. Due to poor enforcement of legal regulations and provi-
sions in small communities, there is a real risk of degradation of the whole system of 
the rules of law, and the situation could cause diﬃ  culties of enforcement for the whole 
society. As the Bulgarian report recommends:
“... there is great demand to undertake a survey of the state’s constraints 
and diﬃ  culties in the implementation of conﬂ ict of interest provisions 
in small communities, keeping in mind the possibilities for a more 
frequent conﬂ ict appearance in small communities due to their popula-
tion’s limited number. Such a study could provide systematic knowledge 
about the opportunities and needed legislative changes regarding small 
municipalities, to help create more eﬃ  cient implementation of conﬂ ict 
of interest rules in their area...”
8.   GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Th ere is no doubt that conﬂ ict of interest regulations addressed to local governments 
are comparatively weak, since they are quite new in the CEE countries. But some 
important measures have been undertaken in the last 10 years in this regard. Th ese 
measures were mostly incorporated in state-level regulations and only initially by the 
local governments themselves.
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In order to build a public integrity system at the local level and to ensure the enforce-
ment of these regulations in real life, systematic public policy should be developed. It is 
essential that this public policy complement and support existing regulations to build 
an integrated system. While developing such a system, four important and interrelated 
factors should be taken into consideration: prevention, investigation, prosecution, and 
protection.33
Th e reports clearly demonstrate that such a coherent system has not been developed 
in any of the six countries discussed here. Th erefore, we can conclude that conﬂ ict of 
interest prevention is still weak in the CEE local governments. Of course, one can say 
that Latvia and Poland have better regulation than Bulgaria, Romania, and the Slovak 
Republic, and these ﬁ ve countries have better regulation than that of Russia. However, 
in our opinion, it would be preferable for all analyzed countries to develop a systematic 
approach in their public policy to prevent conﬂ ict of interest eﬃ  ciently. 
Th e objective of this report was to seek ways to improve instruments that help to 
prevent conﬂ icts of interest. In order to achieve better prevention of conﬂ ict of interest 
situations in a systematic manner we recommend:
      •     Th e establishment of the clear distinction of legal regimes related to local gov-
ernment employees and to elected oﬃ  cials. It should be complemented by a 
political culture within which the eﬀ orts of building capacities and professional 
ethos of the corps of local government employees (similar to the civil service 
corps), as well as eﬀ orts to build political ethos, are distinctly recognized by 
local society and local oﬃ  cials.
      •     Th e system of monitoring, accountability, and sanctions for local public oﬃ  cials 
should be improved in order to maximize the negative consequences for oﬃ  cials 
who engage in conﬂ ict of interest. Integrated and uniform control mechanisms 
(and not separate, uncoordinated eﬀ orts) should be developed, along with clear 
and detailed sanctions for noncompliance to discourage oﬃ  cials from miscon-
duct and to foster public trust in the mechanisms of democratic governance.
      •     Th e implementation of eﬀ ective audit mechanisms by local governments them-
selves; a permanent evaluation process (structural and perceptual assessment) 
of enforcement of legal provisions; frequent risk assessment of areas susceptible 
to misconduct and conﬂ ict of interest (such as the public procurement process, 
privatization, land management, and the use of public property) are strongly 
advisable. 
      •     Risk assessment can help identify the various obstacles to conﬂ ict of interest 
reforms, such as disclosure policy versus personal privacy; complicated and 
time consuming procedures of public procurement versus eﬀ ectiveness and ef-
ﬁ ciency of public activities; “certiﬁ cates of integrity” in the public procurement 
process versus a limited number of employees and contractors; and duplication 
of power rules against a small number of qualiﬁ ed and talented people in the 
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public sector. Audit mechanisms and risk assessment should not only prove 
that conﬂ ict of interest reforms are important by themselves. Th ey should also 
be a stepping stone for future employment of the most talented people in the 
public sector and for the economic development of the country. 
      •     Eﬃ  cient legal remedies should be adopted against unfair decisions on granting 
local concessions and licences, awarding economic subsidies, giving tax breaks, 
and land management. It is self-evident that, because the above mentioned 
sensitive areas are subject to the highest risk of corruption, the eﬀ ectiveness of 
these procedures needs permanent evaluation, and their enforcement should 
be under intense administrative supervision and court control. 
      •     It is essential for the good functioning of local society to regulate the legal 
obligation for all local oﬃ  cials to ﬁ le a declaration of their private interests. It 
should be noted that these regulations must include detailed sanctions for non-
compliance or inadequate ﬁ ling. We emphasize that these declarations should 
be accessible to the general public, since administrative audit is not suﬃ  cient. 
      •     Th e public integrity system in local governments should be based on the as-
sumption that oﬃ  cials can be encouraged to behave with integrity rather than 
being discouraged by the threat of sanctions for engaging in conﬂ icts of inter-
est. Th erefore, codes of ethics for councilors as well as for local government 
employees, should be adopted by local authorities. However, in some countries 
it is preferable to introduce an obligation for the mandatory adoption of codes 
of ethics in the national regulation, since elected oﬃ  cials in local governments 
are very resistant to the adoption of such codes. Th e importance of codes of 
ethics is that they can promote an understanding of the concept of conﬂ ict of 
interest by public oﬃ  cials and local society in all levels of government.
      •     In the context of eﬀ ective prevention of conﬂ ict of interest situations, it is of 
fundamental importance to integrate the institution of withdrawal into the code 
of administrative procedure or into the code of ethics. Th is institution may be 
very useful when local government oﬃ  cials withdraw on their own from the 
decision-making process, should doubts arise on their fairness due to a potential 
conﬂ ict of personal or institutional interest. Th is institution should oblige not 
only government employees but also councilors and heads of local governments 
to withdraw from the decision-making process in which they take any interest. 
Th e institution of withdrawal seems to be a more appropriate instrument in 
small communities than the regulation on “duplication of power.”
      •     In order to ensure that conﬂ icts of interest are reported, the legal protection 
of oﬃ  cials who report on cases of corruption or conﬂ ict of interest should be 
regulated in national legislation. We recommend that the reports on potential 
conﬂ ict of interest situations could be submitted to an independent, specialized 
body on ethics issues, such as a Commission on Ethics. 
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      •     Th e Commission on Ethics should be vested with adequate authority for in-
vestigation and guidance of conﬂ ict situations and for suggesting for sanctions 
by the relevant administrative agencies. Th e commission could help to make a 
judgment as to whether conﬂ ict of interest is or isn’t present in speciﬁ c cases. 
                  Th e Commission on Ethics should also have the authority to make structural 
and perceptual audits and risk assessments in sensitive areas of conﬂ ict of inter-
est in the public sector. To apply eﬃ  cient measures to prevent corruption and 
conﬂ icts of interest, a permanent evaluation and assessment by the independent 
members of such a committee would be necessary. Such a commission would 
not replace the Ombudsman, the National Audit Oﬃ  ce, or the Ministry of 
Interior but could help to professionalize the process of enforcement of conﬂ ict 
of interest regulation as well as the process of measuring its eﬀ ectiveness. 
      •       A wide-ranging implementation of transparency and openness of local gov-
ernment activities could counteract conﬂ ict of interest situations and help 
investigation. In our opinion, transparency of public activities in local gov-
ernments would be the best way for local society to create a conducive social 
atmosphere in favor of prevention measures, since widespread public disapproval 
of these phenomena would be crucial for the eﬃ  ciency of the measures. 
      •     Th e independent mass-media should exercise the most important role in fos-
tering a social atmosphere opposed to corruption and conﬂ ict of interest. It 
is self-evident that the independence of local media should be preserved. We 
emphasize that it is very important that local media mobilize public opinion 
to scrutinize the daily activities of local governments, to monitor the govern-
ment’s expenditure and land management policies, as well as to receive adequate 
and timely disclosures on the government’s ﬁ scal activities and other relevant 
information. Such an active role of the local media may result in a smaller risk 
of corruption and a lower incidence of conﬂ ict of interest, while promoting 
greater accountability and legality. Consequently, the active role of the media in 
local democracy and public control over the performance of local governments 
could be realized in practice.
      •     Special attention and sensitivity to conﬂ ict of interest problems that emerge 
in small communities should be put into public policy strategies. Th e surveys 
exploring these problems could help to introduce special regulation that would 
be more adequate to activities of local governments in small communities. For 
instance, the immediate introduction of “duplication of power” provisions may 
have “counterproductive eﬀ ects in a context where the problem of conﬂ ict of 
interest is poorly understood and where the pool of political and oﬃ  cial talent 
is small.”34
      •     Clear procedures of human resource management based on merit, expertise 
of candidates, and the rules of competition should be implemented in local 
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governance, in order to avoid nepotism, favoritism, and other conﬂ ict of inter-
est situations. In our opinion, human resources management should involve 
long-term contracts, reasonable salaries, a bonus system and rewards for good 
work performance, to motivate government employees to put public interest 
above their own private interests in their work.
      •     Th e main weaknesses of conﬂ ict of interest prevention were described earlier, 
but we should stress here that conﬂ ict of interest prevention could be improved 
in CEE countries by better education and training among local government 
oﬃ  cials. Also, there is a need for better socialization and monitoring of local 
society. In this regard, it is important to develop public awareness of appropri-
ate standards of conduct by public oﬃ  cials through including them in codes of 
ethics disseminated by a Committee of Ethics, by universities, training centers 
and non-governmental organizations.
It seems evident that in CEE countries many activities should still be undertaken by 
public policy makers, starting from national and local regulation, through establishing 
institutions, implementing new management and auditing practices, and ﬁ nally, by 
engaging local society as a whole. Many weaknesses mentioned above could be eliminated 
if the problem of conﬂ ict of interest prevention is taken seriously and if the entire issue 
is regulated by one integrated system instead of separate, fragmented regulations. 
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OECD, PUMA/RD (99)8 and in: “Public Sector Corruption. An International Survey of Prevention 
Measures,” OECD, 1999. 
5 See Table 2.2 in Bulgarian report. 
6 Carney (1998).
7 Data from the country reports included in this volume.
8 Data from the country reports in this volume.
9 Between 1995–2000 the position of civil servants and local government employees was uniﬁ ed in 
Latvia.
10 Nonproﬁ t organizations have done many eﬀ orts to establish the code of ethics for councilors and by 
councilors. Th ese eﬀ orts have met poor results in Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Latvia.
11 Although the federal law “About Bases of the Status of the Elective Person of Local Government in 
the Russian Federation” was developed, accepted in three readings by the State Duma and approved 
by Council of Federation, President Putin rejected it on the basis of discrepancy to the federal 
legislation—the Russian report points out.
12 Since the Law “On Status of Elected Oﬃ  cials in Local Government” is not accepted in Russia.
13 Local government employees who have the right to issue administrative acts.
14 op.cit.
15 Addressed to institutions engaged in entrepreneurial activity with some exceptions. 
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16 Institution of incompatibility in Romania means holding two or more positions by local government 
oﬃ  cials. It is sanctioned by removal from the oﬃ  ce.
17 In all analyzed countries, comparatively good public procurement regulation is not suﬃ  ciently 
applied. 
18 In Romania, detailed regulation is included in the Classiﬁ ed Information Act.
19 In Poland, new sanctions and restrictions were introduced in 2003, but because of very short time for 
their implementation, there is no evidence of how they work in practical enforcement. 
20 But citizens rather did not request an investigation in Romania.
21 Sanctions as well as procedural rules should be set by regional laws; however, they have not yet been 
set in Russia.
22 In Slovakia, new proposal declarations may be opened to the public.
23 On the rules developed by the Council of Ethics as NGOs.
24 Based on “Th e European Code of Behavior of Local and Regional Elective Representatives.”
25 In Romania, there is an intention to pass the code of conduct for civil servants. Th is code could be 
applied to local government employees who have the status of civil servants.
26 Th ere is still a lack of mechanisms to execute and control eﬀ ectiveness and eﬃ  ciency of this 
provision.
27 Th e introduction of self-government ombudsman in Latvia is under discussion.
28 Th e institution is included in the Civil Service Act and in local government acts. According to 
this institution government employees who are given an order that requires violation of the law or 
waste of resources may request the order in written form and then refuse to carry it out under legal 
protection.
29 Kalnins, V., Latvia’s anticorruption policy; Open Society Institute (OSI), Monitoring the EU 
Accession Process: Corruption and Anti-corruption Policy, Tieslietu ministrija, Korupcija Latvijā un 
tās apkarošanas sistēmas pilnveidošana, 2002.gada oktobris, (Corruption in Latvia and improvement 
of the system for combating it).
30 Lewis.
31 Van Wart.
32 Sánchez, p.164.
33 Gilman.
34 Monitoring, p.33.
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1.   INTRODUCTION
One of the primary goals of the reforms that have been launched since 1989 in the 
Central and Eastern European countries was to improve the process of governance. In 
Bulgaria, it was only the last two Bulgarian governments1 that have begun large-scale 
reforms for modernization of governance and establishment of a modern civil service. Th e 
reforms focused on the concept of “good governance” and striving for increased public 
participation in the policy-making process. Th e transformations within the governance 
model and administrative system were implemented through the creation of new civil 
service legislation, regulating both the public relationships within the governance 
system proper and the interaction between administration and society. Another aspect 
of the new legislation further emphasized the moral and ethical issues pertaining to 
the impartiality of administrative employees and to the supremacy of the public over 
personal interest. In this context, particular public attention has been drawn to matters 
concerning the drafting and enforcement of eﬃ  cient norms for prevention of potential 
conﬂ ict of interest in the execution of the civil service.
Th e present study is based on the understanding that a thorough awareness of 
the issues concerning the deﬁ nition and prevention of conﬂ ict of interest, both by 
the authorities and the public, is of crucial signiﬁ cance for the attainment of a higher 
eﬃ  ciency of governance, and it further constitutes a means for the enhancement of 
public trust in the institutions. In this line of reasoning, the restriction of opportunities 
for the appearance of conﬂ ict of interest is of particular importance for the success of 
the reforms launched in the country, as public trust simultaneously contributes to the 
stability of the conducted policies and the public institutions in charge. Th is is especially 
true for local government authorities, since the public evaluation of their activities to 
a signiﬁ cant degree shapes the citizens’ attitude with respect to the importance and 
eﬃ  ciency of the ongoing reforms in the country.
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1.1 Issues of Corruption, Trust in Institutions, 
      and Transparenty Problems: Outlining the Importance 
      of Prevention of Confl ict of Interest in Bulgarian Society
Bulgaria’s transition to pluralistic democracy and a market economy is tightly bound 
with large-scale reforms in the legislative and institutional systems. Th e notion of “good 
governance” has taken on an even greater signiﬁ cance, as it became evident that there 
are problems stemming from the lack of clear and categorical mechanisms to unite the 
processes from the various spheres of governance and the inability to ﬁ nd appropriate 
solutions for the corresponding practices. At the same time, the issues of corruption 
and the unlawful use of position for personal gains the on part of public oﬃ  cials have 
been raised persistently. Despite the implemented measures to combat corruption, 
these questions did not receive clear-cut and categorical answers. In addition, the lack 
of a structured public debate on the issues of “morality and ethics of the governance 
and the politics that the public expects” predetermined the evaluation of the eﬀ ects of 
the reforms, initiated by the Kostov government, which appeared to be positive with 
respect to foreign policy only. 
Th e new parliamentary majority of the National Movement Simeon II (NMS) won 
the elections in June 2001 by announcing its readiness for a new morality of governance 
and immediate changes of the political system to eliminate the afore–mentioned 
negatives.
Th e new government was formed in June 2001. It focused on the public expectations 
of transparency in governance and an objective approach to the creation and enforcement 
of the new legislative framework. Regardless of its declared intentions, as early as 
the ﬁ rst three months of the new government’s taking the oﬃ  ce, the sociological 
agencies registered the biggest decline since 1989 in public trust in the newly-formed 
government—the decline as of October was over 25 percent. Th is trend continued 
through September 2002: Th e government’s activities were approved by no more than 
24 percent, whereas disapproval amounted to over 62 percent. Th e data is particularly 
alarming with regards to the National Assembly, i.e., 17 percent approval and 67 percent 
disapproval.2 Th e observed slump of the public trust in institutions directly related to 
the increase of public apathy. Th e lack of political commitment of society was most 
clearly expressed by the low electoral participation at the last electoral campaigns—on 
both the national and local levels.3
Th e identiﬁ cation of the factors that have an inﬂ uence on the permanent decline 
of public trust in institutions has been an object of a number of surveys conducted 
by sociological agencies and nongovernmental organizations. Despite variations, the 
diﬀ erent surveys outline three major attitudes:
        •     large-scale corruption in governance;4
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        •     use of government resources for personal beneﬁ t; and
        •     lack of eﬀ ective opportunities for civil participation (other than participation 
in elections) in decision-making.
Th e public regards corruption as a particularly important and threatening social 
phenomenon that erodes democracy and good governance by violating the formal 
processes.5 Th e factors that inﬂ uence the spread of corruption include a penchant for 
quick money-making among those in oﬃ  ce, imperfect legislation, a lack of eﬃ  cient 
administrative control, and blending  oﬃ  cial interests with personal ones.
Table 2.1
Public Perception of the Main Factors Inﬂ uencing the Spread of Corruption 
in the Country [%]6
January
2000 
September 
2000 
January 
2001 
October 
2001 
January
2002 
May 
2002 
Penchant for fast 
money-making on part of 
the public servants in office
57.0 57.8 60.8 59.2 58.6 58.6 
Imperfect legislation 35.1 40.5 39.1 38.0 43.0 39.7 
Lack of strict administrative 
control 
30.8 32.3 31.8 35.2 34.5 38.9 
Low wages 47.2 41.6 33.7 32.3 38.5 36.0 
Inefficiency of judicial system 24.7 22.2 27.2 28.5 32.3 31.2 
Blending official duties 
with personal interests
28.3 32.6 25.8 31.7 26.7 26.9 
Moral crisis in the transition 
period
18.2 17.0 18.9 21.1 18.3 16.3 
Specificity of the Bulgarian 
national culture
5.9 4.2 5.9 4.4 5.3 4.3 
Th e decline of public conﬁ dence in the institutions to a signiﬁ cant extent has 
been conditioned by the conviction that, during the years of transition, participation 
in politics and public governance was predominantly undertaken with the purpose of 
promoting special private interests to beneﬁ t selected social groups at the expense of the 
whole of society. Th is perception, together with the public attitude towards corruption, 
strengthened the impression that power is used for unlawful or unjust distribution of 
public resources or for personal gains only.
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Simultaneously, the public holds the opinion that public institutions function with 
poor transparency and accountability, ineﬃ  ciency, and bureaucracy. Th e examples most 
frequently cited include awarding public procurement without holding tenders, or 
misuses in granting licenses and permits violating legislative requirements. To a signiﬁ cant 
extent the latter applies to local authorities that, along with the central authorities, are 
charged with awarding public procurement contracts. Also, a large portion of the needed 
registrations, licenses, and permits for starting up or developing a business enterprise in 
the private sector are issued or controlled by local administrations. Th e general assessment 
of the administration activities is that they serve particular personal or group interests 
at the expense of the public ones.7
Th e presented results focus on issues of public oﬃ  cials’ ethics, morality, and 
motivation by thus extending the conventional notions of corruption.
1.2 Combating Confl ict of Interest—A Historical Perspective
Th e reforms that have been launched since 1997, without placing special emphasis on 
issues of preventing conﬂ icts of interest, established a number of measures in the ﬁ eld, 
i.e., enhancing the eﬃ  ciency of the governance system on the central and local level, 
establishing a modern civil service, and measures to prevent corruption. In practice, 
however, the issue of preventing conﬂ icts of interest is mostly perceived as measures for 
restricting corruption.
Th e ﬁ ght against corruption was set as a priority task of the legislative and executive 
power by the last two governments. Th e government of the United Democratic Forces 
used a horizontal approach, i.e., the measures to combat corruption constituted an 
element of all activities and development plans. Th e major strategic documents of the 
government under consideration contained speciﬁ cs for the respective ﬁ eld measures, 
including eliminating opportunities for corruption and handling cases of established 
corruption practices. Th is approach was further employed in the drafting of new 
legislation concerning the establishment of a legal framework on civil service. In the 
course of implementing the Government Strategy for Establishment of a Modern 
Administrative Service of the Republic of Bulgaria,8 major laws were adopted on the 
administrative system’s structure, organization, and functioning; the status of civil servant 
was determined; regulations on provision of administrative services to citizens and 
organizations on part of the public authorities were prescribed, as were procedures for 
awarding public procurement contracts. A Civil Servant Code of Conduct9 was adopted 
that laid down the ethical rules of conduct for civil servants. Th e State Administrative 
Commission10 was established with a view to ensuring the monitoring of the civil servants’ 
status and the legality of the recruitment practices of civil servants.
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Th e enforced legislation introduced transparency and accountability rules for the 
administration work, as well as rules for restricting the abuse of power, the misuse of 
public service for personal gains, the recruitment and promotion of civil servants based 
on merit, etc.
With the goal of improving public service provision, as well as transparency, 
accountability, and control of the administration activities, a number of initiatives were 
launched, such as the creation of “one-stop shops” for providing services to citizens; and 
the oﬃ  ce of ombudsman was established. Presently, these initiatives are implemented 
as pilot projects in several municipalities.
Th e present government of the National Movement Simeon II (NMS) has also 
declared the ﬁ ght against corruption its priority, and it once again uses the horizontal 
approach to anti-corruption measures. As early as the beginning of its mandate (2001), 
it adopted a National Anti-Corruption Strategy,11 which provides for the introduction 
of mechanisms for the prevention of “conﬂ ict of interest” cases. Th ere have also been 
legislative initiatives for increasing transparency in the following areas: awarding public 
procurement contracts, privatization and post-privatization control processes, illegal 
construction control, granting concessions, etc. In addition, they also introduced various, 
though unsystematic, regulations concerning conﬂ icts of interest.12
Th e new government’s Strategy for Modernization of the State Administration13 
outlines the future dimensions of administrative reform, i.e., establishing a system 
of state administration accountable to the public and the Parliament, developing an 
integrated system for human resources management, validating the competitive basis 
in civil servant recruitment based on a merit system, strengthening civil mechanisms 
for monitoring administration activities, etc.
2.   CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS—
      GENERAL CONTEXT
Th e Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria14 of 1991 deﬁ nes the general model of 
public governance and distribution of powers between the central and local authorities. 
Bulgaria is a unitary state with local self-governance. No autonomous territorial for-
mations may be established on its territory. Th e power of the state stems from the people 
and is exercised by the people directly and through the bodies as provided for in the 
Constitution. Public power is divided into legislative, executive and judiciary branches.
Practical implementation of the principles of the Constitution is tightly connected 
with profound political and economic reforms in the local government system. Th e 
Constitution caused a crucial change in the political vision for local governance—
it introduced the concept of autonomous governance in local communities. Th is 
launched the process of decentralization and the institutional development of a system 
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of democratic local power in Bulgaria. Th e delegation of certain powers from the 
central to the local authorities presented the local authorities with the opportunity to 
use their own political and economic mechanisms for independent administration of 
local issues.
Th e constitutional concept of autonomous local power found its expression in the 
subsequent adoption of legislative acts, aiming at the overall implementation of the local 
self-governance system reform.15 Th us was created a new legislative basis for building well-
functioning local self-governance and for ensuring ﬁ nancial autonomy. Th is legislative 
framework further includes conditions for increasing the public accountability and 
transparency of the local authorities, conditions for better protection of public interests, 
rules for action in cases of conﬂ ict of interest, as well as the ways and forms of civil 
participation in resolving local problems.
Improving the legislation with respect to local self-governance is based on the 
application of principles of the European Charter of Local Self-governance.16 Th e 
adoption of the Public Administration Act (PAA, 1998)17 and the Civil Servants Act 
(CSA, 1999)18 established a basis for organizational and functional restructuring, as 
well as for strengthening the municipal administration. Th e practical application of the 
requirements raised the level of competence and professional qualiﬁ cations, but the new 
structure system of administration is still facing certain constraints. More importantly, 
there seem to be obstacles related to the promotion of municipal administration staﬀ  
and the attraction of young and highly educated people to public positions. Th e 
implementation of the new status of the civil servants sets the conditions for overcoming 
these diﬃ  culties.
In 1998 administrative and territorial reforms were implemented that established 
the new district division of the country. Th e new 28 districts were established after 
amending the Administrative and Territorial Construction of the Republic of Bulgaria 
Act (ATCRBA, 1995).19 In practical terms, this marked the end of the administrative 
and territorial reform that ensured better coordination of governance on the regional 
level. Nevertheless, the legislators did not transform the districts into self-governing 
units with independently elected bodies of local power; instead, they remained territorial 
formations with only formal administrative mandates, actually serving as local outlets 
for the central government.
2.1 Overview of the Bulgarian Local Government—
      Structure and Function
Th e territory of Bulgaria is divided into municipalities and districts, pursuant to Art. 
135 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria. Other administrative and territorial 
units and their local self-government bodies may be established pursuant to the law.
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In Bulgaria, local self-governance is exercised at one level only, i.e., the municipal 
level. 
In contrast to the municipality, the district is an administrative territorial unit for 
practicing regional policy, for implementation of central government policy at the local 
level, and for reconciling national and local interests.20 Local self-governance is not 
exercised in the district, and no independently elected bodies are established in it. 
Currently, there are 262 municipalities in Bulgaria, and they are located in 28 
districts. According to data by the National Statistical Institute (2001), the population 
in the diﬀ erent municipalities varies from 1,422 persons (the municipality of Chavdar, 
Soﬁ a District) to 1,173,988 persons (Soﬁ a Municipality).
Th e local government body within the municipality is the municipal council, which 
is elected by the population of the respective municipality for four-year terms of oﬃ  ce 
under due procedure, as provided by law. Th e municipal council consists of municipal 
councilors who—in accordance with eﬀ ective legislative provisions—are elected under 
the proportionate system. Th e number of municipal public servants varies from 11 to 
61 councilors, depending on the municipality’s size.
Executive power within a municipality belongs to the mayor, who is elected directly 
by the population of the municipality for four-year21 terms of oﬃ  ce. Th e municipal 
mayor is vested with executive powers within the municipality. His work is governed by 
law, by the decisions of the municipal council, and by the decisions of the population. 
Th e municipal mayors are aided by one or more deputy mayors, who are elected by the 
Municipal Council on the mayor’s proposal.22 In the mayoralties with a population of 
over 500 persons, there are directly elected mayors, whereas within the smaller local 
areas, the municipal councilors elect the mayors.23
Th e work of the municipal council is assisted by the municipal administration, whose 
employees for the most part have the status of civil servants, though some workers are 
employees under labor contract.
Th e local government employees24 have the status of civil servants. Th is means that 
their status is regulated by law that applies to all civil servants as laid down in the Civil 
Servant Act. However, according to the legislation, not everyone in the administration has 
the status of civil servant. Th e status of civil servant is granted only to persons occupying 
senior or expert administration positions. Th e remaining administrative positions (i.e., 
technical positions) are occupied by employees under contract, i.e., under the general 
legal provision on labor.
Pursuant to the PAA, the positions within the administration fall into three 
categories: management positions, expert positions, and technical positions (art. 13, 
para. 2). CSA stipulates that only management and professional positions shall be 
occupied by civil servants, and this does not cover technical positions. At the same time, 
all management positions are ﬁ lled by civil servants only (art. 13, para. 3, PAA), whereas 
not all professional positions are intended to be taken solely by civil servants—part of 
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them may be also ﬁ lled by employees under contract. Th e Uniﬁ ed Classiﬁ er for the 
Positions within the Administration,25 adopted by the Council of Ministers, determines 
which professional positions may be ﬁ lled by civil servants. Th us, one must conclude 
that most professional positions are ﬁ lled by civil servants. Th ere is only a small portion 
of professional positions occupied by employees under contract.
Th e central executive power, the districts, and municipalities are speciﬁ cally 
organized systems of governance, but the fact that they form, organize, and develop 
the process of management on the national, district, and local level, makes their 
interconnectivity and cooperation inevitable and required. Th e development of the 
processes of decentralization and democratization of society is unthinkable without their 
partnership and common action, and without the full consideration of the national, 
regional, and local interests.
2.2 Subjects of Confl ict of Interest Regulation 
      at the Local Level of Governance
Within the framework of the present survey, the major issues related to the regulation 
and practices of identifying and preventing conﬂ icts of interest have been predominantly 
tackled in the context of local governance.
Th e major subjects of the provisions concerning prevention of conﬂ ict of interest at 
the local level are the local self-governance bodies and the local administration oﬃ  cials. 
In this context, we have also considered the practices of applying the legal framework 
to the activities of the following:
        •     local elected oﬃ  cials—municipal councilors in the Municipal Council;
        •     local government senior oﬃ  cials—municipality mayors (including mayors of 
mayoralties and local areas);
        •     local government employees (civil servants and employees under labor contract) 
in local administrations.
Th e legal framework poses a number of conduct requirements and ethical standards 
for the subjects listed above. It should be noted that the normative provisions in Bul-
garia determine common civil service rules, which apply both to central and local civil 
servants. Simultaneously, it should be taken into account that the activity of the local 
authorities shapes the public’s judgment of the reforms to a great extent.
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2.3 Legal Framework Outline of Regulations 
      of Confl ict of Interest in Local Governments
Th e legal provisions on conﬂ icts of interest include a number of substantive and pro-
cedural legislative acts—relating to the implementation of the civil service in general, 
and speciﬁ cally—for separate government bodies. Also, increasingly wider application 
involves non-normative techniques, which are most frequently associated with the de-
termination of ethical rules for conduct in the exercise of the public powers. Th e main 
legal sources are the provisions of the legislature and the central executive authorities, 
as well as the acts of local government authorities. According to the Bulgarian legal 
system, the acts issued by the supreme judicial bodies (i.e., the supreme courts) of the 
country are not deemed sources of law, since they do not provide new legal norms, but 
rather interpret and apply the existing ones.
Th e legislation regulating conﬂ ict of interest prevention, and relevant action and 
procedures for avoiding conﬂ ict appearance, includes the following: constitutional 
provisions,26  international regulations,27 acts,28 subdelegated legislation,29 municipal 
rules and ordinances,30 and codes of ethics.31 
Th e Bulgarian legislation does not provide the legal deﬁ nition of conﬂ ict of interest. 
Th e various normative acts point to concrete examples, often insuﬃ  cient in content, 
which have been deemed conﬂ icts of interest. Th e very concept of “conﬂ ict of interest” 
is rarely used in the legal provision. Th e legislative framework pertaining to conﬂ icts of 
interest is dispersed in a variety of acts, due to the horizontal approach in the organization 
of the structure of the legal framework, and is subject to signiﬁ cant reconsideration and 
revision with a view to its harmonization with the acquis communautaire.  
Th e major legal problem with regard to conﬂ ict of interest regulations is the 
lack of an established general concept of the identiﬁ cation and determination of the 
countermeasures to this phenomenon. Simply drafting a uniﬁ ed normative act on 
conﬂ ict of interest would not be eﬀ ective enough, given the Bulgarian legal tradition and 
legislation structure, since regardless of the adoption of such an act, its regulations should 
be subject to further inclusion within the respective acts that provide the requirements 
for exercise of the state powers.
3.   SOURCES OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
      —COVERED AREAS AND PROBLEMATIC ISSUES
For the purposes of the present analysis “conﬂ ict of interest” has been deﬁ ned as a situ-
ation in which persons occupying public oﬃ  ce display personal interests, those of their 
relatives, or those of the organizations in which they have a share, and these interests 
may inﬂ uence the objective exercise of their powers. 
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Or, put in more general terms, conﬂ ict of interest exists in a case where the personal 
interests of a person in public oﬃ  ce conﬂ ict with the public interest that he or she is 
charged to protect in the exercise of civil service—as a management body, civil servant 
or employee under labor contract to the administration.32
3.1 Duplication of Powers
A classical situation where a conﬂ ict of interest arises is the case of duplication of powers, 
i.e., in the simultaneous occupation of positions at diﬀ erent state bodies, particularly 
in the case of duplication of posts in the legislative, executive, and judicial authorities. 
Duplication of powers is considered a prerequisite for conﬂ ict of interest, since it casts 
doubt on the objectivity of their execution, particularly when these are interdependent 
powers. 
Measures for conﬂ ict of interest prevention stemming from duplication of powers 
have been stipulated both by the supreme law of the country, i.e., the Constitution, and 
by the legislative framework regulating the exercise of public service. Th e Constitution 
lays down categorical rules against the possibility of simultaneous occupation of public 
posts. Th ese rules stem from the fundamental constitutional principle of separation of 
powers.
Th e Constitution provides the main regulations on prevention of conﬂ ict of interest 
concerning duplication of powers, but only with respect to the central authorities.  
As far as the local authorities are concerned, speciﬁ c constitutional provisions on 
duplication of powers are missing. As a result of this shortcoming, in the course of 
forming the present government of Bulgaria headed by prime minister Simeon Saxe-
Coburg Gotha, there is a possibility, not regulated by the constitution, of simultaneously 
occupying the posts of a cabinet minister and a municipality mayor. Th ere arose the 
necessity to interpret the Constitutional provisions by the Constitutional Court. Th e 
Constitutional Court announced its decision on the impossibility of duplicating the 
posts of a minister with that of a municipality mayor, as well as that of a member of 
parliament with that of a mayor.33
Th e major issues concerning duplication of powers for the municipal councilors 
are prescribed by the Local Self-Governance and Local Administration Act (LSLAA), 
which is the main act regulating  local government organization and activities.34 Th e 
Act decrees incompatibility between the posts of municipal councilor and member of 
parliament, minister or district governor, deputy minister or deputy district governor, 
mayor or vice mayor or the occupation of a paid oﬃ  ce at a municipal administration 
(art. 30). Th e Act also provides rules on the question of which of the two incompatible 
posts is to be relinquished in case of duplication. Th e post of municipal councilor is also 
incompatible with posts of the judicial system—judges, prosecutors, investigators (art. 
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132), the Judicial System Act (JSA),35 and with the post of a judge at the Constitutional 
Court (art. 147, para. 5, the Constitution).
As for the municipal mayors, the LSLAA does not envisage speciﬁ c regulations 
on the duplication of powers, thus it does not clarify the issue of incompatibility 
between the post of a mayor and a position with the central authorities, other bodies 
or administrations. Th e only existing prohibition is that a mayor may not occupy a 
senior position in a political party. By interpreting the legal provisions on municipal 
councilors, we may conclude that the post of a mayor is incompatible with that of a 
municipal councilor (art. 30, LSLAA).
A more categorical legal framework on the duplication of posts for municipal mayors 
is presented by the Local Elections Act (LEA), according to which mayors may not be 
MPs, or municipal councilors, and they may not occupy positions at public institutions 
(art. 37, LEA). Th is Act further envisages rules as to which of the two incompatible 
posts is to be relinquished.  
In accordance with art. 132 of JSA, municipal mayors are similarly not allowed to 
occupy the post of judge, prosecutor, or investigator, or that of a constitutional judge 
(art. 147, para. 5, the Constitution).
With regard to the third group of subjects of regulation, there exist two separate 
legislative regimes for civil servants and employees under labor contracts. Th e normative 
acts regulating their status are also diﬀ erent, as are the issues related to conﬂ ict of interest. 
Th us, for all positions at the local administration taken by civil servants, the regime is 
provided by the CSA, whereas for the other employees, working under a general labor 
relationship the regime is provided by the Labor Code (LC).36
Th e CSA presents a good example for the Bulgarian legislative practice of codiﬁ cation 
of regulations referring to typical cases of conﬂ ict of interest. With regards to duplication 
of powers, however, the law does not envisage all of the possible incompatibility cases 
for the exercise of the civil service. Pursuant to art. 7, para. 2, the civil service may not 
employ persons who are members of parliament or municipal or regional councilors.
Other cases of incompatibility connected to the occupation of civil service, which 
(as mentioned earlier) are provided by the Constitution, concern the incompatibility 
of the civil service with the posts of the president and vice-president, members of 
government, and judges of the Constitutional Court. Also, the civil servants may not 
be judges, prosecutors, or investigators (art. 132, JSA).
As far as the employees under labor contract in the municipal administration are 
concerned, the LC prescribes incompatibility of the simultaneous occupation of positions 
under labor contract and exercise of civil service (art. 327, it. 9). Besides, pursuant to 
the Constitution and the Election of the Members of Parliament Act (2001), members 
of parliament and members of the Council of Ministers shall terminate their occupation 
for the time of their mandate, jobs under labor contract in other organizations included. 
Simultaneously, occupying a position under a labor contract is also incompatible with 
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the posts of a president, vice-president (art. 95, para. 2 the Constitution), constitutional 
judge (art. 147, para. 5, the Constitution), judge, prosecutor or investigator (art. 132, 
JSA).
3.2 Economic Confl ict of Interest
3.2.1   Involvement in Business Enterprises, Directorships, and Shareholdings
One of the most tangible issues connected with conﬂ ict of interest for Bulgarian society 
involves local authorities making use of the opportunities of the civil service to provide 
favor for personal or group economic interests.37 Th is, together with the preferential 
treatment of relatives and other associates, appears to be the conﬂ ict of interest sphere 
that is most familiar to the public, and is rendered with categorical intolerance. 
From a theoretical point of view the prohibitive criterion for commercial activity 
during public service is whether this service requires a full-time position or only partial 
and session employment, i.e., a part-time position. In the second case, a good amount of 
legislation allows for the simultaneous exercise of commercial activity and civil service. 
Th is is supported by the fact that usually such public positions are not paid, and they 
are conducted on the basis of voluntary or free participation of the persons.
Th e LSLAA stipulates rules for economic conﬂ ict of interest situations for both 
municipal councilors and mayors. Th e municipal councilors do not have the right 
to take part in the executive bodies of municipal companies, such as being director/
manager, or deputy director/deputy manager (art. 34, para. 5). Th e law does not 
prohibit the implementation of commercial activity or participation in private corporate 
organizations, since the position of municipal councilor is carried out in the conditions 
of part-time employment for which there is no associated remuneration.
With regard to the municipality mayors, LSLAA envisages a general prohi-
bition on conducting commercial activity. Th is is due to the fact that the posi-
tion of a municipality mayor is paid and requires full employment of the person. 
Therefore, the participation of mayors in business activities may give rise to a 
number of problems associated with conflict of interest when their business 
activity is related to their public duties. It is also believed that their business 
activity “eats up” the time they need for the execution of their public duties.38 
Pursuant to the law, the municipality mayors (vice-mayors, regional mayors, and 
mayoralties included) may not carry out commercial activity within the meaning of the 
Commercial Act (CA, 1991), or take part in supervisory, managing or controlling 
authorities of companies during the time of their mandate (art. 41).39
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With regard to civil servants, there exists a prohibition for performing commercial 
activity—anyone employed as a member of the civil service may not be a sole proprietor, 
unlimited liability partner in a commercial company, manager or executive member of 
a trade company, commercial commissioner, or commercial representative (procurator) 
(art. 7, CSA). Th e LC and CSA do not state any special requirements for the employees 
under labor contract in the local administration. Nevertheless, such prohibitions may be 
stipulated in individual or collective labor contracts of the municipality employees. 
3.2.2   Additional Private Employment 
Similar to conditions described above, to avoid conﬂ ict of interest, the local authorities 
and public oﬃ  cials holding full-time positions may not perform activities under labor 
contract outside the service. But, in contrast—the bodies and public oﬃ  cials carry-
ing out their functions under partial or session employment do not fall within those 
restrictions.
For this reason, there is no prohibition preventing municipal councilors from oc-
cupying another position outside the service, due to the part-time and gratuitous nature 
of the public posts which they occupy. On the other hand, considering art. 46 of the 
Local Elections Act (LEA), we may assume that the municipality mayor, up to termina-
tion of his mandate, is not allowed to work under contract in public establishments, 
enterprises, and trade companies with more than 50 percent public participation. Th is 
is a logical decision due to the full-time employment and the remunerative nature of 
the mayor’s post.
In this respect, there are categorical regulations on local government employees—civil 
servants may not work under labor contracts except for teachers in higher schools (art. 
7, para.2 CSA). Th e employees under labor contract, pursuant to the LC, may work 
free, without additional permission of the employer, under labor contracts in other 
organizations outside the set working hours, unless it is otherwise stated in their main 
labor contract with the municipality (art. 111).
3.2.3   Membership in Charitable, Sporting, and 
           Other Nonproﬁ t Organizations
Another source of conﬂ ict of interest may be the participation of local authorities and 
oﬃ  cials in various nonproﬁ t organizations pursuing charitable, sports, educational, 
cultural, or ecological activities, or in syndicate organizations. Even if an oﬃ  cial’s partici-
pation in such organizations does not create direct ﬁ nancial or pure economic conﬂ icts 
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of interest, it represents a potential source of certain non-ﬁ nancial interests, thus casting 
doubts on the objective execution of the oﬃ  cial’s respective powers or functions. 
Bulgarian legislation does not provide regulations prohibiting the municipal agencies 
or employees from participating in such organizations.40 Also, Bulgarian legislation does 
not recognize the distinction between ﬁ nancial and non-ﬁ nancial interest. Th e prohibi-
tion against taking part in the decision-making process is explicit only for cases when 
the public servant has ﬁ nancial interests. Th is legislative approach is restrictive, since it 
neglects a wide range of non-ﬁ nancial interests, which may also give rise to conﬂ icts. 
3.2.4   Acceptance of Gifts, Hospitality, Sponsored Travel
Th ere exist some sensitive points, the nature of which are mostly ethical, with regard to 
the behavior and interaction of municipal public oﬃ  cials with citizens and organizations. 
Th ese are issues such as receiving gifts, sponsorship of trips, education, etc., which have 
been accepted in connection with a public service, and they presume an obligation for 
the oﬃ  cial to give something in return. In this context, they appear to be a source of 
conﬂ ict of interest.
Th ere is an interesting survey of public opinion on issues of bribes, blackmail, and 
the oﬀ ering of gifts in Eastern Europe,41 according to which the oﬀ ering of gifts to 
public oﬃ  cials at state institutions by citizens is widespread. Th e majority of people 
think that to successfully bid for a public procurement contract, giving at least a small 
gift is necessary. Table 2.2 shows the percentage of survey data, comparing ﬁ gures for 
Bulgaria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine. 
Table 2.2
Survey: Perceptions about Oﬀ ering Gifts or Money to a Civil Servant42
To get a successful outcome when a person 
asks an offi cial for something, is it likely 
or not likely that he or she would…
Bulgaria Slovak
Republic
the Czech 
Republic
Ukraine
offer a small present? 84% 80% 62% 91%
offer money or an expensive present? 72% 62% 44% 81%
In terms of local self-governance, however, Bulgarian legislation contains almost no 
provisions in this area.43 Th ere is only one regulation relating to the civil servants, and it 
is part of the Civil Servant’s Code of Conduct. According to the Code, the civil servant 
may not derive beneﬁ ts from third parties if the beneﬁ t will justiﬁ ably be perceived as a 
result of compromising their honesty and fairness while executing their duty. It is worth 
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noting that the regulation is too generally formulated, and it does not provide instructions 
for exactly how this rule should be applied in practice. In addition, the regulations of 
the Code are only recommendations, and they are not backed by sanctions in case of 
violations. Th e Government Strategy for Modernization of the State Administration 
in particular focuses on the drafting of rules for the reception of presents and other 
beneﬁ ts, which means that regulation in this area is still forthcoming.
3.2.5   Participation in Government Contracts
A source of conﬂ ict of interest may appear in situations where local public oﬃ  cials 
take part in contracts in which the government or another public authority is a client 
(i.e., a government contract). Th ese contracts may involve the procurement of goods 
and services, construction, etc. Usually, the legislation deems those cases an important 
source of conﬂ ict of interest if a person starts to exercise a public service, and at the 
same time, he has the authority of executor under government contract. It is presumed 
that the public client under contract may attempt to inﬂ uence the exercise of the public 
oﬃ  cials’ duties, on the one hand, and these oﬃ  cials may obtain special beneﬁ ts or gains 
by virtue of the contracts, on the other.44
In Bulgaria, government contracts have been legislatively regulated as public procure-
ment contracts, which have been regulated according to the Public Procurement Act’s 
(PPA) norms. According to the act, the executor of the public procurement contract may 
be a person registered as a merchant solely. Consequently, prohibition for simultaneous 
occupation of a public oﬃ  ce and the post of executor of a public procurement contract 
exists only with respect to the municipality mayors and local civil servants, since they 
do not have the right to conduct commercial activity. However, such a prohibition does 
not apply to municipal councilors and employees under labor contracts.
3.2.6   Restrictions after Termination of Service
Once a person leaves apost or position, the imposed restrictions apply regulating the 
behavior or activities of the public oﬃ  cial for a certain period after withdrawing, retiring 
or resigning from public oﬃ  ce. Th e aim of these rules is that the persons should not 
derive personal gains from their former relationship with public authorities, contacts, 
information, etc., that have been obtained during the course of occupying the oﬃ  ce. 
Often, the prohibitions apply to future employment in organizations with which those 
public oﬃ  cials have been in a direct working relationship or had signiﬁ cant oﬃ  cial 
dealings in the year preceding their departure from oﬃ  ce. Th ere are also prohibitions 
against the use of oﬃ  cial information for personal gain after vacating the post.45 Such 
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rules most frequently are provided by the codes of conduct for public oﬃ  cials, or they 
are stipulated  in their contract.
In Bulgaria, such regulations in the area of local self-governance are present for local 
administration civil servants. However, there are almost no such regulations for municipal 
councilors and mayors. Th e only such regulation is in the new Privatization and Post-
Privatization Control Act (PPCA),46 which prohibits the municipal councilors and 
members of the directorship of specialized municipal privatization bodies from acquiring 
property in privatized companies if they have taken part in privatization agreements. 
Th is prohibition refers to the period of occupation of the respective position, as well 
as the period of one year after vacating the post (art. 23). Th e general labor legislation 
lacks such restrictive rules.
Th e Civil Servant’s Code of Conduct (CSCC) contains a general prohibition for civil 
servants, who after leaving the civil service shall not undertake actions through which 
they may take unlawful advantage of their previous position in any way. Th e code also 
has a prohibition for making public certain facts or circumstances to which outgoing 
civil servants have had access (section IV, Personal Conduct, it. 3 and it. 4). However, 
the regulations are too general, and, consequently, diﬃ  cult to apply in practice.  
3.3 Institutional Confl ict of Interest
Th e local government bodies in Bulgaria exercise control over most of the social and 
cultural activities and institutions on the territory of the municipality, i.e., nurseries and 
kindergartens, orphanages, social care homes, polyclinics and museums; or they share the 
ﬁ nancial responsibility of running the school system with the government. In addition, 
the local government agencies manage a considerable number of trade companies that 
ensure basic public procurement to the local community, including public transporta-
tion, utilities, establishment of infrastructure, welfare, and maintenance of parks and 
buildings. Th ese activities transform the local government bodies into active agents of 
economic life. Often, the municipalities are among the most powerful economic agents 
with their own speciﬁ c economic interests.
Th e economic interests of the municipality may create a potential source of conﬂ ict 
of interest. In the course of managing municipal companies, the municipality encounters 
problems of real economic life. Conﬂ ict appears in cases when municipal public oﬃ  cials 
make decisions that have been based on the private economic interests of the municipal 
companies and that conﬂ ict with the public interests, as the latter are to be protected 
by the very same municipal bodies. What is important in such situations is that such 
conﬂ icts should be managed in a manner that does not allow a compromise in the public 
mission of local institutions and holds up the protection of public interests.
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Bulgarian legislation contains separate provisions on the restriction of so-called in-
stitutional conﬂ ict of interest. Th ese provisions have been horizontally incorporated into 
various regulations, depending on the public sphere that the regulations focuse on.
Th e LSLAA envisages incompatibility for the simultaneous occupation of the posts 
of municipal councilors or municipal mayors and executive positions in municipal 
companies. With respect to municipal mayors, this prohibition also includes private 
trade companies. Th e Municipal Property Act (MPA)47 provides that the management 
of municipal trade companies shall be regulated by an ordinance of the respective 
municipal council. In practice, such regulations are missing at a signiﬁ cant number of 
municipalities.
3.4 Confl icts Involving Family and Personal Relations
Largely due to the heritage of the former communist regime, it is a common phe-
nomenon in Bulgaria that preference is given to relatives or other associates in cases of 
appointment to service, promotion, and other forms of favoring family and friends. In 
legal theory, this phenomenon is known as favoritism or nepotism.
Favoritism is a speciﬁ c source of conﬂ ict of interest and is associated with using public 
authority to beneﬁ t close family members or other relatives, mostly by granting them 
certain positions. Th e restriction on favoritism is not intended to ban the employment 
of relatives at all cost, since often such persons may be the most capable and qualiﬁ ed 
for the position. Its purpose is more to restrict the possibility of using one’s position to 
oﬀ er jobs to associates or relatives for personal gain.
Bulgarian legislation does not oﬀ er a thorough consideration of the issue of favorit-
ism in respect to municipal oﬃ  cials. LSLAA requires that municipal councilors do not 
take part in voting or decision-making on matters that touch upon the interests of their 
spouses and relatives, up to the fourth degree (art. 37). For the mayor of a municipality, 
however, such regulations are missing. Regarding local administration civil servants, 
there is a prohibition against employing persons for civil service who are in the position 
of direct hierarchical relationship of leadership and control with a spouse, a relative of 
a direct line of descent to the fourth degree, or any relation by marriage to the fourth 
degree (art. 7, para. 2, it. 1, CSA). As far as the municipal employees under labor contract 
are concerned, there are no speciﬁ c provisions on restricting favoritism.
Th e PPA, and the ordinances of the municipal councils on the order and conditions 
of holding tenders and competitions for acquiring, running, and managing municipal 
property, place speciﬁ c requirements and restrictions on the membership of the evalu-
ating commissions. When holding tenders and competitions for assigning municipal 
property and public procurement, persons in a family relationship with the participants 
in the competitions and tenders shall not be members of the commissions. 
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Th ere are problems with respect to applying the CSA’s restrictions for employment 
to the civil service in the case of small municipalities with a limited number of residents 
(in Bulgaria there are municipalities with populations of under 2,000–3,000 residents). 
It is exactly due to the small number of residents in certain municipalities that instances 
of family favoritism in public service occur, and in some cases it would be very diﬃ  cult 
to ﬁ nd the appropriate person for the speciﬁ c position who is not in some way related 
to another person in civil service. Consequently, an opportunity should be available for 
employing persons regardless of their family relationships under such circumstances, 
provided that the person in question has the necessary qualiﬁ cation for the position. 
3.5 Use of Offi cial Information for Personal Gain
Th e prohibition against using oﬃ  cial information is intended to prevent an oﬃ  cial from 
the acquisition of personal proﬁ t through the use of conﬁ dential information to which 
the oﬃ  cial has had access in his or her oﬃ  cial duties. Such duties concern the oﬃ  cial’s 
ethical conduct, and thus they are more frequently regulated by the codes of conduct. Th e 
prohibition of using information for personal gain does not apply to information whose 
nature is public and accessible to all, but only to conﬁ dential oﬃ  cial information. 
According to the Access to Public Information Act (APIA), central and local au-
thorities are obliged to give the citizens and organizations access to collected and stored 
public information, i.e., acts, protocols of decisions, contracts, as well as all other kinds 
of information that is not deemed conﬁ dential or is in some other way protected by law 
(art3, APIA). However, there are no explicit prescriptions for these authorities as to the 
manner in which they are to personally use oﬃ  cial, conﬁ dential information, and how 
they are supposed to refrain from using it for personal gain. 
As for local government employees, the issue is more thoroughly considered for 
civil servants. Th e employees under labor contract are not subject to speciﬁ c legal 
provisions concerning the use of oﬃ  cial information for personal uses, except for the 
general requirement against distribution of conﬁ dential data about the employer and 
the prohibition of abuse of the employer’s trust (art. 126, it. 9, LC).
Th e ethical norms of conduct for the use of oﬃ  cial information by civil servants, those 
in local administrations included, have been provided for in the CSCC. Th e regulations 
concern the conduct of the civil servant in disseminating public information. On the 
one hand, under the APIA, the civil servant bears the responsibility for the provision of 
timely, authentic and comprehensive oﬃ  cial information to citizens. Along with this, 
pursuant to CSCC, he has obligations for conﬁ dentiality in dealing with information 
and he must avoid harming the activities of the institution—the civil servant is obliged 
to deal with any and all information and documents acquired as a result of his position48 
with due conﬁ dentiality.
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Th e CSCC prohibits civil servants from using information acquired in the execution 
of their oﬃ  cial duties for their own beneﬁ t or the beneﬁ t of someone related to them 
(CSCC, section II, Professional Conduct, it. 4 and it. 5). Th e CSCC does not stipulate 
sanctions for failure to conform to these prohibitions. 
3.6 Use of Local Government Property
With the amendments to the Constitution of 1991, the municipalities acquired the right 
to own property (art. 140) that should be used for the interest of the local community, a 
change that facilitates the development and strengthening of local self-governance. Th us, 
the use of municipal property by local authorities and oﬃ  cials for personal, family or 
corporate interests contradicts the purpose of this property and gives rise to occasions 
for conﬂ icts of interest. Most often, these situations concern the ethical conduct of the 
public oﬃ  cials at local authorities that manage municipal property. Because of this, it is 
common practice that this is largely regulated by codes of conduct (Th e CSCC contains 
the most general rules for these problems).
Often, however, such conduct by the agencies or oﬃ  cials may result in considerable 
harm to the public interest and a violation of the principle of equality of citizens before 
the law. Th is is particularly true for cases when municipal property is being sold or 
rented without the appropriate tenders or competitions as required by law, or without 
following the rules and procedures for their execution. Due to the lack of transparency 
of such action at municipalities, a favorable environment has developed for abuses, 
corrupt practices, and unlawful leasing of municipal property to insiders (e.g., municipal 
oﬃ  cials and their relatives or associates). Th erefore, more thorough and concrete legal 
norms, i.e., not just ethical regulations, are required for regulating the use of municipal 
property by local public oﬃ  cials.
In fact, experience shows that the leasing of municipal property without tenders 
and violations of the relevant law are quite a common municipal practice. According 
to a Report of the National Audit Oﬃ  ce,49 which describes inspections of municipal 
activities for the period between January 1, 2000 and March 31, 2001, the following 
conclusions have been drawn:
      •     from the inspected 52 municipalities, only 14 have followed the procedures for 
leasing municipal property, established by the Municipal Property Act (MPA); 
in a great number of municipalities, real estate has been leased without holding 
tenders or competitions, in violation of art. 14, para.1 of MPA;
      •     the mayors of several municipalities have continued their rental agreements of 
municipal property without the existence of decisions, or in violation of the 
municipal councils’ decisions over the set deadline;
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      •     in a lot of cases, rental or sales agreements have been made at prices much lower 
than the base price set by the municipal council, or sales contracts have been 
made with buyers who oﬀ ered the lowest price;
      •     municipal real estate rents in arrears have not been collected, and no action has 
been taken for termination of contracts with nonpaying tenants; 
      •     revenues from property have been entered into budgets at less than real value, 
due to inadequate decisions of the municipal councils and violations of the 
normative acts.
Th e National Audit Oﬃ  ce registered poor municipal discipline in compliance with 
legislation on managing municipal property, as the situation that creates potential op-
portunities for abuse. 
In addition, the legislation lacks codiﬁ ed rules or minimum standards for prohibit-
ing membership in commissions that make decisions on the management of municipal 
property (the relationships for giving municipal property to third parties have been 
left to be regulated on an individual basis by the separate municipal councils—art. 8, 
para. 2, MPA). Th is situation creates the opportunity for the abuse and unlawful use 
of municipal property. 
3.7 Involvement in Political Party Activities
A basic principle for the implementation of the civil service (art. 116, para. 1, the 
Constitution) is the political neutrality of the oﬃ  cials and the supremacy of the public 
interests. Th is principle aims to prevent the use of civil servants of local or central 
authorities for the promotion of private political interests, for political appointments 
or dismissals or any other form of interference with the work of public or municipal 
institutions by political parties.50 
Th is principle is further developed and speciﬁ ed in the CSA according to which, in 
their oﬃ  cial duties, civil servants may not represent and protect the interests and will of 
the political party of which they are a member (art. 42, para. 2). Th e act bans the civil 
servant from holding a leading or executive position in a political party (art. 7, para. 
2, it. 2, CSA). Similarly, the LC prescribes a requirement for employees under labor 
contract to exercise their rights and obligations without direct or indirect discrimination, 
granting privileges or imposing restrictions on the basis of their political beliefs.
Violation of the obligation of political neutrality in carrying out oﬃ  cial duty is 
diﬃ  cult to prove and diﬃ  cult to control. Although there are certain general sanctions for 
the violation of the CSA and LC, they are diﬃ  cult to implement in practice. Because of 
this, legislatures in many countries have developed special mechanisms and procedures, 
for both central and local authorities, for reporting violations that public oﬃ  cials commit 
in their oﬃ  cial capacity, or other situations of conﬂ ict of interest. Th ese procedures also 
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stipulate the respective protection and conﬁ dentiality of the oﬃ  cials who report on 
those violations. Yet similar legislation is not popular within the Bulgarian legislative 
framework (such regulations largely exist only in the penalty procedures for protection 
of the persons who provide evidence of a crime).
As for municipal councilors and mayors, the LSLAA does not contain general 
requirements for political neutrality. Art. 41 only prohibits mayors from taking part in 
the leading bodies of political parties. In performing their public duties, the municipal 
councilors and mayors should take into account the interests of the entire local 
community. Nonetheless, they have been nominated by political parties that pursue 
their political programs and bear political responsibility. Th is makes oﬃ  cials naturally 
dependent on party politics, and they should not be expected to be politically neutral. 
Furthermore, political neutrality is not needed, since party membership constitutes a 
guarantee for the consistency of the activities of the municipal councilors and mayors. 
Th ey are bound both to their party and voters with the respective political program and 
strategy, which they should follow and implement. Th us, their political dependence, 
matched with close contact with citizens on the local level, appears to be a productive 
factor for control both along party and citizen lines. Because of this, speciﬁ c regulations 
prescribing political neutrality for municipal councilors and mayors are not needed. 
3.8 Use of Infl uence and Lobbying
In the most general terms, the use of inﬂ uence represents a situation in which an entity 
does not have the respective powers but knows a particular oﬃ  cial to whom these 
powers have been entrusted, and through using his own position (for example that of 
a higher authority), exerts impact on this oﬃ  cial in order to reap personal beneﬁ ts for 
himself or somebody else. In other words, the obligation to act in the public interest 
does not refer exclusively to those who exercise their powers, but also to those who use 
their oﬃ  cial position to inﬂ uence public oﬃ  cials in exercising their authority, and/or 
in making certain government decisions.51
Bulgarian legislation does not contain speciﬁ c provisions on these relationships at 
the local or central level. Th ere are only general recommendations in the CSCC that 
stipulate that civil servants should not use their oﬃ  cial position for their own or another 
person’s beneﬁ t (section III, Professional Conduct, it. 3).
A speciﬁ c form of exerting inﬂ uence is lobbying. In the most general terms, it 
represents mediation for the beneﬁ t of personal or corporate interests aiming to inﬂ uence 
the legislative process.52
In Bulgaria, there is forthcoming discussion about the Publicity and Registration 
of Lobbyists and Lobbying Activities Bill, which in July 2002 was introduced for 
approval by the National Assembly. Th e purpose of the bill is to create clear-cut rules 
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for transparency and publicity in lobbying activities, with the aim of restricting corrupt 
practices and shielding government from pressures by individual and group interests. Th e 
bill also stipulates lobbying rules for local government authorities. Explicit prohibition 
has been established for performing lobbying activities by public servants at central or 
local administrations, as well as prohibitions and restrictions for lobbying, donations, 
and provision of money or other property beneﬁ ts by lobbyists, to beneﬁ t public 
oﬃ  cials.53
3.9 Recruitment and Promotion of Local Government Employees54
The problem with the recruitment and promotion of public officials at local 
administrations corresponds to the issue of favoritism. Th e provisions on the procedures 
for recruitment and promotion of public oﬃ  cials lay down clear rules and are based on 
the unbiased evaluation of qualiﬁ cations, experience, and accomplishments. At the same 
time, there still exist problems of the eﬃ  cient application of those regulations that are 
most frequently interwoven with the phenomenon of favoritism and favoring relatives in 
the administration at the expense of qualiﬁ cations and experience. Such forms of conﬂ ict 
inevitably undermine respect and trust in local authorities. Such conﬂ ict prevention is 
related to the need of administrative capacity to implement normatively determined 
procedures and to foster the competitive basis in recruiting public oﬃ  cials. 
In this respect, the Bulgarian legislation has taken a step forward with the adoption 
of the Ordinance on the Conditions and Order of Attestation of the Servants in the 
State Administration.55 It covers all public oﬃ  cials working in the central and local 
administrations, both on staﬀ  and under contract. Th e ordinance introduced rules for 
assessing the performance of civil servants through annual performance evaluations, 
which then serve as the basis for promotions. Th e purpose of the evaluation is to improve 
the administration activities through eﬃ  cient performance management, establishment 
of the degree of the oﬃ  cials’ professional qualiﬁ cations, fair remuneration based on merit, 
and transparent procedures for professional and career development (art. 1, para. 2).
A transparent evaluation procedure has been established. It is implemented by an 
evaluating supervisor under the supervision and control of a controlling supervisor and 
representative administration syndicates. Th e procedure of evaluation and the criteria 
of performance assessment have been drafted in detail.
As for the procedures for employment in civil service at the central and local admin-
istrations, the CSA is subject to critique due to the poor presence of the competitive basis 
in recruitment procedures, a situation that may create an environment for favoritism. 
Currently, recruitment without competition under the CSA is accepted as a general 
means of recruitment, whereas competition has been treated only as an option, which 
the recruiting authority might use at their discretion (art. 10, CSA). Similarly, the LC 
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mandates holding competitions only for positions that have been explicitly prescribed 
by law or by an act of the Council of Ministers (art. 83 and art. 90, LC). In all other 
cases, the employer signs labor contracts at their own discretion. Amendments to the 
CSA have been prepared to strengthen competition in recruitment, particularly when 
it comes to ﬁ lling executive positions.  
4.   PROCEDURES, INSTITUTIONS, AND INSTRUMENTS 
      FOR THE PREVENTION OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Th e main purposes of the mechanisms and procedures for preventing conﬂ icts of inter-
est in local government are the creation of eﬀ ective guarantees of objectivity in service 
performance and the restriction of opportunities for local public oﬃ  cials from reaping 
personal beneﬁ ts from decisions and actions related to municipal matters. Th erefore, 
those mechanisms and procedures aim to achieve:
      •     prevention of the emergence of conﬂ ict of interest situations—this may be 
achieved by means of conﬂ ict prevention rules (preventive measures);  
      •     eﬀ ective procedures for the resolution of conﬂ icts of interest when they have 
already occurred—by establishing norms of control for the solution of already 
emerged conﬂ ict situations (post-control measures);  
      •     assisting the local administration in identifying situations where conﬂ icts of 
interest may emerge—this is achieved by guidelines and ethical standards in the 
execution of public responsibilities and obligations by public oﬃ  cials (guidance 
measures).  
Th ere is a variety of conﬂ ict prevention mechanisms and procedures. Th is chapter 
describes the most typical and eﬀ ective prevention mechanisms, with their speciﬁ c 
characteristics, in the context of Bulgarian local government practice.
4.1 Rules for Decision-making and Withdrawal from Decisions
Th e measures for removal or withdrawal from the decision-making process, together 
with measures for disclosing and declaring situations of conﬂ ict of interest, are among 
the most widely employed, eﬃ  cient mechanisms for maintaining fairness in the service 
performance and prevention of oﬃ  cial misconduct for personal gain. With respect to 
local public oﬃ  cials, these rules have not been suﬃ  ciently developed by the Bulgarian 
legislature.  
LSLAA imposes restrictions on municipal councilors on participation in decision-
making when they have at stake their own property interests or the interests of their 
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relations—spouses and/or direct or in-law relatives, down to the fourth level. Th ere are 
almost no such provisions regarding the mayor of the municipality.
In this respect, there is only Art. 9 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)56 
presenting a general rule that could be applied to the mayors as well as to local oﬃ  cials 
in managerial positions. Pursuant to this rule, a public oﬃ  cial participating in the process 
of issuing individual administrative acts (i.e., acts aﬀ ecting rights and obligations of 
individual citizens or organizations), who has a vested interest in the outcome of the 
procedure or has relationships with interested individuals or organizations which cast 
doubt on his impartiality, may not participate in the procedure. In such cases, this 
oﬃ  cial should withdraw from the procedure at his own initiative or at the request of 
the interested parties. However, this requirement refers only to procedures for issuing 
individual administrative acts, and not to other actions undertaken by local government 
oﬃ  cers.
Although the two acts, i.e., the LSLAA and APA, prohibit the participation of 
municipal oﬃ  cers in such decision-making, they do not determine concrete procedures 
for removal or withdrawal of the persons from decision-making. Th e application of such 
provisions is seriously impeded by the absence of a legal deﬁ nition of the concept of 
property or ﬁ nancial interest. Th ese shortcomings in the provisions make the practical 
application of the mechanisms for non-participation in decision-making diﬃ  cult.
Th e legislation of other countries oﬀ ers various solutions to the deﬁ nition of ﬁ nancial 
interest: a percentage is deﬁ ned as an indicator of the presence of ﬁ nancial interest, for 
instance, a 10 percent share or supervision in commercial companies and organizations. 
Other legislations assume that there is ﬁ nancial interest in any form of ownership or 
relationships of management and control in commercial organizations, regardless of 
the size of that interest.
With respect to civil servants occupying managerial positions in local administrations, 
the CSA does not contain rules for removal from decision-making in the management 
process. Also, the CSCC does not contain special rules for withdrawal. Th e code 
stipulates only the general requirement that civil servants should be guided solely by 
the law and the public interest and should present all relevant information when they 
submit a decision-making proposal to the local authorities. Here again, the above-
mentioned provision of art. 9 of the APA may be applied, but only with regard to the 
procedures for the issue of individual administrative acts and not with regard to other 
civil servants’ actions.
Separate rules restricting participation in decision-making are included in various 
legal acts. Th e PPA and its supplementary ordinance require that the members of the 
evaluating commission on public procurement should have no property interest in the 
execution of the contracted activities, they should not be members of executive bodies 
of the procurement authority, and they should not be related to the applicant (including 
spouses, relatives, employer or employee, persons where one is in the management of the 
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other’s company, associates, commercial representatives or grantors etc.). Th e PPPCA 
demands that the municipal councilors and the management of the specialized municipal 
privatization bodies disclose conﬂ icts of interest and withdraw from decision-making 
in privatization procedures when they or members of their families have commercial, 
ﬁ nancial, or other interest in the privatization deal (art. 25).
4.2 Disclosure and Declaration of Private Interest
It should be noted that Bulgarian legislation has hardly any rules for disclosure and 
declaring the presence of private interest and potential conﬂ ict of interest on the part 
of local public oﬃ  cials. Th is is another reason why the Bulgarian experience cannot be 
thoroughly analyzed. Th ere is only an obligation for civil servants in municipal adminis-
trations to declare their property status when assuming oﬃ  ce and then annually (art. 29, 
CSA). Th ey are obliged to declare only their real estate, and they do not have to declare 
the assets of their spouse or children. Th e authority appointing the relevant oﬃ  cial is the 
institution that administers the declarations and imposes disciplinary sanctions when 
the oﬃ  cial fails to submit his/her declaration. However, public access to the declared 
circumstances is restricted—it is possible only with the civil servant’s permission.
Considering the practices of identifying and disclosing conﬂ icts of interest, some 
good decisions from foreign legislation can be mentioned.  Th e legislations of other 
countries most often use two forms of disclosing the presence of private interests. Th e 
ﬁ rst one is the ad hoc announcement of an already existing ﬁ nancial or non-ﬁ nancial 
interest for a concrete case. Th e second form of disclosure represents the advance notice 
of an interest in view of possible conﬂ icts which may arise in connection with a particular 
person. Th is is performed by declaring the person’s interests, both when ﬁ rst assuming 
a position and annually. Th e declaration of interests is done in a special public register 
of interests.57
In accordance with Bulgarian legislation, there is a public register where persons 
occupying senior public positions declare their property and liabilities (Publicity of the 
Property of Persons on Senior Public Positions Act (PPPSPPA)). However, the obliga-
tions of this law do not apply to municipal councilors and mayors.
Similar to other European legislations, a broad range of items are subject to 
declaration in the register, including real estate, vehicles, yachts and airplanes, company 
shares, payments exceeding a certain limit, training, sponsored trips, income and its 
source, as well as ﬁ nancial liabilities. Th e private interests of spouses and minors should 
also be registered. According to the law, however, not subject to declaration is the 
performance of managerial functions (i.e., manager, member of a board of directors, 
member of an executive or supervisory board etc.) in organizations, or participation in 
nonproﬁ t organizations. Besides, although by deﬁ nition the register is a public document, 
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citizens have no direct access to its data but can only get information through the media 
or public administrations. No sanctions for failure to submit a declaration on time are 
established.
According to data published by the head of the National Audit Oﬃ  ce, which 
maintains the public register, 52 people have not submitted their declarations for 2002 
after the expiration of the respective deadlines. It should be pointed out that senior 
public oﬃ  cers ignore this obligation.
4.3 Other Measures Assisting Prevention of Confl ict of Interest
4.3.1   Winning Public Procurement Contract Restrictions
Local government administrations conduct public procurement procedures for activi-
ties, deliveries, or services related to local needs. Th e procedures for contracting public 
procurement are among the local activities with the highest corruption risk, a risk of 
misguided application of the procedural rules and opportunities for abuses.
Because of those risks, the PPA intends to create conditions for transparency, com-
petition and guarantees for the unbiased execution of the procedures for the selection of 
contractors of public procurement. Th ose rules are also a guarantee to prevent conﬂ icts 
of interest in awarding procurement contracts. Th us the law states that the candidates 
should be evaluated and selected only on the basis of the requirements that are previously 
announced in the tenders (art. 41). Incompatibility criteria for the post of an evaluating 
committee member are listed in detail (art. 38), and the invitations to tender are published 
in the State Gazette and in a local or national daily newspaper (art. 34, para. 5). An-
other guarantee against abuses is the possibility to appeal the actions of the awarding 
authority (art. 56, para. 1). Th e National Audit Oﬃ  ce and the administrations at the 
Agency for State Internal Financial Control monitor the authorities’ actions and their 
compliance with the law (art. 57, para. 1). Similar guarantees are also provided in the 
Ordinance on Public Procurement Procedure under the threshold deﬁ ned in art. 7, 
para. 1 of PPA.
Nevertheless, the Act and the Ordinance are subject to criticism by private business 
representatives, due to the lack of established necessary organizational prerequisites for 
applying the principles of transparency in the procedures, on the one hand, and to the 
incompetent implementation of the law by the procurers, on the other. 
In fact, in their capacity as public procurers, local government authorities substantially 
violate the regulation. Th is is the conclusion of the National Audit Oﬃ  ce reports for the 
period of January 1, 2001–December 31, 2002 in several municipalities (the munici-
pality of Sapareva Banya, the municipality of Soﬁ a and its areas). According to these 
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reports the violations most often committed are related to public procurement, carried 
out by local authorities who do not follow the procedures provided by the PPA. 
4.3.2   Privatization and Concession Rules
Privatization and concessions conducted by local authorities are among the activities 
that carry a potential risk of corruption, blackmail, opportunities for personal gain and 
other abuses. Th e rules for transparency and control are also very important in their 
regulation When it comes to ensuring objectivity of the actions of the municipal oﬃ  -
cers and limiting the opportunities for promoting private and corporate interests at the 
expense of the public interest.  
In March 2002 a new Privatization and Post-Privatization Control Act (PPPCA) 
was adopted in Bulgaria. Th e act regulates the manner of privatizing municipal and 
public commercial companies. Since it is a comparatively new one, it is too early to 
evaluate its eﬃ  ciency, but the rules it has established for the privatization procedures 
can be deemed much more transparent and useful in creating prerequisites for equality 
among investors. Negotiation with a potential buyer (a limited circle of entities) and 
privatization by worker-managed companies are no longer among the methods of 
privatization, i.e., the least transparent privatization procedures under the old law, very 
often used by the state and municipalities have been eliminated.58 
Th e privatization methods provided in the new act are of public character only 
(public oﬀ ering, public tender, among others, art. 31 and art. 32). As it was pointed 
out in 4.1 of this report, the law contains special provisions that pose restrictions on 
municipal councilors and the management team of the specialized municipal privatization 
bodies, and members of their families, to prevent their acquiring property in privatized 
companies when they have participated in privatization deals, while occupying the 
respective position and within one year’s time after withdrawing from the post (art. 
23). In cases when such persons participate in a privatization deal from which they or 
members of their families have commercial, ﬁ nancial or other interest, they are obliged 
to disclose this circumstance and cancel their participation in the decision-making on 
that particular privatization deal (art. 25).  
As far as the municipal concessions are concerned, being the instrument for awarding 
municipal property, the regulation and rules for its implementation are contained in the 
MPA. Th e regulation, however, has certain imperfections aﬀ ecting the transparency of 
the procedures related to municipal concessions. It is required that the conduction of 
a competition or a tender should be regulated in an ordinance issued by the separate 
municipal council. Th e law does not contain minimum standards for transparency or 
an explicit opportunity for judicial appeal of the municipal council’s decisions on the 
selected concessionary.  
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4.3.3   Political Donation Restrictions
Th e rules and mechanisms for ﬁ nancing the political parties are also of importance 
in conﬂ ict of interest prevention because the ﬁ nancing of parties is a frequently used 
form of imposing private interests and their promotion as public. Besides, the ﬁ nanc-
ing of parties and their election campaigns represents an essential factor of corruption 
in Bulgaria.  
In 2001, the National Assembly adopted a new Political Parties Act (PPA), which 
repealed the old and more imperfect one of 1990 and regulated in detail the rules and 
limitations on the ﬁ nancing of political parties. On the basis of annual reports submit-
ted to the National Audit Oﬃ  ce by the parties, the oﬃ  ce, exercises general control over 
the ﬁ nancial input of parties. Also, the law restricts anonymous grants over a certain 
amount.
4.3.4   Anticorruption Measures
Th e municipal public servants who are in direct contact with the citizens in relation to the 
services that are most demanded by a municipality’s population are exposed to a high risk 
of corruption. Corruption at the local level is assessed by many experts as considerably 
higher and more frequent than corruption at the higher levels.59 Besides, corrupt practices 
may also lead to long-term economic and social consequences for both the particular 
municipality and society as a whole—for example, the negative consequences from 
unscrupulous privatization of a municipal enterprise, incorrectly issued licenses, or 
assigning public procurement to incompetent persons or organizations. 
Th erefore, in addition to legislative amendments introduced during recent years, to 
criminalize various acts of corruption (including giving or receiving bribes, blackmail, 
and money laundering) and the establishment of special institutions to combat 
corruption and ﬁ nancial abuse (such as the Bureau for Financial Investigation Agency 
at the Ministry of Finance established in 2001), there have been various civil initiatives 
at the local level as well. 
As a result, special mailboxes and hotlines to report cases of corruption have been 
created alongside the mediation groups—experts who mediate between citizens and 
local authorities on illegal actions or ommissions of actions by municipal councilors 
when delivering administrative services. A number of non-governmental organizations 
have turned the ﬁ ght against corruption into the main objective of their activities: 
they undertake various activities of anti-corruption and an educational character; 
they publish and distribute civil manuals for administrative services, etc. All these 
initiatives aim to foster an attitude of public intolerance to corruption and to raise the 
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level of citizens’ familiarity with their own rights and the rights and obligations of the 
administration.60
4.3.5   Accountability and Transparency in Providing Public Services
An important prerequisite for the work of the elected municipal bodies and the munici-
pal administration in the public arena is transparency of their work in providing public 
services. A step in this direction is provided by the Administrative Service to Physical 
and Juridical Persons Act (ASPJPA) adopted in 1999.  
Th e law stipulates that each administration should introduce internal rules for the 
work and accountability of its oﬃ  cers (art. 6, para.1, it.3). In addition, special units have 
to be established for applications by citizens for administrative services (art. 6, para.1, 
it.1), the so-called one-stop-shop. Th rough those units, people can follow the course of 
actions undertaken by the administration on their applications, quickly and directly. 
To carry out the provisions of the law, many municipalities have undertaken the 
building of municipal centers for information and services. Th ese units are expected to 
raise the direct civil control over time schedules, reduce the time for delivering services 
and the expenses of both citizens and the administration; and increase the transparency 
in local government. However, such units have so far been introduced only in a small 
number of pilot municipalities. Also, no uniform service standards have been developed 
yet, and not all municipal administrative structures apply the established model for 
administrative servicing. 
 
4.3.6   Public Access to Oﬃ  cial Information
Th e local policy making process in Bulgaria is subject to civil control by force of the 
normatively regulated publicity of governance. By means of various legislative norms, 
the work of making important decisions, discussion of local bills and voting have been 
made transparent. 
Th us, municipal council sessions are open to the public and the media, and the 
decisions that have been reached are displayed at the municipal building and brought 
to the attention of the population at large in the press and the electronic media (art. 22, 
LSGLAA). Moreover, the Access to Public Information Act, adopted in 2000, compre-
hensively regulates the right of free access of citizens and organizations to information 
generated and maintained by the central and local authorities. Th e latter are obliged 
to publish updated information on the acts they have issued (decisions, regulations, 
ordinances, orders), as well as a description of the functions and responsibilities of the 
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respective administration. Th ey are also obliged, when requested by citizens, to provide 
free access to information rthat they are holding (with the exception of cases of classiﬁ ed 
information, protected by law).
Th e law presumes the possibility of limiting access to information on opinions, refer-
ences, statements, and consultations, given in the process of adopting acts or decisions. 
Th e access to such information would ensure greater transparency with regard to the 
principles and motives that have guided the authors of the acts, aand it would ensure 
more eﬀ ective public monitoring of the prejudices and promotion of private interests 
in the performance of local authorities.
Apart from giving legal guarantees of transparency and free access to information, 
new practices and initiatives more broadly provide municipalities an opportunity to 
citizens about decisions and activities thereby increasing the transparency in the work 
of local authorities. Here are the most interesting initiatives by the municipalities in 
this respect:
      •     establishment of Internet sites of the municipalities and publishing their own 
information bulletins containing ordinances, decisions of the Municipal Coun-
cil, information on renting municipal property, announcement of competitions, 
tenders, and their results;
      •     public discussions of the municipal draft ordinances are organized;
      •     an opportunity for direct communication with the mayor on the municipality’s 
Internet site through electronic mail or forum discussions, where citizens ask 
questions and receive answers directly (mayoral receptions); 
      •     annual reports to the public on the conducted activities during the year and the 
way the municipality was governed—meetings where citizens can ask questions, 
and publish a report in a local newspaper; 
      •     “open day” is organized for all those wishing to get acquainted with the everyday 
work of the municipal administration, to ask questions and make proposals for 
optimization of the activities.
4.3.7   Civic Participation in Local Decision-making
Motivation for civil participation in local governance is still weak, and that is why 
public control over local decision-making is weak. On the one hand, the municipalities 
are unwilling to turn to the opinion and expertise of non-governmental and branch 
organizations. On the other, legislation in the ﬁ eld does not establish enough mecha-
nisms for public participation in decision-making (with the exception of certain more 
formal rights, including the fact that one-ﬁ fth of the local population has the right to 
summon the municipal council, hold referenda on certain matters of local importance 
and general assemblies of the population). 
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Nevertheless, a tendency of increased civil initiatives to participate in the work of 
local authorities has been perceived in recent years. With the involvement of various 
non-governmental organizations, mechanisms for joint activities and dialogue are be-
ing worked out. Th ose mechanisms facilitate a broader access by citizens to the local 
self-governance bodies and a better control over their performance, openness, and 
transparency in decision-making. Here are some of the initiatives:
      •     creation of initiative committees with representatives of non-governmental 
organizations, citizens, and municipal bodies for joint discussions of local 
priorities;
      •     holding training seminars for mayors, municipal councilors and administrations, 
dedicated to various aspects of civil participation in local self-governance;
      •     granting the right of a “deliberative vote” to local non-governmental organi-
zations thereby allowing them to express their opinion, to submit reporting 
notices for consideration, and to make proposals for decisions at the sessions;
      •     creation of Civil Consultative Councils, with participation of representatives 
of the public, which assist in execution of local policies in their capacity as 
consultants to the municipality;
      •     signing cooperation agreements between non-governmental organizations and 
local authorities—a unique experience for the country to establish a mechanism 
for discussing common problems through agreement for participation of non-
governmental organizations in standing and temporary (ad hoc) commissions 
at the municipal council, holding regular meetings, and joint investigation of 
important municipal issues;  
      •     organization of municipal forums as venues of public debate in the municipali-
ties where all citizens of the municipality are invited to participate and make 
proposals for action.61
4.3.8   Media Awareness and Independence Rules
Along with citizens and non-governmental organizations, the media are the third impor-
tant corrective of local authorities, helping to achieve better accountability, transparency, 
and legality of the work of the municipal bodies. Th rough the participation of the media 
in local democracy, civil control over the performance of local authorities is put into 
practice. Also, through their own independent investigations, the media have the op-
portunity to alert the public and the controlling bodies about instances of corruption, 
abuse, violations, etc.
According to the legislation, one of the mechanisms for accountability of the mu-
nicipal authorities to the public is precisely the publishing of the decisions that have 
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been taken and the acts that have been adopted in the public media (art. 22, para. 1, 
LSGLAA). Th us, public awareness is achieved through the media. 
In recent years, the attention of the media in Bulgaria has been particularly strongly 
focused on the problem of corruption in local and central authorities as the media un-
dertook their own investigations on reported instances of abuse of power. According to 
the Penal Code (1968) it is quite easy to charge and convict a journalist: if a journalist 
attributes a crime or discloses some other defaming circumstance about another per-
son in the media, he/she could be convicted. In foreign legislation, such an action is 
deemed a civil violation and is punished in accordance with the civil law and not the 
criminal law.
4.4 Institutional Control Measures
In Bulgaria, there are no special institutions in local government exercising control in 
conﬂ ict of interest situations, such as ethics committees, independent local oﬃ  cers or 
the like. Nor are there oﬃ  ces where local administrative oﬃ  cers can report on conﬂ icts 
of interest or bring issues regarding cases when a person is not certain whether he/she 
is in a conﬂ ict of interest situation. If in some municipalities such ethic committees are 
created, they are isolated instances and not part of a general practice. Th e legislation in 
itself does not require the local authorities to create such units in their administrative 
structures. 
Th e established Public Administrative Commission at the Council of Ministers, 
which monitors the overall performance of civil servants at the central and local 
administrative bodies, may be deﬁ ned as a specialized controlling organ of the civil 
servants’ conduct. Nevertheless, it monitors how civil servants fulﬁ ll their obligations at 
all public administration structures, not at any local administration in particular. 
At this stage, prevention of conﬂ ict of interest in a local administration is done by 
various public bodies and institutions that monitor the authorities’ work in one form 
or another. Th ese controlling institutions are supposed to ensure objectivity in the 
governance of local issues and prevent local oﬃ  cers from beneﬁ ting at the expense of 
the public interest. Th ese bodies exercise internal or external control over the activities 
and decisions of local authorities. Table 2.3 shows the various institutions and organs 
exercising control over the work of local authorities.
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Table 2.3
Institutions with Control over Local Governments Regarding Conﬂ ict of Interest Prevention
Controlling Bodies and Institutions Subject of control and the way it is exercised 
1.  Municipal council (over the 
mayor of a municipality) 
•   repeals mayor’s acts issued in violation of decisions of the municipal council (art. 45, para. 1, LSLAA);
2.  Mayor of the municipality 
(over the municipal council)
•   imposes veto upon decisions of the municipal council (postponing the enforcement of a decision), which 
he/she believes is in conflict with the interests of the municipality or is against the law (art. 45, para. 2, 
LSLAA); 
•   challenges the legality of the municipal council’s decisions before the court if the municipal council 
confirms it;
3.  Regional governor •   stops the application of illegal acts of the municipal council and takes them to the respective regional court 
(art. 32, PAA);
•   repeals unlawful acts of the municipal mayors (art. 32, PAA);
4.  Public Administrative 
Commission at the Council of 
Ministers
•   exercises overall control over civil servants in central and local authorities; 
•   monitors the fulfillment of obligations by civil servants; 
•   observes the legitimate holding of job competitions and provides methodological instructions on the latter; 
•   maintains the Civil Servant’s Register; 
•   issues mandatory prescriptions to the respective body for repair of the violations if such have been 
registered;
5.  Chief Labor Inspectorate
    Executive Agency at the Ministry
    of Labor and Social Policy 
•   carries out overall control over labor—exercises overall control on the monitoring of labor legislation in all 
economic, social and government branches and activities; 
•   gives mandatory prescriptions and terminates the execution of illegal decisions or orders of the employers 
and officers in cases of violation of the labor legislation;
6.  Specialized bodies for 
controlling compliance with 
labor legislation within the local 
government authorities
•   exercise internal control on compliance with the labor legislation; 
•   give mandatory prescriptions and terminates the execution of officers’ illegal decisions or orders in violation 
of the labor legislation;
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7.  Courts •    the acts of the municipal councils and mayors are subject to appeal before the respective regional court, 
which reviews their legitimacy (art. 36, APA);
8.  National Audit Office (the 
national audit organ of Bulgaria)
•    performs independent external audit (assessment of the financial management) of public funds, including 
the municipal budgets and amounts spent by the municipalities coming from funds and programs of the 
European Union (CAA); 
•    submits an audit report to the National Assembly and informs the public by making public the spending of 
public funds; 
•    when violations are registered, it recommends measures for ceasing illegal action; sends the audit materials 
and reports to the respective competent authority for the establishment of civil, administrative or criminal 
liability;
9.  State internal financial control 
bodies
•    prior to a decision for assuming financial responsibility or making an expenditure; 
•    or, internal audit by a delegated internal auditor from the Agency for State Internal Financial Control, 
which examines the audited structure and prepares a report with recommendations;
10. Ombudsman (public mediator) •    institution, independent from the local and central executive authorities, which defends the rights and legal 
interests of the citizens from illegitimate actions of the public administration; 
•    acts against bad administration, power abuse, corruption and misdemeanor; 
(in Bulgaria the institution exists in only four municipalities: Sapareva Banya, Sevlievo, Koprivshtitsa and 
Sofia—Mladost area; the adoption of the ombudsman act is forthcoming);
11.  Specialized agencies to combat
       corruption
•    carry out investigation in cases of corruption; 
    Those are: 
    –     Bureau for Financial Investigation Agency at the Ministry of Finance; 
    –     Economic Police, a specialized unit at the National Police Service.
Table 2.3 (continued)
Institutions with Control over Local Governments Regarding Conﬂ ict of Interest Prevention
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4.5 Accountability and Responsibility 
      for Generating Confl ict of Interest
4.5.1   Legal Liability
Bulgarian legislation stipulates various types of legal liabilities applicable to cases of 
violation of the regulations related to conﬂ icts of interest in local government. As was 
mentioned earlier in section 2.3 of the report, codiﬁ ed legislation concerning conﬂ icts 
of interest in Bulgaria does not exist. Th is naturally presupposes disparate provisions on 
the liabilities borne by the local oﬃ  cer for the respective breaches.
Th e type of legal liability designed to be borne by local oﬃ  cers depends on the 
nature of the violation. According to Bulgarian legislation, the liability may be civil, 
criminal, administrative, and/or disciplinary (the last one concerning the civil servants 
and employees at the local administration only). Th e application of these liabilities consti-
tutes an important corrective to the unlawful behavior of local oﬃ  cers. On the one 
hand, a penalty is imposed on the oﬃ  cer in order to punish him/her for wrongdoing 
(penalizing function) and, on the other hand, the imposed penalty serves as a warn-
ing for the penalized oﬃ  cer and for all oﬃ  ce holders in the municipality (monitoring 
function).
Civil liability for damages exists because local oﬃ  cials are liable to compensate the 
state, municipal, or civil organizations for damages intentionally caused as a consequence 
of unlawful  action or lack of action. Liability for damages may be applied both to 
municipal councilors and mayors and to municipal civil servants and employees. Rules 
in this respect are contained within the State Internal Financial Control Act, which ap-
plies to established unlawful oﬀ ences in the course of conducting an audit of municipal 
ﬁ nancial management. Th e CSA further provides rules for public and civil damages 
caused by the municipal civil servants, as does the LC—for damages caused to the 
employer by employees under labor contract.
Administrative liability is a type of liability imposed on municipal public oﬃ  cials 
when they commit an oﬀ ence in the course of exercising their oﬃ  cial duties, if the 
oﬀ ence is not considered a crime by law. It is applied to municipal mayors, municipal 
councilors and municipal civil servants and employees under labor contract. A ﬁ ne is 
levied for the oﬀ ence. Separate laws contain a good deal of such regulations: with regards 
to committing unlawful acts in privatization deals by the oﬃ  cials (PPPCA); with regards 
to non-provision of public information by the obliged bodies (APIA); with regards to 
bypassing the law, or circumventing a public procurement procedure (PPA); with regards 
to unlawful refusal to deliver administrative services (ASPJPA); with regards to violating 
a normative act, laying down provisions on the budget, ﬁ nancial and economic and 
accounting activities (State Internal Financial Control Act (SIFCA)).
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Criminal liability applies to crimes that are committed by municipal public oﬃ  cials 
and are considered the most serious and publicly dangerous acts. Th e Penal Code of the 
Republic of Bulgaria stipulates a number of acts related to power abuse and unlawful 
gains derived from public service that are treated as crimes, such as bribe (art. 301 and 
the following articles), blackmail (art. 214), abuse of oﬃ  cial position (art. 282 and the 
following articles), intentional contracting of a disadvantageous deal, illegal disclosure 
of oﬃ  cial secrets, money laundering, etc. (art. 220 and the following articles).
Disciplinary liability is applicable to civil servants and employees under labor contract 
in the central and local administrations, if they have intentionally violated rules in their 
oﬃ  cial duties. Civil servants are penalized according to the CSA (through reprimand, 
censure, postponement of promotion for up to one year, demotion from six months to 
one year, or dismissal). Pursuant to the provisions in force of CSCC, civil servants do 
not bear responsibility, and there are no stipulated penalties for violation of its rules. 
No disciplinary sanctions are provided for violating CSCC. Sanctions are imposed on 
employees as stipulated in the LC (reprimand, warning, dismissal) for breaking oﬃ  ce 
discipline.
4.5.2   Political and Professional Responsibility, Public Accountability
Apart from legal liability, there exist some other types of public responsibilities, like 
political and professional responsibilities, which may also play a corrective role for unlaw-
ful actions or lack of actions by local public oﬃ  cers. According to Bulgarian legislation, 
however, political parties are not vested with the legal power to inﬂ uence the termination 
of the powers of any authorities. Political parties cannot withdraw mayors and municipal 
councilors who are their parties’ members from public positions. All the parties can do 
is to take away the political conﬁ dence from a given person, sanction them for deviating 
from the party line, or expel them from the organization, but a party cannot deprive 
an oﬃ  cial of their mandate. Th e situation is similar with the professional association 
of municipal oﬃ  cers, because their status can be regulated by law only, and not by the 
professional unions’ norms.  According to current legislation, if a municipal oﬃ  cer is 
expelled from a professional association, this will not lead to his/her dismissal from the 
occupied administrative position. Such regulations exist only for speciﬁ c occupations, 
such as doctors, dentists, etc. 
As far as the public accountability of the municipal oﬃ  cers to the public is concerned, 
public trust in municipal oﬃ  cers can mostly be expressed in elections. Voting for a 
candidate is the expression of voters’ conﬁ dence that the person in question will represent 
their interests, and vice versa. Secondly, the citizens also exercise continuous public 
control over the work of the elected local authorities and the local administration (this 
matter was discussed in greater detail in 4.3.6 and 4.3.7 of the report).
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4.6 Extralegal Instruments for Confl ict of Interest Prevention
4.6.1   Codes of Ethics and Internal Regulations
Since legal acts do not make a provision for matters of ethics by not creating eﬀ ective 
instruments for certain moral issues concerning the prevention of conﬂ ict of interest, 
codes of ethics are being developed. Th ey can eﬀ ectively determine various requirements 
for objectivity and lack of prejudice in decision-making and regulate issues like accept-
ance of gifts, favoritism, sponsored trips, rules of conduct after leaving oﬃ  ce, etc. Codes 
are a good instrument that trains and facilitates administrative oﬃ  cers in recognizing 
conﬂ icting situations. Th ere is a common practice in European countries of adopting 
such codes for members of parliament, ministers, civil servants, local governments, and 
even private organizations. 
Th e use of codes of ethics (or codes of conduct) for local authorities, to deﬁ ne internal 
rules for conﬂ ict of interest prevention, is not common practice in Bulgaria. Furthermore, 
the legislation does not oblige municipalities to adopt such codes for public oﬃ  cials in 
local institutions. If, nevertheless, some have been adopted by certain municipalities, 
they remain isolated instances. Th ere are municipalities that adopt individual rules for 
conﬂ ict of interest prevention in their statutes, but again these are individual cases.
Th e Civil Servants’ Code of Conduct (CSCC) adopted in 2000 outlines the ethical 
norms of conduct in the performance of civil service. Th e Code is applied equally to 
civil servants of the central and local administrations and provides for certain conﬂ ict 
of interest rules. Th e major goal of the regulations is to strengthen public conﬁ dence 
in public administrations and oﬃ  cials, and to enhance the behaviorist culture of the 
latter in exercising their duties. In this connection, the code outlines ethical rules of 
conduct both for interaction between the civil servants and the public, and for their 
internal relationships in oﬃ  ce. Th e code elaborates on the major principles and standards 
established by the CSA.
From a legal point of view, the code is of a more recommendatory character and 
contains no sanctions. For the code’s creation, the positivist approach has been applied. 
Th is approach uses moral and ethical norms of conduct with a primarily guiding and 
instructional function. Th is approach corresponds to the idea of preventative measures 
(measures in advance) but, due to its recommendatory character and the lack of sanctions, 
it has no legal force. Because of the ethical nature of the norms, and the need to ensure 
their more eﬀ ective implementation, it is necessary that sanctions for illegal behavior 
be provided.
Th e provisions of the code deal with the basic types of interaction between civil 
servants and the public, their professional conduct and work attitude, relationships 
between oﬃ  cers and executives, their dealings with information, and their personal 
90
C O M B AT I N G  C O N F L I C T  O F  I N T E R E S T  I N  LO C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  T H E  C E E  C O U N T R I E S  • •  PA R T  I I
D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
behavior. Most of the requirements, however, have been laid down in the form of 
general principals. Th ere are no guidelines for conduct in concrete situations, conﬂ ict 
of interest situations included.
A Code of Ethics for municipal councilors has been drafted by experts of non-
governmental organizations.62 Th e draft is to be implemented in several municipalities 
as a pilot project, and at this stage it will probably be evaluated as a good document, 
regulating conﬂ ict of interest issues that municipal councilors are likely to encounter. 
It also establishes sanctions for violation of the provisions.
4.6.2   Education and Training
Training municipal oﬃ  cers in standards on ethical and lawful professional conduct 
for typical situations and rules for acting in conﬂ ict of interest cases represents a good 
extra-legal tool for enhancing the eﬃ  ciency of conﬂ ict of interest norms.  
In Bulgaria, a special state body for training public servants in the central and local 
administrations was established: the Institute for Public Administration and European 
Integration at the Ministry of Public Administration.63 Th e main focus of the institute 
is to raise the professional qualiﬁ cation of public oﬃ  cials by developing annual training 
curricula and holding courses and seminars for them.
Th e Institute for Public Administration and European Integration plays a leading 
role in the implementation of the National Strategy for Training of Administrative 
Personnel adopted by the Council of Ministers on February 7, 2002. Th e strategy has set 
the priority areas of training and seeks to raise the professionalism of the administrative 
staﬀ  and strengthen the administrative capacity of the country to prepare for future 
membership of the Republic of Bulgaria in the European Union. Th e strategy is based 
on the need to realize of a holistic integrated policy for management and development 
of human resources in the administration. Th e training measures are mostly directed 
at civil servants, but measures have also been established for all of the administrative 
personnel working under civil or labor contract.  
However, there is no specialized organization for training local elected oﬃ  cials 
(i.e., mayors and municipal councilors). Th is type of training is mostly done by non-
governmental organizations. Various initiatives exist for training mayors and municipal 
councilors, mainly owing to the National Association of Municipalities in the Republic 
of Bulgaria, established in 1996. All the municipalities in the country are members 
of the association. Th e National Association of Municipalities organizes a national 
system for training and qualiﬁ cation of municipal councilors, mayors and municipal 
administrative personnel.
Non-governmental organizations working in the ﬁ eld of local self-governance 
are also active in this respect. Th ese include the Foundation for Reform in Local 
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Government, the National Association Legal Initiative for Local Government, etc. 
Th ese organizations are carrying out the Innovation Practices in Bulgaria project, 
through which municipalities are exchanging their experiences of successful practices 
for improvement and development of local self-governance. Th e local authorities get 
access to information, printed and electronic, about the innovative achievements of 
their colleagues in the ﬁ elds of servicing the citizens, training staﬀ , cooperation and 
joint decision-making with the civil organizations, etc.
So far, the courses dedicated to ethics of conduct and conﬂ ict of interest prevention 
have not been a separate module but were presented an element of the programs for 
increasing the legal knowledge and skills of the local administration. A more eﬀ ective 
use of this instrument would substantially enhance the eﬃ  ciency of the application of 
legislation in this respect.
4.6.3   Human Resource Management Measures
Human resource management is an activity that has not been developed at the necessary 
level and with suﬃ  cient intensity by state and municipal authorities in Bulgaria. Yet in 
recent years it has been regarded in a more serious way. As a result, special provisions 
were included in the Civil Servant Act for promoting civil servants based on professional 
experience, acquisition of a rank and promotion in rank at certain time intervals, and 
rules for granting ﬁ nancial and moral incentives for good work performance. In addi-
tion, the Ordinance on the Conditions and Order of Attestation of the Servants in the 
State Administration was adopted. Th is ordinance should assist the fair and transparent 
career and professional development of those employed in public administration.
As far as ﬁ nancial incentives for the staﬀ  of the local bodies are concerned, it should 
be pointed out that the municipalities are quite restricted in applying them, though 
this appears to be one of the major motivational mechanisms for fair and lawful oﬃ  ce 
performance. Salaries of municipal employees and mayors are determined by the central 
government—within the normative framework on salaries in budget organizations, laid 
down by the Council of Ministers.
Some municipalities are trying to use moral incentives for their staﬀ , in the form 
of various encouragements for high quality work and recognition of employee eﬀ orts. 
Some motivational techniques being used include providing training courses for which 
a formal certiﬁ cates are issued, awarding letters of gratitude, greeting and recognition 
papers for participation of municipal servants in competitions, exhibitions, etc.64 
Th ose, however, are not widespread practices but rather interesting decisions of separate 
municipalities.
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5.   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Summary of the Identifi ed Problems, 
      Evaluation, and Conclusion
Currently, we can conclude that eﬀ orts have been made toward legal regulation of con-
ﬂ ict of interest in Bulgaria and that these eﬀ orts aim for the development of minimal 
standards of prevention. Due to the horizontal approach of Bulgarian legislation, conﬂ ict 
of interest provisions may be found in diﬀ erent legislative acts, depending on the sphere 
of the public relationship being regulated. Th e separate acts stipulate diﬀ erent prohibi-
tions and restrictions, intended to prevent the use of oﬃ  cial position for personal gain, 
or to create conditions for bias in the activities of public oﬃ  cers. 
Nevertheless, legislation has not deﬁ ned all the potential areas of conﬂ ict. Some 
problems that are provided for in other European countries are either not regulated in 
Bulgaria, or the legislation is too laconic. More detailed regulation on conﬂ ict of inter-
est exists mainly for civil servants. With regard to mayors, municipal councilors, and 
employees under labor contract in municipalities, regulation is insuﬃ  cient. Besides, the 
norms on conﬂ ict of interest prevention are not systematically grouped into divisions 
or separate parts of the acts but instead dispersed throughout the text. Also, there are 
legal gaps concerning some procedural regulations in areas of a strong public interest 
(e.g., granting concessions or awarding municipal property).
Th e most essential problem areas, identiﬁ ed in the course of this research, are:
      •     With regard to substantive law:
            1)  Diﬃ  culties for municipal oﬃ  cials in determining the opportunities for, and 
presence of, conﬂ ict of interest. Th is problem is predetermined by the lack 
of legal deﬁ nition of the concept of “conﬂ ict of interest” in Bulgarian legis-
lation. Various acts contain partial lists of cases where such conﬂ icts might 
emerge. Th is makes it diﬃ  cult for municipal oﬃ  cials to easily recognize the 
situations in which conﬂ icts of interest arise. What is more, the scattered 
regulation in a number of acts hampers the administrators’ knowledge of 
the entire situation.
            2)  Lack of clearly deﬁ ned provisions on economic conﬂ icts of interest, such 
as receiving gifts, sponsored trips, participation in nonproﬁ t organizations, 
and restrictions on ex-oﬃ  cials who have left their position.
            3)  Th ere is no detailed regulation on the problem of favoritism and thorough 
prevention rules regarding municipal mayors.
            4)  Th ere is a problem with the application of conﬂ ict of interest norms in 
small municipalities with a limited population. Th e latter is especially true 
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for the ban on recruiting persons with family relations in one and the same 
municipal administration, as well as rules for withdrawal from the decision-
making process.
      •     With regard to procedural regulation:
            1)  Lack of requirements for conﬂ ict of interest declaration. Municipal coun-
cilors or mayors are not required to declare or disclose personal interests and 
conﬂ icting situations upon taking oﬃ  ce, annually, or in concrete situations 
of conﬂ ict. Th ere is only a requirement that municipal civil servants declare 
their property status, and that includes real estate only.
            2)  Insuﬃ  cient regulation on withdrawal from decision-making in the presence 
of personal interests. Th ere is no thorough and well-developed regulation 
on exclusion from decision-making, valid for all local bodies or managing 
administrative oﬃ  cers in the municipal administration, when concerned 
oﬃ  cials have some individual or corporate interests, family or relatives’ 
interests in a decision in question. No detailed procedures are provided for 
removal of an oﬃ  cial from decision-making on the request of the interested 
parties or for self-withdrawal from the process.
            3)  Th ere are no common legal rules ensuring objectivity, transparency and 
prevention of conﬂ icts of interest in tender and competition procedures for 
awarding municipal property or granting local concessions. Th ose issues, as 
well as the entire procedure for awarding municipal property or granting 
local concessions, are left to the competences of each separate municipality. 
Many municipalities have adopted no such ordinances. 
            4)  A widespread practice in Bulgarian municipalities is the violation of tender 
and competition procedures for awarding municipal property, local public 
procurement, granting local concessions, or privatization deals.
            5)  Th ere is no procedural mechanism for control, training and consideration 
of the issues related to conﬂ ict of interest in local government, nor is there 
a body to which such issues can be addressed.
      •       With regard to publicity and public control:
            Th e municipalities are still not using eﬀ ectively the opportunities to include civil 
and non-governmental organizations in decision- and policy-making processes 
of local importance.
      •       With regard to the ethical standards and codes of ethics:
            Codes of ethics are rarely used in municipalities. Th e use of codes of conduct 
or ethical codes by local authorities is not a widespread practice in Bulgaria. 
Th ere is also no legal obligation for municipalities to adopt such codes. A code 
of conduct is only available for civil servants working for the national and local 
authorities.
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Th e outlined problems lead us to the conclusion that the Bulgarian legislation is 
not taking full advantage of the techniques for conﬂ ict of interest prevention. Th ese 
techniques can help guarantee the objective and unprejudiced execution of local public 
duties and restrict power abuses and corrupt practices.  
5.2 Policy Proposals 
Th e described problems make it necessary to improve the regulatory framework and 
draft better rules to prevent conﬂ icts of interest in Bulgarian legislation and administra-
tions. In particular, the application of eﬀ ective and transparent mechanisms for public 
control over local self-governments will create prerequisites for consolidating stability 
and public conﬁ dence in local institutions, and, consequently, assist in the successful 
implementation of reforms in local government. Meanwhile, eﬀ orts to introduce modern 
standards of transparency and public accountability in the public sector represent an 
important catalyst for the country’s accession to the European Union.
Th e development of local self-governance and strengthening of local democracy 
are among the government’s priorities. It is established that a second level of local 
government will be created, the administrative capacity of local administration will be 
strengthened, and civil participation in the processes of development and government 
of the local communities will be enhanced. Furthermore, with the National Strategy to 
Combat Against Corruption of 2001, the government has planned a series of measures 
and mechanisms for combating corruption in local authorities, through the establish-
ment of rules for increasing public accountability and transparency of the performance 
of the municipal authorities, development of control over the decisions by the municipal 
councils, and increased public control.
In order to enhance guarantees of objectivity in oﬃ  cial’s performance of public 
duties and limit opportunities for abuse of oﬃ  ce, a set of measures for improving the 
legislative framework and implementation practices may be proposed. Th ese measures 
are mostly directed at the local government, in view of the speciﬁ c focus of this study, 
but they could serve as a model for prevention in the central government bodies as well. 
Such rules are equally needed for both the local government bodies and the central 
government authorities, since the problem of conﬂ ict of interest is underdeveloped at 
both levels of state governance.
Putting such measures into practice would signiﬁ cantly assist the government in its 
combat against corruption in state governance at all levels, and in building an eﬀ ectively 
functioning local government in the country.
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Table 2.4
Proposals for Changes 
Proposals Description
1.    Development of legal 
definition on conflicts of 
interest
Develop and adopt a legal definition on conflict of interests.
Differentiate between financial (pecuniary) and non-financial (non- pecuniary) interests by taking into account that 
both financial and non-financial interests should be subject to disclosure and declaration. 
2.    Systematization of 
duplication of power rules
Systematize the duplication of power rules with regard to the municipal councilors and municipal mayors by 
enumerating exhaustively all incompatibility cases for occupying public positions. 
Provide rules for action to be taken when such duplication appears, i.e., which one of the two positions is to be 
relinquished in such cases.
3.    Stipulation of a detailed 
procedure for withdrawal 
from the decision-making 
process
Establish the legislative order and cases for withdrawal from decision-making for municipal councilors, mayors, and 
municipal officers in managerial positions, when they have personal, family, or corporate interest in the issues to be 
decided. 
Develop detailed procedures for self-withdrawal and opportunities for removal on request of other interested parties 
in the decision-making process (the public included). 
4.    Provision of an obligation 
for municipal councilors 
and  mayors for 
declaration of interests 
and property
Provide for an obligation of municipal councilors and municipality mayors to disclose (declare) personal or 
corporate interests as well as family interests.
This could be done by means of adding municipal councilors and municipal mayors to the persons liable under the 
PPPSPPA. 
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5.    Introduction of changes 
in the rules for declaration 
in the Register under the 
Publicity of the Property 
of Persons in Senior Public 
Positions Act
Together with the inclusion of municipal councilors and mayors as liable persons, the Register under PPPSPPA 
should provide for: 
•    declaring the occupied management positions (manager, member of board of directors, executive or supervisory 
council, etc.) in organizations where high-positioned officials, such as municipal councilors, are allowed to 
occupy such positions by law; 
•    declaring membership in various non-profit organizations and unions;  
•    informing of changes in the circumstances declared in the Register within a set term (i.e., 30 days of term) of the 
occurrence of the change;  
•    direct rather than mediated (through the media or public bodies) access of citizens to data in the Register, with 
the exception of access to data on family members —a stipulation made in order to respect the right to privacy 
of such persons; 
•    sanctions (fines) against liable persons who fail to submit a declaration within the deadline, in view of the 
currently low discipline in this respect.
6.    Enlarging the scope of 
public relations and 
property declared by local 
administration employees
Stipulate an obligation for civil servants and employees under labor contract in local administration to submit a 
declaration on real estate, possessions over a defined value, payments and presents received with relation to public 
service that exceed a certain amount, andmembership in managing and controlling bodies of commercial and non-
profit organizations. 
7.    Provisions for restrictions 
after an official leaves a 
post or position
 
Develop provisions banning, for at least two years after an official leaves office, the performance of activities in 
organizations with which the person has had direct and considerable official relations during the year preceding 
termination of office.  
Define which official relations shall be deemed direct and considerable.
Provide for a ban on using official (confidential) information for personal gain after leaving office. 
These provisions may be included in the codes of conduct for municipal councilors, mayors, and local government 
employees. 
8.    Adoption of minimum 
standards for tenders and 
competitions for awarding 
municipal property and 
granting local concessions
Provide for minimum standards in the MPA regarding conflict of interest prevention in holding tenders and 
competitions for awarding municipal property and granting local concessions. 
The minimum standards should be mandatory for municipalities when adopting local ordinances regulating such 
matters, and they should also guarantee transparency if no such ordinances exist. 
Table 2.4 (continued)
Proposals for Changes 
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9.    Development of detailed 
methodological guidelines 
for the implementation of 
the PPA provisions
Develop and adopt detailed methodological guidelines for implementation of the PPA and the ordinance for small 
public procurement under the act. 
The guidelines should make use of and include the implementation practices for the Public Procurement Act, 
different cases related to the awarding and execution of public procurement, and judicial practices. 
10.  Introduction of 
legal obligations for 
municipalities to adopt 
codes of ethics
Introduce an obligation for the mandatory adoption of codes of conduct by each municipality, for municipal 
councilors and mayors.
The legislation should establish minimum norms and standards that need to be incorporated within the codes, as 
well as sanctions for violations.
11.  Addition to the Civil 
Servants’ Code of Conduct
Supplement the CSCC with matters such as receiving gifts, sponsoring trips and education, and bans on certain 
activities for a set period of time after someone leaves their position. 
Provide for sanctions for violating the provisions of the Code. 
12.  Establishing a specialized 
body on ethical issues in 
local government
Establish a Commission on ethics at respective municipal councils as a standing or interim commission.
The Commission should monitor the overall observation of the norms of conduct by municipal officers, investigate 
the conduct of local bodies, receive appeals and reports on conflict of interest situations in local government. 
It should tackle issues concerning emerging conflicts, those of removal on request of other interested parties, as 
well as cases of self-withdrawal from office; it should propose to the municipal council the imposition of relevant 
sanctions for violations of the codes of conduct.
The Commission should provide instructions and guidance in conflict situations and in cases when a person is 
uncertain whether he/she is in a conflict situation, as well as other matters regarding the observation of ethical 
standards.
13.  Provision of special 
procedures for 
examination of conflicts 
of interest situations by 
the State Administrative 
Commission
Provide special procedures for examination of conflict of interest cases related to civil servants in the statute of the 
State Administrative Commission. 
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Table 2.5
Recommendations Related to Practices upon Implementation 
of Norms for Conﬂ icts of Interest 
Proposals Description
1. Training for local officials 
on conflicts of interest
Undertake training of local officials on issues related to conflicts 
of interest, based both on the currently existing normative 
regulation on conflicts of interest and on the future adoption 
of respective legislative amendments within the provision of 
conflicts of interest. 
The training should be assigned after publishing a tender for 
public procurement.
2. Development of a database 
and information pools on 
conflict of interest issues
Establish a database and information pools clarifying the 
normative basis for conflicts of interest, describing the relevant 
obligations, providing example cases and instructions for 
proper action in conflict situations, and giving guidance on the 
particular authority that the official should address.
The database should be at the continuous disposal of the 
municipal bodies and their employees.
Assign the establishment of the information base through a 
public procurement procedure. 
3. A survey on the status 
of applying norms on 
preventing conflicts 
of interest in small 
municipalities
Conduct a survey of the status, constraints, and difficulties 
in the implementation of provisions for the prevention of 
conflict in Bulgarian small municipalities bearing in mind the 
possibilities for more frequent conflict appearance in small 
communities, due to their small population.
Study the opportunities and necessary legislative changes 
regarding small municipalities related to the more efficient 
implementation of conflict prevention rules in their area. 
4. Development of 
mechanisms for civil 
participation in the local 
decision-making process
Develop mechanisms for civil participation in the work and 
decision-making of the municipal council, such as: 
•        granting the right to citizens to have representation at 
municipal council sessions through local non-governmental 
organizations and providing these organizations with a right to 
advisory vote; or
•        establishing civil consultative councils with representatives 
of the municipality, citizens, and non-governmental 
organizations for discussion of local issues and proposal of 
solutions; or
•        concluding cooperation agreements between nonprofit 
organizations and local authorities for joint discussions of 
common problems.
Introduce an obligation for municipalities to inform the public 
in advance of the agenda of municipal council meetings through 
appropriate methods, which will facilitate the participation 
of citizens and organizations in the process of discussing and 
resolving matters of local importance. 
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ACRONYMS 
APA         Administrative Procedure Act 
APIA        Access to Public Information Act 
ASPJPA   Administrative Service to Physical and Juridical Persons Act
ATCRBA Administrative Territorial Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria Act 
CSA         Civil Servants Act 
CSCC      Civil Servants’ Code of Conduct
JSA          Judicial System Act 
LC           Labor Code
LEA         Local Elections Act 
LSLAA     Local Self-Governance and Local Administration Act 
MBA       Municipal Budgets Act 
MPA        Municipal Property Act 
NAMRB  National Association of Municipalities in the Republic of Bulgaria
NAOA     National Audit Oﬃ  ce Act
PAA         Public Administration Act 
PC           Penal Code 
PPA         Public Procurement Act 
PPPCA    Privatization and Post-Privatization Control Act 
PPPSPPA Publicity of the Property of Persons in Senior Public Positions Act 
SIFCA     State Internal Financial Control Act 
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NOTES
1 May 1997–July 2001—Government with Prime-Minister Ivan Kostov, leader of the United 
Democratic Forces Coalition—the party, that won the parliamentary elections in 1997; since July 
2001—Government with Prime-Minister Simeon Saxe-Coburg Gotha, formed by the National 
Movement Simeon II—coalition between the Movement for National Revival Oborishte and the 
Party of Bulgarian Women.
2 According to data of the national representative survey of the National Center for the Study of Public 
Opinion at the National Assembly, conducted in September 2002.
3 For further information on the electoral activity of Bulgarian citizens—Bulletins of the Central 
Election Commission on the results of the presidential elections, held on July 17, 2001; on 
November 11, 2001 (round I) the activity is 50.5 percent, on November 18,  2001 (round II)—54 
percent, and at the partial local elections in the municipalities of Sliven (13 percent), Ruse (24 
percent), Blagoevgrad (25 percent), etc.
4 According to a public opinion poll held in May 2002 by Coalition 2000, corruption is among the 
gravest problems in Bulgaria, preceded by the problems of unemployment, low income, and poverty 
only.
5 Th e surveys show that, in the CEE countries, the lack of conﬁ dence in national institutions is 
largely due to the public understanding that there exists widespread corruption. Th e majority of 
the citizens in Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, and half of the citizens in Bulgaria and Hungary, 
think that corruption is most widespread in state institutions and state administration—On the Take: 
Central and East European Attitudes Toward Corruption, October 1999—USIA report, United States 
Department of State.
6 Corruption indices of Coalition 2000, May 2002, op.cit.
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7 In Support of the statements, the highlighted problems of public administration are described in 
the report Corruption in Transition: the Bulgarian Experience, a Report by the Bulgarian Working 
Group for the Partners in Transition II Conference, 2001, and also the problems of the work of the 
administration in the delivery of public services in Service Standards Improvements Project Report, 
World Bank, 2002, pp.133, 274.
8 Adopted with Decision No. 36 of the Council of Ministers of 1998.
9 Established with decision No. P–100 from December 29, 2000 of the minister of public 
administration. 
10 Regulation Nos. 152 and 259 of the Council of Ministers of 2000.
11 Adopted with Decision No. 671 of the Council of Ministers of 2001.
12 During the last transition years, there may be observed an improvement in the corruption rating of 
the Republic of Bulgaria within the framework of the comparative index of the international non-
government organization Transparency International: In 1998 it was ranked 66th (as for 1999 it 
had the lowest rating), in 2001 it took 49th place, and along this line it came closer to the Central 
European countries. 
13 Government Strategy for Modernization of the State Administration—from accession to integration, 
adopted with Decision of the Council of Ministers No. 465 of 2002.
14 Prom., SG, No. 56 of 1991.
15 Th ere were adopted the Local Self-governance and Local Administration Act (LSGLAA, 1991), 
Referenda Act (RA, 1996), Local Elections Act (LEA, 1995), Local Fees and Taxes Act (LFTA, 1997), 
Municipal Budgets Act (MBA, 1998), and Municipal Property Act (MPA, 1996).
16 Ratiﬁ ed with an Act, prom. SG, No. 28 of 1995, issued by the Ministry of Regional Development 
and Public Works, prom., SG, No. 46 of 2000.
17 Prom., SG, No. 130 of 1998, last amended and added SG, No. 99 of 2001.
18 Prom., SG, No. 67 of 1999, last amended and added SG, No. 110 of 2001.
19 Prom. SG, No. 63 of 1995, last amended—SG, No. 57 of 2000.
20 Art. 142 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria.
21 Th e order of electing a municipality mayor is established by law, i.e., the Local Elections Act, prom. 
SG, No. 66 of 1995,  last amended—SG, No. 24 of 2001.
22 Th e mayor of an area or mayoralty carries out speciﬁ c activities related to the governance of the area 
or mayoralty, entrusted to him by law, or by the regulations on the activities of the municipality. For 
example, he allocates the municipal budget; he is responsible for the economic entities as established 
by the municipal council; he appoints and discharges public servants who assist him in his activities 
in the municipal administration; he ensures the implementation of the administrative services, etc.
23 In the present study, the mayors of mayoralties and areas are not considered separately, since the 
regulations referring to prevention of conﬂ ict of interest do not diﬀ er from the regulations on mayors 
of municipalities.
24 Th eir position is regulated by: Public Administration Act (PAA, 1998), Civil Servants Act (CSA, 
1999), Administrative Service to Physical and Juridical Persons Act (ASPJPA, 2000), Access to Public 
Information Act (APIA, 2000), Public Procurement Act (PPA, 1999), Local Self-Governance and 
Local Administration Act (LSGLAA, 1991), Local Elections Act (LEA, 1995), Municipal Property 
Act (MPA 1996), Privatization and Post-Privatization Control Act (PPPCA, 2002), Labor Code (LC, 
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1986) Penal Code (PC, 1986), State Internal Financial Control Act (SIFCA, 2000), National Audit 
Oﬃ  ce Act  (NAOA, 2001), and Publicity of the Property of Persons on Senior Public Positions Act 
(PPPSPPA, 2000).
25 Adopted with Regulation No. 35 of CoM of 2000.
26 Th e Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria (1991), which lays down fundamental principles 
related to conﬂ icts of interest such as rule of law, openness and transparency of public governance, 
equality before the law, political neutrality of the civil servants, etc.
27 In which Bulgaria is a party—European Charter of Local Self-Governance (Strasbourg, October 15, 
1985).
28 Public Administration Act (PAA, 1998), Civil Servants Act (CSA, 1999), Administrative Service 
to Physical and Juridical Persons Act (ASPJPA, 2000), Access to Public Information Act (APIA, 
2000), Public Procurement Act (PPA, 1999), Local Self-Governance and Local Administration 
Act (LSGLAA, 1991), Local Elections Act (LEA, 1995), Municipal Property Act (MPA, 1996), 
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Th e Progress of Regulation 
of Conf lict of Interest 
in Local Government in Latvia
Maris Pukis
1.   INTRODUCTION
Conﬂ ict of interest used to be mainly regarded as the core problem associated with pre-
venting corruption. Public oﬃ  cials should serve the public interest, but the temptation 
to act for one’s private interest is very strong. Eliminating such opportunities by the 
introduction of adequate restrictions is the traditional way of ensuring proper conduct 
of public administration for society’s beneﬁ t. 
Corruption is the potential consequence of conﬂ ict of interest. It is a crucial issue 
for local democracy, because it threatens the rule of law and human rights; undermines 
good governance, fairness, and social justice; distorts competition; hinders economic 
development; and endangers the stability of democratic institutions and the moral 
foundations of society.
Th e Civil Law Convention on Corruption (Council of Europe, 1999) gives the 
deﬁ nition of corruption as “requesting, oﬀ ering, giving, or accepting, directly or in-
directly, a bribe or any other undue advantage or prospect thereof, which distorts the 
proper performance of any duty or behaviour required of the recipient of the bribe, the 
undue advantage or the prospect thereof.”
Successful public policy has to be based on the real, not imagined, qualities of public 
oﬃ  cials. Th erefore, preventing conﬂ ict of interest situations is a substantial part of any 
anti-corruption program.
Th e national policy of preventing conﬂ icts of interest fully inﬂ uences local authori-
ties. Th e scale of local governance can be substantially diﬀ erent from that of national 
governance, particularly in the case of small, rural municipalities. Th erefore, it is necessary 
to describe not only common features, but also the eﬀ ects of diﬀ erence in scale.
In the case of small-scale authorities, each of the above-mentioned dilemmas is 
to be resolved in diﬀ erent ways from the national scale. Solution on the national level 
has tended to be stronger regulation, economic uniformization, which is suspect to 
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employees, and collective responsibility. Such an approach leads to bureaucratization 
and entails substantial expenditure.
Th e same is true for measures developed to prevent conﬂ ict of interest. In local 
governments of smaller scale, such measures appear more expensive. Th erefore, solutions 
to prevent corruption that seem suitable on the national level could lead to a signiﬁ cant 
decrease of eﬃ  ciency at the local level.
2.   GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SITUATION
 
2.1 The Characteristics of Self-Governments
Th ere are two kinds of local governments in Latvia—regional and local. Local govern-
ment is based on directly elected representatives in decision-making bodies; regional 
(district) councils consist of chairmen of directly elected local councils according to a 
1998 law (from 1989 to 1997 district councils were directly elected).
As of October 1, 2002, the number of self-governments of diﬀ erent types was:
        •     seven major cities (with the competence of local and regional governments);
        •     59 towns, 397 rural municipalities, pagasts, and nine municipalities, novads, 
merged by reform, (with the competence of local governments);
        •     26 districts, rajons, (with the competence of regional governments). 
Th ere were 15 novads as of December 1, 2002; correspondingly the number of towns 
and pagasts are decreasing. Th e central government intends to decrease the number of 
local authorities to approximately 102 by the year 2006. Half the population lives in 
seven major cities, the rest under local governments.
Councils of local governments are elected in proportional elections. If the number 
of residents exceeds 5,000, candidates have to be nominated by political parties. If the 
number of residents is less than or equal to 5,000, candidates have to be elected by 
political parties or by lists of electors. Many of the rural municipalities have fewer than 
1,000 residents, therefore the majority of elected local government oﬃ  cials are not 
delegated by political parties. 
Chairmen of local governments are the highest oﬃ  cials of the locality, and they used 
to be called mayors. Mayors have to be elected by councils and are directly account-
able to them. Mayors are chairpersons of councils and simultaneously head the local 
or regional government. Th ey are entitled to represent the self-government in relations 
with any other public or private entities.
Th e head of the local government administration is the executive director. Th e execu-
tive director has to be appointed by the council. Candidates to that position can only 
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be nominated by the mayor. In a sense this is a political position, since it depends on a 
political majority. In some views, the executive director has to be a professional manager. 
Th e executive director of a local government is not a civil servant and may come from 
the private sector. In small municipalities (fewer than 5,000 residents) mayors can also 
carry out the responsibilities of the executive director.
2.2 Positions, Roles, and Functions of Local Government Offi cials
To explore real and potential situations of conﬂ ict of interest, it is necessary to describe 
the position, roles, and functions of local government oﬃ  cials and employees.
Th e order of elections, main requirements to participate in elections, and primary 
qualiﬁ cations of councillors are determined by Th e City Council, District Council and 
Rural Municipality Council Election Law (1994-a), and by the Law On the Status of 
Councillors in City Councils, District Councils, and Rural Municipalities Councils 
(1994-c). 
Councillors carry out their duties in their own free time. Th e job of chairman of 
council (mayor) must be full-time by law. Th e statute on local governments may de-
termine some other positions, such as vice chairman, chairmen of councils, standing 
committees, etc., as full time, but it happens mainly in cities. As a rule, in rural munici-
palities, only the mayor works for the community full time. Councillors normally get paid 
for the time spent performing their duties, using rates established by the council.
Th e national association of self-governments (ULRGL—the Union of Local and 
Regional Governments of Latvia) opposed the idea of giving the legal status of state civil 
servants to self-government employees because there was a clear danger that this more 
might subordinate local or regional government executive bodies to central authorities. 
However, the ﬁ rst Law on State Civil Service (1995) determined the introduction of 
a uniﬁ ed system for both central and self-government civil servants. Implementation 
was postponed from year to year, taking into account the lack of ﬁ nancial resources 
for that purpose, until that stipulation was eliminated from the second State Civil 
Service Law (2000). Th is prevented a violation of the European Charter of Local Self 
Government. Nevertheless, legal acts about civil service during the last eight years have 
had substantial indirect inﬂ uence on the performance of local or regional government 
employees and institutions.
Self-government employees are not civil servants. Th ey work on contract with the 
self-government or its institution (the contract being signed by the mayor, executive 
director or head of a local or regional government institution). Uniform legislation of 
employer–employee relations in the private sector apply to local and regional government 
employees as well. Exceptions from those general rules, which lead to stricter require-
ments for self-governmental oﬃ  cials, are contained in special laws on preventing conﬂ icts 
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of interest, detailing administrative processes, providing freedom of information, etc. 
Further requirements might also be included in the text of individual contracts.
Senior local or regional government oﬃ  cials and heads of self-governmental en-
terprises or establishments are employed by contract with the mayor. Other oﬃ  cials 
have contracts with the executive director or the head of enterprises owned by the 
self-government.
2.3 Recent History of Preventing and Combating Corruption 
      in Latvia 
Like in any democratic country, the problem of conﬂ ict of interest is under permanent 
discussion by civil society in Latvia. Attempts to reduce the inﬂ uence of conﬂ ict of in-
terest are a substantial part of combating corruption in general. Th at concerns all levels 
of public government, including local and regional governments. 
A form of “wild capitalism” was initially a common stage of development in all 
transition countries. Among the characteristics of that period were the growth of illegal 
economic activities, the substantial inﬂ uence of criminal elements, and the growing 
corruption of the bureaucracy. On the one hand, it was a continuation of the Soviet 
traditions, on the other hand these phenomenausually characterize any society that goes 
through revolutionary changes.
Th e environment was hospitable for these activies because previous legislation and 
institutions were questioned, but no new ones had yet been created. Th e system of control 
was also weakened during the ﬁ rst years after re-establishing independence.
Th e negative role of corruption as a source for slowing economic development 
became evident from the ﬁ rst steps of Latvia’s transition from a planned centralized 
economy to a market economy. First of all, it led to a decrease of income in public posi-
tions. Second, it led to unfair competition—creating opportunities for bribery.
Gradually, the role of corruption became more evident and dangerous. An increase 
in corruption meant a decrease in trust in democratic values, resulting in the loss of 
support by citizens for the democratic process at the national, regional, and local levels. 
Th e inﬂ uence of corruption played a crucial role in election results: In many cases it 
gave rise to populistic and undemocratic political parties.
In an eﬀ ort to prevent corruption, attention was focused on conﬂ ict of interest as a 
source of potential corruption. Th e early laws on rural municipalities, and self-govern-
ments of districts and cities during the years 1990–1993 introduced legal statutes to 
prevent participation in the decision-making process when real or potential conﬂ icts 
of interest were present, as well as restrictions to prevent duplication of power. Legal 
norms to ensure transparency of local and regional governments were also included. 
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During 1990–1993, eﬀ orts to prevent conﬂ icts of interest in local or regional gov-
ernment did not lead to practical results—legislation norms were fragmentary and the 
institutional basis for implementation insuﬃ  cient.
In 1994, a strong intention of combating corruption was declared. Th e period since 
has had two phases:
        •     introduction of anti-corruption legislation package (1994–1997);
        •     revision strategies, corresponding legislation and institutions (1997 until present).
Th e ﬁ rst stage is related to the process of public administration reform after re-es-
tablishing the legal and institutional system of pre-Second World War Latvia, including 
the Constitution (Satversme) (1922), Cabinet of Ministers Structure Law (1923) and 
Civil Law (1937), as well as the cabinet system of national governance. In the ﬁ rst stage, 
anti-corruption measures were nationally introduced through legislative acts:
        •     on dealing with public property (on privatisation (1994-b), on alienation of 
property (1995-b), on the prevention of squandering ﬁ nancial resources and 
property (1995-c) and procurement (1996)) including legal norms ensuring 
transparency, competition and economy;
        •     establishing restrictions preventing self-government oﬃ  cials (1994-c, 1994-d, 
1994-e, 1995-e) from occupying positions with potential or real conﬂ ict of 
interest;
        •     introducing procedures and institutions to supervise the activity of oﬃ  cials and 
authorities (1994-d, 1995-a, 1995-d).
Special mention has to be made of the Prevention of Corruption Law (1995-e), 
which established a detailed system of measures to prevent conﬂ icts of interest. Th is law 
applies to public oﬃ  cials and, in cases speciﬁ ed by this law, to their relatives and former 
public oﬃ  cials. Mayors, elected councillors, executive directors, senior self-government 
oﬃ  cials, heads of enterprises, establishments, and departments, and employees issuing 
administrative acts are subject to this law. All persons mentioned here were obliged to 
respect the restrictions and declare their assets. 
Th e institution charged to handle the declarations was the State Revenue Service. 
In the ﬁ nal days of the year 2001, when this law was put in force, over 40,000 public 
oﬃ  cials registered to ﬁ le declarations, one third of them self-government employees.
Declarations by public oﬃ  cials submitted to the State Revenue Service were acces-
sible to the public. Th e information included in the declarations may not be qualiﬁ ed 
as conﬁ dential and should be available without restrictions. Th ese provisions do not 
apply to information that, in accordance with this law, has been determined to be non-
publishable. 
According to the law, public access means the right of reporters of media organiza-
tions, as well as any other person, to gain access to declarations by any public oﬃ  cial, 
and to report on them.
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Th e second stage of anti-corruption policy was driven by two forces:
      •     wide criticism of the existing system, regarded by politicians, civil servants, and 
public oﬃ  cials as bureaucratic, ineﬀ ective, and discouraging better eﬃ  ciency;
      •     inﬂ uence of foreign advisors, particularly from the European Commission, to 
increase administrative capacity by strengthening anti-corruption measures.
In this period, the Corruption Prevention Council was formed as a coordinating 
institution by the Cabinet of Ministers on September 23, 1997. Th is new institution 
has developed a four-year governmental program for the prevention of corruption. Th e 
program is based on the awareness that corruption undermines the economic, social 
and legal development of the state, as well as the rights and freedoms of its citizens, 
thus reducing public trust and resulting in an adverse impact upon the political stability 
of the country. Th e Program has been developed with the objective of creating a long-
term and eﬃ  cient state policy to prevent corruption by identifying conditions inviting 
corruption and by providing legal and other mechanisms for the elimination of said 
conditions, including the development and implementation of new legislation.
Th e corruption prevention strategy took three basic directions at the time: preven-
tion, ﬁ ghting against corruption, and training. Th e three directions need to be made 
more eﬀ ective by harmonizing eﬀ orts by the state sector, private sector, and the public, 
meeting Latvia’s international commitments at the same time. Th e central objective 
of the strategy to prevent corruption should be the improvement of legislation and 
strengthening the institutional framework, along with increased public awareness and 
support for corruption prevention eﬀ orts. 
Th e conclusion of program is that the primary conditions favoring corruption 
are:
        •     normative acts are not clearly and accurately formulated;
        •     the institutional system of public administration is in disarray;
        •     the system of ﬁ nancial reporting and accounting is incomplete;
        •     the public is poorly informed about the essence of corruption and causal rela-
tionships;
        •     the norms of ethics are neglected;
        •     remuneration of public employees is extremely low;
        •     the public is tolerant of corruption and potentially willing to participate in it.
Another important conclusion is that the prevention of corruption is hindered 
by:
        •     the conviction that conditions justify corruption;
        •     the disinclination of the public to report cases of corruption when no conse-
quences are deﬁ ned for punishment;
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        •     the belief that a particular act is not a case of corruption;
        •     concern about revenge;
        •     concern about insuﬃ  cient evidence.
As a result, even though signiﬁ cant eﬀ orts have been made in Latvia to prevent cor-
ruption, independent investigations showed that in many respects the situation is not 
satisfactory. Municipalities are regarded as potentially corrupt organizations.
Th e Transparency International Corruption Perception Index has given Latvia a score 
of 3.4 (where 0 means the most corrupt and 10 the least) since 1999, ranking it be-
tween 57th and 59th place—the worst position for any candidate country except Bulgaria 
and Romania. According to the same index, the situation has become a little better in 
2002—Latvia scored 3.7, ranking it between 52nd and 56th place along with the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia and before Romania.1 
Th e EBRD/World Bank’s 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey (BEEPS) indicated that Latvia was relatively unaﬀ ected by administrative cor-
ruption (1.4 percent of annual revenue spent on unoﬃ  cial payments by companies 
compared to 2.2 percent of the regional average).
On the other hand, according to the BEEPS survey, Latvia suﬀ ered from a serious 
problem of “state capture,” with the highest “capture economy index” of any EU can-
didate country (30 compared to the candidate country average of 16). Forty percent of 
Latvian ﬁ rms reported that their business was signiﬁ cantly or very signiﬁ cantly aﬀ ected 
by buying parliamentary votes.2
Th ese survey results indicate that ﬁ rms perceive the legislative process to be easily 
inﬂ uenced by corruption, more than in any other candidate country with the arguable 
exception of Bulgaria and Romania.
Media reports explain these results by the limited attention society pays to cor-
ruption. In countries where there is little public awareness of corrective actions against 
corrupt practices, public opinion polls show the “highest level” of corruption. Th ere 
are countries where bribes are a common element of relations between citizens and 
public administrations. It seems strange that the Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index places Latvia behind Belarus (36th place) and some other countries that 
are less democratic than Latvia.3 
One of the main obstacles in combating corruption is lack of attention to the bureau-
cracy, including public administration reforms. As Jansone and Reinholde4 argued:
 “from the point of view of society and NGOs, the Civil Service is 
perceived as an enormous and closed bureaucratic machine with a ten-
dency for self-maximization and limited possibilities for cooperation. 
For politicians it is preferable to speak about combating bureaucracy as 
such, than about improving capacity of public administration.” 
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Corruption is a permanent topic in the media. Journalists do much reporting on 
real, as well as at times imagined, cases of conﬂ ict of interest. Th erefore, the issue of 
corruption is high on the political agenda. Fighting against corruption was one of the 
major promises by the winners of parliamentary elections of October 5, 2002. After 
the elections, among its ﬁ rst steps, the new government dismissed many senior oﬃ  cials 
from state civil service and reduced the protection of public oﬃ  cials by amendments 
in legislation. 
3.   POTENTIAL SOURCES OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST
3.1 Over-regulation
Th e latest edition of the national corruption prevention program (Cabinet of Minis-
ters, 2001) mentions that the fact that “normative acts are not clearly and accurately 
formulated” favors corruption. Th e ﬁ rst edition saw over-regulation as the source of 
conﬂ ict. Th e diﬀ erence between the two editions shows a diﬀ erent approach to public 
administration reforms. 
One approach is based on the Westminster tradition and corresponding reforms, 
characteristic for Commonwealth countries during the last decades of the 20th century. 
Jansone and Reinholde5 found:
 “similarities between New Zealand and Latvia on such issues as the 
establishment of governmental or executive agencies, the ﬁ rst attempts 
to introduce the quality management system in public institutions and 
introduction of management contracts (regarding civil servants) and 
performance agreements (regarding institutions).” 
Th at approach is connected to the idea of less regulation and more of a results 
orientation.
Th e other approach is based on the Roman–German tradition and attempts to re-
store the pre-Second World War situation, akin to the Weimar republic in Germany of 
the 1920s. Many Latvian public law theoreticians and politicians are inclined strongly 
towards the “traditional” bureaucracy that can be found in the new State Administration 
Structure Law (2002). According to that law, “state administration shall be organized 
in a single hierarchical system. No institution or administrative oﬃ  cial may remain 
outside this system.” Such requirements also concern self-governments. Th at approach 
is connected to the idea of more precise regulation and prompting the administrations 
to comply with rules.
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To analyze the inﬂ uence of legislative acts on corruption, Klitgaard6 used this 
formula: 
            C = M + D – A
            where C stands for corruption, M stands for monopoly of power, D for the 
discretion of public oﬃ  cials, and A for accountability. 
Corruption tends to increase in situations where oﬃ  cials have a monopoly on power 
and discretion, but are not held accountable for their conduct.
Th e tendency to introduce more regulations leads to the necessity to establish cor-
responding executive and controlling institutions. At the national level, this can be
reasonable, but in the case of local governments, it is not obvious that beneﬁ ts will 
outweigh costs.
One of the principles limiting controlling actions has to be the application of pro-
portionality. Th e scope of involving central supervision has to be comparable with the 
importance of interests being protected. If the cost to control corruption will decrease 
the eﬃ  ciency of local government, then the introduction of more regulations is not 
useful.
Th ere is one more aspect. Too much regulation leads to bureaucratization. Th at 
bureaucratization leads to an increase in the number of restrictions and to oﬃ  cials’ 
issuing administrative acts. Each executive oﬃ  cial has some authority to decide on 
administrative acts. Th e introduction of new executives can be a reason to employ new 
inspectors and supervisors. Th ey also get their corresponding authority to make deci-
sions. Additional authority always increases the potential of corruption. If the principle 
of proportionality is not taken into account, then expenses to ensure accountability at 
the local level could outweigh beneﬁ ts.
One of the manifestations of over-regulation is “legal centralization.” Each year, 
more and more functions of the local government are subjected to uniform national 
regulations.
In 1992, social protection was a voluntary function determined by local governments 
and performed according to local regulations. At present, there is a complex system of 
national statutes and secondary legislation issued by the Cabinet of Ministers. In 1996 
there were diverse systems for primary and secondary health care organization in each 
district, because they were managed and ﬁ nanced by regional governments. Currently, 
there is a centralized ﬁ nancial and administrative system of health care where local gov-
ernments function only as owners of hospitals. Until 2002, land use planning was under 
the authority of local governments, but in recent years there have been steady attempts 
to reduce that traditional local function through new national over-regulation. 
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3.2 Insuffi cient Publicity
Insuﬃ  cient publicity is a factor that allows oﬃ  cials to be involved in conﬂ ict of inter-
est situations and corruption. Latvian legislation determines that a high level of local 
government activities and decisions must be made publicly. 
Th e Law on the Press and Other Mass Media (1990) determined that censorship 
and monopolization of the press and other mass media are not permitted. State and 
public organization oﬃ  cials may only refuse to provide information if it is not to be 
published in accordance with the law.
According to the Freedom of Information Law (1998-d), generally accessible infor-
mation shall be provided to anyone who wishes to receive it, subject to the equal rights of 
persons to obtain information. Th e applicant shall not be required to speciﬁ cally justify 
his or her interest in such information, and he or she may not be denied it because the 
information does not concern the applicant personally.
Restricted access to information is legal when the information:
      •     has been granted such status by law;
      •     is intended and speciﬁ ed for internal use by an institution;
      •     concerns trade secrets;
      •     concerns the private life of natural persons; or
      •     is related to certiﬁ cations, examinations, submitted projects, invitations to 
tender, and other assessment processes of a similar nature. 
Th erefore, a major part of self-governmental information is generally accessible. Th e 
Law on Self-Governments (1994-e) sets some important conditions favoring publicity, 
including:
      •     meetings of self-government councils shall be public;
      •     decisions of councils, orders of chairpersons, and minutes of public meetings 
of self-government councils shall be publicly accessible, in order that persons 
residing or working in the administrative territory of the relevant local govern-
ment, as well as journalists of the mass media, may acquaint themselves with 
such documents free of charge;
      •     self-government councils shall determine the procedures according to which 
public access is provided.
Th e law also establishes strong requirements for the preparation of an annual public 
report. Th e annual public report should include information regarding:
      1)   the allocation of the two previous years’ budgets and the accepted budget of the 
current year, including funds allocated for obligations and guarantees;
      2)   the value of local government’s real estate properties for the last two years;
      3)   the value of local government capital in undertakings and expected changes in it;
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      4)   the measures performed in the previous two years, as well as those planned for the 
current year, in implementing the territorial development plan, including:
            a)   public investments in the infrastructure of the administrative territory of 
the local government;
            b)  private investment in the administrative territory of the local government, 
and the participation of residents and undertakings in discussion and im-
provement of the local government territorial development program and 
territorial planning;
      5)   the opinions of the sworn auditor on the economic activities of the local gov-
ernment, its institutions and undertakings, as well as the local government’s 
annual report for the previous year;
      6)   the decision of the council regarding the annual report of the previous year;
      7)   the audit opinions of the State Audit Oﬃ  ce and the measures taken by the 
council to rectify discovered deﬁ ciencies;
      8)   the participation of the local government in co-operation with institutions and 
companies;
      9)   the measures taken to improve the management of local government institutions 
and companies; and
      10) the measures taken in order to promote the awareness of residents regarding the 
activities of the local government and the possibilities for their participation in 
the discussion of decisions.
Local governments may also add other information to their annual report.
Th e above-mentioned legal norms demonstrate a clear intent to involve civil society 
in matters of self-governance, and give the public wide access to basic information. 
Nevertheless, the tradition for preparing and disseminating public reports is not suf-
ﬁ ciently strong. Unfortunately, central government policy tends not to facilitate local 
government’s education and strengthen its capacity to improve public relations.
Problems of corruption, including conﬂ icts of interest, have been the focus of public 
attention in recent years. One of the most popular NGOs is “Delna,” which primarily 
focuses on this issue.7 A signiﬁ cant number of research projects have been completed 
by that NGO, particularly work supported by the EU-Phare program and by OSI. 
Two research projects focused on the availability of information in public institu-
tions. Th e ﬁ rst one was conducted from October 1999 to February 2001, and the 
second three years later (in 2003). In the period between the two projects, signiﬁ cant 
amendments were provided: In the Law On the Procedures for Reviewing Submissions, 
Complaints and Proposals in State and Self-Government Institutions a change created 
the right to verbal submissions; and the obligation to disclose information about public 
procurement was added in the Freedom of Information Law.
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Among 300 cases of submissions about getting information 35 percent came from 
local government institutions. Th e situation with local governmental oﬃ  cials’ responses 
could be characterized by the ﬁ gures below:
      •     5 percent of submissions were unsuccessful;
      •     43 percent of answers were provided in 15 days;
      •     26 percent of answers were provided in 30 days.
Attention from oﬃ  cials could be characterized by the fact that in 42 percent of the 
cases, representatives from local governments tried to get additional information about 
reasons behind the application for information. Such inquiries by oﬃ  cials is illegal.
In general, the quality of answers from local governments was approximately the 
same as that of central government institutions. Th ere are no corresponding traditions 
of public society to utilize opportunities provided by law. A positive tendency can be 
discerned in recent years in the increased activities of NGOs and the mass media to 
deal with problems of openness of information. 
3.3 Insuffi cient Compensation
Th e low level of compensation compared with the private sector is an incentive for public 
oﬃ  cials to engage in corruption. In this regard, the situation of local government em-
ployees is better than of those working in state civil service. Since 1998, self-governments 
councils have had the right to determine the level of compensation for their oﬃ  cials.
According to the Law on Self-Government (1994), among their exclusive compe-
tences, local government councils are authorized: 
      •     to determine compensation for the duties of a councilor, the procedures for 
payment of such remuneration, and procedures for reimbursement of work-
related expenditures;
      •     to determine the salary rates for the chairperson of the council, the deputy 
chairperson, employees of the territorial local government city or county council 
(parish council), and heads of local government institutions.
Th ose rights are not constrained by any restrictions issued by the central govern-
ment. Th e Law on Self-Governments establishes the requirement of usefulness—the 
activities and decisions of self-government councils (parish councils) should be as ef-
ﬁ cient as possible.
Th erefore, each local government can make separate decisions about compensation. 
Naturally, this leads to full political responsibility. Each decision about salary increases is 
always described negatively by the media; the councils are always under heavy pressure 
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by journalists in these cases. Decisions about balancing salary levels between the public 
and private sectors take political courage and entail many risk factors.
For the political opposition, it is always advantageous to declare the compensation 
of local government employees is too high. For the majority of the population, thanks 
partly to media reports favoring scandalous subjects over reporting on good develop-
ments, local oﬃ  cials are seen as unprofessional, stupid bureaucrats whose main line 
of business is to interfere with private activity. Publicity about attempts to introduce 
proportionality of compensation, i.e., equal pay for equal work, both in the public and 
private sectors, does not make any local politician more popular.
It would be much easier to make such decisions if the same problem were solved by 
the central government. Decisions of the central government about state civil service 
always draw public attention to corresponding self-government decisions. Unfortunately, 
in recent years, the Latvian government has not been ready to bring rational decisions 
in this area, submitting to populist pressures. 
 Another important constraint preventing local governments from introducing ad-
equate compensation is insuﬃ  cient ﬁ nancial resources. Financial centralization, always 
among the objectives of central government in the past nine years, leads to the reduction 
of relative local government resources, as compared to the central government. In some 
years, funding for self-governments was on the increase, but the general trend has been 
what one can see also during the last ﬁ ve years: Increasing the tasks of self-governments 
while funding is decreasing in relative terms means serious constraints to adquately ad-
dress the issue of compensation on today’s job market.
3.4 The System of Legal Restrictions
Th e system of legal restrictions to decrease potential conﬂ icts of interest is illustrated in 
Figure 3.1. Traditionally that system consists of preventing:
      A)  duplication of power;
      B)  entering into contracts and supplementary remuneration;
      C)  economic conﬂ ict of interest;
      D)  conﬂ ict of interest of personal relations;
      E)  using oﬃ  cial information for personal proﬁ t;
      F)   using local government property for personal proﬁ t;
      G)  involvement of non-political employees in political party activities.
All the above-mentioned objectives were implemented during the ﬁ rst stage in the 
ﬁ ght against corruption. Th erefore, presently it is possible not only to describe cor-
responding legislation, but also to draw initial conclusions about six years’ experience 
about enforcing such restrictions.
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Figure 3.1
Latvian Legislation Prohibiting Conﬂ icts of Interest in Local Governments
Sources of Conflict of Interest in the Local Governments of Latvia
1. Duplication 
of power
2. Economic
conflict of interest
3. Conflict of 
interest in 
personal relations
4. Using official
information for 
personal profit
5. Using local
government 
property
6. Involvement 
in political 
party activities
The Law on 
Self-Governments, 
1994
Law on Procurement
for State or Local 
Government Needs, 
2001
The Law on 
Prevention of 
Conflict of Interest 
in Activities of 
Public Officials, 
2002
Prevention of 
Corruption Law, 
(1995–2002)
Law on Prevention 
of Squandering of the 
Financial Resources 
and Property of the 
State and Local 
Governments, 1995The Law on Shares 
of State and Local 
Government Capitals 
and Capital 
Companies, 2002
The City Council, 
County Council 
and Parish Council 
Election Law, 1994
The Law on State and 
Local Government 
Procurement, 
1996–2001
Cabinet Regulation 
No. 560, on 
Procedures for 
Open Competition 
with Respect to 
Performance of 
Construction Work
Cabinet Regulation 
No. 559, on 
Procedures for 
Open Competition 
in Relation to 
Purchase of Services
Cabinet Regulation 
No. 558, on 
Procedures for 
Open Competition 
in Relation to 
Purchase or Lease 
of Goods
State Civil 
Service Law, 
2000,
(1994–2000)
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Dotted lines show three pieces of legislation in Figure 3.1. In all cases it means that 
the eﬀ ect of the relevant national law is indirect. Th e Law on State and Local Government 
Procurement was in force from 1996 to 2001; since 2002, a new Law on Procurement 
for State or Local Government Needs has been in eﬀ ect. Th e same applies to the Preven-
tion of Corruption Law (1995–2002) and the Law on Prevention of Conﬂ ict of Interest 
in Activities of Public Oﬃ  cials, being in eﬀ ect from the second half of 2002. In both 
cases, the latter law includes main elements of previous legislation.
Th e third “indirect” law is the State Civil Service Law. Th at law is not about employ-
ees of self-governments, but its inﬂ uence is indirect, deﬁ ning guidelines for principles 
of public service. Th e ﬁ rst piece of civil service legislation (1994-d) also includes civil 
service of local governments, but those legal norms were not implemented because, for 
the last six years, local governments have opposed central government eﬀ orts intention 
to abolish their independent authority in personnel matters (See also Chapter 2.).
Th e Law on Prevention of Conﬂ ict of Interest in Activities of Public Oﬃ  cials 
(2002-b) covers practically all kinds of restrictions. Duplication of power is covered 
also by the Law on Self-Governments, the City Council, County Council and Parish 
Council Election Law, and a new law on Shares of State and Local Government Capitals 
and Capital Companies. Economic conﬂ ict of interest is covered also by the Law on 
Procurement for State or Local Government and derived from that law's regulations 
(Cabinet of Ministers, 2001-a, b, c). Th e use of local government property is also cov-
ered by the Law On Prevention of Squandering of the Financial Resources and Property 
of the State and Local Governments. Involvement in political party activities was also 
covered by the State Civil Service Law.
Th e system of restrictions does not correspond strictly to the system of penalties and 
sanctions. Th e Law on Prevention of Conﬂ ict of Interest in Activities of Public Oﬃ  cials 
determines liability of public oﬃ  cials:
                1) “Persons shall be held liable for violations of this Law as speciﬁ ed 
in regulatory enactments. Civil liability shall also apply to public 
oﬃ  cials in accordance with the provisions of this Section.
                2) Income and ﬁ nancial beneﬁ ts obtained by violating the re-
strictions speciﬁ ed in this Law or a proportional augmentation 
thereof shall accrue to the State, by presuming that by violating 
the restrictions determined by the State and illegally obtaining 
income or ﬁ nancial beneﬁ ts, the public oﬃ  cial has caused such 
harm to the State administrative order as is to be evaluated in 
ﬁ nancial terms and is proportional to the value of augmentation 
of income, ﬁ nancial beneﬁ ts and property that are obtained in 
a prohibited way. 
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                3) If a public oﬃ  cial does not compensate voluntarily for the 
losses caused to the State, the State authority or the public 
oﬃ  cial authorized by law has a duty to perform the necessary 
actions in order to claim compensation for the losses caused in 
accordance with the procedures determined by law. 
                4) Compensation for losses shall be requested in accordance with 
the procedures determined in the Civil Procedure Law. 
                5) Th e recovery of losses from the public oﬃ  cial shall take place 
regardless of whether the public oﬃ  cial is subject to adminis-
trative or criminal liability for violating the provisions of this 
Law.” 
As far as criminal and administrative liability is concerned, the situation is illustrated 
in Chapter 4.7 of this report.
3.4.1   Duplication of Power
Th ere is a widely held opinion that duplication of power leads to conﬂ ict of interest. 
Th e Law on Prevention of Conﬂ ict of Interest in Activities of Public Oﬃ  cials (2002-b) 
requires that:
“Chairpersons of local government city councils (parish or district coun-
cils), deputy chairpersons of city councils, executive directors of local 
governments and their deputies, heads of State and local government 
institutions and their deputies, as well as members of executive boards 
and councils of such State and local government capital companies, 
in which the State or local government’s share of the equity capital 
separately or in aggregate exceeds 50 percent, are permitted to combine 
their oﬃ  ce of public oﬃ  cial only with: 
                1) oﬃ  ces which such persons hold in accordance with laws, or 
Cabinet regulations and orders; 
                2) oﬃ  ces in public, political or religious organizations; 
                3) the position of teacher, scientist, doctor or creative work; or 
                4) other oﬃ  ces in a State or local government institution if such 
combination does not result in conﬂ ict of interest and written 
permission has been received from the public oﬃ  cial or collegial 
authority which has elected, appointed or approved the relevant 
person in oﬃ  ce.”
Th e City Council, County Council and Parish Council Election Law (1994-a) 
allows state oﬃ  cials, such as members of parliament, members of government, pros-
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ecutors, judges, soldiers (except those, who perform active military service), to run in 
self-government elections. If they are elected, they lose the mandate of MP or their 
oﬃ  ce, except soldiers retired from military service. Th erefore, elected self-government 
councilors cannot take corresponding positions. 
And vice versa: Self-government deputies can occupy those positions, but then they 
lose their position in self-government. Th e idea behind the division of oﬃ  ces is based 
on the general doctrine of separating powers as much as possible. At the same time, 
there is no evidence of an increase in conﬂ ict of interest in such situations because state 
functions and self-government functions normally have to be exclusive. Some conﬂ icts 
could arise if self-government councilors can be judges and prosecutors, but excluding 
their participation in self-government could solve such problems.
During 1990–1993, some chairmen of local councils (mayors) were simultaneously 
members of parliament. Th at experience showed that mayors do not have  enough time 
for active work as parliamentarians, but there were no cases of conﬂ ict of interest. In 
Latvia, the participation of local government councillors directly in Parliament’s work 
could be a factor in strengthening local democracy.
Th ere is another form of conﬂ ict of interest when a representative of an interest 
group takes oﬃ  ce in a corresponding sector of the economy. For example, if the position 
of  health minister is occupied by a physician. Th en it could happen that the physician 
supports the interests of doctors, not those of patients. But in the case of self-govern-
ments, such conﬂ icts could not be excluded, because council membership depends on 
elections.
3.4.2   Entering into Contracts and Supplementary Compensation 
Conﬂ ict of interest can arise when oﬃ  cials enter into contracts with companies that 
receive municipal support or municipal orders. A similar situation occurs when oﬃ  cials 
get supplementary compensation from corresponding companies.
 Th e Law On Prevention of Conﬂ ict of Interest in Activities of Public Oﬃ  cials 
(2002-b) requires that members of the council or executive board of a state or local 
government capital company shall not obtain any type of income from merchants who 
receive orders for state and local government procurement, except in cases where orders 
have been granted as a result of an open competition. Th ese restrictions do not apply to 
income earned in a position at a private company in which the state or local government’s 
share of the equity capital, separately or in aggregate, exceeds 50 percent. 
Chairpersons of city and rajon councils and executive directors of these local gov-
ernments should honor the above-mentioned restriction for a period of two years after 
they leave public oﬃ  ce.
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3.4.3   Economic Conflict of Interest
A gift is any ﬁ nancial or other kind of beneﬁ t, including services, transfer of rights, 
release from obligations, or refusal of any rights, in favor of a public oﬃ  cial or his or 
her relatives, as well as other activities by which any beneﬁ t is granted to such persons. 
Small gifts, hospitality, and other beneﬁ ts received by local government oﬃ  cials are 
regarded as forms of economic conﬂ ict of interest.
Detailed restrictions of this kind of conﬂ ict of interest are included in the Law on 
Prevention of Conﬂ ict of Interest in Activities of Public Oﬃ  cials. A public oﬃ  cial is 
prohibited from accepting gifts directly or indirectly, except in cases speciﬁ ed by law.
According to the law, local government public oﬃ  cials are:
      •     mayors, executive directors of local governments and their deputies;
      •     councilors of local government councils; 
      •     heads of local government institutions and their deputies;
      •     members of councils or the executive board of those private companies 
in which the local government has an equity separately or in aggregate of over 
50 percent; 
      •     members of councils or executive boards of local government capital compa-
nies; 
      •     representatives of the holder of the local government’s share of capital and their 
authorized persons; 
      •     anybody who in the performance of their oﬃ  cial duties with the local govern-
ment authorities, in accordance with regulatory enactments, has the right to 
issue administrative acts, as well as to perform supervision, control, inquiry 
or punitive functions, in relation to persons who are not under their direct or 
indirect control, or to deal with the property of the local government, including 
ﬁ nancial resources, should also be considered public oﬃ  cials. 
Exceptions are made for diplomatic gifts and gifts that are presented on public 
holidays of the Republic of Latvia and on days of commemoration and celebration; 
on the anniversary of the State or local government authority where the oﬃ  cial works; 
or in other cases provided for by law. Th ose gifts shall be the property of the local 
government. 
Public oﬃ  cials are permitted to accept gifts from their relatives independent of their 
public oﬃ  ce. It is permitted for them to accept gifts from other natural or legal persons 
outside the performance of their oﬃ  cial duties only if the value of the gift received from 
one person within a time period of one year does not exceed the amount of a minimum 
monthly salary and the public oﬃ  cial has not issued an administrative act or performed 
supervision, control, inquiry or punitive functions in relation to the donor within a 
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time period of two years before the receipt of the gift. If a public oﬃ  cial has accepted 
gifts from natural or legal persons outside the performance of their oﬃ  cial duties, he or 
she is not entitled to issue administrative acts or perform supervision, control, enquiry, 
and punitive functions in relation to the donor for the period of two years after the 
acceptance of the gift. 
 A donation is the allocation (transfer) of ﬁ nancial resources, goods or services with-
out compensation for speciﬁ ed purposes. Public oﬃ  cials are prohibited from requesting 
or accepting a donation or aid for public needs if it aﬀ ects the taking of a decision in 
relation to a natural or legal person. Such donations or aid are also regarded as a source 
for conﬂ ict of interest.
 A public oﬃ  cial or collegial authority is prohibited from bringing any decision in 
relation to the donor for a period of two years after the acceptance of the donation or 
ﬁ nancial aid. 
Involvement in business and share holdings in local government service is also 
regarded as a source of conﬂ ict of interest. Th e Law on Prevention of Conﬂ ict of Inter-
est in Activities of Public Oﬃ  cials requires that mayors, their deputies and councilors, 
and executive directors of local governments shall not be shareholders, stockholders, or 
partners of commercial companies or individual merchants who receive orders from the 
respective local government, for procurement purposes for the local government, for 
ﬁ nancial resources, for local government-guaranteed credits, or for privatisation fund 
resources, except in cases where they are granted in open competition.
For two years after leaving public oﬃ  ce, a public oﬃ  cial is prohibited from accepting 
property from a merchant, or becoming a shareholder, stockholder, partner or oﬃ  cer 
in any commercial company that he/she had a professional relationship with while in 
oﬃ  ce—whether making decisions on procurement for local government needs, allocat-
ing of local government resources and local government privatisation fund resources, 
or performing supervision, control or punitive functions.
A public oﬃ  cial who is registered in the commercial register as an individual 
merchant in accordance with procedures speciﬁ ed in relevant regulations, and whose 
annual revenue from economic activities does not exceed 30,000 LVL (approximately 
50,000 Euro), is permitted to combine public oﬃ  ce with the economic activities of an 
individual merchant if the individual merchant receives income only from agricultural 
production, forestry, ﬁ shery, or rural tourism. 
To reduce the possibility of conﬂ ict of interest, the Law on Procurement for State 
or Local Government (2001-a), and regulations (Cabinet, 2001-b,-c,-d) derived from 
that law, require that during the tender process the contracting authority shall not alter 
the composition of the commission, except in cases where a member of the commission 
has an interest in the choice or activities of a particular applicant, has died, or is not 
able to perform his or her duties due to illness or absence.
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3.4.4   Conﬂ ict on the Basis of Personal Relations
Special requirements preventing work relations between relatives in self-governments 
do not exist. Legal stipulations of the State Civil Service Law (2000-d) could be regarded 
as a guideline in this respect. A person may be a candidate for a civil service position if they 
are not a relative (married to, or directly related to, or a brother or sister of ) the head of an 
institution or a direct supervisor. Th e Cabinet of Ministers may determine exceptional 
cases if a relevant institution cannot otherwise ensure the execution of pertinent func-
tions.
According to the Law on Prevention of Conﬂ ict of Interest in Activities of Pub-
lic Oﬃ  cials, relatives to whom established restrictions apply include father, mother 
grandmother, grandfather, child, grandchild, adoptee, adopter, brother, sister, half-sister, 
half-brother, and spouse.
Relatives shall not be the shareholders, stockholders or partners of commercial com-
panies or individual merchants who receive orders from the respective local government 
for procurements for local government needs, ﬁ nancial resources, local government-
guaranteed credits or privatization fund resources, except for cases where they have 
received the business through open competition.
A public oﬃ  cial is prohibited from preparing or issuing administrative acts, perform-
ing the supervision, control, inquiry, or punitive functions, entering into contracts or 
performing other activities in which such public oﬃ  cials, their relatives, or other parties 
are personally or ﬁ nancially interested. Th e period of cessation for relatives is the same 
as for oﬃ  cials—two years.
Small local governments used to be hotbeds of nepotism. An old-boy network all 
too often protects the jobs of friends. Claims that no one else is available or that a job 
requires special experience mask a self-serving and cynical agenda whereby turf is pro-
tected by preventing the empowerment of well-trained new personnel (Karklins, 2002).8 
Th e continued practice of nepotism in small rural self-governments can be blamed on 
two main circumstances:
      •     higher unemployment than in urban areas; incomplete structural reforms of 
rural economies; few available jobs for professionals in rural areas;
      •     scale—in cases when the local territory includes 400–1,000 residents (which is 
characteristic for one third of presently existing municipalities), it is not simple 
to divide economic activities between members of a family. 
3.4.5   Using Oﬃ  cial Information for Personal Proﬁ t
Using conﬁ dential information acquired during the performance of oﬃ  cial duties is 
prohibited. According to the Law on Prevention of Conﬂ ict of Interest in Activities of 
Public Oﬃ  cials:
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“It is prohibited to disclose unlawfully information accessible to a public 
oﬃ  cial in connection with the performance of the duties of oﬃ  ce of the 
public oﬃ  cial or utilize such information for purposes not related to the 
performance of the duties of oﬃ  ce of the public oﬃ  cial or fulﬁ lment 
of speciﬁ c terms of reference.”
As far as personal data is concerned, that is protected additionally by the Physical 
Persons Data Protecting Law (2001-b). Each database of personal data (including 
applied procedures) is supervised by the State Data Inspection.
3.4.6   Using Local Government Property 
According to the Law on Prevention of Conﬂ ict of Interest in Activities of Public 
Oﬃ  cials:
“A public oﬃ  cial may act with regard to state or local government prop-
erty, including ﬁ nancial resources, in accordance with the procedures 
provided by laws, government regulations, as well as binding regulations 
of self-government councils.” 
Activities with state or local government property, including ﬁ nancial resources, 
covered by the law include drafting or making a decision to acquire state or local gov-
ernment property or transfer of ownership and the use, appropriation to other persons, 
or the re-allocation of ﬁ nancial resources. 
A detailed system of restrictions has earlier roots in the Law on Prevention of 
Squandering of the Financial Resources and Property of the State and Local Govern-
ments (1995-b).
Local governments, local government institutions, enterprises, corporations, and 
other private companies in which local government’s equity separately or combined 
exceeds 50 percent, shall administer the ﬁ nancial resources and property rationally, 
that is:
      1)   objectives are to be achieved with the minimum use of ﬁ nancial resources and 
property;
      2)   property shall be alienated or transferred to the ownership or possession of 
another person at the highest price possible; and
      3)   the ownership or possession of property shall be acquired for the lowest price 
possible.
Th ere is a prohibition against transfering local government property to other persons 
for use without compensation, except in cases where:
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      •     a local government transfers the property of one of its institutions for use by 
another institution of the local government;
      •     a local government transfers its property for use by another local government. 
Th ere is a prohibition against alienating local government property at a reduced 
price, except where property is sold at a public auction. It is also prohibited to acquire 
property for ownership or use, or to order services or work at an obviously inﬂ ated price. 
Local government institutions are prohibited from giving as a gift (donating) ﬁ nancial 
resources and property, except where specially provided for in laws or by Cabinet of 
Ministers regulations. When such requirements are not fulﬁ lled, administrative or 
criminal liability applies.
Any Latvian citizen, including any journalist, has the right to get access to contracts 
granted for a gift (donation) registered by local government authorities. 
Th ere are special prohibitions concerning public aid according to the Law on the 
Control of State and Local Government Aid Provided for Entrepreneurial Activity 
(1998). Exceptions include those enterprises (companies) whose primary activity is 
related to education, health care, organizing sports events, social care, preservation of 
cultural and historical heritage, ands environmental protection, if the aid is granted to 
conduct the relevant activity.
Th erefore, in the area of economic activities with local government property, there 
is a comprehensive system of restrictions. Monitoring implementation, however, poses 
problems.
One problem is that the current system of restrictions covers too much. Progress 
in stricter control will be achieved by establishing and strengthening the Bureau for 
Preventing and Combating Corruption (2002a). Th e current national government is 
very impressed by results of a similar institution in Hong Kong.9 Setting up a single 
agency will lead to the expansion and intensiﬁ cation of investigations.
3.4.7   Local Government Employees’ Involvement 
           in Activities of a Political Party 
Th e notion of a politically independent civil service is very popular. It was introduced 
in the ﬁ rst public administration reforms in 1993–1995. Th e ﬁ rst law on civil serv-
ice (1994-d) establishes the political independence of civil servants. Th e last edition 
(2000-d) outlines a professional and politically neutral state civil service that performs 
administrative functions. Th at leads to the formal requirement “to be loyal to the lawful 
government irrespective of one’s political convictions.” Restrictions on membership in 
political parties or softer requirements, such as membership in party-aﬃ  liated political 
institutions, have yet to be covered by special laws.
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Followng the last parliamentary elections, the usefulness of political neutrality has 
been questioned. In order to “make state administration more eﬀ ective and more hon-
est” one of the ﬁ rst acts of the new government was to apply emergency rights to issue 
regulations with the power of law to amend the civil service law (2000-d). Th e prime 
minister has the right to dismiss senior civil servants in cases of “loss of conﬁ dence.” 
Th e State Civil Service Administration is accountable directly to the prime minister. 
Th erefore, political inﬂ uence on the recruitment and promotion of professional em-
ployees now has a legal basis.
Naturally, it is unacceptable for politically appointed supervisors to use local gov-
ernment employees for partisan political purposes in the performance of their oﬃ  cial 
duties. Th is includes inﬂ uence by any interest group, not only political parties, and has 
to be regulated by other legal statutes. Th ere are no formal restrictions on local govern-
ment employees’ membership in political parties. Job relations between professional 
employees and the mayor are regulated by civil law.
Special legislation on lobbying national authorities and self governments in Latvia 
has not been drafted or enacted into law. Th erefore, in principle, anything is permissible 
that is not covered by eﬀ ective laws. 
Local governments have full political responsibility for their executive structure and 
staﬀ . In cities where only the election of political parties is allowed, it is common to 
appoint senior oﬃ  cials on a political basis.
4.   INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 
      TO PREVENT AND DETECT CONFLICT OF INTEREST
4.1 Map of Corresponding Legislation
Th e main areas of preventing and detecting conﬂ icts of interest are:
      •     disclosure policy;
      •     procedures to report misconduct or suspected conﬂ ict; 
      •     other measures assisting prevention; 
      •     external and internal control supporting prevention; 
      •     accountability and responsibilities of local government oﬃ  cials.
Actual examples of the disclosure policy and procedures to report misconduct is 
described in the Law on Prevention of Conﬂ ict of Interest in Activities of Public Of-
ﬁ cials; other “indirect” pieces of legislation (marked by dotted lines) have not directly 
attributed to self-governments or have historical inﬂ uence.
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Other measures cover a set of procedures concerning issuing and disputing admin-
istrative acts,10 public procurement,11 property-related activities,12 the organization and 
supervision of public agencies,13 and ﬁ nancing political parties.14 
Supervising institutions and procedures to prevent conﬂ icts of interest are described 
by primary legislation.15
Accountability and responsibilities of local government oﬃ  cials are described by 
legislation on procedures of accountability of oﬃ  cials, revision procedures,16 submis-
sions,17 criminal liability,18 and administrative liability.19
4.2 The Current System of Declaration 
Local government oﬃ  cials have a duty to submit declarations by public oﬃ  cials. Dec-
larations have to be submitted:
      •     when assuming oﬃ  ce; 
      •     for the current year; 
      •     upon terminating public service; and 
      •     after public service has been terminated. 
Declarations have to be submitted to the Prevention and Combating of Corruption 
Bureau (until recently the agency was the relevant unit at the State Revenue Service). An 
anual declaration by self-government oﬃ  cial must be submitted each year by April 1.
In the declaration, a public oﬃ  cial must specify (both with respect to Latvia and 
foreign states) the following: 
      1)   his or her given name, surname, personal identiﬁ cation number and place of 
residence, as well as the given name, surname, personal identiﬁ cation number, 
place of residence and relationship of his or her spouse, parents, brothers, sisters, 
and children; 
      2)   his or her oﬃ  ce as a public oﬃ  cial; 
      3)   information on other oﬃ  ces that the public oﬃ  cial holds in addition to the 
in public oﬃ  ce, as well as information on the work-performance contracts or 
authorizations which he or she performs or in which he or she performs speci-
ﬁ ed obligations; 
      4)   information on real estate property in his or her possession (including the 
properties rented from other persons) and information on real estate stemming 
from guardianship or trusteeship; 
      5)   information about whether the public oﬃ  cial is an individual merchant, share-
holder, stockholder, or partner of a commercial enterprise and information about 
ownership of shares, stock and securities; 
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      6)   information on vehicles used by the public oﬃ  cial, as well as vehicles owned or 
leased for their personal use; 
      7)   information on cash or non-cash savings if their amount exceeds 20 times the 
minimum monthly wage; 
      8)   information on any kind of income earned during the reporting period; 
      9)   information on business dealings with amounts exceeding 20 times the minimum 
monthly wage, including speciﬁ cs on the amount of such transactions and the 
parties to them; 
      10) information on debts that exceed 20 times the minimum monthly wage, with 
speciﬁ c information about the amount of such debt and the debtor or creditor 
respectively; 
      11) information on the amount of loans given if the total amount of such loans 
exceeds 20 times the minimum monthly wage; and 
      12) information that the public oﬃ  cial wishes to specify in the declaration. 
In order to ensure the protection of personal data, the declaration contains a section 
that is publicly accessible and one that is conﬁ dential. Th e publicly available section 
contains all the information included in the declaration except for the oﬃ  cial’s place of 
residence and personal identiﬁ cation number, the oﬃ  cial’s relatives and other private 
persons mentioned in the declaration, as well as other parties, including debtors and 
creditors speciﬁ ed in the declaration.
Public access means the right of members of the mass media and other persons 
to access the declarations of any public oﬃ  cial, as well as to publish the information 
included therein. 
Th e declarations by the councilors of city councils (pagasts or district councils) have 
to be published in the oﬃ  cial newspaper Latvijas Vēstnesis, no later than one month 
after submission, and published simultaneously on the Internet. Th e Prevention and 
Combating of Corruption Bureau must send these declarations for publishing.
Some Latvian authors20 argue that the current disclosure policy is ineﬃ  cient and 
needs substantial improvements. Some of its weakest points are:
      •     the declaration does not prevent legalization of criminally obtained funds;
      •     information on relatives of oﬃ  cials is not suﬃ  cient.
Administrative responsibility applies for inadequate fulﬁ lment of disclosure obliga-
tions. One of the proposals of the corruption prevention program is the introduction 
of initial declarations. Th ose could be declarations, ﬁ lled out by all physical persons—
in other words taxpayers.
Th e ﬁ rst version of the annual declaration of income was published in 1990. Unfor-
tunately, it was not implemented. Presently, annual declarations are ﬁ led only by those 
taxpayers who apply for a refund.
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4.3 Attempts to Introduce Codes of Ethics
One way to prevent conﬂ icts of interest could be based on codes of ethics. In the early 
1990s, the Council of Ethics was established in order to improve performance of state 
and local government institutions. Th at Council was a private voluntary organization, 
including supporters of state administrative reform and representatives from local gov-
ernment training centers (private enterprises established by local governments and their 
association—the Union of Local and Regional Governments of Latvia).
During that period, the idea of adopting codes of ethics was discussed. Some local 
governments, for example one in Jekabpils city, adopted such a code by the council’s 
decision. Unfortunately, that approach has not had practical consequences.
Th e usefulness of codes is not lost, nevertheless. Th ere was another attempt in the 
process of the state administrative reform—the Cabinet of Ministers adopted regulations 
on rules of state oﬃ  cials’ performance, trying to introduce norms of ethics through man-
datory regulation. Conferences and seminars were organized to support such measures. 
Th ere is no information about practical consequences of those measures.
4.4 Report on Misconduct or Suspected Confl ict of Interest
Th ere are no obligations for local government oﬃ  cials to report misconduct by fellow 
government oﬃ  cials. Detailed obligations for local government oﬃ  cials to report poten-
tial or actual conﬂ ict of interest situations appear in the Law on Prevention of Conﬂ ict 
of Interest in Activities of Public Oﬃ  cials (2002-b).
A person who assumes public oﬃ  ce as a self-government oﬃ  cial is not permitted 
to simultaneously hold another position or perform work on contract or commission; 
and they have a duty to declare it in writing that they will: 
      1)   notify a mayor (executive director, head of local government institution) of the 
fact that they hold an oﬃ  ce (perform a work on contract or commission) as 
well as public oﬃ  ce; and 
      2)   submit a request to be released from their relevant oﬃ  ce (notiﬁ cation regard-
ing withdrawal from the work-performance contract or authorization) to the 
authority in which the person holds oﬃ  ce. Th e request has to be answered in 
one month. 
A public oﬃ  cial is prohibited in his oﬃ  cial capacity to draft or issue administrative 
acts, supervise, control, perform inquires or punitive functions, enter into contracts, 
or perform other activities in which they, their relatives or other concerned parties are 
personally or ﬁ nancially interested. 
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Public oﬃ  cials shall without delay provide information in writing to a higher public 
oﬃ  cial or collegial authority regarding: 
      1)   their ﬁ nancial or other personal interest, as well as ﬁ nancial or other personal 
interest of their relatives or counter-parties regarding the performance of any 
action included in the duties of their oﬃ  ce; 
      2)   commercial companies of which the oﬃ  cial or his or her relative is a shareholder, 
stockholder, partner, member of a supervisory, control or executive body; the 
fact that the public oﬃ  cial or a relative is an individual merchant who receives 
orders from the relevant state or local government authority for procurement 
for the state or local government, state or local government ﬁ nancial resources, 
credits guaranteed by the state or local governments or state or local government 
privatisation fund resources, except when they are allocated as a result of open 
competition. 
After the receipt of requested information, an executive public oﬃ  cial or collegial 
authority has to reassign the public oﬃ  cial. If misconduct or suspected conﬂ ict of in-
terest is not reported, then sanctions could be applied, including disciplinary sanctions 
(concerning civil servants), administrative, or criminal liability.
4.5 Other Measures
Th e important legal norm that is intended to reduce bureaucracy by increasing respon-
sibility of any public oﬃ  cial and that is recognized by Administrative Procedure Law 
(2001-c) means that:
“Institutions and courts may not refuse to decide an issue on the ground 
that it is not regulated by law or other external regulatory enactment 
(prohibition of legal obstruction by institutions and courts). Th ey may 
not refuse to apply a norm of law on the ground that such norm does 
not provide for the mechanism of application, it is not exhaustive or 
no other regulatory enactments have been issued which would more 
closely regulate the application of the relevant norm. Th is shall apply 
only in cases where an institution, which is required to apply this norm 
or participate in its application in another way, has not been established 
or is not operating.”
For Latvian tradition this is a revolutionary norm not yet suﬃ  ciently applied. An 
administrative act may be disputed by a submitter, an addressee, a third party, a legal 
entity, or by a person whose rights or legal interests are restricted by the administrative 
act and who has not been invited to participate in the administrative proceeding as a 
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third party. Th e act may be disputed at a higher authority in accordance with procedures 
regarding subordination. Usually the higher authority is the council of self-government, 
except for functions delegated by the state. If there is no such institution, an administra-
tive act may be immediately appealed in court.
Concerning public procurement, the corresponding Law on Procurement for State 
or Local Government (2001-a) has tended to ﬁ ght potential corruption, rather than 
increase competition and improve public administration. For example, the contracting 
authority must announce a tender if the amount of the procurement for the purchase 
or lease of goods is between 1,000 to 10,000 lati. Until November 2000, the maximum 
contract price was 5,000 lati—approximately 40 times less than the average in EU 
countries.
In eﬀ ect, complicated procurement procedures were prevalent in granting very 
small contracts. As a result there was a substantial decrease in the eﬃ  ciency of public 
institutions which spent a lot of time and money on expensive bureaucratic procedures. 
Th e motivation behind such legislation was a mistrust of public oﬃ  cials and a priority 
on legality over eﬃ  ciency.
At the same time, procurement procedures are strongly criticized in many studies 
for ineﬃ  ciency to achieve anti corruption goals.21 Th e criticism mainly concerns insuf-
ﬁ cient transparency and procedures which allow bidding where the requirements apply 
only to one pre-selected petitioner.
 Among the procedures for dealing with local government property the Law on Pre-
vention of Squandering of the Financial Resources and Property of the State and Local 
Governments (1995-c) is especially important, as well as the latest pieces of legislation 
on Shares of State and Local Government Capitals and Capital Companies (2002-e).
Until now, a substantial number of state and senior local government oﬃ  cials have 
supplemented their income by performing work as representatives of private enterprises. 
For many self-governments, the annual turnover of such companies used to be greater 
than their annual budget.
Statistical data about the above-mentioned phenomena are not available. Th e sig-
niﬁ cance of such supplementary income could be estimated from the annual income 
declarations by mayors and councillors at local governments which have to be pub-
lished in the oﬃ  cial newspaper Latvijas Vēstnesis. Equally, there are public disclosures 
by cabinet ministers and parliamentary secretaries, as well as members of parliament. 
General conclusions are based on particular investigations of journalists and on personal 
observations of the author.
Th is system has existed until the last amendments in legislation and went against 
the internal remuneration system in self-governmental establishments. Th at system 
used to be heavily inﬂ uenced by politicians and thereby closely connected to conﬂ icts 
of interest.
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Th e new legislation deﬁ nes a shareholder as a legal person—a self-government itself 
or institution, appointed by the council of a self-government. Th e mayor should bring 
decisions on behalf of the shareholders. Th e council could also delegate this responsibil-
ity to the head of an institution created by self-government.
Th e chairman of the local government council (mayor) has to appoint a responsible 
person who prepares the required documents and can participate in shareholder meetings 
on behalf of the mayor. Th e appointed person can only vote in cases when he knows the 
mayor’s position. Remuneration for performing these functions has to be paid from the 
local government’s budget (not by the company, as was typical until 2003). 
Th e council of the local government can decide about issuing personal shares. Per-
sonal shares are without voting rights. Th ese requirements are adopted to reduce conﬂ icts 
of interest in the management of local government controlled enterprises.
4.6 Accountability and Control Supporting
      the Prevention of Confl ict of Interest
Latvian legislation determines disciplinary responsibility for civil servants who are in 
conﬂ ict of interest. Th at legislation does not concern local government oﬃ  cials. Ad-
ditionally, there is administrative and criminal liability. 
Penalties can range from censure, to reduction in salary for as long as three years, 
to conﬁ scation of property.
Administrative liabilities can entail the imposition of a ﬁ ne, such as:
      •     25 LVL (approximately 40 Euro);
      •     250 LVL (approximately 400 Euro), in the most severe cases;
      •     250 LVL with conﬁ scation of the accepted gift.
Criminal liabilities can entail:
      •     imprisonment for up to 15 years;
      •     imprisonment, with conﬁ scation of property;
        •     imposition of a ﬁ ne of up to 100 times the minimum wage.
Th ere are many options for penalties. At the same time, state institutions don’t 
actively exercise these options. Th e most active in recent years has been the corruption 
prevention unit (in the internal structure of the State Revenue Service) which deals with 
annual declarations of income by public oﬃ  cials. Th e central government intends to shift 
anti-corruption activities to a stronger approach, based on the new Bureau of Preventing 
and Combating Corruption Law (2002a), and to introduce the Hong Kong model.
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Criminal statistics show that addressing corruption is not one of the priorities of 
diﬀ erent structures that handle the problem.22 Criminal cases used to be registered and 
convictions brought mainly in cases of bribery, or some economic cases.
To reduce conﬂ icts of interest, external and internal controls should be eﬀ ective. 
Latvia’s monitoring institutions are severely fragmented, and this applies not only to 
state administration, but also to local governments.
Th e main forms of control are:
      1)   external ﬁ nancial controls performed by the State Treasury (according to the 
Law on Budget and Finance Management, local governments prepare detailed 
monthly reports);
      2)   internal audits of departmental practices and ﬁ nances of local government units, 
performed by Revision Commissions (from 1999 those commissions have not 
been compulsory, but more than half of the local governments voluntarily set 
up such audit commissions);
      3)   external control of public procurement performed by the Ministry of Finance 
(the Procurement Monitoring Bureau, created according to the public procure-
ment law (2001-a);
      4)   external control of legality and usefulness performed by the State Audit Oﬃ  ce 
(1995-d, 2000-a); 
      5)   external ﬁ nancial control, performed by auditors or private audit companies 
(obligatory annually for each local government and each local government 
institution, (1994-e));
      6)   external legal supervision performed by central ministries (according to sectoral 
legislation), and by the minister responsible for supervision of self-governments 
(1994-e);
      7)   external legal supervision performed by state prosecutors (1994-f );
      8)   external supervision of the State Bureau of Human Rights, which participates 
in cases of individual persons’ submissions.
Th e weakest point in this system of monitoring is the insuﬃ  cient performance 
audit, because such a management culture has not been developed in Latvia. Since 
1998, the main support of EU and other international organizations has been to 
increase administrative capacity of the central government, while the administrative 
capacity of self-governments almost fully depends on them. In the future, the role of the 
Bureau to Prevent and Combat Corruption (2002-a) must be substantially increased.
Th e introduction of the institution of ombudsman is under discussion. Th e draft 
law proposes the creation of an oﬃ  ce that would include ﬁ ve ombudsmen, one of whom 
could be the ombudsman for self-governments.
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5.   CONCLUSION
Latvia has a wide set of legislation to prevent conﬂ ict of interest, treating it as a core 
problem in combating corruption. Many legal norms have been adopted and have been 
implemented since the early 1990s. Since 1995, there has been a uniﬁ ed approach to the 
prevention of conﬂ ict of interest in central and local government institutions. Th e main 
novelties are the introduction of a mandarin-type civil service for state institutions and 
the organization of local government administration on the basis of private contracts.
To characterize the situation in Latvia, one could reasonably apply the classiﬁ cation 
proposed by the investigation of corruption performed by the Open Society Institute 
in Central and Eastern European countries.23 Four approaches have been distinguished 
to ﬁ ght corruption:
      a)   Th e “criminal and administrative control ” approach (anti-corruption policy con-
sists of establishing and enforcing eﬀ ective criminal law provisions combined 
with eﬀ ective formal control mechanisms in the public administration).
      b)   Th e “small government” approach (using the assumption that minimizing the 
role of government is the solution).
      c)   Th e “political economy” perspective (policy leads to public administration reform 
programs to increase transparency and accountability).
      d)   Th e Multi-pronged Strategy/National Integrity System Perspective (structural eﬀ orts 
to enhance state capacity and public sector management, strengthen political 
accountability, enable civil society, and increase economic competition).
One can argue for a combination of all four approaches for best results. Neverthe-
less, analysis of particular municipal problems can be the basis for deciding the most 
eﬀ ective approach, and such analysis could be more fruitful for further development. 
Major pieces of legislation provide a detailed set of restrictions for public oﬃ  cials. Th e 
institutional system is very fragmented, the administration of anti-corruption legislation 
weak. Th e national program to prevent corruption (2001-a) is based on the concept of 
strengthening control by the central administration and it clearly leans towards approach 
(a). For small local governments, much better results could be achived by minimizing 
the role of the central government, approach (b).
Among other problems, the issue of over-regulation must also be mentioned. Too 
much legislation reduces ﬂ exibility, which is a characteristic of good local governance. 
Too many restrictions and permissions increase the potential for conﬂ ict of interest.
For small local authorities, the contradiction between eﬃ  ciency and strong regula-
tion is more obvious than for large administrative units. Good local governance could 
be more result-oriented than governance at the national level. Th erefore there is a good 
argument for keeping local government executives out of civil service.
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To improve self-governments, decentralization of responsibilities and funding is 
necessary. Th is is the best way to increase eﬃ  ciency and combat corruption. At the same 
time, approach (b) could not work without increasing transparency and involving civil 
society. In that sense one can argue for developing procedures of self-governments’ public 
reports and strengthening openness; strengthening the role of the Bureau to Prevent 
and Combat Corruption; and improving liability mechanisms.
Th e main policy proposals based on documented research include:
      1)   Prepare and implement a national program supporting dissemination of knowl-
edge about facilities to NGOs, so they can monitor the activities of public 
oﬃ  cials.
      2)   Introduce the ombudsman institution (including self-government ombuds-
men), representing citizens and entities in cases when actions of oﬃ  cials seem 
to violate laws or codes of ethics.
      3)   Support and develop activities of the Bureau to Prevent and Combat Corruption, 
thereby strengthening penalties for oﬃ  cials involved in conﬂ icts of interest.
      4)   Discuss reduction of over-regulation, decrease the number and scope of regu-
lation for state and local government institutions. Such reduction should be 
done by developing stronger rules to ensure openness of public institutions’ 
activities.
      5)   Stop the process of centralization of functions and funding by central govern-
ment in recent years; and, consequently, increase the role of local communities 
and public trust in the values of local democracy. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION
Th is report is part of comparative, comprehensive studies on regulations to prevent 
conﬂ ict of interest in CEE countries. Th e present report focuses on Polish local govern-
ments, and its scope is to present the legal framework for conﬂ ict of interest in Poland 
with regard to some practical issues. On the basis of an analysis of the functioning 
instruments, we have evaluated the eﬃ  ciency of the current legal solutions that support 
conﬂ ict of interest prevention and counteraction. We have also made some policy and 
de lege ferenda recommendations to improve existing regulations.
Despite the fact that in Poland there has been an analysis of corruption as a phenome-
non in public life, as well as public opinion polls on this topic (provided by Transparency 
International, the Polish Stefan Batory Foundation, Council of Europe reports, and 
OECD reports), at the same time, there is a lack of a comprehensive study on identifying 
and preventing conﬂ icts of interest. According to all reports, the level of corruption, 
especially in public oﬃ  ce, is high, and the problem is getting worse.
1.1 Corruption and Confl ict of Interest Perception
In a 2001 Report on Poland, considered by the European Commission as one of the 
more corrupt candidate countries, the Commission commented that:
“Irrespective of whether the speciﬁ c allegations turn out to be true or 
not, there is a general perception that corruption is widespread. Th is is 
damaging both domestically and internationally.”1 
Th e Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2002 places Poland in the 45th place with 
a score of 4.0, after such countries as Slovenia (27th) with a score of 6.0, Estonia (29th) 
with a score of 5.6, Hungary (33rd) with a score of 4.9, Belarus, and Lithuania (36th) 
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with a score of 4.8. Th e CPI study ties the degree of corruption to the perception of 
business people, academics, and risk analysts, and it ranges between 10 (highly trans-
parent) and 0 (highly corrupt)2 and focuses on corruption in the public sector. Th e 
CPI deﬁ nes corruption as the abuse of public oﬃ  ce for private gain, with a focus on 
bribe-taking by public oﬃ  cials.
It is generally known that corruption is a serious threat to the state’s normal func-
tioning. It has been pointed out that it destroys not only legalism and free competition, 
but the whole economy, changing a free market into a “market of dependencies.”
 Th e signiﬁ cance of the problem has been acknowledged in Poland since the be-
ginning of the transition process. In 1991 almost three quarters of Polish society (71 
percent) considered corruption in Poland a serious problem. In 1992 there was a jump 
in the number of people (from 71 percent to 86 percent) who thought that corruption 
is a serious problem, and in those who considered it a very serious problem. A similar 
poll was done in July 2000. Th e poll of August 2001 showed another jump (from 86 
percent to 93 percent) of respondents considering corruption a serious problem.
In February 2003 91 percent of Poles were aware of the signiﬁ cance of the corrup-
tion problem.3 
Table 4.1
What Do You Th ink of Corruption in Poland?
Respondents’ Answers According to the Year [%]
July 1991 February 1992 July 2000 August 2001 February 2003
Very serious 33 49 46 68 68
Serious 38 37 40 25 23
Not serious 15 8 6 2 2
Almost none 2 1 0 1 0
Hard to say 12 5 8 5 6
Source:     CBOS, February 2003.
Th ere is a strong conviction that corruption exists both at the central and local level. 
In February 2003, 61 percent of all respondents stated that abuse of power happens 
with the same frequency at the central and local level.
Th e criticism of public oﬃ  cials is even more pronounced if we take a look at the 
practice. According to the respondents, the most frequent wrongdoing among public 
oﬃ  cials is nepotism (favoritism based on kinship) and cronyism (favoritism based on 
informal links). And this is one of the most important issues covering conﬂ ict of interest, 
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since it may appear not only in the ﬁ nancial dimension (as with cases of corruption) 
but also in a “gray area.” When private or personal interests come into conﬂ ict with 
public obligations, “oﬃ  cial duties,” there is conﬂ ict of interest. Th is conﬂ ict usually 
interferes with professional responsibilities, threatening the impartiality of professional 
behavior. 
Table 4.2
In Your Opinion, is the Abuse of Power More Frequent 
at the Central or Local Level?
Respondents’ Answers According to the Year [ %]
September 1995 July 1999 July 2000 February 2003
More often at the central level 24 15 17 18
With the same frequency 56 57 58 61
More often at the local level 10 14 13 12
Hard to say 10 15 12 9
Source:     CBOS, February 2003.
Ninety-one percent of Poles believe that it happens frequently that relatives, co-work-
ers, and friends receive positions in public oﬃ  ces, banks or public companies, while 59 
percent think this happens “very often”; 81 percent of respondents believe that granting 
public contracts to family or friends takes place frequently; and almost 85 percent think 
that public oﬃ  cials in Poland generally accept bribes in their oﬃ  cial duties.
In research carried out within the Anticorruption Program and the Institute of 
Public Aﬀ airs (Kubiak, 2001), attempts were made to reach a common, spontaneous 
deﬁ nition of corruption, and thus, at the beginning of the interview, the respondents 
were asked to supply a deﬁ nition. 
Th e greater majority of respondents identiﬁ ed corruption with bribery and graft 
(76 percent). Th ere was a large proportion of people who were unable to say what 
corruption meant (22 percent). Some responses, such as “hard to say,” may also mean 
an unwillingness to seriously consider the issue or to give an answer. Th e percentage 
of responses showing a lack of knowledge or diﬃ  culty understanding the term vary in 
accordance with the social and demographic features of the respondents.
It is signiﬁ cant that Polish society as a whole does not link corruption with conﬂ ict 
of interest (only 5 percent of respondents connect corruption with conﬂ ict of interest 
issues such as favoritism, nepotism, i.e., staﬃ  ng positions with family members and 
friends, taking care of matters through connections and special arrangements, etc.).
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Conﬂ ict of interest is not a concept generally known and understood. Especially 
recently, with many references to it in media reports on public life, one might think 
that the deﬁ nition is quite obvious (as an aspect of corruption) on the one hand, 
and is ambiguous on the other. For people who are not interested in political matters, 
conﬂ ict of interest quite often is a word not understood. Generally, corruption in local 
governments exists and is recognized by local oﬃ  cials, but when it appears in the form 
of conﬂ ict of interest it is not always disapproved. It’s not considered an important 
matter.
Table 4.3
What Do You Th ink About the Abuse of Power?
April 
1997
July 
1999
July 
2000
February
2003
Frequent [%]
Giving public contracts to a family, friends 78 73 78 81
Taking bribes 72 74 79 85
Giving posts in public offices to relatives and friends 69 84 87 91
Using public money for a political party 56 58 65 67
Rare [%]
Giving public contracts to family, friends 9 10 10 6
Taking bribes 13 8 8 5
Giving posts in public offices to relatives and friends 13 4 5 2
Using public money for a political party 15 11 12 10
Hard to Say [%]
Giving public contracts to family, friends 13 17 12 13
Taking bribes 15 19 12 10
Giving posts in public offices to relatives and friends 18 11 7 7
Using public money for a political party 29 31 23 23
Source:     CBOS, February 2003.
Conﬂ ict of interest in Poland, however, is not a term in the legal vocabulary. Even 
though there are many regulations designed to prevent or combat conﬂ ict of interest, 
these laws and regulations themselves do not contain the concept of “conﬂ ict of inter-
est.” Th erefore there is no accepted legal deﬁ nition for it.
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1.2 Counteracting Confl ict of Interest: The Historical Perspective
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Poland has made great eﬀ orts to reduce conﬂ ict of in-
terest, particularly by introducing new laws. However, there is not one single law dealing 
with the problem of corruption and conﬂ ict of interest in Poland. Diﬀ erent regulations 
are provided by a number of laws, from the Polish Constitution to administrative law, 
to labor, criminal, and civil laws.
For the purposes of this analysis, I divide pertinent legislation into three main groups. 
Th e ﬁ rst one consists of general, constitutional regulations supporting limitations of 
conﬂ ict of interest.4 Th e second is legal prescriptions to prevent conﬂ ict of interest; and 
the third group consists of laws that concern procedures supporting the limitations to 
conﬂ ict of interest.
Th e Law on Community Self-Government (1990) initiated the process of building a 
decentralized local government. Also, the Law on Local Government Employees (1990) 
has created the ﬁ rst professional group of local government public oﬃ  cials. But the proc-
ess of turning attention to corruption issues started in 1997, with the implementation of 
the law on reducing opportunities to do business for persons in public oﬃ  ce. Th at law, 
called the “Anticorruption Act,” initiated the process of developing and implementing 
a number of legislative and other measures against corruption and conﬂ ict of interest. 
As the report on Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policy in Poland assumes, none of 
the initiatives were introduced by the Government (EU Accession Program, p.405). 
However, to a great extent, many of those laws remained on paper mainly because 
not enough emphasis has been placed on their eﬃ  cient enforcement. In view of the 
instances of corruption that have come to light, the tendency is to pass new laws rather 
than enforce the existing ones. As many reports pointed out, instead of passing new laws, 
some of those already in eﬀ ect should be amended and their institutional enforcement 
strengthened. In some cases the law only speciﬁ ed what is considered illegal but did not 
include provisions for consequences or sanctions for violating those regulations. 
Also, the EU accession process has had a major impact on the legal and institutional 
framework to counteract conﬂ ict of interest. Commission pressure has led to important 
legislative changes, especially in the area of anticorruption legislation. 
In the autumn of 2002, the Polish government developed a prospective state strategy 
for combating corruption.5 Th e strategy proposed a three-tiered program for ﬁ ghting 
corruption. Th e project also determined tools to prevent conﬂ ict of interest. One tier 
is legislative changes. Th e second one consists of organizational changes, and the third, 
educational and informational actions.
As the Council of Europe's GRECO recommended, the Polish authorities made a 
commitment in their strategy to take steps towards progressively reducing the scope of 
discretionary powers of administrative oﬃ  cers, and to enhance the transparency of the 
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procedures and abolish, whenever possible, licensing and authorization procedures for 
many economic and social activities.6 Th e strategy also obliges the Minister of Interior 
to prepare a draft for a law creating a corps of local government employees, as well as 
to prepare a draft for a law concerning auditing in local government.
As for the organizational improvements, the Minister of Interior is obliged to in-
troduce a training program on ethics for local government oﬃ  cials. In the educational 
and informational respect, the same minister will promote the program called “Friendly 
Oﬃ  ce,” which will comprise basic standards for local government administration. 
E-Government services are also an instrument in the strategy to make local government 
more transparent and the process of making administrative decisions objective. 
Th e Polish government has put in place an anticorruption strategy that reﬂ ects 
the fact that the strategy is “top down,” created at the high level with little or no in-
volvement of civil society, lower level oﬃ  cials or even the Parliament. For example, 
the obligation for the minister of interior to draft and introduce new regulations on 
additional employment of local government employees or new mechanisms to control 
the declarations of income coincided with the Polish Parliament developing similar 
regulations since May 2002.
On November 27, 2002, the Polish Parliament passed a new law responding to 
internal pressure by, among others, the World Bank, OECD, Th e Council of Europe 
or EU,  and internal pressure by the Supreme Auditing Chamber-NIK and NGOs. 
Th e new law implements a signiﬁ cant modernization of anticorruption rules at all local 
government agencies. Th at law has been in force since January 1, 2003.
2.   THE GENERAL CONTEXT FOR PREVENTING CONFLICT 
      OF INTEREST AT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL IN POLAND
2.1 Local Government Structure and Functions
Public administration reforms have been a fundamental element of the systemic trans-
formation of Poland’s local self-governments in 2,478 communities since 1990. Th e 
creation of communities after the fall of communism has proved a great success. Th e 
1998 reforms have introduced two new levels of self-government and signiﬁ cantly 
reduced the central government’s administrative presence at the sub-national levels. 
According to a decision by the Polish Parliament in the summer of 1998, Poland has 
transferred responsibilities and ﬁ nancial capacities to 314 districts (including 65 urban 
communities that were granted district rights). Th e reforms have also radically reduced 
the number of existing regions (voivodships) from 49 to 16 regions, enabling them to 
create regional development policies. 
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Public administration reform has radically changed intergovernmental relations 
in Poland, as well as its ﬁ scal and territorial structure, by decentralizing control over 
public services and public ﬁ nance to two new levels of democratically elected self-gov-
ernment. Th ey have independent legal identities with independent budgets. As a result, 
the reforms have brought about signiﬁ cant decentralization of both public authority 
and public ﬁ nance.
In the system of Polish local government, communities form the basic and most 
important level of public administration. It is here that the most important collective 
needs of local citizens are met. District self-governments, with an average population of 
80,000–100,000 inhabitants, are responsible for local issues that, due to the subsidiary 
and proportionality principles, cannot be ascribed to communities. Th e 16 new regions 
are quite large, with populations ranging between approximately 1 and 5 million, and 
an average population of approximately 2.4 million. Regions are responsible for the 
regional development policy programs.
 One of the basic premises of the reforms was the idea that the transparency and 
openness of public decisions must be improved. Th is meant eliminating unclear and 
complicated administrative procedures at various levels of government, streamlining 
administrative structures, radically reforming the system of public ﬁ nance, and delegat-
ing new powers to democratically elected local and regional authorities. Table 4.4 shows 
the structure of organs (authorities) of self-government in Poland.
Table 4.4
Polish Local Government
 
 
Community (2.478) 
(gmina)
District (314) 
(województwo)
Region (16) 
(powiat)
Constitutive organs Council Council Council
Executive organs Mayor Board, Starosta Board, Marszałek
                                   
Councils are authorities with constitutive prerogatives acting as collective bodies. 
Th ey are responsible for making local (district or regional) policy, as well as decision-
making in the area; they draft local regulations as well. Th e councilors are elected in 
general elections. Th e councils in turn elect executive boards to exercise the executive 
authority in self-governing units, except for the community tier, where there is no board 
and the mayor and council are elected in direct elections. Th e executive district board 
is headed by the head of the district executive board (starosta), the board of the region 
by the marszałek.
According to the poll of February 2003 poll to evaluate political institutions, half of 
the respondents (50 percent) evaluated positively the activity of their own local govern-
ment unit, while almost 31 percent held the opposite opinion.
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Table 4.5
Assessment of Local Authorities’ Activities
Respondents’ Answers According to the Year [%]
Marks 
Good Bad
June 1998 62 27
September 1998 61 27
December 1998 58 25
May 1999 54 32
September 1999 54 32
January 2000 57 29
June 2000 52 34
December 2001 51 34
June 2002 49 35
June 2002 52 28
January 2003 46 29
February 2003 50 31
Source:     CBOS, February 2003.
2.2 Local Government Public Offi cials: 
      The Subject for Regulations on Preventing Confl ict of Interest
Th e subjective scope of the problem might concern the following local government 
oﬃ  cials: local government employees, senior oﬃ  cials, councilors and director and managers 
of local government units. 
Th e ﬁ rst group—local government employees consists of senior employees, such as 
secretaries and book-keepers and other local government employees. Local government 
employees usually do not act on their own, they are authorized to act on behalf of deci-
sion-makers. Th is group is usually a permanent, merit-based staﬀ 
Th e second group consists of directly or indirectly elected or appointed local gov-
ernment senior oﬃ  cials. Th e directly elected mayors play the role of executive authority; 
they are decision-makers, bringing administrative decisions in individual cases. Th e 
indirectly elected local government senior oﬃ  cials include the deputy mayor, appointed 
by the mayor, the head of the district executive board (starosta) appointed by the district 
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executive board, the marshal (marszałek) appointed by the regional executive board, as 
well as executive board members in districts and regions. Heads of the district executive 
boards and marshals have double responsibilities: Th ey head the executive boards of 
the local government, and they bring administrative decisions in individual cases. Th e 
common denominator in this group of local government public oﬃ  cials is that they 
are usually political appointees.
Figure 4.1
Local Government (LG) Public Oﬃ  cials
                    
         
Th e third group consists of councilors of the three-levels of local government (com-
munities, districts, and regions). Th e directly elected councilors have substantial power 
and responsibilities, drafting local legal regulations and making policies; they act as 
community executives. Th ey are politicians as opposed to professional managers.
Th e directors of local government units are, for example, primary- and secondary 
school principals and hospital directors. A manager of a local government company can 
be, for example, a director of communal sanitation company.
Each of these groups can be potentially inﬂ uenced by conﬂ icts of private, personal 
or institutional interests that aﬀ ect their objectivity in performing their oﬃ  cial duties. 
2.3 Potential Sources of Confl ict of Interest 
      in Polish Local Government
Opportunities and incentives for conﬂ ict of interest have been growing sharply since 
regional reforms were implemented and a massive shift from central to local tiers took 
place in the disbursement of public funds. Risks and opportunities for conﬂ ict of interest 
are also greater where regional, district, and community powers exist in the same area, 
reducing transparency in areas of responsibilities and decision-making.
According to the World Bank Report, widespread corruption in regional and local 
administrations undermines eﬀ orts to promote local development, improve services and 
reduce rural poverty. It mirrors many of the issues that arise at the parliamentary and high 
SENIOR OFFICIALS
Major
Starosta
Marszałek
Director of LG 
units
Manager of LG 
companies
LG EMPLOYEES
Senior employees
Secretaries 
Treasures
Other 
LG employees
COUNCILORS of:
Community
District
Region
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political levels of the central government administration. Local administrations tend to 
be highly politicized, with close links between political parties, elected councilors, and 
administrative staﬀ s. Staﬀ  sizes have been rising since well before the territorial reform. 
In big cities, it has been reported that private citizens with public business need politi-
cal support to schedule meetings with inﬂ uential oﬃ  cials. Th e control rights that local 
governments exercise over zoning decisions, licenses and permits for economic activity, 
contracts for construction work, goods and services, property rent controls, and other 
distortions in setting tariﬀ s, furnish ample opportunities to extract bribes and trade 
favors. Th ese activities have an adverse impact on local revenues and expenditures, and 
also result in serious misallocation of resources, with consequent damage to the local 
economy and society. 
Municipal ownership of large amounts of land and real estate aggravates the situation 
and adds to the opportunities and incentives for corrupt behavior. Conﬂ ict of inter-
est linked to election funds is also a problem at the local level. Companies that refuse 
to cooperate may be excluded from the procurement process. Th e process of granting 
licenses and permits can easily be a source of conﬂ ict of interest. Most important are 
permits related to architecture, construction, land registration, land survey, and any 
other matters tied to municipal land and buildings. 
Public procurement at the municipal level is notoriously corrupt. Misconduct 
stemming from conﬂ ict of interest includes contracts granted to companies owned 
by family relations of council members. Procurement abuses appear to be a particular 
problem when they involve construction projects, such as building bridges or oﬃ  ce 
buildings. Conﬂ ict of interest in public contracts, whether during the bidding process or 
during contract execution, can also result in poor-quality construction and inadequate 
safety standards. Th e risks to public safety are even higher when even the inspection 
procedures are fraught with corruption. 
3.   INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 
      PREVENTING AND DETECTING CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Formulating programs to combat conﬂ ict of interest in local government areas should 
be started with an investigation on where conﬂ icts of interest can occur, and they should 
try to identify its source. Eﬀ orts to reduce conﬂ ict of interest have so far focused on 
attempts to introduce laws rather than to eﬀ ect signiﬁ cant changes in practice. Th ese 
eﬀ orts are commendable, but they have missed the broad middle ground in which local 
government elites actually operate, with a vested interest in resisting change. According 
to the World Bank’s Review of Priority Areas and Proposals for Action, there is a need to 
strengthen the legislative framework with some speciﬁ c, clearly deﬁ ned pieces of legisla-
tion. However, the emphasis has tended to be too much on passing new laws rather than 
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eﬀ ectively enforcing existing ones. As the World Bank reports, Poland has most of the 
instruments it needs but not yet enough will and capacity to use them well.7
3.1 Constitutional Basis Supporting Limitations of Confl ict of Interest
Th e Polish Constitution established by Constitutional Act in 1997 is typical for modern, 
democratic states of civil society. Constitutional principles based on the general rule 
of law (art. 2) support conﬂ ict of interest limitations: lawfulness (art. 7), social justice 
(judicial fairness)—art. 2, proportionality (art. 31, art. 228), rule against bias (art. 153), 
openness and transparency (art. 61), equality before the law (art. 32), protection of 
legitimate trust and vested rights (art. 2), and the right to recover damages for public 
authorities’ illegal activities (art. 77). 
According to art. 153 paragraph 1 of the Constitution, a corps of civil servants shall 
operate the agencies of government administration in order to ensure a professional, ef-
ﬁ cient, impartial, and politically neutral discharge of state obligations. Th is rule strongly 
supports impartiality in the civil servant corps. Extension of this rule to public oﬃ  cials’ 
corps at local governments is strongly needed as well. 
Most important is the rule of equality (art. 32 paragraph 1 and 2), which states that 
all persons shall be equal before the law and all persons shall have the right to equal 
treatment by public authorities. For administrative bodies it means that when cases are 
essentially the same, their oﬃ  cial treatment must be the same as well. When cases are 
objectively diﬀ erent, there will be corresponding diﬀ erences in treatment. 
Th ese general, basic principles are applied in speciﬁ c laws—substantive, procedural 
and internal laws, and they even inﬂ uence extralegal regulations. In a legal analysis con-
cerning conﬂ ict of interest, one has to point out that it is mostly about restrictions. Th us, 
it is very important to stress that eﬀ ective restrictions have to be actually incorporated 
into law, (and not subject to interpretation); sanctions must be clearly deﬁ ned (and not 
subject to interpretation); and an authority must be in charge to impose sanctions. It 
should be prohibited to use precedents in the application of the law.
3.2 Legal Rules Being Substantial Prerequisites of Confl ict of Interest
3.2.1   Duplication of Power
Th is is a classic situation of conﬂ ict of interest being the consequence of the separation 
of powers: a public oﬃ  cial occupying positions and carrying out activities at diﬀ erent 
public authorities simultaneously. Polish restrictions are categorical and strict in this 
matter. Prohibition on post conjunction (prohibiting the duplication of positions) is 
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provided by the Local-Self Government Acts, the Act on the Rules of Election to the 
Local Government Councils and the Act on Direct Mayoral Election. 
Th e Local-Self Government Acts deﬁ ne the incompatibility between the posts of 
councilor and a member of Parliament or senator, oﬃ  ce of voivode (governor8) or lieu-
tenant governor of a region, or membership in other local government units. 
Moreover, the speciﬁ c laws provide that the mandate is equally incompatible with 
the posts of prosecutor, judge, a member of the Regional Accounting Chamber (RIO9), 
and a member of the Self-Government Board of Appeal (SKO10); occupying any of 
these positions would cause an obvious conﬂ ict of interest. Making clear the situation 
of compatibility of posts, Polish law provides the sanction for violating this rule, which 
is the loss of mandate.11 Th e authority charged with implementing this sanction is the 
municipal/district/regional council.
Another legal framework regarding the duplication of posts is presented by the 
Local-Self Government Acts, pursuant to which a councilor may not simultane-
ously perform the function of a head or deputy head of municipal, district or regional 
(adequate) administrative unit, for example the position of principal or deputy principal 
of the municipal primary school, the director or deputy director of a district hospital, 
etc. Th e sanction is loss of mandate. Th e authority empowered to execute this sanction 
is the municipal/district/regional council.
Simultaneously, the Community Self-Government Act provides speciﬁ c restric-
tions for mayors and deputy mayors. In accordance with the act, he/she may not be a 
mayor or deputy mayor in another community as well; his/her mandate may not be 
linked with membership in a local government unit, other than where he/she serves 
as mayor or deputy mayor; and he/she may not have employment in a governmental 
administration or have a mandate as a member of parliament or a senator. Violation of 
this rule entails the sanction of loss of mandate.12 Th e authority empowered to impose 
this sanction is the municipal council.
Th e District Self-Government Act, as well as the Regional Self-Government Act, 
determine incompatibility between the mandate of a member of a district or regional 
executive board and membership in another local government unit, employment in 
government administration, or the post of member of Parliament and senator. If a 
member of the executive board is appointed by the council, the sanction is loss of man-
date. Th e authority empowered to impose this sanction is the district/regional council. 
Unfortunately, there is no sanction for cases when a member of the executive board has 
been appointed by an entity other than the council.
3.2.2   Additional Employment
Th e additional employment restrictions are similar to those of duplication of power 
and concern the situation of councilors’ employment in administrative institutions that 
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may cause an obvious conﬂ ict of interest. Regulations on public oﬃ  cials’ additional 
employment are provided by Local Self Government Acts and the Act on the Rules of 
Election to the Local Government Councils. 
Th e major issues concerning additional employment are covered by the Local Self 
Government Acts, according to which a councilor may not be an employee of the unit in 
which he/she obtained the mandate. It means that he/she cannot take part in constitutive 
authority activities (to be a member of the council also means to control the activi-
ties undertaken by the executive board), and, at the same time, be a local government 
employee (who is accountable to the executive body). Violation of the rule entails loss 
of mandate. Th e authority authorized to impose this sanction is the municipal/district/
regional council. Th is restriction does not cover councilors appointed to be a member 
of an executive district/regional board. According to the law, they are employees of the 
local government units in which they have obtained the mandate. 
Th ere are additional prohibitions on hiring a councilor on the basis of a civil law 
contract that is linked to the mayor of a community, executive board of district or head 
of district executive board and executive board of region or the marshal. Th e sanction 
for the councilor is loss of mandate. Th e authority authorized to impose this sanction 
is the municipal council.
3.2.3   Economic Conﬂ ict of Interest
Th e concept of economic conﬂ ict of interest is interpreted broadly in this report. Some 
of the actual regulations are dealt with in the section on the use of local government 
property for personal purposes. Other limitations of the freedom to engage in economic 
activity appear in the Act on Reducing Opportunities to do Business for Persons Perform-
ing Public Functions. Th ese rules concerning economic conﬂ ict of interest were mostly 
criticized as lacking mechanisms for monitoring and implementation. Th e change of 
law since January 1, 2003 should signiﬁ cantly improve the situation.
i)     Involvement in Business Enterprises and Shareholding, 
       Membership in Commercial or Charitable Organizations
Since January 1, 2003, the Local Self-Government Acts provide categorical restrictions 
for councilors, their spouses, and the spouses of: mayors, deputy mayors, executive 
district/regional board members, secretaries, and treasurers, directors of local government 
units and managers of local government legal persons. As can be seen, the Polish legal 
framework covers not only LG oﬃ  cials themselves, but also families of LG oﬃ  cials. Th is 
is a new regulation which signiﬁ cantly limits the rights of persons not directly engaged 
in performing public activities.
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Persons covered in the law are prohibited from membership in managing, control 
and audit authorities and execution of commercial power of attorney in an economic 
entity or commercial law partnership with participation of municipal legal persons. Th e 
appointment is invalidated by law. Resignation from functions held before the com-
mencement of the mandate or appointment is required within three months. Violation 
of these rules causes the sanction of loss of the managerial, controlling or auditing posi-
tion by a councilor, his/her spouse or the spouses of persons mentioned.
Th e general restrictions on economic conﬂ ict of interest, especially for local govern-
ment employees, are provided by the Act on Local Government Employees. Th e local 
government employee mustn’t undertake activities that are in conﬂ ict with his duties 
and obligations or would cast suspicion on his partiality or self-interest.13 Additionally, 
since the beginning of 2003, every local government employee must submit to their 
employer information about their individual economic activities, as well as changes in 
these activities. Th e sanction for not submitting the declaration is disciplinary liability. 
Th e sanction for false declaration is criminal responsibility—imprisonment for up to 
three years.  
A categorical legal framework for economic conﬂ ict of interest is presented by the 
Act on Reducing Opportunities to do Business for Persons Performing Public Func-
tions. Th e restrictions provided by this act are supported by sanctions. Local government 
employees (senior oﬃ  cials and other local government employees—persons authorized 
to make administrative decisions on all three levels), the directors of local government 
units (for example primary communal school or district hospital) and managers of local 
government legal entities (for example waterworks) are prohibited from:
      •     membership in boards, supervisory boards, and audit committees of commercial 
law partnerships;
      •     employment and other engagement in commercial law partnerships if it may 
give rise to a suspicion of their partiality or self-interest;
      •     membership in boards, supervisory boards, and audit committees of co-opera-
tives, with the exemption of supervisory boards of building societies;
      •     membership in boards of foundations that engage in economic activity;
      •     individual or joint economic activity, management, representation, and power 
of attorney in such activity, with the exemption of farm and livestock produc-
tion at a family-run farm.14
Th ese prohibitions are waived in the case of appointment to a commercial law 
partnership with participation of the State Treasury, other public legal persons, local 
government units, their associations or other legal persons of local government units as 
representatives of those entities, with a maximum of two such appointments. 
A mayor is obliged to make a disclosure on ceasing economic activity in which he/she 
was involved before the election. A deputy mayor, a member of an executive board, a 
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secretary, a treasurer, a director of local government units, a manager of local government 
legal entities, or a person empowered to undertake administrative decisions is obliged 
to disclose information on how and when they ceased the economic activity (before, 
or on the day of taking oﬃ  ce).
Mayors, deputy mayors, district/regional executive board members, treasurers and 
secretaries, other persons empowered to pass administrative decisions, the directors of 
the local government units, and managers of the local government legal entities are 
prohibited from employment and any business involvement with a private enterprise if they 
participated in the passing of a decision aﬀ ecting the pertinent enterprise’s interests, within 
a year after leaving oﬃ  ce or relinquishing their post.15 Th is prohibition does not con-
cern individual administrative decisions concerning local taxes (with the exception of 
reduction or exemption of taxes). Th e sanction for breaking these rules for a mayor or 
deputy mayor is loss of mandate; for others, dismissal.
Th e Local Self-Government Acts prohibit a councilor from possessing a package 
exceeding 10 percent of shares or stock in a commercial law partnerships with participa-
tion of municipal legal persons or economic entities in which such persons participate. 
Additionally, the disposal of surplus before the ﬁ rst session of the municipal board is 
required. Th e sanction: Preserved stock should not grant the due privileges of the right 
to vote, the right to dividend, the right to division of property, and the right to collec-
tion during the tenure of the mandate and within two years following its expiration. 
Additionally, the violation of these rules causes loss of mandate for councilors. 
According to the Act on Reducing Opportunities to do Business for Persons Per-
forming Public Functions—mayors, deputy mayors, district/region executive board 
members, treasurers (principal budget accountants) and secretaries, the directors of the 
local government units, the managers of the local government legal persons as well as 
other persons empowered to pass administrative decisions on all three levels are prohib-
ited from the possession of more than 10 percent of shares or stock in commercial law 
partnerships, or shares or stock representing more than 10 percent of the initial capital 
in those partnerships. Th e sanction for mayor or deputy mayor for violating these rules 
is loss of mandate; for others, dismissal. 
Th e violation of restrictions described above was quite frequent in Polish local gov-
ernments. Until 2003, rulings without sanctions and a lack of authority to enforce any 
sanctions resulted in rules of blank concept, i.e., rules that did not work in real life. Local 
government employees—employed in the architecture department and empowered to 
issue building permits—were at the same time engaged in private economic activity; 
they were involved in construction projects for which building permits were required. 
At the same time, they did not have to declare their engagement in their own, or joint 
economic activities. Such activities clearly conﬂ icted with public oﬃ  ce and had many 
harmful consequences.
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ii)    Acceptance of Gifts, Hospitality, and Sponsored Trips
Polish regulations on the acceptance of gifts, hospitality, and sponsored trips are not 
clearly deﬁ ned restrictions. In terms of local governmetn oﬃ  cials, the Polish legislation 
contains some laconic statements, i.e., a municipal, district and regional councilor, 
a mayor, or a deputy mayor mustn’t engage in certain economic activities or accept 
donations that would result in the loss of public conﬁ dence or harm their reputation 
as public oﬃ  cials. Th ese articles also provide the prohibition of resorting to councilor’s 
mandate in the course of permissible additional activities or economic activity. Th e 
sanction for councilors, mayors, and deputy mayors is loss of mandate. Th e authority 
empowered to impose this sanction is the municipal/district/regional council. Pertinent 
regulations in this respect are furnished by the Act on Community-Self Government.
Since January 1, 2003, the pertinent regulation in eﬀ ect stipulates that a mayor, 
his deputy, a district/regional executive board member, secretary, treasurer, director of 
the local government unit, local government legal entity manager, and other persons 
empowered to pass administrative decisions while performing their oﬃ  cial duties, dur-
ing the entire period of their mandate and for a period of three years after that, cannot 
accept any free gifts or beneﬁ ts or accept something in exchange of payment of less 
than its market value, from any person he is the supervisor of, or who may be aﬀ ected 
by any decision he makes in his oﬃ  cial duties.
However diﬃ  cult it is to distinguish a gift from a bribe, the provisions on accepting 
gifts are established by the Local Self-Government Acts; while cases of bribery are regu-
lated by the Criminal Code. Th e practice of giving and accepting gifts is quite popular 
in Poland, and it takes diﬀ erent forms: money, alcohol, trips to foreign countries (in 
2002, members of the Regional Health Oﬃ  ce in Bialystok were oﬀ ered and accepted 
a sponsored trip to the Republic of South Africa by a pharmacy company), dinners in 
restaurants, and so on. 
According to the Report on the Survey on Corruption in Everyday Experience 
(Kubiak, p.19) among respondents who admitted having given gifts within the last 
three-four years, the majority (51 percent) had done it more than once. Figure 4.2 
illustrates the number of cases of giving gifts.
As the report points out: 
“…less than half of the respondents had given gifts only once; but 
as a rule, people who participated in bribery  did it more than once. 
Some participants (in only a few cases) described eight, 10 and even 
20 cases of giving bribes/gifts—a record. Th e most frequent reason for 
giving bribes, according to the respondents (42 percent) is a sense of 
coercion. In their opinion, bribery was the only way of taking care of 
business. For more than half of the respondents (51 percent), “practical” 
considerations were decisive—raising the eﬃ  ciency of their action. For 
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20 percent of respondents time was the most important factor. Th anks 
to a bribe, oﬃ  cial business received faster handling. Greater accuracy 
or reliability in handling a matter was mentioned in 17 percent of the 
cases; in 14 percent of the cases a bribe made it possible to take care 
of something at a smaller cost. Other reasons—apart from “eﬃ  ciency-
related” or “practical” considerations—that were decisive in giving a 
bribe included the desire to show gratitude, preserve health, or avoid 
a more expensive ﬁ ne or penalty (4 percent). In 3 percent of the cases 
respondents refused to give the reasons why they had decided to give a 
bribe. Bribes are obviously considered a strategy to make life easier.
Figure 4.2
Frequency of Giving Bribes/Gifts (N = 224)
Source:     A. Kubiak, Batory Foundation: Corruption in Everyday Experience, 2001, www.batory.org.pl.
Above all, gifts were given in the form of money (77 percent of cases). Material 
gifts (17 percent) included primarily alcohol—the “cognac for the doctor” routine—but 
there have also been automobile covers and tennis rackets. Th e declared worth of bribes 
shows we are dealing with corruption of modest ﬁ nancial dimensions. Th is is illustrated 
by the list of paid bribes by their value as shown in Table 4.6.
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Table 4.6
Delivered Bribes by Th eir Worth
Value of Gift Number of Cases Proportion in Group of Cases 
of Giving Bribes (N=224)
under €25 51 23
€25 33 15
over €25, under €125 37 16
€125 20 9
over €125 24 11
replies hard to say, I don’t remember 18 8
refused to answer 42 18
Source:     Kubiak, A.
It was value that distinguished a bribe from a gift as an expression of gratitude. Th e 
majority of respondents (45 percent) feel that the value is the decisive criterion in de-
termining a bribe. At the same time, 40 percent do not share this view, and 15 percent 
are unable to give an explicit answer. 
3.3.4   Conﬂ ict of Interest in Personal Relations
Conﬂ ict of interest may also appear in a situation when close relatives are employed in 
the same oﬃ  ce belonging to the same hierarchy. Rules eliminating the potential conﬂ ict 
between a public oﬃ  cial and their relatives (limitation of relatives’ employment) are 
provided by the Act on Local Government Employees. 
It is prohibited to employ close relatives (spouses,  ascendants, descendants, 
siblings, kin, adopted family, or guardians) in positions which involve a hierar-
chical relationship. Polish regulations do not provide clear sanctions to prevent 
this, or assign authorities charged to enforce this rule. Th is is another blank concept 
regulation. Moreover, it is common in Polish public administration oﬃ  ces that close 
relatives work in the same unit, with one of them being the other’s supervisor.
3.3.5   Using Oﬃ  cial Information for Personal Gain
Generally, Polish regulations do not provide restrictions on using oﬃ  cial informa-
tion for personal gain. However, in the Act on Local Government Employees and 
the Law on Protection of Undisclosed Information, there are regulations on handling 
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conﬁ dential information, but they do not apply in the case of information that is not 
speciﬁ cally labeled conﬁ dential. For example, for buying municipal properties (land, 
buildings, etc.) it is necessary to know that these properties are put up for sale. In this 
situation, the rule of “who gets there ﬁ rst” is very valuable. Th at is why it is common 
practice that councilors, local government employees, and their families and friends buy 
municipal real estate at a very advantageous price.
Th e ﬁ rst of the above-mentioned acts stipulates that a local government employee’s 
primary obligation is to the state, and information acquired in public oﬃ  ce should be 
kept conﬁ dential. Th ere are no sanctions for the violation of this rule, nor an authority 
to enforce it.
Art. 2 of the Act on Securing Secret Information states that local government authori-
ties are obliged to preserve the conﬁ dentiality of oﬃ  cial information. Th is act provides 
a special control system to ensure the conﬁ dentiality of secret information.
As far as local government oﬃ  cials are concerned, there are no speciﬁ c provisions 
concerning this matter. Th ere is a signiﬁ cant lack of regulation proscribing the use of 
oﬃ  cial information for purposes other than professional and no regulation that a public 
oﬃ  cial can make use of information only when that information is available to the general 
public. Such regulation could serve as a means to prevent proﬁ ting from information 
that only an oﬃ  cial has had access to while performing his or her oﬃ  cial duties.
According to the Polish Criminal Code, disclosure or use of conﬁ dential informa-
tion by a public oﬃ  cial while performing his or her duties is a crime. Sanctions include 
a ﬁ ne or imprisonment of up to two years.
3.3.6   Using Local Government Property
Th e Local Self-Government Acts provide speciﬁ c prohibitions for councilors and district/
regional executive board members on using communal/district/regional property in 
individual or joint economic activity.16 Th is rule does not apply to mayors, deputy 
mayors and local government employees, but their rights are limited further than those 
of councilors: Th ey aren’t allowed to perform any economic activity at all, as was men-
tioned before. If a councilor runs an economic activity before he/she gets the mandate, 
he/she is obliged to stop that economic activity within three months from the date of 
swearing in. Non-compliance is grounds for loss of mandate.
Civil law (family) relations are prohibited within local government authorities or 
local government units in cases aﬀ ecting the property of a regional councilor or regional 
executive board member, with the exception of services publicly available on general 
principles, real estate rental for personal housing purposes or individual economic activ-
ity and lease, and other forms of real estate use, if rental, tenancy or lease are based on 
general rules.17 Th is restriction concerns only regional councilors and executive board 
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members and oﬀ ers no mechanisms to control civil law relations mentioned above. It 
seems that such a mechanism (restrictions coupled with eﬃ  cient disclosure tools) is also 
needed at the community and district level. 
But there are no other regulations concerning the use of public (local government) 
properties (buildings, cars, printers, copiers, etc.) for personal purposes. Even though 
the Act on Local Government Employees deﬁ nes public oﬃ  cials’ obligation in public 
service, there are no clear sanctions for noncompliance, and no authority is named to 
enforce the law. Th is aspect of conﬂ ict of interest is an evident weak point in the Polish 
legislation.
Use of public property for personal gain takes place with the public’s consent; a 
characteristic of post-communist societies is litmited public awareness of the fact that 
public property belongs to no individuals. Th is mentality and common practice results 
in the evident waste of public money.
Th e law prohibits councilors of municipal/district and regional governments to 
enter into contractual agreements with the city/district/region or do business with the 
council’s assets. Nevertheless, the World Bank reports that 
“approximately half of the Warsaw councilors or members of their 
families were reportedly involved in business using municipally owned 
land and shops” (World Bank, 1999). 
According to the World Bank report, many self-governments own large amounts 
of land and real estate. Th is gives local administrations signiﬁ cant leverage over urban 
development, business opportunities, and kickbacks. Th ere appears to be a strong cor-
relation between improvements that raise land values and the location of residences of 
city oﬃ  cials. In addition, there are reportedly many cases of council members or their 
spouses renting from the council, often at low rents set in 1990/91 (some rents are not 
indexed at all, some are indexed but remain below market levels). Th e owner of the 
lease then sub-leases the property illegally at market prices, thereby making a proﬁ t. 
Other cases involve the creation of special conditions for sale, so that a piece of land or 
real estate can be sold only to those now leasing or only at a predetermined price, or 
transactions are completed on the day of the announcement, so only those in the know 
can participate. Th e result is below-market returns on public assets and high proﬁ t for 
well-placed private interests. Revenues from public assets are further reduced when rents 
for stores and buildings owned by the municipality go into the pocket of the municipal 
manager rather than into municipal revenues. 
Corruption in the allocation of apartments is also a problem. Leverage over people 
who are anxious to keep their apartments and their jobs, and who do not see alterna-
tives, adds to the power of local administrations. In addition, some apartments are set 
aside to be allocated as a personal gift from the mayor. Investigations indicate that these 
apartments are not always used to help the poor or  the needy.
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Th e Polish Supreme Auditing Chamber (NIK) disclosed obvious cases of conﬂ ict 
of interest in controlled local government units.18 Among others, the NIK described 
cases when local councilors use municipal property (for individual economic activity 
such as inﬁ rmaries,) at below-market prices or sell municipal property to councilors 
or other local government employees without proper public procurement procedures.
Using public properties for personal purposes is common in the health care system 
and can be easily identiﬁ ed. Informal payments, ranging from small gifts ex post to 
poorly-paid oﬃ  cials, to “speed money” for better, faster treatment, to extortion of large 
bribes on an informally established rate scale for surgery and other treatments, is the 
second form of conﬂ ict of interest. Th e large scale of the problem indicates that conﬂ ict 
of interest introduces adverse incentives in the health care system, distorts priorities, 
limits access, and compromises eﬀ orts to improve eﬃ  ciency, accountability and equity. 
It is impossible to assess the actual cost of damage in health care. Many cases have been 
reported of medical personnel using public hospital facilities to deliver paid medical 
services. To some extent, the prevalence of this practice can be related to the extremely 
low pay in the health sector, but many of the beneﬁ ciaries have high incomes. Th ere are 
indications that the practice has exceeded the scale of compensation for low pay and 
become predatory. Pressure to eliminate conﬂ ict of interest can be expected to rise as 
people become unwilling—and/or unable—to pay both their mandatory health care 
contribution and informal payments, but it will take more than public pressure to solve 
this problem. 
3.3.7   Limitations in Salaries
For almost 10 years, since the system of local governments appeared (1990), Poland 
has faced an unregulated and rather unlimited increase of public oﬃ  cials’ salaries, both 
at the central and local levels. Positions that used to carry moral value and had often 
been unpaid became well-paid and secure jobs. Th us, positions in local self-government 
have become lucrative and coveted jobs, where one can not only earn a good salary but 
also have the opportunity to earn additional income illegally. Due to public outrage 
and media attention, the Polish Parliament decided to stop the system of unregulated 
increases in local government oﬃ  cials’ salaries.
Th us, on the basis agreed by the councils, a councilor receives per diems, as well as 
travel cost reimbursement.19 Th e monthly per diem of a councilor cannot exceed 150 
percent of the base amount speciﬁ ed in the budget law for persons in executive public 
oﬃ  ces and can be lowered by an executive order of the Council of Ministers on account 
of a smaller number of inhabitants in a particular constituency.20 A district councilor 
or regional councilor who is a paid member of the executive board is prohibited from 
receiving per diem payments.21
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Local government employees obtain a salary corresponding to their qualiﬁ cations 
and professional responsibilities. Th e amount is speciﬁ ed by an executive order of the 
Council of Ministers. Th e monthly salary of a mayor, deputy mayor, or a member of 
the district/regional executive board can amount to a maximum of seven times the base 
amount speciﬁ ed in the budget law for persons in executive public positions.
3.3.8   Involvement in Political Party Activities
From a professional point of view, local self-government in Poland seems to be highly 
politicized. All strategically inﬂ uential positions with decision-making authority are 
occupied by elected politicians. Th at is why it is impossible to avoid political pressure 
on the decision-making process, a situation that provokes a conﬂ ict between private, 
political, and public interests. 
Local government public oﬃ  cials comprise two groups: Some of them are politicians 
(councilors and senior oﬃ  cials), while others are professional staﬀ  (local government 
employees). As a rule, politicians are characterized by a high level of professional in-
security, since their position is tied to the four-year term of oﬃ  ce. Local government 
employees usually are hired based on stable labor regulations. Ordinarily they keep their 
jobs even when the term of oﬃ  ce for councils and executive boards ends. Th at is why 
they form a rather permanent staﬀ . It is important to emphasize that local government 
employees are usually subordinated to senior oﬃ  cials in the hierarchy.
Contrary to the Polish Civil Service Act, the Polish legal framework on local self-
government does not forbid local government oﬃ  cials from manifesting their political 
convictions or from being members of a political party. However, the Act on Local 
Government Employees stipulates it is the general obligation of an employee in local 
government to perform his oﬃ  cial duties without any political bias. Of course the situ-
ation is the result of a dangerous shortcoming in the Polish legal system, and it provides 
opportunities for conﬂ ict of interest.
3.3.9   Transparency
It is generally recognized that a democratic system can function more eﬀ ectively when the 
public is fully informed about issues of public life since being informed is a prerequisite 
for acceptance, participation, and compliance. It is thus necessary that the public have, 
subject to unavoidable exceptions and limitations, access to the large number of records 
and information of general interest and importance that administrative authorities 
maintain at all tiers. According to the Constitutional provision of art. 61 paragraph 1 
(on transparency and openness), a citizen must have the right to obtain information on 
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the activities of organs of public authority as well as persons performing a public oﬃ  ce. 
Such right must also include access to information on the activities of self-governing 
economic or professional organs and other persons or organizational units relating to 
the ﬁ eld in which they perform their oﬃ  cial duties and manage community assets or 
state property.
Th e right to obtain information must ensure access to documents and admission 
to meetings of collective organs of public authority established by universal elections, 
with the opportunity to make sound and visual recordings. Limitations may be imposed 
by statute solely to protect liberties and rights of other persons and economic subjects, 
public order, security or important economic interests of the state.22
Th e constitutional rule of transparency (openness) is the foundation for the preven-
tion of conﬂ ict of interest. A citizen generally has the “right to know.” Without having 
to show any speciﬁ c interest, everyone is entitled upon request23 to access public infor-
mation (by eﬀ ective and appropriate means), to enter council and committee sessions, 
and to access documents associated with the performance of public duties, within a 
reasonable time.24 
One does not have to be a participant in any administrative procedure as a pre-
requisite for the right to request information from administrative authorities. Th e 
administrative authorities should supply information as soon as it is possible by eﬀ ective 
and appropriate means. Th ese means may consist of oral or written information, allow-
ing inspection of documents and ﬁ les, etc. Th e fact that the administrative authorities 
charge a fee for a request or recover the cost of providing requested information (copy-
ing, printing, mailing, etc.) is compatible with the principle of transparency.25 Access 
to information may only be subject to limitations that are necessary in a democratic 
society for the protection of legitimate public interests, privacy, and other legitimate 
private interests.26 Where access to information is refused, the administrative authori-
ties must give a statement of reasons, and the refusal is subject to review (due to the 
administrative procedure).27 
Additionally, the Code of Administrative Proceedings provides the general rule (art. 
9) that a participant of administrative procedures must be informed by administrative 
organs about his/her rights and obligations within the administrative procedure. 
According to current regulations, access by the press, civic organizations, etc., to 
information on public ﬁ nance and management can be easily limited. Th e constitution 
guarantees the right to information on government performance. However, there are 
speciﬁ c acts that allow for severe restriction of that right. Examples include:
      1)   Th e Criminal Code extends greater protection from libel to politicians and public 
ﬁ gures (public oﬃ  cials) than to regular citizens; this is a direct violation of the 
rulings (also referring to Poland) of the Strasbourg Human Rights Tribunal.
      2)   Th e Law on Protection of Undisclosed Information allows directors of public 
institutions to decide what kind of information constitutes a “professional 
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secret” and there is no appeal to reverse that decision. In 2000, in a famous case, 
the council of a small town (Losice) barred access to a protocol of a supervisory 
commission meeting, thus making information on how the town allocates public 
money “conﬁ dential.” When the press turned to the Supreme Administrative 
Court, it ruled that the council had not violated the law. 
      3)   Th e Law on Protection of Personal Data provides tools that can limit access to 
information about certain politicians, e.g., candidates to local governments, if 
they do not agree to disclose it (whether they belonged to political parties or 
have been convicted, for example).
      4)   Th e Law on Public Procurement also includes vague provisions that can serve 
to block access to information.
      5)   Th e Local Government Acts provide that the speciﬁ c rules and mode of access to 
public information be regulated by internal regulations (statutes of communities, 
districts and regions). Unfortunately, these internal procedures vary a great deal, 
but even worse, a  number of internal statutes limit citizens’ constitutional right 
to access to information. Internal (local) statutes provide, for example, that the 
community council can exclude the public from council meetings (i.e., Bytom 
city, Grojec district, Biala community). Th ere are cases when internal regula-
tions provide that the citizens can access public information only on Mondays 
(as in Wysokie Mazowieckie district).
4.   PROCEDURAL INSTRUMENTS
      PREVENTING CONFLICT OF INTEREST
4.1 Declaration of Income and Property
All local government public oﬃ  cials (except for professional local government employ-
ees) are obliged to make a disclosure on income and property.28 Th is disclosure covers their 
separate estate and joint property of spouses (with the exception of a particular spouse’s 
property). Th e declaration includes information about:
      •     funds, real estate, shares in commercial companies and the purchase of property 
from the Treasury or from other state legal entity, local government units or 
their associations or from local government legal entities (the property that was 
purchased by vendees); information on any business activity and positions at 
private companies;
      •     income received from employment or from other commercial activity or oc-
cupation stemming from the sources mentioned above;
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      •     personal property with a value exceeding PLN 10,000 (about €2,500);
      •     pecuniary obligations with a value exceeding PLN 10,000 (about €2,500), 
including debts and loans as well as contractual obligations.
Th e disclosure of income and property, along with a copy of the declaration on in-
come in the preceding tax year and its correction, have to be supplied in two copies. 
Councilors and mayors have to ﬁ le the disclosure within 30 days of taking oﬃ  ce. 
Th e following declarations of income and property have to be supplied by a councilor 
or a mayor, annually by April 30th concerning the preceding year, and two months 
before the end of their term. 
A deputy mayor, a member of an executive board, a secretary, a treasurer, a director 
of a local government unit, a manager of a local government legal entity, and a person 
authorized to make administrative decisions ﬁ le their ﬁ rst declaration within 30 days 
of taking oﬃ  ce or the ﬁ rst day of employment. Subsequent declarations must be ﬁ led 
by April 30 every year, and on the last day of their term or employment.
Th e data in the declaration is checked by the authority where the declaration was 
ﬁ led, and it is also sent to the local oﬃ  ce of the State Treasury, which does a similar 
check. Th e analysis of the declaration the treasurer’s oﬃ  ce also takes into account the 
income earned by the spouse of the oﬃ  cial in the preceding tax year. Th e analysis may 
compare the ﬁ gures of the declaration and the attached copy of the deposition on the 
income earned in a given tax year to previous declarations of income and property with 
the attached copies of the depositions on the amount of income earned in a tax year. 
If there is a suspicion that the declaration contains incorrect or outright false infor-
mation, the oﬃ  cial in charge of checking the declaration can request an audit from the 
director of the ﬁ scal inspection oﬃ  ce. If the request is refused, the case can be appealed 
to the general inspector of ﬁ scal inspection. 
Th e oﬃ  cial in charge of checking the declarations has to make a report to the ad-
equate community/district or regional council by October 30, listing people who did 
not ﬁ le a declaration or ﬁ led after the deadline; and outlining any incorrect information 
contained in the declaration, with detailed explanations.
Th e information included in the declaration on income and property is public, 
excluding private data, such as the ﬁ ler’s home address and the location of his/her 
property.
Th e law on reducing opportunities for public oﬃ  cials to engage in business activities 
established a Register of Beneﬁ ts. Mayors, deputy mayors, members of executive district/
regional boards, secretaries, and treasurers, and their spouses, must submit information 
on all earnings deﬁ ned as stemming from all positions and activities subject to remu-
neration (both in public administration and in private institutions); from work carried 
out independently, sponsorship of public activities of the functionary, gifts and travel 
174
C O M B AT I N G  C O N F L I C T  O F  I N T E R E S T  I N  LO C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  T H E  C E E  C O U N T R I E S  • •  PA R T  I I
D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
unrelated to public oﬃ  ce; all gifts exceeding 50 percent of the minimum monthly wage; 
and all other beneﬁ ts exceeding the same value. Th e register is public and is maintained 
by the State Election Commission. 
Th e 1999 World Bank Report stated that: 
“Nepotism, cronyism and the conﬂ ict of interest would be less pervasive 
if eﬃ  cient mechanisms of control existed.” (World Bank, 1999)
Since the beginning of 2003, it seems that Polish anticorruption laws are equipped 
with such mechanisms. Time will tell.
A completely new regulation says that local government public oﬃ  cials (except for 
professional local government employees) are obliged to ﬁ le a declaration on economic 
activities by their close relations (spouses, parents, children and siblings), if the work is 
performed on the local government level where the person who is obliged to ﬁ le the 
declaration is employed. Th ey must also ﬁ le a declaration on civil contracts between their 
close relations and any community/district/regional bodies, local government units or 
their legal representatives, except for contracts that do not concern legal relationships 
resulting from the utilization of freely available services or from legal relationships based 
on general conditions. 
Th e local government oﬃ  cial (apart from professional local government employees) 
whose close family member is employed by the local government unit or started work-
ing for a commercial company in which at least 50 percent of shares is owned by local 
government units during the oﬃ  cial’s term, is obliged to include this information in 
the declaration of income and property. Th e obligation of disclosure also applies to a 
spouse, parent, child or sibling. 
If the declaration is not ﬁ led on time, the law provides for strict sanctions, such as lost 
per diem (for councilors), loss of salary (for a mayor, head of the district executive board, or 
marshal), recall from oﬃ  ce (for a secretary or treasurer), dissolving an employment 
contract (for a deputy mayor, a member of an executive board, a director of local govern-
ment unit, a manager of a local government legal entity, or a person authorized to make 
administrative decisions). Additionally, supplying false information or concealing the 
truth results in criminal liability, punishable by imprisonment of up to three years.
Until January 1, 2003, that issue was poorly regulated. Public oﬃ  cials (local gov-
ernment employees) themselves were not allowed to own private businesses or to be 
employed in the private sector. And only the highest public oﬃ  cials (central government 
oﬃ  cials) were obliged to disclose their spouse’s business activities. Unfortunately, this 
requirement did not apply to local public oﬃ  cials, which left a lot of room for corrup-
tion, particularly at the local level. Even in the case of those who are obliged to disclose 
the business activities of their spouse, the mechanism of control was really weak. Th e 
eﬀ ectiveness of the newly passed laws is diﬃ  cult to assess, but at least the mechanism 
for disclosure of potentially corrupt circumstances has ﬁ nally been established. 
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4.2 Rules on Withdrawal
One of the most important procedures to provide for the prevention of conﬂ ict of interest 
is the institution of the decision-maker’s withdrawal or recall, established in the Polish 
Code of Administrative Proceedings and the Local Self-Government Acts. 
4.2.1   Withdrawal in Individual Cases
In many situations government agencies have to choose among several applicants or 
impose positive or negative duties on individuals. Th e Polish Code of Administrative 
Proceedings (C.A.P.), issued on June 14, 1960, and still in eﬀ ect, provides the option of 
excluding any candidate whose impartiality is questionable, assuring the avoidance of 
conﬂ ict of interest as much as possible. C.A.P. indicates three kinds of exclusion: suspen-
sion of an administrative authority employee, an administrating body, or a member of 
collective body (art. 24, 25). Suspension means that the employee (administrating body 
or member of a collective body) must abstain from any actions except those of utmost 
urgency in the public interest or the paramount interest of the party.
According to the regulations, an oﬃ  cial or a member of a collective body is subject 
to suspension in cases where:
      •     a legal relationship exists between the oﬃ  cial and a party in the case such that 
the oﬃ  cial’s rights or duties may be inﬂ uenced;
      •     one party is a spouse, while the causes of suspension persist after termination 
of marriage, his/her relatives and relations up to the second degree;
      •     one party in the case is a person related by adoption, custody and guardianship, 
while the causes of suspension persist after dissolution of adoptive relationship, 
custody and guardianship;
      •     if the oﬃ  cial was or still is a representative of one of the parties, or if the rep-
resentative was a spouse, close family member or someone related up to the 
second degree or someone related by adoption, custody and guardianship;
      •     if one of the parties is a person in a supervisory position.
According to the C.A.P., the oﬃ  cial or a member of a collective body in local 
government should withdraw from participation in a case if he/she has an interest in 
the case; was a witness or an expert in the case; took part in the appeal of a decision 
at a lower level; or if there has been an oﬃ  cial, disciplinary, or criminal investigation 
against the oﬃ  cial.
Th e list of reasons for suspension contained in the C.A.P. is incomplete. Th e existence 
of other factual or legal circumstances casting doubt on someone’s personal impartial-
ity is highly possible. Th erefore, as the ﬁ nding of a condition speciﬁ ed in C.A.P. is the 
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essential reason for the oﬃ  cial’s suspension, it is unnecessary to point out an apparent 
bias of the person deciding a case. Th ere exists another kind of suspension that calls 
for the substantiation of certain circumstances that can cause doubts of neutrality. It 
does not necessitate the substantiation of speciﬁ cs concerning possible bias if there is 
even a hint of impartiality. Th ere is no need to prove that the oﬃ  cial acts with bias if 
his neutrality can be questioned. Th e assessment of the circumstances is done by the 
direct superior of the oﬃ  cial, but its discretion is limited to demonstrating the pos-
sibility of bias. Th e characteristic of the occurrences can range from the private sphere 
to professional activities.
Th e C.A.P. can also require the withdrawal of a public administration agency from 
the settlement of a case. Th is means that the agency is not eligible to make the admin-
istrative decision in the case, in other words it is unable to undertake any procedural 
activities in the case. Th e withdrawal of an administrative agency equally binds both 
collective and single-person agencies. Th e only exception occurs when the situation is 
related to the proprietary interests of:
      •     the director of the agency or his/her spouse; while the causes for suspension 
persist after termination of marriage, his/her relatives and relations by aﬃ  nity 
up to the second degree, as well as a person related by adoption, custody and 
guardianship—in these instances the case is settled by an agency at the next 
higher level;
      •     the person at the managerial position in the supervising agency or that person’s 
spouse, relation by adoption, custody and guardianship; such cases are settled 
by the supervising agency on the next higher level.
Th e regulations on withdrawal from a case do not list among the conditions cases when 
one of the participants in the decision-making process is a councilor of the self-governmental 
unit, and the case is under the direct authority of the unit.
Th ere is no doubt that there are a number of possibilities for collusion between the 
oﬃ  cial of the self-governmental agency and the councilor.29 As for the executive board, 
the council has the authority to implement the board’s dismissal. Th e interdependence of 
authorized agencies to establish the units of self-government and the executive agencies is 
mentioned in most of the statutory regulations. Th e executive organs of the communities 
(mayors) or the executive boards of the districts and regions carry out the resolutions of 
the councils,30 prepare the drafts of council’s resolutions,31 and implement them.32 Th e 
legal act on Community Self-Government stipulates that, in the accomplishment of the 
speciﬁ c municipal tasks, the mayor is accountable exclusively to the council.33
Except for the organizational dependence resulting from the structure, tasks and 
functions of decision-making and executive agencies in the self-governmental units, there 
are various forms of interdependence among the members of the bodies. I consider, for 
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example, the reliance on friendship, political party or politics as such. It is worth noting 
that the decision-making and executive organs of the self-governmental units—typically 
characterized by political loyalties—are composed of elected oﬃ  cials along with the so-
called “key ﬁ gure.” Th at means that, while council members are directly elected by the 
voters, the oﬃ  cial who assembles the executive district/regional board is selected by the 
political majority of the council. Th e issue of loyalty, or the lack of it, has apparently 
nothing to do with professional qualiﬁ cations. If a participant in a given decision is a 
councilor who has a vested family or political interest in the case (they are politically 
dependant on a board member, the chairperson of the board, or an appointed oﬃ  cial), 
and the matter is decided along political loyalties inﬂ uencing objective, impartial con-
duct, the institution of withdrawal (or abstention) is called for.
In every council, regardless of its size, diﬀ erent relations exist between the councilors 
and the executive organs (directly) and the employees of the agency (indirectly). It may 
be presumed that such relations (friendly or political), may actually or possibly inﬂ uence 
impartiality. Th e solution calls for the obligatory application of oﬃ  cial withdrawal of 
the self-governmental agency (and as the result the abstention of the agency) in cases, 
where the party is the councilor of the self-governmental unit or the person related to 
him/her.
Th e institution of withdrawal is very useful for the prevention of conﬂ ict of inter-
est. Nevertheless, there remains a lack of mechanisms to implement and monitor the 
eﬀ ectiveness and eﬃ  ciency of this provision. Th at is why the institution of withdrawal 
is almost unused in Polish local government.
4.2.2   Collegiate Organ Resolutions
Th e Polish Local Self-Government Act contains a provision prohibiting councilors or 
executive board members from voting at council, board, or commission sessions where 
such matters are decided that pertain to the person’s personal legal interest.34 Th is regu-
lation does not specify tools for implementation and monitoring.
4.3 Limitations on Public Procurement
Th e law that was speciﬁ cally adopted in order to regulate procurement is the Public 
Procurement Act. It established the Public Procurement Oﬃ  ce (PPO) and introduced 
mandatory tenders for most public purchases, restrictions on membership in purchaser’s 
bidding commissions, and a procedure of appeals for the vendors disagreeing with the 
purchaser’s contracting decision. 
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To ensure honest and impartial public procurement procedures, the Act on Public 
Procurement provides the institution of withdrawal from the public procurement pro-
cedure. A person cannot represent a procuring entity, perform other activities related 
to procurement proceedings, or be a consultant in procurement proceedings if such a 
person:
      •     is married to, directly or indirectly related to the second degree, or is related by 
adoption, or guardianship with the bidder, the bidder’s legal proxy or members 
of the governing bodies of a legal person competing for the procurement;
      •     worked in the last three years as an employee or a contractor for the bidder or 
has been a member of the governing bodies of legal persons competing for the 
procurement;
      •     is in such a legal or factual relationship with a supplier or contractor competing 
for the procurement as to give rise to doubts regarding his impartiality.
Persons acting on behalf of the procuring entity in public procurement proceed-
ings shall submit declarations in writing of the existence, (or the lack) of circumstances 
spelled out in this article.
Th e existence of the circumstances inﬂ uencing partiality shall result in the exclu-
sion of a given person from the public procurement proceedings. Th e violation of the 
above-mentioned restrictions draws consequences deﬁ ned by the Labor Code.35 How-
ever, persistent and frequently unpunished misconduct proves that the law on Public 
Procurement is not properly implemented. No monitoring of the assets or lifestyles of 
persons performing public procurement takes place, nor do any codes of ethics exist.
Th e cases revealed by the press as well as opinion polls and statistics indicate prob-
lems. Most of them demonstrate that the primary goal of the Public Procurement Act, 
namely the establishment of an eﬀ ective procedure, has not been achieved. Th ose com-
panies that do turn to the PPO most often charge the procuring agency of selecting a 
vendor not based on criteria published in the announcement of the tender (unjustiﬁ ed 
or arbitrary rejection of oﬀ ers)—and of changing the criteria after the bidding process 
has started.36
Th e allegation that a procurer sets the criteria for bidding to favor one particular 
bidder comes up frequently in surveys but not in legal action, because it is very diﬃ  cult 
to prove—particularly since the oﬀ ers are secret and the vendors only get to know the 
prices proposed by their competitors. Th is kind of criteria-manipulation occurs par-
ticularly at the local level, where supervision is less stringent and personal bonds among 
people working for diﬀ erent companies and institutions are stronger.
Signiﬁ cant abuses occur before the tender is announced, such as bribes to ensure 
early access to information on technical requirements, speciﬁ cations, and other criteria 
crucial to the point system used in the decisions. Conditions for winning a bid can 
be set in such a way as to favor one particular bidder, and conditions are sometimes 
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subject to change after bidding has started. Procurement abuses are also made possible by 
weak bidding documents and poor evaluation practices. Characteristics (such as ﬁ nan-
cial standing) that should be used to include or exclude ﬁ rms from the bidding process 
altogether are instead used as part of the evaluation—and are slanted in numerous ways 
to favor a predetermined winner. For example, the successful bidder can be deﬁ ned by 
a requirement of proﬁ tability of precisely 12 percent (World Bank, 1999). 
Various other techniques used to bypass proper public procurement methods in-
clude the attachment of large additional contracts to the contract of the winning bidder 
after an initial bid for a small contract has been won. In some cases, other bidders are 
informed of the lowest bid so that they can adjust their prices and inducements accord-
ingly. Winning ﬁ rms can also be allowed to negotiate the tender price upwards after the 
contract has been awarded. Access to conﬁ dential information in advance appears to be 
the key feature of these abuses. Collusion among bidders (for example non-competi-
tion agreements between ﬁ rms that dominate the market) also serves to raise prices and 
subvert the procurement process.
In the local government units ﬁ nancial control (from December 2001) the Supreme Audit-
ing Chamber (NIK) disclosed common examples (43 cases in 89 controlled units) of selling 
municipal property to councilors and local government employees with an obvious violation 
of the public procurement procedures or even without public procurement procedures. A 1999 
audit of school renovations performed by communities found that, in 16 out of 94 schools, 
audited procedures mandated by the procurement law were not applied at all, and in most 
of the rest of them numerous improprieties were found .37
4.4 Confl ict of Interest Rules in the Field of Privatization
Widespread nepotism, cronyism, and other forms of conﬂ ict of interest are the main 
problem in appointments to privatization commissions and selection committees. 
As the World Bank reports, it appears that some public oﬃ  cials’ representatives and 
their proxies are appointed in order to ensure a particular outcome of the privatization 
process, channeling funds to particular individuals or political parties, thereby contribut-
ing to a complex web of traded favors, and/or manipulating prices downward.
For example, the Supreme Auditing Chamber (NIK) estimates that the state lost at least PLN 
85 million in the privatization of the “Centrum” department store complex in Warsaw.38
Th is situation thrives on the lack of transparency concerning appointment criteria, 
qualiﬁ cations for membership of committees, and members’ connections and interests. 
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Th e process of privatization on the local level mainly concerns three aspects:
      •     the privatization of communal legal entities, owned or managed by the local 
government;
      •     the privatization of communal services;  
      •     the privatization of municipal property.
According to the report by the Minister of the Treasury, at the beginning of the 
privatization process, communities had no knowledge, skills or understanding of the 
complex concept of eﬀ ective and eﬃ  cient municipal economy reforms.39 For example, 
self-governments’ attitudes to privatization of health assets vary widely. According to 
the World Bank Report, some wish to hold on to assets blindly, rather than consider 
rationalization; others wish to privatize them in an ill-considered way. Although Poland 
supports private sector primary care, hospitals raise more diﬃ  cult issues, and reasonable 
fears have been expressed about “wild privatization” in the absence of a strong regulatory 
framework, eﬀ ective monitoring capacity, and provisions to ensure access for the poor. 
Cases have been reported of hospital management (hospitals are owned by districts or 
regions) deliberately bankrupting hospitals so the assets can be sold cheaply to manage-
ment or their proxies. Th e Health Insurance Supervisory Oﬃ  ce will need to develop the 
capacity to detect and prevent such abuses and help identify cases when hospitals should 
be closed or can be privatized without detrimental consequences on public care.
4.5 Restrictions on Political Donations 
According to the Act on Reducing Opportunities to Do Business for Persons Perform-
ing Public Functions, mayors, heads of district executive boards, and marshals (and 
their spouses) must disclose all information about performing paid activities and public 
(including political) activities, as well as any form of ﬁ nancial support, in the Proﬁ ts’ 
Register. Th e Register is open to the public. Additionally, the Act on Political Parties 
provides that ﬁ nancial contribution for political parties’ can only come from individuals. 
Political party activities mustn’t be sponsored by legal entities.
Even though regulations prohibit companies from ﬁ nancially supporting political 
party activities,  corruption linked to election funds still exists, presenting a problem at 
the local level. According to the World Bank Report, companies that refuse to comply 
may be excluded from the procurement process.40 In bigger cities, there is strong pressure 
from potential investors, including foreign investors, who can aﬀ ord to pay substantial 
party donations. In smaller cities and at village level, there is a risk that the local elite 
develops a network that controls the town and inﬂ uences bank loans and other decisions 
aﬀ ecting both businesses and private individuals.
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5.   LEGAL INSTRUMENTS PROVIDING RESPONSIBILITY 
      FOR ACTIVITIES CAUSING CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Th ere is no special legal framework either to encourage whistle blowing by local govern-
ment employees or to protect whistleblowers. However, local government employees 
who are given an order that requires the violation of the law or the waste of resources 
may request the order in writing and then refuse to carry it out.
Supervision of the local government administration is implemented primarily by 
central administrative organs or accountable to the main administrative authority (inter-
nal control) and, secondarily, by organs independent from the administration (external 
control). Within this ﬁ rst group, the Self-Government Board of Appeal (SKO), the 
governor (voivode), the Regional Accounting Chambers (RIO), and the prime minister, 
are worth mentioning. 
5.1 Internal Control Supporting the Prevention of 
      Confl ict of Interest
Th e internal supervisory regulations concerning conﬂ ict of interest prevention consist 
of the procedure for appeal of individual administrative decisions (regulated by the 
C.A.P) and other control instruments. Th e Local Self-Government Acts state that the 
prime minister, the governor and the Regional Accounting Chambers supervise local 
government activities on the basis of the rule of lawfulness.41 At the same time, they 
are limited by this rule. 
Th e governor plays the important role of supervising the loss of mandate, or the 
decision-making of the councils, in accordance with the amended Local Self-Govern-
ment Acts.
Th e Regional Accounting Chambers supervise the ﬁ nancial condition of the com-
mune, district, and region and are accountable to the prime minister. Th e law regarding 
the RIO was issued on October 7, 1992. Supervising these Regional Accounting Cham-
bers, the Supreme Auditing Chamber (NIK) stated that RIO’s provided paid courses for 
public oﬃ  cials in local government that were normally supervised by the RIO. Usually 
the Regional Audit Chamber is the institution in charge of auditing and supervising 
the ﬁ nances of local governments. But in this controversial case, the auditing institution 
obtained the ﬁ nancial means from the institution whose ﬁ nances are the subject of its 
supervision. Such activities could provoke a suspicion of bias and of not adequately 
meeting obligations.42
Within the ﬁ rst group of supervision, it is necessary to mention the public prosecu-
tors as well. Th ey can also determine whether a decision issued by the local government 
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authority is in accordance with the law. Potential or existing conﬂ ict of interest is usually 
not the subject of the audit. Th e prosecutors practically play no role in detecting and 
preventing conﬂ ict of interest.
5.2 External Control Supporting the Prevention of Confl ict of Interest
5.2.1   Supreme Auditing Chamber
Th e second supervisory agency, the Supreme Auditing Chamber (NIK) is particularly 
noteworthy. Established in 1949, initially it was accountable to the government, but 
since 1980 the Chamber has been accountable only to Parliament (Sejm). Th e NIK is 
subordinate to Parliament (Sejm), but the Constitution grants the Supreme Auditing 
Chamber independence and institutional separation from other state organs. Th e Su-
preme Auditing Chamber undertakes audits on its own initiative, by the order of the 
Sejm or its bodies, or at the request of the president of Poland or the prime minister. 
According to the Constitution, the Supreme Auditing Chamber is also allowed to 
audit the activity of organs of local self-government, communal legal persons, other 
communal organizational units (regarding legality, economic prudence and diligence), 
and other organizational units and economic subjects (regarding legality and economic 
prudence) to the extent to which they use state or communal property or resources or 
satisfy ﬁ nancial obligations towards the state. Th e Supreme Auditing Chamber carries 
out ﬁ nancial and performance audits. Th e main areas of audit include public ﬁ nance, 
management of public property and anti-corruption activity. One of the seven priori-
ties of the NIK for the period 2000–2002 was the auditing of anticorruption activities 
implemented by diﬀ erent bodies. Th e Supreme Auditing Chamber plays the most im-
portant role in detecting and disclosing conﬂ ict of interest, and it reports on the activities 
that are in conﬂ ict with the law (several statements of the NIK were presented in this 
analysis). However, it cannot inﬂ uence illegal activities by local government authorities, 
it can only refer the cases to the public prosecutor.
5.2.2   Ombudsman
Th e role of the Ombudsman must also be emphasized. Th e institution has existed in 
Poland since November 1987 and was established by the law of July 15, 1987. Th e 
Ombudsman protects the rights and liberties of citizens; he is not dependent on any 
governing body but responsible only to Parliament (Sejm). When the Ombudsman ﬁ nds 
that a law has been broken he/she can apply to the organs of inspection or prosecution. 
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He can appeal to the Sejm requesting that the Supreme Audit Chamber carry out an 
inspection, and he may also lead the inspection himself. Th e Ombudsman is entitled 
to inspect any authority. His main role within the administrative procedure is to take 
administrative action and judicial review against administrative decisions. He can also 
make statements about acts of administrative organs and direct them to the supervisory 
body. Th ese statements also include disciplinary cases. Th e organs are obliged to co-
operate with the Ombudsman and notify him about all amendments they have made 
on the Ombudsman’s request. 
Th e legal system of supervision is established: Th ere are diﬀ erent supervisory institu-
tions in charge of monitoring the activities of local government authorities. However, the 
problem of eﬀ ective and eﬃ  cient monitoring of conﬂ ict of interest lies with the control-
ling authorities. Th e autonomy and impartiality in control and supervisory bodies, as 
well as the inclinations to use existing procedures, according to the World Bank report, 
are not yet well established. Nepotism in appointments results in too many political 
appointees and too few professionally and technically well qualiﬁ ed experts. As a result, 
there is little incentive to use the considerable powers of the supervisory agencies to 
stamp out conﬂ ict of interest and other forms of corruption or to ensure high profes-
sional standards of entry to the profession and in the conduct of its activities. 
5.3 Verifi cation of Final Administrative Decisions
Th e legal consequences of the breach of regulations on withdrawal may be far-reaching. 
If an oﬃ  cial or an agency ordered to withdraw can issue a decision that inﬂ uences the 
sanction, it will necessarily lead to the resumption of misconduct. A decision by the 
oﬃ  cial subject to suspension (or a decision issued with the participation of a member 
of a collective body who should have been suspended or an agency which should have 
been withdrawn) eﬀ ects its liability to be challenged for the following ﬁ ve years after 
the date of its issuance, in the mode of resumption of administrative proceedings. It is 
suﬃ  cient to prove that during the next proceeding on resumption the relevant agency 
will be able to bring a decision that is essentially modiﬁ ed.43
5.3.1   Supreme Administrative Court
Th ere is only one administrative court in Poland, the Supreme Administrative Court 
(NSA), which has been in existence since 1980 (there had been no administrative 
courts in Poland from the end of the Second World War until 1980). Th e Court was 
established by the law of January 31, 1980, and by an amendment to the C.A.P. Th e 
latest act establishing the internal organization, scope of jurisdiction and procedure 
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before the Supreme Administrative Court was issued on May 11, 1995. Since 1980, 
the C.A.P. has provided the Court almost every administrative act for judicial review. 
Th e jurisdiction of the Court is based on the rule of protection of individual rights, 
which means that the Court takes action only on the claim of an individual, prosecutor, 
ombudsman or NGO. 
5.4 Political Accountability
In discussions on the political life in Poland, there often appears a decreasing interest 
in elections—and in participation in democratic procedures in general.44 Th e political 
institutions and politicians do not have the sympathy of Polish people.45 On the con-
trary, a general indiﬀ erence prevails. Even the most popular political parties winning 
elections encounter indiﬀ erence instead of acceptance. 
Th e public’s interest in taking part in local elections does not enjoy high esteem 
in Poland. Th e average participation at the last local government elections was from 
44.24 percent (in the ﬁ rst round) to 35.02 percent (in the second round).46 Poles are not 
especially interested in participating in public life, and they don’t trust politicians.
Political responsibility of politicians who are public oﬃ  cials at the local government 
level and at the same time are empowered to make administrative decisions is diﬃ  cult to 
prove. Th e loss of conﬁ dence in a politician due to illegal and corrupt activities means 
that he/she will probably not be re-elected. Internal political accountability slowly starts 
to take place at the top level, when politicians of a party suspend a colleague to preserve 
the party’s reputation (for example by a disciplinary procedure), after the press discloses 
illegal or corrupt behavior.
Th e statistics describing the last local government election (October 27, 2002) do not 
provide numbers for councilors or mayors re-elected once or more. However, there were 
96 communities out of a total of 2,478 where only one candidate ran in the election. 
5.5 Legal Liability
Apart from political liabilities, the most important role is played by legal responsibili-
ties, such as oﬃ  cial responsibility, disciplinary responsibility, liability of damages, and 
criminal responsibility.47 
As has been mentioned in the analysis, there are several forms of oﬃ  cial liability for 
councilors and executive board members (appointed by the councils), such as loss of 
mandate, loss of per-diem, dismissal. In several cases, Polish regulations determine the 
kinds of liability for local government employees (mayors, deputy mayors, heads of the 
district executive boards, their deputies, marshals and deputy marshals, executive board 
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members, secretaries, treasurers, and other employees empowered to pass administra-
tive decision on behalf of senior oﬃ  cials), such as the Act on Reducing Opportunities 
for Persons Performing Public Functions to do Business. Th e provided sanctions are 
loss of mandate or dismissal. It is worth noting in this context that the majority of 
administrative decisions are made by ordinary employees who are not authorized to 
pass administrative decisions. In such cases, they are in the position of actual decision-
makers—they draft the decision which is then signed by the person formally in charge 
of issuing the decision. 
Th e essential obligations of all local government employees include: public service 
performed in the best interest of the general public; compliance with eﬀ ective laws and 
regulations; eﬃ  cient, reliable and impartial execution of tasks; polite and kind behavior 
with supervisors, other employees and clients.48 It doesn’t seem to be clear how ordinary 
employees can be expected to impose sanctions for violating the conﬂ ict of interest 
limitation on the basis of these obligations.
Disciplinary responsibility is provided only for violating an employee’s obligations, 
and the sanctions follow the legal Act on Local Government Employees49 and the legal Act 
on State Agencies Employees,50 which applies to instructional and disciplinary liability 
cases—the appointed local government oﬃ  cials bear the instructional or disciplinary 
liability for the violation of oﬃ  cial obligations before the immediate superior (for the 
breach of a lesser degree) or before the disciplinary commission, in cases of ﬁ rst and 
second violations (of a more serious nature).
Disciplinary actions can include reprimand, reprimand with warning, reprimand 
with suspension of promotion for up to two years, demotion, and dismissal.
Th e liability of damages caused by the local government oﬃ  cial rests with the local 
government unit where the oﬃ  cial is employed.51 Moreover, if the damage is caused 
by the violation of the rule for withdrawal from an individual decision the basis for 
the liability of damages is the C.A.P.52 Th is liability is not limited to the actual dam-
age (damnum emergens) but can also comprise moral compensation (lucrum cessans). 
Th e speciﬁ c sort of regulations penalizing conﬂ ict of interest, such as corruption, are 
provided by the Criminal Code.53 
6.   EXTRALEGAL INSTRUMENTS PREVENTING CONFLICT OF INTEREST
6.1 Human Resources Management Instruments 
Human resources management in terms of the selection process is still a weakly regu-
lated area in Polish law on local government employees. Th e candidate for a position of 
local government employee must have Polish citizenship, pertinent qualiﬁ cations and 
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experience, be at least 18 years old, have all public rights and the ability to act within the 
law, and be in good health. Th ese prerequisites according to Polish law are suﬃ  cient to 
obtain and hold the position of local government employee. Contrary to the selection 
process in the civil service corps of a local government, there is no pre-work qualiﬁ ca-
tion procedure, such as an admission exam, for checking the candidate’s references, 
communication skills or knowledge of foreign languages. 
Unfortunately the human resource system, with regard to local government employ-
ees, is usually not based on merit, experience, or competition but on family relations or 
friendship. Th is situation does not concern school principals (community), directors 
of hospitals (districts), museums, theatres (regions), where competitions are used to ﬁ ll 
positions. It has to be stressed that, in regard to the speciﬁ c administrative units which 
provide services (schools, kindergartens, etc.), the competitions are announced in ac-
cordance with legal regulations, and are merit-based. 
6.2 Codes of Ethics
Th ere is a growing role of extralegal regulations, internal regulations and procedures, 
such as codes of conduct, codes of ethics, and bylaws in Poland. 
It might be said that these extralegal regulations play the most important role in 
conﬂ ict of interest prevention. Local authorities that use extralegal instruments, such 
as codes of ethics, demonstrate openness and transparency and make a great contribu-
tion to developing a clean (in the sense of being free from unethical behavior) and clear 
(accessible, transparent) public administration. 
However, though regulations that seek to counter conﬂ ict of interest, the conﬂ ict 
of roles, and the conﬂ ict of obligations, while developing a strong basis for ethical 
decision-making processess are more and more popular in Poland’s professional 
associations, such as medical, engineering, legal, business associations, they are almost 
unknown in Polish local governments.
In Poland, there are codes of ethics that apply to the civil service and to members of 
Parliament. In 2000 the Bialystok School of Public Administration initiated an analysis 
of organizational, legal and procedural tools supporting ethical conduct in the com-
munity for the City of Cracow and Bialystok, where, as a result, codes of ethics were 
adopted. However, the City of Cracow is a rare example.
Also, anticorruption measures that the European Commission has tended to recom-
mend to candidate countries have been generally oriented towards the adoption (apart 
from supervision) of codes of ethics for public oﬃ  cials. But it appears to endorse a 
“top-down” approach for such codes, i.e., they are imposed from above.54 Likewise, the 
approach taken by candidate countries in adopting such codes is not as broad as some 
of the more important lessons learnt in Western countries that have adopted ethical 
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codes might suggest. for example, eﬀ ective codes should be detailed, and they need to 
be developed through a process of consultation with the oﬃ  cials to whom they apply.
6.3 Education and Training
Any change in human attitudes takes time. Children and young people are more amen-
able to inﬂ uence than adults, whose views and habits are already ingrained. One positive 
and groundbreaking example of promoting anticorruption activities is the Anti-corrup-
tion Program’s initiative targeted at students—a project that is not yet popular.55 
Th e project, entitled “Introduction of an ‘Anti-Corruption’ Module to the School 
Curriculum,” is being pursued in collaboration with the Civic Education Center in 
Warsaw. Th e Center has devised a “Civic Education at Self-Government School” pro-
gram, which is now incorporated into the curriculum of secondary schools of various 
types. In this program, scenarios have been drawn up for six sessions for two types of 
schools. Young people attending these lessons learn what is understood under responsible 
governance, why the life of society ought to be governed by the principle of transpar-
ency, what rights extend to citizens (the right to information receives special emphasis 
here), what threats are caused by corruption, and what each citizen can do so that our 
country is governed in a better, more responsible way. 
Private and public universities make great eﬀ orts to provide courses on anticorrup-
tion strategies for students, to stimulate their interest in corruption-related issues (in 
Bialystok School of Public Administration, Bialystok University—School of Law, and 
others). It emphasizes that a strong NGO sector, and academic institutions that provide 
analysis, build up pressure for reforms and support progress towards a more eﬃ  cient 
strategy to reduce the extent of conﬂ ict of interest in the country. 
Along with executive management and the legislature, civil society plays an impor-
tant role in social education in the broadest possible sense of the term. Th e integrity, 
eﬃ  ciency, and transparency of all state organs in all their operations are the main guar-
antors against conﬂ ict of interest. 
6.4 The Role of the Media and NGOs
Th e role of the media and NGOs in promoting public anticorruption activities is still 
growing in Poland. Th e Program Against Corruption by the Polish Stefan Batory Founda-
tion (Kopinska) plays the strongest role in the anticorruption campaign. Th e Program, 
in co-operation with the Social Communication Foundation, launched an educational 
campaign in the media in July 2000. Th e aim of the campaign was to raise society’s 
awareness about the importance of the problem and the necessity to ﬁ ght corruption, 
188
C O M B AT I N G  C O N F L I C T  O F  I N T E R E S T  I N  LO C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  T H E  C E E  C O U N T R I E S  • •  PA R T  I I
D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
as well as the need of individuals to participate in combating it. Th e campaign consisted 
of many elements and the use of a variety of media: billboards, city-lights signs, radio 
and TV advertisements, post-cards, and press publications. 
Approximately 30 newspapers undertook their own campaign against corruption, 
publishing articles about corruption and printing letters from readers. Suggestions by 
readers were carefully followed,and they were informed about the possibilities of par-
ticipating in the Program Against Corruption. Twenty local radio-stations organized 
their own anti-corruption blocks. Th e Program ordered the Social Communication 
Foundation and the multimedia house Group IIS to establish an Internet discussion site 
named Cafe KontraKorupcja. One can ﬁ nd there interviews with presidential candidates, 
while in the section entitled “Law Saloon” important legal acts appear on anti-corruption 
activities in Poland. In the “Interactive Atrium” there is a discussion forum where visi-
tors can exchange opinions about published interviews and comments on psychological 
advice concerning the phenomenon of psycho-corruption. 
Th e role of non-governmental organizations, an indispensable part of civil society, lies 
in educating society about the damage caused by corruption, monitoring the activities 
of administrations at all levels, and channeling social pressure to apply the principles of 
transparency in public life to politicians. 
Achieving a shift in societal attitudes poses a task that will require years, and it 
certainly shouldn’t be left up to the non-governmental organizations alone. But in a 
situation where such a change cannot be brought about by public institutions, such 
as schools or public television and radio, the issue must also be addressed by privately 
owned media and by NGOs. Th ere are a number of NGOs and periodicals working to 
ﬁ ll this gap in Poland, among them Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita, and Nowe Państwo, 
as well as several regional and local titles. 
Th e Polish Batory Foundation is currently engaged in a nation-wide civic campaign 
with the Polish branch of Transparency International, the Social Communication Foun-
dation, and the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights. To run this campaign, they 
have assembled an Anti-Corruption Coalition of Non-Governmental Organizations. 
Th e goal of this enterprise lies in making citizens aware that their elected representatives 
should be honest people who do not make promises they don’t intend to keep, and that 
it is their legitimate right as citizens to monitor the actions of elected oﬃ  cials. 
Monitoring of the authorities combined with the publication of results, organization 
of educational campaigns, publication of opinion research results, hosting conferences, 
encouraging the media to address corruption-related issues in a responsible way—all 
these measures are conducive to the exertion of social pressure on politicians. 
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7.   SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
It seems that the key problems that faced Polish local government authorities, like ad-
ditional employment cases, disclosure of assets of public oﬃ  cials in local government, 
nepotism, and a lack of public control of the local government authorities’ activities, 
have decreased since January 1, 2003. Th e considerations on newly adopted changes lead 
to questions concerning whether standards for preventing and counteracting conﬂ icts 
of interest should be universal, or whether, under certain circumstances, it is necessary 
or even productive to tolerate practices that would be found unacceptable or illegal in 
consolidated democracies. It seems that there are reasons for being cautions about the 
application of strict conﬂ ict of interest regulations forbidding the occupation of “in-
compatible” positions, or restrictions on employment. Although it is clearly desirable 
that local oﬃ  cials not be inﬂ uenced in their public capacity by their ancillary activities, 
the immediate introduction of incompatibility provisions may have counterproduc-
tive eﬀ ects in a context where conﬂ ict of interest is poorly understood and the pool of 
political and professional talent is small. In a worst case scenario, encouraging talented 
oﬃ  cials to leave public service might reduce eﬃ  ciency, while doing little to limit conﬂ ict 
of interest. At a minimum, it might be more constructive to develop an understanding 
of the concept of conﬂ ict of interest, through mechanisms based on codes of ethics and 
case by case disclosure requirements. 
Still, Polish laws show some inconsistencies in public procurement and privatization, 
problems with cronyism, abilities of the local government authorities’ control powers 
(concerning location decisions, concessions and permits for conducting economic ac-
tivity, and land and real estate management). Th ese are the key areas where conﬂ ict of 
interest occurs.
In my opinion, the most signiﬁ cant weaknesses of Polish laws to detect and prevent 
conﬂ ict of interest include:
      •     lack of clearly deﬁ ned regulation, sanctions and authority in charge of imple-
menting sanctions, related to the use of oﬃ  cial information for personal gain;
      •     lack of rules providing for political neutrality as the guiding principle for per-
manent local government staﬀ ;
      •     weak guarantees for ensuring the citizens’ right of access to information;
      •     lack of mechanisms for the institution of withdrawing;
      •     poorly implemented Public Procurement Act.
Th e following recommendations of a general nature apply mainly to the Polish 
Government, the speciﬁ c recommendations (like improving internal procedures) apply 
primarily to local government authorities and also to public oﬃ  cials: 
      1)   It is very important to phase out patronage in local government appointments 
in a feasible and systematic manner, by creating a professional, reliable corps 
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of local government oﬃ  cials. Th e idea of creating a corps of local government 
employees will be important in developing human resource management and 
in strengthening ethics and professionalism beyond local government oﬃ  cials. 
Th is corps should be managed similarly to the corps of civil servants: with 
political neutrality, professionalism, impartiality, and eﬀ ective operation. 
Oﬃ  cials should be hired based on rules of competition and professional abilities. 
Also, it is necessary to introduce a new culture of public service and transparent 
procedures.
      2)   Family relations in public oﬃ  ce should be clearly regulated: Relatives cannot 
work in the same oﬃ  ce, otherwise the public oﬃ  cial must be excluded from 
the process. Th e statement that it is prohibited to employ in the same local 
government unit an oﬃ  cial’s spouse, relative or any person related by aﬃ  nity 
up to the second degree in positions that involve the relationships of superiority 
and subordination—is not complex enough. 
            Also, the provision for an oﬃ  cial’s withdrawal from a case if the other party is the 
oﬃ  cial’s spouse, relative or person related by aﬃ  nity up to the second degree does 
not constitute grounds for the limitation of employment or oﬃ  cial mandatory 
withdrawal from the procedure in a case of nephews or nieces (or nephew or 
nieces of spouses of local government employees), his/her factual partner or the 
person who lives with her/him in a relationship of actual guardianship, though 
it does not exclude optional withdrawal. Th is is an obvious shortcoming of the 
regulation, because it seems more likely that an oﬃ  cial’s nephew or niece gets 
hired than his/her grandparent.56
            Th e situation based on the mandatory application of the oﬃ  cial withdrawal of 
the self-governmental agency (and as the result—the suspension of the agency) 
in a case where the other party is the councilor of the self-governmental unit or 
the person related to him/her, should be postulated de lege ferenda.
      3)   It is important to create an anti-conﬂ ict of interest culture of disclosure and 
case by case “self-withdrawal,” rather than basing conﬂ ict of interest provisions 
primarily on incompatibility guidelines. Th is may be accomplished two ways: 
Th e ﬁ rst is to improve the legislation (the Local Self-Government Acts), which 
could state that a local government public oﬃ  cial is obliged to include in the 
declaration of income and properties information on his/her close relatives. Th is 
information should be transparent and could eﬀ ectively decrease the number 
of cases concerning employment of relatives, oﬃ  cials undertaking decisions 
involving family members, etc. Th e second approach is targeted at local gov-
ernments—the obligation for oﬃ  cials to give disclosure about relatives could 
also be useful in the internal monitoring procedure. Transparent information 
on family relationships would also help in the assignment of cases, to avoid or 
reduce to a minimum the potential for conﬂ ict of interest. 
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      4)   Th e creation of codes of ethics in local governments, through a consultative 
process that enables oﬃ  cials to regard such codes as their own, seems to be 
more eﬀ ective than imposing them from above. As with high level corruption, 
much self-government corruption is fuelled by close links between public of-
ﬁ cials and economic interests. But conﬂ ict of interest and cronyism are much 
harder to avoid in small communities. It is therefore all the more important that 
work is organized so that it is open to scrutiny and that decisions are brought 
in meetings that are open to the public and the press. An updated ethics code, 
and training and illustrations of what good practice means in procurement, 
licensing, privatization, and other relevant situations would also be helpful. It 
is important to point out that oﬃ  cials do not always know what guidelines to 
follow, having had no good examples. It would be useful to develop guides of 
good practice, explaining, for instance, when oﬃ  cials should identify conﬂ icts 
of interest or excuse themselves, or that councilors should not participate in 
tender evaluation. Local governments could also be encouraged to adopt internal 
administrative codes with the force of law.57 
      5)   Th e current procurement law represents a signiﬁ cant step forward but needs to 
be strengthened in various respects. Th at is why the Polish Government should 
pay more attention in public procurement reform to measures designed to ensure 
the integrity of public procurement oﬃ  cers, rather than designing procedures 
that can be circumvented anyway—and that hamstring honest oﬃ  cials.
            Coverage of the law should be explicitly extended to services; the complaint and 
appeal procedures should be better speciﬁ ed, reasonable time periods should 
be deﬁ ned for bid submission (at present they are only deﬁ ned for contracts 
valued over 200,000 euros), and delays in bid-opening should be prohibited. 
            Th e Public Procurement Oﬃ  ce also needs to improve the guides and proce-
dures it disseminates. It is therefore urgent to supply well-designed, standardized 
bidding documents, at least for goods and construction work, and reform the 
points system used in awarding contracts, as well as strict procedures for bid 
evaluation. 
            Other safeguards to consider include the introduction of a two-level decision 
procedure—one for evaluation and recommendation, one for decision. Fur-
thermore, a minimum number of members on bid and evaluation committees 
should be deﬁ ned to make collusion more diﬃ  cult. Disclosure of tenders and 
prices should also be in the public domain. If eﬀ ectively implemented, this can 
prove to be a much needed improvement. 
            As the World Bank Report stated:
“On a large scale, pay levels could not be raised within 
budget ceilings without signiﬁ cant streamlining of functions 
and slimming down overstaﬃ  ng in some areas of the public 
192
C O M B AT I N G  C O N F L I C T  O F  I N T E R E S T  I N  LO C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  T H E  C E E  C O U N T R I E S  • •  PA R T  I I
D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
service. While this would be desirable, it cannot be achieved 
eﬃ  ciently by arbitrary cuts. Rather it requires analysis of 
ministerial and agency functions to identify those that can be 
eliminated, streamlined, or left to the private sector, together 
with an analysis of jobs required to perform the functions to 
be retained. Th is initial stage would need to be followed by 
consultation and negotiation, and elaboration of an Action Plan 
to implement the required changes humanely and in a way that 
would not be too disruptive of the normal functioning of the 
administration” (World Bank, 1999). 
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1.   THE GENERAL CONTEXT FOR PREVENTING 
      CONFLICT OF INTEREST AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
Th e beginning of 2003 in Romania was marked by legislative and political reforms that 
aimed to create the necessary tools, as well as the appropriate rules, to address the cor-
ruption phenomenon better. In the ﬁ rst months of 2003, new bills were announced to 
generate a complex remedy for the already numerous corruption cases. At the same time, 
civil society had closely watched these steps and immediately raised questions regarding 
the government’s approach to the issue.  Civil society representatives have complained 
of insuﬃ  cient transparency in preparing the new legislation, and have objected to the 
adoption procedure that hadn’t allowed any debate on the provisions.
Several analysts claimed that it was already too late, that the reform process should 
be speeded up, and that policy makers should decide to issue the necessary legislation, 
along with the necessary implementation methodology, to generate a real application of 
the law. Even the most skeptical analysts have agreed that complex reforms were required; 
that, in the absence of proper regulation, growing corruption would soon dramatically 
aﬀ ect all other major aspects of the economy and the public institutions consolidation 
process. Th is complex reform eﬀ ort is expected to involve all aspects of political life as 
well as of civil society. Th e problem of Romania issuing laws without ﬁ nding the right 
tools to implement them, as well as the lack of proper mechanisms to evaluate their 
impact, is no longer unknown—important international reports underline the fact that 
this shortcoming in Romania needs to be addressed.
People who are in agreement on the subject believe that the real challenge is the 
precise deﬁ nition of concepts and a proper understanding of the issue’s complexity and 
its ramiﬁ cations. 
Th e current report has been drafted while the government and other political parties 
were accelerating the legislative drafting process. With some exceptions, civil society 
was hardly involved formally, if at all, in consultations before the new legislation was 
to be adopted. 
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Still, independent experts have continued publishing their observations about the 
government’s anti-corruption strategy (in this context, the strategy means new legisla-
tion), oﬀ ering concrete and constructive suggestions for improvement. Th e conclusions 
of the study include some references to the political debate on conﬂ ict of interest legisla-
tion and a summary of civil society concerns. 
Whenever possible, the experts had consultations with policy makers in which they 
mentioned the preliminary ﬁ ndings of their research, the European recommendations 
on the topic of corruption, and, more speciﬁ cally, conﬂ icts of interest in local public 
administrations, which remained the experts’ primary focus.
Th ere is no doubt that one big problem is generated by the still existing confusion 
about what conﬂ ict of interest means and how the area of application is determined. 
Some interviewees have said it only refers to family assets. Others have underlined that 
it could naturally be enlarged to include beneﬁ ts for their relatives, friends, or political 
parties or coalitions they belong to. 
While drafting the current report and interviewing politicians and experts, the 
coordinators have heard at least 10 deﬁ nitions: Many interlocutors associate a conﬂ ict 
of interest with incompatibilities, while others, on the contrary, describe a quite nar-
row vision about what conﬂ ict of interest may imply, obviously excluding the relations 
that exist between conﬂ icts of interest and a transparent decision-making process, staﬀ  
selection and management at a professional public institution, etc. 
Th is is why we believe that recalling the Council of Europe’s deﬁ nition of conﬂ ict of 
interest could be a useful contribution, not only to the report but, even more important, 
to the future debates on the topic in Romania:
“Conﬂ ict of interest arises from a situation in which the public oﬃ  cial 
has a private interest which is such as to inﬂ uence, or appear to inﬂ uence, 
the impartial and objective performance of his or her oﬃ  cial duties. 
Th e public oﬃ  cial’s private interest includes any advantage to himself 
or herself, to his or her family, close relatives, friends and persons or 
organizations with whom he or she has or has had business or political 
relations.”1
Th ere is a common understanding that conﬂ icts of interest have become almost part 
of daily life at all public administration levels in Romania, so that the situation requires 
further legislative regulations and, mostly, a strong political will to implement them 
and eﬀ ective tools to control their application. While in the capital and other big cities, 
mostly thanks to media coverage, the public is more familiar with the level of conﬂ ict 
of interest and local political correlations, there is very little evidence coming from the 
country side, a situation that gives a poor overall picture of the whole country.
Th e current study focuses on conﬂ icts of interest at the local public administration 
level but, because Romanian local political life can not be disassociated from the central 
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government, which remains extremely inﬂ uential, some observations could be also 
applied to the national dimension of corruption. 
One conclusion all experts agreed on was that the web of corruption (of which 
conﬂ ict of interest is but one crucial area) requires an updated legislative framework 
that will equally respond to the EU standards, with which Romania is concerned, and 
to local needs and speciﬁ cs. 
Th e new legislative provisions need to take into account the following:
      •     Th e already existing legislation has been poorly implemented. Th ere is no tradi-
tion of assessing the implementation of the law, and, for that matter, issuing 
new legislation doesn’t guarantee that its application will follow.
      •     Th e culture of practicing corruption at all levels and at diﬀ erent degrees that 
exists in Romania: Gift giving to members of public institutions has been a 
natural part of Romanians’ way of taking care of an issue at a public institution. 
Th e more complicated or urgent the issue is, the more substantial the gift is to 
be oﬀ ered. 
      •     A certain temptation that policy makers at diﬀ erent levels were feeling to use 
public property, public resources and/or preferential information to their own 
beneﬁ t, as if this behavior were normal. As this is a widespread practice, control 
was practically ineﬃ  cient, if it was applied at all. Ultimately, auditors are regular 
public servants, very much aware that their eﬀ ort to control any high oﬃ  cial 
will possibly not remain without consequences. 
      •     A conformist mentality in Romanian public institutions that has a direct impact 
on all regular public servants who have something to report about the miscon-
duct of their superior. 
Th ese are just a few examples of the context and concerns policy makers are dealing 
with when debating legislation reform. 
In brief, most commentaries that were expressed in the current legislative revising 
process refer to:
      a)   Proper elaboration to cope with EU recommendations and standards.
      b)   A coherent, articulated, and also realistic, set of provisions to help Romanian 
democracy prevent and control the increase in corruption through decreasing 
the number of conﬂ ict of interest situations, among other strategies.
      c)   Secondary legislation (that could be a code of ethics or internal code of con-
duct) to complement the law. Th e role of this secondary legislation will be very 
important, as it could regulate the emerging particularities that one single law 
may miss. 
      d)   Drafting realistic legislation, to make sure it is applicable, while developing 
appropriate evaluation indicators that will allow an eﬃ  cient legislative solution 
for the phenomenon.
204
C O M B AT I N G  C O N F L I C T  O F  I N T E R E S T  I N  LO C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  T H E  C E E  C O U N T R I E S  • •  PA R T  I I
D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
Th e debate about how to better ﬁ ght corruption (conﬂ icts of interest included) in 
Romania is not yet ﬁ nalized. Th e biggest concern, though, has been the issue of how 
to better interpret and implement legislation.
Apart from the government, which has pledged to make all necessary eﬀ orts to 
develop a professional monitoring methodology applicable all around the country, 
Romanian civic groups have expressed their commitment to seriously watch the next 
steps and monitor each phase in the law’s implementation process. 
It also needs to be underlined from the very beginning of the present report that, in 
Romania, conﬂ ict of interest is not a criminal oﬀ ence. Th e spirit of conﬂ ict of interest 
resolution consists of solving it without penalties. Th is treatment can not discourage 
conﬂ icts of interest (at all levels of public administration in Romania), as long as those 
involved are not severely punished.
1.1 The Structure of Local Government in Romania
Members of elected bodies, local government employees and senior government oﬃ  cials 
are the ones primarily prone to conﬂ icts of interest.
Th ere are three types of territorial-administrative units in Romania: communes, 
towns/municipalities, and counties. Th e local government in Romania has a non-
hierarchical two-level structure, with towns/municipalities and communes at the ﬁ rst 
level, and counties (judete) at the second level. Th ere are 41 counties (Bucharest is con-
sidered as a separate one, the 42nd county), approximately 265 towns and municipalities 
and 2,686 communes (July 2001—ﬁ gures are in a continuous change). Conforming 
to certain criteria, new communes were formed, and diﬀ erent small communes were 
merged into single towns. Th is administrative change has had budgetary and political 
consequences. 
Managing a county is not only the responsibility of elected oﬃ  cials but also of 
government-appointed representatives, i.e., the prefect. In accordance with the above-
mentioned territorial division in Romania, there are 42 appointed prefects, their main 
responsibility being to supervise the legality of local acts.
1.2 Position, Roles, and Functions of Members 
      of Elected Bodies, Local Government Employees, 
      and Senior Local Government Offi cials
Local Councils are formed by councilors elected at town/municipality or commune level. 
Th e mayors are also directly elected at town/municipality or commune level. Th e mayor 
is assisted by two deputy mayors, or one if the community is small. Th ese deputies are 
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elected from among the members of the local council. Each deputy mayor has separate 
responsibilities; these responsibilities are decided with the mayor and according to 
local needs. One of the deputy mayors will substitute for the mayor whenever it’s called 
for. Th e need for a better deﬁ nition (eventually a better explained role in the legislation) 
has been constantly underlined by independent experts and political parties. Some 
recent proposals suggest that the local council should be the one deciding the separate, 
distinctive responsibilities between the two deputy mayors. Similar propositions were 
issued for the county councils’ vice-presidents.
Th e staﬀ  (employees) of the local councils are managed by a secretary, who has the 
status of civil servant. Th e employees of the local councils at certain levels also have 
the status of civil servants. Th e rest of the employees work for the local authority on a 
contractual basis. Th ey are not public servants but have to follow the provisions of the 
internal code of conduct of the institution they work for. 
Although the institution of the prefect is not strictly speaking a part of the local 
public administration but an executive body representing the government at the county 
level, it is important to mention two main reasons in this context as to why. Th e role 
and responsibilities of the prefect make it closely interconnected with the operations 
and decision-making process of the local public administration. In each county it is the 
prefect’s responsibility to supervise the legality of local decisions. 
Apart from locally elected and appointed oﬃ  cials, a local public administration 
relies upon a professional executive body. Law No. 188/1999 on the status of civil 
servants regulates the main executive positions’ responsibilities. Th is law provides a 
classiﬁ cation of the oﬃ  ces that should be held by civil servants in the local government. 
It is important to note that the law diﬀ erentiates between oﬃ  cials vested with public 
authority and the rest of the staﬀ  (such as secretaries, maintenance personnel, drivers, 
etc). Only the ﬁ rst category is subject to Law No. 188/1999. With reference to local 
public administrations, the law precisely stipulates the list of positions vested with the 
status of civil servants, including:
      •     Senior civil servant positions: county/Bucharest municipality secretary, munici-
pality/Bucharest sector/town/commune secretary, head of department, chief 
architect, general director/deputy general director, director/deputy director, 
chief ﬁ nancial clerk, head of service, head of oﬃ  ce.
      •     Regular civil service positions:  adviser, expert, specialized inspector, legal coun-
selor, auditor, specialized referent, inspector, referent.
Th ese positions should concern all local communities in Romania. Th ey are the 
professional staﬀ  of the local public administration, appointed on the basis of professional 
criteria. Th e professionalization of the administrative staﬀ  is one of the most important 
current debates in Romania. Th is staﬀ  must play a role in improving local community 
development through better local services delivery, with special emphasis on quality. 
206
C O M B AT I N G  C O N F L I C T  O F  I N T E R E S T  I N  LO C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  T H E  C E E  C O U N T R I E S  • •  PA R T  I I
D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
Reform designed to create a strong professional body of civil servants in Romania has 
started and will remain an ongoing process, leading to continuous  training of person-
nel. Although they are not appointed based on political criteria, they are accountable 
to their supervisors, who often represent diﬀ erent political parties. 
According to Romanian legislation, professional staﬀ  activity should not depend on 
political changes, although in some cases (directly depending on the political stakes) high 
level positions (directors, personal advisors) are potentially subject to change depending 
on the political aﬃ  liation of the institution’s leader in oﬃ  ce. 
As important international institutions and domestic think tanks have already 
poined out, one of the most problematic aspects that Romania has to deal with today 
is not necessarily the absence of legislation (although some areas, including the local 
administration ﬁ eld, could be further regulated) but its actual implementation. Provi-
sions are often vague enough to leave space for interpretations that ultimately lead to 
the non-implementation of the law. As for the growing number of legislative abuses, 
many citizens have complained about legislative inconsistencies and insuﬃ  cient law 
enforcement. Th e following chart exempliﬁ es this statement.
Figure 5.1
Do You Th ink that in Romania...
Source:     Open Society Foundation, Romania. Public Opinion Barometer, October 2002.
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1.3 Evidence of the Scale of Confl ict of Interest Problems 
      in Romania
As conﬂ ict of interest is closely related to the general phenomenon of corruption, sta-
tistical data about the magnitude of corruption can be considered relevant background 
information. In the last Corruption Perception Index, conducted by Transparency 
International2 in 2002, Romania scored a relatively poor 2.6 (on a 0–10 scale) and 
ranked 77th out of 102 surveyed countries. 
Another major data source regarding corruption perception and practices in Romania 
is the EBRD/World Bank 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS). Th e 1999 BEEPS assessed Romania as the only EU candidate country aﬀ ected 
by both high “state capture” and high “administrative corruption.” “State capture” is 
a theoretical concept that designates “the eﬀ orts of ﬁ rms to shape and inﬂ uence the 
underlying rules of the game (i.e., legislation, laws, rules, and decrees) through private 
payments to public oﬃ  cials,”3 while “administrative corruption” applies to “the illicit 
payments required from the ﬁ rm in the (oft-distorted and arbitrary) implementation 
of existing regulations, policies and laws.”4
In year 2000, the Romanian Government commissioned the World Bank to pro-
duce a Diagnostic Survey of Corruption in Romania, research that produced the most 
comprehensive corruption-related data set in Romania so far. 
Figure 5.2
Overall Corruption: Perceptions and Experiences
Note:       Encounters with bribery means percentage of respondents who encountered bribery in the previ-
ous 12 months.
Source:     World Bank, Diagnostic Surveys of Corruption in Romania, 2001.
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Although a signiﬁ cant amount of information relevant to corruption has been 
gathered in the last three years, there is no speciﬁ c statistical data available on the per-
ceptions or experiences of the general public with conﬂ ict of interest in the Romanian 
administration. Still, some statistical information about recent public perceptions of the 
corruption phenomenon in Romania could be interesting in this context.
Figure 5.3 
What is the Main Reason for Corruption in Romania?
(Two Choices, Cumulative Answers)
Source:     Open Society Foundation, Romania. Public Opinion Barometer, October 2002.
After a series of media reports, the large scale of economic conﬂ ict of interests in 
local government was acknowledged by the Romanian Government as a major issue, 
and the government decided to enact Emergency Ordinance No. 5/2002 in January 
2002 to introduce and strengthen prohibitions for local government elected oﬃ  cials 
and civil servants. Th is act primarily forbids commercial ﬁ rms in which the local gov-
ernment oﬃ  cials and/or civil servants are managers, signiﬁ cant shareholders, associates, 
administrators, and auditors to contract for services, work, or supplies with the respective 
local government and its subordinated companies. 
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Because reciprocal accusations of conﬂ ict of interest between various Romanian 
political parties has become common practice, the media has published several lists of 
local councilors who are allegedly in an economic conﬂ ict of interest situation, accord-
ing to allegations by their political opponents. Th e lists were provided directly by the 
parties that, through their local members, managed to collect the necessary informa-
tion. Some national newspapers also researched the topic, publishing estimates on how 
widespread economic conﬂ icts of interest have become, occasionally including lists of 
names. Still, none of the information provided by opposition parties or by the media 
has been double-checked. 
1.4 Measures and Initiatives to Improve Prevention 
      of Confl ict of Interest During Post-Communist Transition
Unfortunately, legislative measures against various aspects of conﬂ ict of interest that 
were considered really eﬃ  cient have been introduced in Romania only recently. Th e 
government’s approach in dealing with the phenomenon, between 1996 and 2000, 
had a methodology that made more use of committees and commissions. Th e former 
president of Romania, Emil Constantinescu, decided to form county committees and 
a national commission in which to determine the best route to target corruption. Th e 
president himself took the lead in the campaign, in an attempt to stimulate the necessary 
actions at public institutions. His vision was to bring together all segments of public 
administration as well as of civil society, and encourage them to assume a more pro-ac-
tive role in dealing with corruption at all levels. Unfortunately, this approach, although 
quite deliberative, led to no concrete results. 
For instance, the Law on the Status of Civil Servants was adopted in 1999, the Law 
on Preventing and Combating Corruption in 2000, the Law on Public Procurement, 
the Law on Free Access to Information, and a new Law on Local Government, in 2001. 
As mentioned above, an act speciﬁ cally directed at economic conﬂ ict of interest in local 
government was adopted no earlier than January 2002, following great public pressure 
and scandals reported by the media.  
Even though references to the relevant regulations will be made in the following 
section of the report, an overview of present legal provisions on conﬂ ict of interest in 
the local government is necessary from the very beginning.  
1.4.1   Law on Local Public Administration (2001)
Law No. 215/2001 on Local Public Administration has two articles that discuss incom-
patibilities at the local level. Art. 30 prohibits local council members from simultaneously 
holding other positions such as:
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      •     prefect or deputy prefect; 
      •     civil servant in a local public administration (county council, prefect hall) or 
in central public administration;  
      •     civil servant in public services at municipal or county level, in the decentralized 
public services;
      •     employee of a local public administration (in the sense that one can not be 
employed by the same public authority where he serves as an elected oﬃ  cial);
      •     employee of the prefect hall (in the sense that he can not serve as an employee 
in the prefect hall of the same county); 
      •     manager or member of the board of directors of public utility companies estab-
lished by local and county councils;
      •     mayor;
      •     member of parliament, cabinet minister;
      •     secretary of state, deputy secretary of state, and any other equivalent posi-
tions.
Furthermore, holding the oﬃ  ce of councilor, mayor or deputy mayor is incompat-
ible with the following positions:5 
      •     management positions in commercial ﬁ rms where the state or the local govern-
ment is the main shareholder or in state-owned or public utilitiy companies;
      •     any other position in a public oﬃ  ce or activity, except teaching and positions 
in non-governmental organizations.  
Th e position of prefect is incompatible with the position of member of Parliament, 
member of Government, mayor, or local or county councilor. He cannot hold a profes-
sional representative job, any other public function, or a professional activity paid by 
autonomous companies or by commercial companies with state or private capital.
Th ere is a legal term of 10 days for solving a situation of incompatibility and failure 
to do so can lead to the termination of the local elected oﬃ  cial’s mandate (art. 60 and 
72). Th e law also stipulates the obligation of local elected oﬃ  cials to withdraw from 
taking part in decisions on matters in which they or their relatives, up to the fourth 
degree, have a family interest (art. 47). Decisions made without compliance with this 
rule are void de jure and can be attacked by any interested person.
Some political parties have published lists with potential infringements of the 
legislation. Th is information revealed already known cases rather than promoting the 
prevention of conﬂ icts of interest.  Th e media has followed some of these cases and 
covered interesting stories involving local political leaders. However, there is no policy 
in place by the respective institutions to deal with the frequent cases reported on by 
the media. Political parties, in their turn, promised deﬁ nitive political measures if any 
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of their local members were to violate the law. No such cases have been encountered so 
far, but parties promised an unbiased assessment of the situation before the upcoming 
elections in 2004.
1.4.2   Law on Preventing Corruption (2000) 
A set of generic provisions relevant to the issue of conﬂ ict of interest were introduced 
in the Law No. 78/2000 on Preventing and Combating Corruption, which covered the 
following actions relating to crimes of corruption:
      •     engaging in commercial transactions incompatible with one’s public position 
by using information acquired in public oﬃ  ce (art. 12);
      •     using conﬁ dential information or allowing access to such information to un-
authorized third parties (art. 12).
Art. 4 of this law also provides for the obligation of the holders of a public oﬃ  ce to 
declare in 30 days any direct or indirect donation and gifts received related to their 
public duties, except those of a “symbolic” (minor) value. Th e text neither speciﬁ es a 
threshold deﬁ ning the “symbolic” character of a gift nor stipulates sanctions for non-
compliance. 
1.4.3   Law on the Status of Civil Servants (1999)
Th e main legal framework regulating conﬂ ict of interest related to civil servants is Law 
No. 188/1999 on the Status of Civil Servants. Section 4 (art. 56–57) is devoted entirely 
to prohibitions applying to civil servants, such as:
      •     a civil servant position is incompatible with any other public oﬃ  ce engagement, 
except teaching;
      •     civil servants are not allowed to hold any position in public utility companies, 
commercial ﬁ rms or any other proﬁ t-making entities;
      •     civil servants are not allowed to engage in any activities that have a relationship 
with their oﬃ  cial duties in privately owned companies. 
Civil servants have the obligation to ﬁ ll out ﬁ nancial disclosure statements upon 
appointment and termination of employment of a speciﬁ c position. Th ey are not 
allowed to accept any gifts or favors related to their public oﬃ  ce (art. 46). 
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1.4.4   Law on Disclosure of Assets (1996)
Th e supervision of assets and ﬁ nancial situation of public oﬃ  cials and civil servants 
has been regulated since the adoption of Law No. 115/1996 on Financial and Prop-
erty Statements. Public oﬃ  cials and civil servants are requested to ﬁ ll out the ﬁ nancial 
disclosure report within 15 days after the commencement of their term/employment 
and 15 days after the end of their term/employment. Th e information requested covers 
oﬃ  cial’s own ﬁ nancial resources and assets, ﬁ nancial resources and assets shared with 
spouses, and ﬁ nancial resources and assets of children in the oﬃ  cial’s custody. Th e main 
shortcoming of this law resides in the non-public character of these statements. Th is 
drastically diminishes its preventive role.
1.4.5   Discussions and New Proposals, 2002 and 2003 
In the year 2002, the concern for better regulation of conﬂ ict of interest increased. Two 
very diﬀ erent draft laws on conﬂ ict of interest were issued; one originating with the 
government and the second with an opposition political party (National Liberal Party). 
Th e ﬁ rst is narrower in scope and covers members and employees of the executive branch 
only, while the latter is far more comprehensive, covering also local government oﬃ  cials 
and employees. Although they do not deal directly with conﬂ ict of interest, two other 
draft laws on transparency in the decision-making process and on disclosure of public 
oﬃ  cials’ ﬁ nancial and property statements were also developed at the same time.
In 2002, besides legislative measures, there were isolated political initiatives at the 
local level, intended to set good examples of solving conﬂ ict of interest situations by 
voluntary withdrawal of councilors, either from public oﬃ  ce or private business (for 
instance, the initiative of the opposition Democratic Party). Th e elected oﬃ  cials of the 
opposition National Peasant Christian Democratic Party, which voluntarily disclosed 
ﬁ nancial statements, represents another relevant example of how party leaders could be 
instrumental in implementing a law which, in a way, very much concerns the party’s 
existence.
In a late development, the government, through the National Agency of Civil 
Servants, intends to promote a code of conduct for civil servants. In this code, some 
of the potential conﬂ icts of interest are taken into consideration. It is the Romanian 
Government’s intention to give the code the judicial force of law, making it more im-
portant than a simple internal regulation paper. Judging from the latest extensive debate 
of civil society on the civil servants code of conduct, this area seems to be one of the 
most delicate and also urgent to consider in the reform process of public administration 
in Romania. When discussing the need to give gifts and favors, Romanians frequently 
associate these practices with civil servants.  
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As this report was reaching its conclusion, the government was still debating the 
necessary legislation concerning civil servants. Obviously, the code was not part of the 
anti-corruption legislation the government presented to Parliament (March 2003). De-
tails about the government’s recent anti-corruption legislative approach are introduced in 
the Conclusions section of the report. In the existing context, it is expected that further 
documentation and consultations on the civil servant code are to be implemented before 
adopting the law, to harmonize it with the newly adopted anti-corruption legislation. 
Tolerated as it was, conﬂ ict of interest became a more and more serious threat to 
Romania’s still young democracy. Th e current situation made the policy makers realize 
that committed political and legislative actions should no longer be postponed. Th ere’s 
no doubt that the international reports underlining the current status of corruption 
in Romania stimulated the acceleration of reforms. It is obvious that the new circum-
stances of Romania’s NATO/EU accession played a crucial role when the government 
announced multi-level and comprehensive legislative regulations. 
Figure 5.4
Representation of the Main Legislative Provisions on Conﬂ ict of Interest
Law No. 215/2001 on Local 
Public Administration (modified by 
Law 216/2002, Law No. 738/2001, 
Emergency Ordinance No. 74/2001): 
art. 30, 60, 61, 62, 72.
Law No. 188/1999 on the Status 
of the Civil Servant (modified by 
Emergency Ordinances No. 82 and 
No. 284/2000): art. 6, 56–58, 
70, 79, 92.
Government Decision 
No. 1087/2001, regarding 
the organization of contests 
and examinations for civil 
service recruitment.
Government Decision 
No. 1083/2001, regulating the 
organization and operation 
of disciplinary committees 
within public institutions.
Secondary legislation
Emergency Ordinance 
No. 60/2001 on public 
procurement. 
(Chapter X, Contraventions 
and Sanctions, art. 97–101)
Law No. 78/2000, on 
Preventing and Combating 
Corruption.
Law No. 115/1996 on 
Financial and Assets 
Statements by Public Officials.
Law No. 544/2001 on
the Free Access to 
Information.
214
C O M B AT I N G  C O N F L I C T  O F  I N T E R E S T  I N  LO C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  T H E  C E E  C O U N T R I E S  • •  PA R T  I I
D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
After a period of solving corruption issues as they were happening, policy makers 
have decided to prevent further escalation of the phenomenon by issuing additional 
legislation. With the importance of such regulations stressed, the real question of 
whether the government would fully and non-partially implement them remains to be 
seen. In this context, the opposition parties, non-governmental organizations, and the 
media have spoken about their future projects to monitor the anti-corruption legislation 
application, assessing the government’s capacities and making concrete improvement 
recommendations whenever appropriate, as well as joining the institutions’ eﬀ orts to 
prevent future escalation of conﬂ icts of interest and corruption. 
Recommendations:
      1)   When deﬁ ning the terminology, Romania’s conﬂ ict of interest speciﬁ cs need 
to be carefully assessed. Also, European recommendations regarding conﬂ ict of 
interest regulation should be the basis for developing national legislation.
      2)   Before further regulations are developed, we suggest a thorough examination 
of current legislation, for harmonization of diﬀ erent provisions.
      3)   Solving conﬂ icts of interest should go beyond the occasional removal of an 
oﬃ  cial’s position whenever serious cases of conﬂ ict of interest occur. 
      4)   An easy-to-ﬁ le complaint system against all forms of conﬂ ict of interest should 
be designed and regulated, to allow citizens’ access.
2.   POTENTIAL SOURCES OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST
      IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
2.1 Duplication of Power
“Conﬂ ict of interest” as such is a relatively new concept in Romania as far as its ap-
plication to public administration is concerned (it had larger recognition in the private 
sector, and it was one of the key terms in corporate governance debates). Th e concept 
of “incompatibility” was used instead of conﬂ ict of interest, ﬁ rst in the Romanian Con-
stitution but also in other special legislation mentioned in this report. 
Th ere are a number of incompatibilities relevant to local public administration 
provided by Law No. 215/2001 on Local Public Administration. All such cases were 
detailed in Chapter 1.4.  Besides the prohibition of conﬂ ict of roles between elected local 
government and central government executive oﬃ  ces, Romanian legislation includes 
other relevant provisions when it comes to incompatibilities with oﬃ  ces falling under 
other jurisdictions, such as active military, police, judges, public attorney, Constitutional 
Court, Court of Audit, etc.
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Although the law prohibits the overlap between the role of a local government em-
ployee and member of a local elected body, the enforcement of the relevant provisions is 
rather weak. Members of the county council in Iaşi county were mentioned in the media 
because they were also working as employees of the mayor’s oﬃ  ce. It is very likely that 
such a situation is aggravated in smaller communities, where qualiﬁ ed human resources 
are scarce. However, this circumstance by no means can provide a complete explana-
tion of these practices, since other situations occur in a very diﬀ erent environment. In 
Bucharest, a councilor of the 5th Sector held, in the past mandate, the position of head 
of public domain inspectors. Presently he is a Bucharest General Council member and 
head of the Control Department of the 6th Sector mayor’s oﬃ  ce.
Th e conﬂ ict of roles between members of local elected bodies or senior local oﬃ  cials 
and civil servants at a national government agency is explicitly prohibited, but the un-
clear formulation of these provisions leaves room for attempts to avoid the appearance 
of incompatibility.
Th e most signiﬁ cant attempt of transgression was made by former Prime Minister Victor 
Ciorbea (1996–1998), who nominally kept his position of elected Mayor of the Bucharest 
Municipality during his term of prime minister. An attempt to justify that situation was 
made based on a legal interpretation of a specious distinction between the concurrent hold-
ing and the actual execution of two public oﬃ  ces. Basically, it was claimed that only the 
simultaneous actual execution of both oﬃ  ces would generate a situation of incompatibility 
and that the prime minister would be entitled to nominally keep his oﬃ  ce of mayor alongside 
his mandate as prime minister while merely suspending the execution of his mayoral duties. 
Even though Prime Minister Ciorbea eventually resigned from the oﬃ  ce of mayor a few 
months after the elections, this decision was primarily determined neither by the weakness 
of this argument nor by the severe public criticism, but rather by his lack of political support 
from his own political party (National Peasant Christian Democratic Party). 
A special case is related to the “personal advisors” of senior public oﬃ  cials and 
dignitaries, whose appointment is very arbitrary, mainly based on loyalty and disci-
pline. Such an example is the case of a local elected councilor who is the adviser to the 
minister of agriculture after holding the position of personal adviser to Prime Minister 
Adrian Năstase. Th e arbitrary nature of the appointments of the already high number of 
personal advisers is aggravated by factors such as the lack of precise professional criteria 
for their selection and their special status among the public administration personnel. 
In Romania, personal advisors are paid positions and, what is even more important, 
they are not classiﬁ ed as public servants, which accords them a special status at public 
institutions, diﬀ erent from other staﬀ . 
Because these positions are often perceived as “low proﬁ le” activities, they can eas-
ily shift from their original responsibilities to promoting personal interests, using their 
inﬂ uence at high decision-making levels.
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Overall, there is a need for more rigorous enforcement and clariﬁ cation of conﬂ ict 
of roles of staﬀ  in local elected bodies to avoid situations such as overlapping with the 
position of civil servant: 
      •     in the local government of the same local community;
      •     in the local government of another local community;
      •     of executive agencies in the same local community;
      •     of executive agencies in another local community.
Th e conﬂ ict of roles of local government oﬃ  cials and owners of local media is one 
of the most frequent examples of conﬂ ict of interest at the local level in Romania. Its 
main consequences lead to a growing trend of concentration of media ownership at 
the county and regional level and a limitation of the freedom of expression of the local 
media in exposing corruption cases and criminal activities. 
Salient examples come from Constanţa and Bacău counties, where mayors have a major 
inﬂ uence on the local print and/or electronic media and distribution channels, based on 
their position as owners or signiﬁ cant shareholders; there are also many other examples of 
more diﬀ use control over media in other regions, indicating an involvement of members of 
Parliament in joint businesses with local, politically active businessmen. Th e most prominent 
situation is the tendency of local elected oﬃ  cials to gain and maintain a monopoly on the 
media at the local level by using their inﬂ uence or their direct authority.
As marginal as the sports ﬁ eld might seem, there are strong reasons for mentioning 
it in the context of conﬂ ict of interest. Th e position of a sports club owner, especially 
in such popular sports such as football, oﬀ ers privileged means for collecting and 
manipulating public sympathy that can easily be converted into votes.  Th erefore, it 
is no coincidence that many prominent locally elected oﬃ  cials and politicians are, at 
the same time, owners of sports clubs and associations. Th ere is no legal regulation or 
code of conduct in this regard, although the issue has been acknowledged as a serious 
political matter.7 Th e above-mentioned situations place conﬂ ict of interest into a larger 
perspective, since there are local public funds that the local authorities are investing 
into sports-related projects. Examples can be found in the local municipalities of Bacău, 
Braşov and Craiova.
Along with the growing importance of the local authorities and associations in 
Romania, their leading positions became very attractive for members of the central 
government. Th ose who consider these positions valuable (both in terms of visibility 
and access to international funds that have been, in fact, primarily allocated to such 
associations in recent years) are former members of local public administrations. Th ey 
are the ones currently representing the local authorities’ needs while negotiating with 
the central government, of which they are also members. 
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2.2 Economic Confl ict of Interest
Accepting gifts and hospitality is a widespread practice in Romanian local governments 
and in the public sector as a whole. City hall, as the public institution in charge of the 
most directly citizen-related issues, is one of the ﬁ rst public institutions where Romanians 
are used to oﬀ ering gifts. Th e following chart gives us a picture of the gift-giving prac-
tice in Romania. City hall members receiving gifts are high on the list. It is interesting 
to note that the rest of the percentages are also high which indicates the wide scale of 
such practice in Romania.
Figure 5.5
During the Last Year, if You or a Member of Your Family had a Problem 
to be Solved by a Public Institution, have You had to Oﬀ er a Gift to a Member of ... 
Source:     Open Society Foundation, Romania. Public Opinion Barometer, May 2001
On the subject of options, Figure 5.6 indicates that many citizens would prefer that 
the public servants ﬁ rst fulﬁ ll their duties and only later would they oﬀ er a gift, if there 
is no other option.  According to the diagram, Romanians would rather complain to 
the supervisor of an unhelpful public servant ﬁ rst, as opposed to oﬀ ering a gift right 
away. An analysis of the chart results in other interesting conclusions, but this is not 
the aim of the present report.
Although Law No. 188/1999 on the Status of the Civil Servant and the Law No. 78/
2000 on Preventing and Combating Corruption both have introduced provisions against 
this practice, their implementation is so far rather poor. According to the provisions 
in Law No. 188/1999, all civil servants are forbidden to directly or indirectly solicit or 
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accept, for others or for themselves, any gifts that are oﬀ ered to inﬂ uence their service. 
Civil servants in executive positions should not be directly involved with any solicitation 
whose resolution falls in his mandate. 
Furthermore, Law No. 78/2000 regulates bribery and inﬂ uence peddling, stipulating 
that the legal punishment for the civil servants included in the Penal Code is more 
severe.
Figure 5.6
What Should a Person Do when, for a Speciﬁ c Problem that Needs an Oﬃ  cial 
Approval/Authorization, the Civil Servant Keeps Delaying the Resolution ...
Source:     Open Society Foundation, Romania. Public Opinion Barometer, November 2001.
Th e main reason for the perpetuation of this practice is the absence of a sound 
organizational culture in public institutions, associated with delays in the general reform 
of Romanian public administration. Th is problem is also ampliﬁ ed by a cultural factor: 
As indicated by public opinion surveys,8 relationships between civil servants/public 
oﬃ  cials and citizens are not understood as professional ones, but as informal relationships 
dominated by obligations of reciprocity, or rather a citizen’s natural obligation vis-à-vis 
civil servants. 
Th e elected oﬃ  cials of local governments and, to a smaller extent, their employees, 
are frequently involved in business interests. Th is involvement takes various forms: 
Th ey may be major shareholders, administrators, and managers of private and public 
10%Do not know/do not answer
1%Others
1%Manage without it
8%Find a friend with connections 
who could influence the decision
8%Offer a gift to the respective civil servant
22%Complain to civil servant superior
50%Ask the civil servant to perform his obligations
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companies. Such involvements can also include ownership of private enterprises that are 
somehow under the jurisdiction of the councils (for instance through association).  Th is 
overlap allows oﬃ  cials to gain economic advantages by means of preferential access to 
inside information about public procurement and concession contracts or privatization 
deals. Although these situations are legally regulated by Law No. 215/2001 concerning 
elected oﬃ  cials and by Law No. 188/1999 concerning civil servants, with other sup-
plementary regulations for both categories being provided by Government Ordinance 
No. 5/2002 provisions, there is no enforced mechanism for the strict monitoring of 
illegal conduct. 
More precisely, Government Ordinance no. 5/2002 stipulates that no private en-
terprise whose managers, signiﬁ cant shareholders, associates, executive administrator, 
auditors, or board members are elected local oﬃ  cials (local councilors, county councilors, 
mayors of all community sizes, deputy mayors, or presidents and vice-presidents of 
the county councils) is permitted to contract for public funds. No commercial link or 
any contractual agreement that involves local oﬃ  cials is permitted with public utility 
companies (regie autonoma).
Th e above-mentioned provisions are also applied to civil servants and any other 
employee of the respective public administration body or subordinated public utility 
company. Th ese same provisions are applied to the relatives of the local elected oﬃ  cials 
up to the second degree. It is important to emphasize in this context that the extent of 
family relations covered by the regulations is not always consistent. For example, other 
provisions already in place, referring to a local oﬃ  cial who is not allowed to participate 
in any debate and decision from which he or his relatives up to the fourth degree are 
ﬁ nancially gaining, impose more severe obligations. 
Th ere are ambiguities in the regulation of some incompatibilities: Even if the posi-
tions of elected local oﬃ  cials and managers of public utility companies (regie autonoma) 
or public services subject to the local council cannot be combined, this prohibition 
does not explicitly refer to lower positions, such as deputy directors or technical or 
economic directors.
According to data collected by the Democratic Party and National Liberal Party, at the 
beginning of 2002, a number of the 573 local elected oﬃ  cials from the ruling Social 
Democracy Party (PSD) had business relationships with public utility companies (regii 
autonome) or commercial companies subordinated to the local councils that the elected 
oﬃ  cials were members of.
A recent Emergency Ordinance (No. 16/2002) regulating the “public-private 
partnership” has a serious potential for engendering new forms of conﬂ ict of interest 
by stimulating the involvement of the local councils in commercial activities. Th ese 
practices will directly aﬀ ect the principles of free competition, leading to corrupt or 
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politically biased allocation of resources. Most recent examples come from the establish-
ment of public stores with subsidized prices (economate) and the national program of 
free distribution of “cakes and milk” in public schools.  
Th ere are cases where the managers of private companies that did business with the 
municipality eventually became elected local oﬃ  cials with the sole motivation of acquir-
ing a better position for promoting their commercial interests. One relevant example is 
the manager of a lightning company who continued to hold his private position after 
being elected to the local council.
Engaging in other paid employment or paid activities is a common situation for local 
elected government oﬃ  cials, especially county and local councilors. Th e most frequent 
explanation they provide is that revenues they earn from exercising their public respon-
sibilities are not suﬃ  cient (as a matter of fact such a claim is justiﬁ ed because of low fees 
per council meeting). More worrying are the cases of civil servants (employees) whose 
economic conﬂ ict of interest of this type are tolerated, for instance city chief-architects 
who are, at the same time, employees of a construction company doing business with the 
municipality. In this last respect, the delay in the enactment of the secondary legislation 
related to Law No. 188/1999 on the Status of Civil Servants has very negative eﬀ ects. 
A draft on civil servants code of conduct was recently developed by the National Agency 
for Civil Servants (the political debates on the code are not over yet). Th e draft has 
been publicly debated since the fall of 2002, its completion being an important priority 
since the creation of the agency in February 2000. Th e code is meant to complement 
the law and more clearly stipulate the mechanisms and the authorities supervising the 
above-mentioned misconduct.
Today, there are no legal restrictions on post-employment activities of a person who 
previously represented a public institution in a transaction with a private company. Th is 
is a major source of conﬂ ict of interest, not only for local government oﬃ  cials but for 
the public sector as a whole. 
For instance, a local councilor of the Bucharest Municipality occupying the position of director 
of the water supply public utility company (regie autonoma) led the negotiations with the 
private company that eventually won the concession of the water supply services. After ending 
his public service, the winning company hired him as a consultant. Even though it is not an 
example taken from local government, the following situation is also quite typical: A former 
director in the Ministry of Environmental Protection in charge of inspecting and evaluating 
the environmental implications of a large private mining project, became the director of the 
mining company shortly after leaving his public oﬃ  ce.
A particular conﬂ ict of interest situation comes from sponsorships granted by com-
mercial companies to foundations closely connected to political parties, in an eﬀ ort to 
win public tender contracts. 
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Th e media recently brought under public scrutiny the case of foundations from 
Ialomiţa County, connected to the ruling party, which received sponsorship from a commercial 
ﬁ rm that won the public tender for the governmental program “cakes and milk,” aimed 
at providing free breakfast to students in elementary schools. Following media reports 
and political reactions, the prime minister’s Control Department has triggered a control 
action.
In this example, the foundations had no direct contractual link with the local au-
thority. At the same time, it should be noted that there are frequent cases in Romania 
wherein local authorities subcontract various services to NGOs with which they have 
successful partnerships. Th e evident conﬂ ict of interest begins when a foundation/
association gets a publicly funded project while being led by a local oﬃ  cial who is 
also part of the decision-making process of the ﬁ nancial agreements. Under these cir-
cumstances, all prohibitions regarding private companies that are managed/owned by 
a local oﬃ  cial while receiving publicly funded contracts should be equally applied to 
non-governmental organizations whose leaders are also holding a local public position 
at the same time. 
Th e role of the NGOs in the whole debate on conﬂ ict of interest is very important, 
and therefore it has generated many disputes recently. Independent analysts determined 
that ﬁ nancial links between parties and NGOs directly aﬀ ect the still fragile NGOs’ 
credibility in Romania. Obviously, the sometimes money-driven activities of non-
governmental organizations have increased the interest of local and national politicians 
in getting involved in the NGO sector. Behind declarations of noble aims, foundations 
run by local politicians very often ﬁ nd easier, convenient ﬁ nancial routes through which 
to channel funds to ﬁ nance diﬀ erent party activities. Donors have also become more 
and more interested in supervising and, of course, discouraging, such practices.
2.3 Confl ict of Interest of Personal Relations
While nepotism is openly charged in political debates, there are no substantive mecha-
nisms to prevent it. As a result, there is a plethora of media reports about relatives being 
employed in local government institutions under the inﬂ uence of public oﬃ  cials.
Economic activities by spouses of local government oﬃ  cials are not only a frequent 
practice, but also the best cover for public oﬃ  cials who claim their distance from busi-
ness interests. 
Regarding the mechanisms to prevent personal association of public oﬃ  cials with 
clients and matters/cases under oﬃ  cial consideration, Law No. 215/2001 on Local 
Public Administrations contains a provision requiring oﬃ  cials to withdraw from 
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debate/decision-making if they or their relatives have a family interest in the matter 
under consideration. In fact, the text is unclear as to the meaning of “family interest” 
of local elected representatives, which renders it almost inapplicable to some concrete 
situations: While the situation of an individual decision (a particular concession, 
procurement, etc.) is quite clear and indisputable, regarding the requirement of with-
drawal, this is not the case when it comes to deliberations of a more general nature, 
concerning adoption of normative acts.
Th e provision states that a member of the local council cannot be involved in the 
deliberation process or be part of the decision-making process, if, directly or through 
relatives up to the fourth degree, he has a personal interest in the matter. Th e same 
regulation applies if he is a part of the management team of a regie autonoma or private 
enterprise involved in the respective decision.
Any local council decision that is adopted while ignoring the above-mentioned rule 
is subject to cancellation. It is the prefect’s role, however, to supervise the legality of any 
local council decision, which makes him the main institution in charge of appealing 
the encountered illegal decisions to the administrative sections of the courts (contencios 
administrativ). At the same time, any citizen can submit an appeal.  
Th ere are no systematic mechanisms to prevent preferential treatment of friends, 
colleagues and family members. Th e smaller the community, the greater the chances of 
nepotism in local public administration. Small communities in Romania suﬀ er from a 
very limited number of intellectuals from among whom to select as future candidates 
for any position in the local public administration or to nominate as a trained, profes-
sional civil servant. Under these circumstances, it is very likely that close relatives are 
found who are part of the same local, small or even medium-sized public administration 
body, mainly due to the limited alternatives, as well as to the litmited interest potential 
candidates might show for a public role in the community. Unquestionably, the level 
of compensation discourages well qualiﬁ ed potential candidates, who are aware they 
could be easily paid better if they join a private company.  
On the other hand, we have to note that the smaller the community, the more 
limited the number of elected local public oﬃ  cials and civil servants will be. Stressing 
the above situation, the law should not diﬀ erentiate between large communities and 
smaller ones when it comes to nepotism situations. 
2.4 Using Offi cial Information for Personal Profi t
Romanian authorities can hardly be described as being too generous with information 
at their disposal. Th ere is a prevalent culture of secrecy in the Romanian public sector 
and there are still great diﬃ  culties in the implementation of the newly adopted legisla-
tion on Free Access to Information (Law No. 544/2001). 
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We will describe brieﬂ y the main provisions of Law No. 544 concerning its relevance 
to conﬂ icts of interest. Law No. 544 stipulates that each public institution must organize 
a public communications department specialized in informing citizens and conducting 
public relations activity or designate a responsible person to organize the public relation 
activities. Certain categories of information will be issued as part of the institution’s 
public relation obligation (laws regulating their organizational structure, names and 
leading positions, the institution’s budget and annual report, programs or strategies, 
and the list of public interest documents the respective institution can issue), while for 
other information, any citizen should write a solicitation. By public information, the 
law means any information that refers to, or results in the activities of a public author-
ity or public institution. To any request for information, the public institution must 
formulate an answer within 10 days—the only exception being when the information 
requires further documentation or systematization in which case, the deadline could be 
extended to 30 days (during the ﬁ rst 10 days, the petitioner will be informed that the 
response requires an extended period). Refusal to answer the request, with the explana-
tion of such a decision, should also be communicated within ﬁ ve days upon request. It 
is the public institutions’ duty to hold monthly press conferences making sure the public 
is well informed. Th e refusal to issue a legitimate response leads to situations where the 
petitioner can appeal to the institution’s leader. If the petitioner is not satisﬁ ed with the 
internal mechanism of the appeal, he can approach the Administrative Court (contencios 
administrativ). If his eﬀ ort is successful, the Court can order the respective institution to 
issue the requested information while covering the moral and personal damages of the 
petitioner. Such a trial is free of charge and conducted with priority. Special provisions 
for media access to public information are included, information is to be provided in no 
more than 24 hours, unless there is an additional justiﬁ ed need for further documenta-
tion, a situation that will be communicated to the media petitioner. 
Along with the adoption of Law No. 544/2001, the whole spectrum of public 
institutions has been involved in complex institutional reform, learning new tech-
niques on how to manage information and communicate it to the public. Many cases 
of malfunction are generated by a lack of client-oriented information management. 
Th e opportunity created by the Law on Access to Public Information made the public 
institutions more vulnerable to the scrutiny of citizens seeking public information. 
Th e old culture of keeping public information from the citizens as much as possible 
has been going through signiﬁ cant positive changes, to which many people working at 
these institutions have not been able to adapt. Adopting such legislation is expected to 
generate a change of mentality.
Th e situation is further complicated by the law on classiﬁ ed information (Law No. 
182/2002), recently passed by Parliament, which creates diﬃ  culties for public oﬃ  cials 
and civil servants in dealing with the criteria of information disclosure. More precisely, 
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the law stipulates that any information whose disclosure could legally damage the 
public or private interest of a public person is categorized as conﬁ dential information. 
Th e leader of the institution is in charge of deciding what information is classiﬁ ed and 
what is public.  Non-compliance with the leader’s decisions in this area has criminal 
consequences. It is prohibited for any public institution to restrict access to any type of 
information that is intended to inform the public or to information which, if withheld, 
from the public could obstruct the legal system.
In reality, there are many situations in which conﬁ dential information is used by 
senior public oﬃ  cials to attack political adversaries. Because of the incomplete legal 
framework and inapplicable control mechanisms, a public oﬃ  cial cannot be eﬃ  ciently 
supervised if providing any privileged information to interested third parties. Whenever 
reported, the misconduct was not investigated and couldn’t be sanctioned in any way. 
Withholding oﬃ  cial information that should properly be released or providing false 
or misleading information are just sub-varieties of an overall poor implementation of 
legislation on free access to information. Th e obfuscation of many local governments 
leaves room for channelling inside information about public procurement contracts or 
other local government decisions to interested third parties.
Th e adoption of Law No. 544/2001 on access to information of public interest 
has not improved access in the last year. According to data gathered by Transparency 
International Romania,9 the year 2002 brought a generalized decrease in the response 
rate and the quality of public institutions’ response to information requests, irrespective 
of the social or professional status of the petitioners (journalists, citizens, NGOs, etc.). 
Still, civil society campaigns aiming to improve the mechanisms of releasing public 
information, according to the new law—not only through soliciting information but 
also through following legal procedures—have forced many institutions to reform their 
disclosure policies. 
It is expected that, after these ﬁ rst steps of the law’s implementation, many more 
local institutions will learn to act more transparently, from the stage of deliberation to 
one of sharing motivations for decisions.
2.5 Using Local Government Property
Th ere are no eﬀ ective mechanisms to prevent the unauthorized use of local govern-
ment property for private or political purposes. According to media reports, this is a 
widespread practice, which becomes more frequent during electoral campaigns. In most 
local governments, there are no technical means to control the use of the telephone 
for private purposes. Automobiles and mobile electronic equipment are also frequently 
used for private and political purposes. 
225
N E W  WAY S  O F  M A N A G I N G  C O N F L I C T  O F  I N T E R E S T  I N  R O M A N I A
Th e only legal mechanism in place is the Penal Code, which holds suﬃ  cient 
provisions to sanction the use of public property for personal interest. One might say 
that there is a common understanding that a person holding a public position is going to 
use that advantage. Th e dimension of using public property for one’s private interest (or 
the political party’s interest) depends on one’s position within the public administration 
hierarchy. Th is varies from situations where regular employees frequently use the oﬃ  ce 
phone for personal use, to cases where oﬃ  cials use the oﬃ  ce car for shopping (or even 
asking the driver to shop for them), and even high oﬃ  cials traveling to a seaside resort 
by state helicopter. Although all of this is well known, and the most extravagant cases 
are highlighted in the media, no public sanctions have been recorded.
It is the responsibility of the internal auditor to check whether public money is 
spent in a proper manner, serving only community interest. In practice, very often 
internal audit has to ﬁ nd legal justiﬁ cations for expenditures that don’t happen to have a 
credible explanation. For instance, a common practice for public oﬃ  cials traveling in the 
country on personal business is to explain that their trip was motivated by maintaining 
professional relations with local authorities in the city of destination. In some of these 
cases, persons who are involved do not even hold a position to justify their trip (they 
may be relatives or political party oﬃ  cials), while the supporting documents indicate 
names of eligible people working for the local government.  
Another common situation of the inappropriate use of local government property 
occurs in cases when the mayor oﬀ ers various amenities, such as cars and mobile phones, 
to be used with no budget restriction, to members of the council, in exchange for their 
“cooperation.”
Due to mutual consent on using public property for personal beneﬁ t, only the most 
extravagant cases are subject to media scrutiny. 
2.6 Government Employees’ Involvement 
      in Political Party Activities
Local government employees have the status of civil servants and, consequently, their 
expressing political views or taking part in political activities in their capacity as public 
civil servants is forbidden. However, media reports show that there are cases when politi-
cal leaders of local government institutions put pressure on their employees, expecting 
them to join a speciﬁ c political party. Sometimes it is not really necessary that the leader 
exercise any pressure, a simple recommendation by the institution’s members have the 
same impact. Even if one doesn’t join a political party, local government employees, 
prompted by supervisors who are political appointees, are frequently used for partisan 
political purposes in performing their oﬃ  cial duties, especially during election cam-
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paigns. However, it needs to be underlined that in many cases it is the public servant’s 
decision to actively support the leader in his political activity while serving as a public 
authority. Th ese situations occur often, whenever there has been a long, steady profes-
sional relationship between the institution’s leader and some of the staﬀ  members, with 
the latter freely agreeing to be involved in political activity for the sake of their leaders’ 
expressed needs. Th ese types of situations require individual analysis, to carefully assess 
all the circumstances, before drawing any conclusion.
Still, in a normal situation, when a public servant is asked to perform an activity 
that is not strictly related to his job, the person has the right to complain and demand 
that he be not asked to do the task in question. If the supervisor still insists, of course—
depending on the gravity of the demand—the public servant can complain in a written 
memo, while still having to carry out the respective request. Th ese situations are more 
often determined by a local public authority and the individual employee rather than 
national practice. Other legal mechanisms someone could utilize in such situations 
depend directly on the gravity of a situation.
As mentioned above, politically appointed supervisors show a strong preference for 
the political “homogeneity” of employees in their institutions. Th is situation becomes 
more obvious during election campaigns. It is common practice that key personnel in 
the local administration are also members of the campaign staﬀ  of local candidates, a 
situation that leads to the frequent allocation of employees’ oﬃ  ce time for electoral 
purposes. Also, due to their preferential access to public facilities, some candidates rely 
on local public administration facilities while running their campaign.
Political inﬂ uence for recruitment and promotion of employees within local 
government exists, but to a lesser extent than in central government institutions. One 
obvious reason is that the recruitment base at the local level (outside Bucharest) is quite 
limited, and the number of competent professionals to be employed is rather small, 
while the duties of public oﬃ  ce are becoming more and more demanding in terms of 
general skills and qualiﬁ cations.
Given that the political membership is often perceived by civil servants as a 
supplementary guarantee for job stability or for a promotion, there are cases when 
employees take initiatives and change their political aﬃ  liation if a political change occurs 
in the management of the institution.10  
It should be noted though that the government has recently established a National 
Agency for Civil Servants whose main role is to coordinate policies, including the 
formation of a professional civil servants’ body in Romania. 
Recommendations:
      1)   Creation of a national database that includes all elected local oﬃ  cials and civil 
servants, in order to track any duplications of power or any potential conﬂ ict 
of interest. Th is data should be constantly updated.
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      2)   Reducing the maximum number of personal advisors for each local public 
oﬃ  cial, regulating the competence criteria when selecting personal advisors.
      3)   A more rigorous enforcement of the already existing regulations on conﬂ ict of 
interest at diﬀ erent levels of local public administrations.      
      4)   Members of local public administrations should be forbidden to be employed by 
any of the private companies that had economic ties with their former activity. 
Th is restriction could be imposed for three to ﬁ ve years. 
      5)   No professional relationships within an administration should be tolerated 
between relatives, up to the fourth degree.
      6)   Better management of conﬁ dential data, through enforcing better application 
of the law on classiﬁ ed information.
3.   INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES FOR PREVENTING 
      AND DETECTING CONFLICT OF INTEREST
3.1 Disclosure Policy
According to Law No. 115/1996, local government oﬃ  cials have to ﬁ ll out ﬁ nancial 
disclosure statements, when ﬁ rst employed and after the end of their term. At the lo-
cal level, the following categories fall under the provisions of the law: local and county 
councilors, mayors, civil servants, members of managerial boards, and other managers 
and directors of local public utilities companies that are accountable to the local au-
thority. Th ere are no special requirements concerning senior public oﬃ  cials. Th e same 
procedure is also mentioned in Law 188/1999, art. 46 (2).
Public oﬃ  cials are requested to ﬁ ll out the ﬁ nancial disclosure report 15 days after 
taking oﬃ  ce and 15 days after the end of their term. Th e information requested covers 
their ﬁ nancial resources and assets, the ﬁ nancial resources and assets shared with spouses, 
and the ﬁ nancial resources and assets of children in their legal custody. 
Civil servants and other employees (such as members of the executive boards and 
managers and directors of local public utility companies that are accountable to the 
local authority) submit their ﬁ nancial disclosure statements to the public authority that 
has hired them or to the person responsible for their appointment. Local and county 
councilors and mayors submit their statements to the prefect. 
Th e law provides for a control commission, formed by two judges and a prosecutor 
from the regional Court of Appeals, in charge of reviewing the ﬁ nancial disclosure state-
ments. Th e members of the control commission serve a three-year term. Unfortunately, 
the commission does not act ex oﬃ  cio but only upon receipt of a request for investiga-
tion. Th e request for investigation can come from the chief prosecutor of the regional 
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Court of Appeals or the head of the institution where the person under investigation 
is employed. A public oﬃ  cial who is publicly accused of illicit acquisition of wealth 
can also submit a request for an investigation. Any regular citizen who holds solid 
information can become involved in this process by notifying the chief prosecutor of 
the regional Court of Appeals, or the head of the institution where the person under 
investigation is employed, about the presence of a public oﬃ  cial whose property was 
acquired illegally.
Th e possibility for the average citizen to request a property investigation remains 
rather minimal, because the party asking for an investigation has to provide a solid, 
comprehensive list of proofs. Th e legal procedure can be inhibiting to the average citizen 
who holds information that he intends to submit to the court, because, if the infor-
mation is not proven to be correct, the person can be liable to penalties. Th e control 
commission acts as an intermediary, evaluating the cases in a period of no more than 
three months, reaching one of the following situations:
      •     the commission sends the case further to the regional Court of Appeals, if it 
has strong reasons to do so; 
      •     the commission stops the investigation if the initial proof turns out to be 
false; 
      •     it suspends the investigation and sends the case to the competent regional 
District Attorney, if, during the investigation, other criminal facts turned up. 
If the court evaluation determines that the property was illegally acquired, it 
candecide to conﬁ scate it. 
Th e biggest concern regarding the topic of ﬁ nancial disclosure these days is related 
to the provision that denies public access to this information. Although the media 
and civil society have already voiced their interest in learning about public oﬃ  cials’ 
ﬁ nancial disclosure documents, there is no evidence that a regular citizen has used the 
legal mechanisms described above (submitting a notice to responsible authorities on 
the basis of which to start an investigation).
3.2 Procedures to Report Misconduct 
      or Suspected Confl ict of Interest
Th ere is no uniform practice regarding local government employees’ obligation to report 
misconduct of other public oﬃ  cials, conﬂ ict of interest situations, etc. Local govern-
ments and public institutions in general are reluctant to introduce in their internal 
codes or regulations any strong requirements that would exceed the scope of obligations 
provided for by law.
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Th e prefect is the public oﬃ  cial who has the legal obligation to ensure the im-
plementation of the law and consequently to suspend a local elected oﬃ  cial who is 
found to be in a situation of incompatibility. 
Law No. 544/2001 on free access to information states that information that covers 
an illegality cannot be legitimately classiﬁ ed as secret; consequently, any person disclos-
ing such information cannot be accused of publishing secret/conﬁ dential information. 
Although the law on civil servants and the Labor Code include regulations about abusive 
dismissals, there are no speciﬁ c mechanisms to encourage information disclosure prac-
tices by protecting the respective person doing the reporting. Under current economic 
and political circumstances in Romania, the decision to disclose information that is 
interpreted as illegal jeopardizes an employee’s professional career and position in the 
institution concerned.  
Still, it has to be mentioned that both Law No. 188/1999 on the Status of the 
Civil Servant and the Labor Code provide general protection against abusive dismissal. 
Again, like in many previously mentioned situations, the issue is not the absence of a 
legal framework but its enforcement. 
It is the responsibility of each public institution (at all levels) to organize its manage-
ment in the most eﬃ  cient manner.  While writing the current report, experts learned 
that there were institutions in Romania that developed their own internal procedures 
for their employees in order to report any obvious conﬂ ict of interest. Such practices 
opened a new chapter in the whole debate about corruption and ways to prevent it. 
Experts have also learned that many employees’ reaction to these procedures were not 
encouraging, in the sense that they perceived them as a betrayal of their colleagues, a 
perception which, in fact, would be impossible to explain without looking back to the 
communist mentality and working environment. Self-consciousness is a concept that 
needs to be further analyzed and explained, along with a better understanding of poli-
cies to help to decrease corruption in the future.
Th e general public can make use of the general complaint mechanisms that are in 
place in each public institution in Romania. Th ere are no special procedures the public 
should follow when exposing conﬂ ict of interest situations. Following recent public 
debate on the issue of conﬂ ict of interest and corruption, there are isolated initiatives 
by some mayors, such as hotlines to report oﬃ  cial misconduct.11 Given the voluntary 
nature of these initiatives, there is no guarantee as to their continuity. Furthermore, 
anonymous reports can often be ignored by supervising institutions, whose investiga-
tions needs evidence. 
Instead of usin anonymity to directly expose wrongdoing to other oﬃ  cials, repre-
sentatives of public institutions sometimes choose to give their information to a journalist 
who is already investigating a suspected conﬂ ict. 
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3.3 Other Measures Assisting Prevention of Confl ict of Interest
Redress against administrative decisions is provided by means of the administrative 
sections of the courts (contencios administrativ).  Any person violated in his legitimate 
right by an administrative act or failure by a public authority to answer his complaint 
within the legal term is entitled to the acknowledgement of his right, annulment of the 
act, and remedies for the damage.
Law No. 29/1990 on Administrative Litigation and Civil Code Procedures stipulates 
that appeals against administrative decisions can be ﬁ led at the Administrative Litigation 
Sections of the county court or in Bucharest. Appeals can be ﬁ led at the Administrative 
Litigation Section of the Appeals Court. Th e courts can nullify administrative decisions, 
order adoption or amendment of an administrative act and decide on compensation 
for damages. Law No. 29/1990 does not provide citizens with an eﬀ ective means to 
appeal decisions of the public administration. Most of the appeals reviewed by the Ad-
ministrative Litigation Sections are ﬁ led by prefects questioning decisions of the local 
or county councils or by mayors, who are questioning the prefects’ decisions. Currently, 
a draft law on Administrative Litigation that would give citizens more rights to appeal 
administrative decisions is under discussion in Parliament.
Th e prefect can make a public appeal against any decision of the local administra-
tion that he/she considers illegal. Any private individual (citizen or legal entity) can 
appeal a decision of the local administration if he/she thinks it causes direct damage 
to him/her. 
Th ere is no systematic practice of risk assessment of areas susceptible to misconduct 
and conﬂ ict of interest, except for general conclusions that can be drawn from social 
inquiry instruments, such as the World Bank’s Diagnostic Survey of Corruption in Ro-
mania. Th e last report in 2000 is an opinion-based survey that allows for identiﬁ cation 
of sectors where corruption incidents reportedly occurred more often. Unfortunately, 
the scope of the survey was very large, and the local government system was treated as 
a whole, making a sub-sectoral assessment very diﬃ  cult.
In fact, Law No. 215/2001 on Local Public Administration states that an elected 
local oﬃ  cial who has a “family interest” in the matter under discussion, either directly 
or through relatives, is under obligation to withdraw from related deliberations and the 
decision-making process.  If this occurs, the decision can be appealed in the Administra-
tive Litigations Section.
A large number of companies winning public contracts have important oﬃ  cials 
from the local government among their shareholders. Many public oﬃ  cials do not even 
hide the fact that they work as private managers or consultants at local companies that 
do business with the municipality. Th ey justify their business practices as a ﬁ nancial 
acknowledgement of their expertise conveniently supplementing their modest salaries 
in the public administration.
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Th e case of the municipal councilors in Bucharest was the most salient in this respect. 
However, it is important for the accuracy of this report to recall that the oﬃ  cial legal 
ground for the recent suspension of the Bucharest Council was not related to conﬂ ict 
of interest but to a procedural problem (six successive decisions of the council were 
invalidated in court). 
According to information released by the Public Administration Ministry,12 in February 
2002, a total of 123 local elected oﬃ  cials were registered as connected with private commercial 
companies that have business relations with the local public administration in all parts 
of Romania. According to the same report, as a result of the enactment of Ordinance No. 
5/2002, in general, oﬃ  cial concerns lead to the following steps for eliminating the existing 
conﬂ ict of interest situations:
•    24 oﬃ  cials have resigned from their public oﬃ  ce positions
•    88 oﬃ  cials have resigned from their positions held in private commercial ﬁ rms.
At the same time, 11 contracts have been cancelled.  
As was mentioned earlier in the report, the opposition parties’ lists include names of 
local oﬃ  cials of the ruling party who made ﬁ nancial agreements with public money or 
who are in managerial positions in local public utility companies. Th e opposition oﬀ ered 
new data to have a better picture on the dimensions of this phenomenon in Romania 
(573 cases were registered around the country at the beginning of 2002).  
Although the leadership of political parties are aware that businessmen represent 
important “assets” for a party’s budget, recent statements indicated that leaders have 
asked their local representatives to choose between politics and business, in an eﬀ ort to 
prevent growing corruption.
One important aspect in this context concerns transparent auctions. To prevent 
the impression that personal contacts make it easy for someone to acquire a business in 
Romania, more emphasis was put on the importance of legal, transparent public auc-
tions. According to Emergency Ordinance No. 60/2001 on public procurement, bidders 
who can be proven to have been involved in corrupt or fraudulent practices related to 
the procedure for the contract in question must be excluded. 
However, it is unclear how such a provision can be eﬀ ectively implemented, 
because the law does not provide any procedure for blacklisting companies. Th e pro-
cedure mentioned above applies only to corrupt practices related to the contract in 
question, which leaves room for that company to participate in future tenders, involving 
either the same or another local government. 
In order to sum up all major legal provisions that concern our topic, we ﬁ nally 
note that local governments do not play a signiﬁ cant role in the privatization ﬁ eld. Law 
No. 219/1998 on the Regime of Concessions, which does not stipulate any provisions 
concerning conﬂ ict of interest, regulates concession agreements. 
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3.4 Measures Used by Human Resource Management 
      to Prevent Confl icts of Interest
General rules for personnel recruitment and promotion procedures are provided by Law 
No. 188/1999 on the Status of Civil Servants, supplemented by Government Decision 
No. 1087/2001 on the Organization of Contests and Examinations for Public Oﬃ  ce 
Employment. Th is Government Decision states that the recruitment process should 
comply with the principles of open competition, merit-based selection, and transparency 
of contest organization, equal opportunities, and conﬁ dentiality of personal data (art. 
1). According to Government Decision No. 1087/2001, the National Agency for Civil 
Servants is responsible for the methodological coordination, monitoring, supervision, 
implementation and compliance with the selection procedures by public authorities 
(art. 55).
A general framework for the evaluation and promotion of civil servants has been 
prepared by the National Agency for Civil Servants. At the present time, promotion 
procedures are based on the application of a professional evaluation grid. Some of the 
criteria in the evaluation grid are described as leaving room for unusual or even arbitrary 
practices, independent experts say. 
According to Law No. 188/1999 on the Status of Civil Servants, the recruitment 
and promotion of government employees must be based on merit and professional 
competence, which are to be judged by means of a standard evaluation procedure. 
With few exceptions, the rules regarding openness of selection procedures are generally 
observed. Government Decision No. 1084/2001 introduced the standard methodology 
for evaluating individual professional performance. Employees have the right to contest 
the evaluation if they consider it unfair. Each institution has the autonomy to evaluate 
its employees and can also have direct consultations with experts from other national 
institutions (these frequently involve Labor Ministry experts). If any public servant raises 
complaints, the National Agency takes part in the resolution process.  
Th e strictness of national monitoring of the selection process decreases according to 
the size of local governments. One very important, but also problematic, step concerns 
the public announcement of vacant positions in a way that any interested party will 
learn about the job and apply.  “Public locations” had various meanings for diﬀ erent 
institutions/persons. By purposely posting the announcements in an area diﬃ  cult to 
access, oﬃ  cials could hinder citizens’ access to information.  
Th ere are cases when publicizing vacant positions in a public location is interpreted 
in a manner that hampers access to that information, because an intention to “ﬁ x” the 
selection procedure exists.  
Despite the need for autonomy, it is very clear that local public institutions in Ro-
mania need to constantly consult with the national institutions in charge, both when 
hiring new personnel and when evaluating their performance. Th e National Agency for 
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Civil Servants will oﬀ er consultancy and assistance for good human resources manage-
ment. More assistance will also come from the public training institution, whose role 
in the preparation of public servants and oﬃ  cials is expected to increase.
3.5 External and Internal Control Supporting the Prevention of 
      Confl ict of Interest in Local Public Administration
Exercising control in Romania involves a variety of actors, from the specialized control 
departments of ministries, the Ministry of Finance included, to local and/or internal 
specialized units in local public administrations. Th ere is the National Audit Court, 
whose inspectors exercise control of public funds (local administration included) but also 
a Prime Minister’s Control Department, whose area of competence covers institutions 
directly accountable to the government and other institutions as well. Th e creation of 
the Prime Minister’s Control Department didn’t become an issue until its representa-
tives started to exercise control at the level of local public administration units. At the 
same time, although its leader constantly advocated that the department should follow 
no directives other than the law, analysts concluded that its political role and its deci-
sions are quite eﬀ ective. As Romania gets closer to accession into the EU, the fairness 
of EU fund management becomes a crucial priority for the government. Th e Prime 
Minister’s Control Department has direct responsibilities in supervising the EU projects 
implemented in Romania, being the OLAF contact institution for EU projects. A better 
deﬁ nition and separation of roles of all these control mechanisms would be very useful, 
especially during the current legislation revision process that Romania has been going 
through these days. 
As for legislation, as was already mentioned in the ﬁ rst chapter of the report, Ro-
manian legislation mainly covers the typical conﬂ ict of simultaneously held positions 
at administrations and institutions or private companies. As far as local government is 
concerned, the most eﬀ ective tool of enforcing these prohibitions is the mutual oversight 
of diﬀ erent, competing political parties represented in local and county councils.
It is thus becoming crucial, for the sake of the autonomy of Romanian public ad-
ministrations, to have a clear description of the supervising institutions’ responsibilities, 
as well as their supervising mechanisms. Controls exercised at the local level should no 
longer be interpreted as a “political pressure tool,” as mayors delegated by opposition 
parties have recently complained.
Each local public authority has an internal control department and internal control 
procedures. Internal audit and ﬁ nancial control units of local governments’ representa-
tives are in the best position to detect potential conﬂ ict of interest situations under 
their authority. None of these situations can be reported and acted upon if they are not 
explicitly deﬁ ned as conﬂ ict of interest situations by eﬀ ective legislation.
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Besides the internal control mechanisms, external ﬁ nancial controls exerted by 
the local ﬁ nancial control departments of the Ministry of Finance cover some aspects 
of conﬂ ict of interest situations. Th eir main responsibility is to prevent poor ﬁ nancial 
management that might include, for example, irregularities related to public procurement 
procedures and the use of public property for personal gain. At the same time, a local 
authority often receives visits from the control departments of diﬀ erent ministries, i.e., 
inspectors from the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Environment, or the Ministry 
of Transportation, if speciﬁ c projects are under their authority. 
It is not the aim of this report to describe the local budgeting process in Romania, but 
one aspect is very important for the accuracy of the control mechanisms. Representatives 
of the control departments of diﬀ erent ministries target “special funds” expenditures 
(the funds that are allocated by a ministry, that come in addition to the annual budget 
allocations to a local authority, and that have a clearly deﬁ ned purpose).
Th e National Audit Court plays a very important role in this context. Media 
reporting about the activity of this institution mainly refers to its control at the level 
of the central government. Yet, the National Audit Court exercises controls at the local 
level as well. Given the actual legal framework, which was rather lenient toward various 
types of conﬂ ict of interest, the National Audit Court could not be very eﬀ ective in 
exposing them. Unfortunately, the independence of the Court of Audit is periodically 
challenged by attempts of the ruling parties to inﬂ uence the appointment of its oﬃ  cials 
(at the national level or for their local branches, such as at the county level), and at times 
they even use pressure on the court to intimidate or hassle local administrations run by 
oﬃ  cials belonging to opposition political parties. At the same time, because the number 
of local inspections has increased lately, mayors who would prefer not to be inspected 
have complained publicly about too many “visits” by the National Audit Court. 
When it comes to the relationship between the public institutions that are most 
frequently involved in inspection activities at the local level, it needs to be noted that 
neither the National Audit Court, nor the Prime Minister’s Control Department has a 
legal basis to issue recommendations to individual public institutions. 
Th e Prime Minister’s Control Department has already been involved in inspection 
activities in a number of local communities (Bucharest, Cluj, Giurgiu). Its local 
inspections were highly criticized on the grounds of Local Autonomy Charter provisions. 
Also, those who criticized these practices referred to the Romanian legislation that 
stipulates that the Prime Minister’s Control Department area of competences mainly 
covers institutions directly accountable to the government. According to Law No. 215/
2001, the authority that oversees and controls the application of the law at the local 
level is the prefect. Consequently, the role of the Prime Minister’s Control Department 
is to supervise the inspection activity performed only by the prefect at the local level 
(dealing with any local communities within the respective county). In this respect, 
the responsibilities of the PMCD should be further clariﬁ ed, so that there will be no 
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misunderstandings as to what other institutions than the ones directly accountable to 
the government can or cannot be inspected.
 One particular example could be very helpful in clarifying the place of the Prime 
Minister’s Control Department in the whole spectrum of the supervisory institutions 
in Romania. In December 2001, there was an ad-hoc politically generated13 situation 
in the Bucharest Municipality when an inspection of the Prime-Minister’s Control 
Department identiﬁ ed a series of economic conﬂ ict of interest situations in the Bucharest 
General Council. However, one can consider this situation atypical and more relevant to 
the political dispute between the government and the opposition mayor of Bucharest, 
especially when taking into consideration that the PMCD has no clear jurisdiction 
over the local public administration. Th e involvement of the Prime Minister’s Control 
Department had an important meaning, its visibility raising the public awareness of 
the subject. Th e role of this department in relation to other control units at the central 
government has been  intensely disputed lately. 
Th e role of the institution of the Ombudsman is rather negligible in this respect, 
although this institution has the legal basis for making investigations and issuing 
recommendations to concerned institutions. As for other public institutions, the 
Ombudsman only takes action following citizens’ complaints about infringement of 
their constitutional rights by public authorities. So far, no such complaints have indicated 
conﬂ icts of interest as reasons for such infringements.
Th e mission of institutions (exercising control) is very delicate as it directly concerns 
the topic of self-autonomy. Political interference in the administrative decision-making 
process at the local level was harshly criticized, both in Romania and abroad. Especially 
because such suspicions exist, the control mechanisms need to be transparent, well 
synchronized, coherent, and well intentioned, in order to really prevent any potential 
conﬂ ict of interest and to sanction existing conﬂ icts. 
3.6 Accountability and Responsibilities of Local Government 
      Offi cials for Activities Generating Confl ict of Interest
Th e attitudes of political parties regarding their representatives perceived as corrupt are 
not very coherent. Initially, the parties adopted a defensive strategy, trying to dismiss the 
reports of alleged conﬂ ict of interest/corruption as “politically motivated attacks.” When 
media and public opinion pressure exceeded a certain level, and the public perception 
of the party was severely damaged by the association with such persons, the withdrawal 
of political support was more carefully assessed. In fact, there are no general rules for 
how political parties’ decisions are inﬂ uenced, due to complicated considerations of 
local client networks and prospects for political parties’ funding. 
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As a matter of fact, the political parties do not have internal mechanisms (such as 
codes of conduct for their members) to deal consistently with conﬂ ict of interest situations 
aﬀ ecting their members. Due to this situation, it is hard to predict how political parties 
respond to corruption allegations, and this also explains the fact that parties take respons-
ibility for their members’ misconduct in oﬃ  ce not because of their internal mechanisms 
but because of strong external pressures. Still, a few opposition parties have recently stated 
that, following the Bucharest Council’s economic conﬂ ict of interest scandal, they have 
asked their local members to choose between their public position and their private 
business. Th eir public statements indicated that internal policies were in place to sanction 
further conﬂ icts. One statement referred to sanctions such as withdrawing political 
support and a ban on the implicated person’s placement on the party’s election list.
While the responsibility of individual elected oﬃ  cials for their own conﬂ icts of 
interest is more or less clear to their voters, the Romanian electoral system (based on 
party preference voting) makes it very diﬃ  cult for voters to prevent particular corrupt 
councilors from getting into oﬃ  ce at the next election, if their political parties do 
not withdraw their support and remove these councilors from the candidates’ lists. 
A mayor who is elected through direct vote is more exposed to being accountable to 
the public but, as elections results have shown, the voters do not necessarily sanction 
a mayor’s conﬂ ict of interest if they perceive him as an eﬃ  cient administrator of the 
community. Th e subordination of the local media makes public accountability even 
more problematic.
Another expression of a mayor’s accountability to the citizens, Law No. 215/2001, 
stipulates that a mayor could be sanctioned by being removed through a referendum. 
Reasons to organize a referendum are more general, but they could be applied to potential 
conﬂ ict of interest of a mayor and it is clear that the law empowered the citizens with a 
democratic set of tools. Th e substantial implications of organizing a public referendum 
mean this option is rarely implemented in Romania. Th e procedure can be initiated by 
25 percent of the voters from that locality, and the mayor is dismissed with the votes 
of 50 percent plus one votes.
In terms of misusing conﬁ dential information, the legislation is meant to prevent 
the abuse at all levels of public administration. Emergency Ordinance No. 60/2001 
on public procurement provides weak sanctions for misuse of conﬁ dential information 
during the public procurement procedure, with ﬁ nes ranging from the equivalent of 
$150 to $1,500, applicable to both legal and natural persons (art. 98). 
Other forms of responsibility concerning the area of conﬂ ict of interest are not 
suﬃ  ciently regulated by the legislation. As was repeatedly emphasized in this report, the 
Romanian legislation only covers prohibitions of holding public oﬃ  ce in conjunction 
with other jobs and positions, either public or private (so called “incompatibilities,” which 
encompass only a fraction of what is here designated as “conﬂ ict of roles”).  Usually such 
situations are easily clariﬁ ed at the beginning of someone’s term in oﬃ  ce. 
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Finally, there are no forms of professional responsibility for local government 
employees in conﬂ ict of interest situations. Actually, the regulations on professional 
responsibility are speciﬁ c to each professional organization (such as medical doctors, 
lawyers, accountants, etc.) that has an interest in developing them. 
3.7 Extralegal Instruments to Prevent Confl icts of Interest
In general, the simple adoption of codes of ethics is not perceived as an eﬀ ective mecha-
nism to prevent conﬂ ict of interest or corruption. But application of an internal code 
of procedure/code of ethics certainly has a positive impact on the internal management 
of an institution. Sectors as a whole can function better if internally developed regula-
tions are in place. Th is explains why sectoral groups, such as public servants and even 
elected local oﬃ  cials, have drafted their speciﬁ c internal regulations. How eﬃ  ciently 
they function is hard to say, but their role in the way of better management of their 
respective ﬁ eld should be emphasised.
Training could be another method through which to futher eﬀ orts aimed to prevent 
conﬂ icts of interest. Education and training on conﬂ ict of interest issues will become 
more eﬀ ective when a satisfactory legal framework is in place, which is a task still to 
accomplish. As a matter of fact, although issues of conﬂ icts of interest and others related 
to corruption are well known, there is still an incipient understanding of how they 
could be better approached through training courses, in order to prevent their further 
increase.
As far as formal education in political sciences and public administration is con-
cerned, corruption-related issues are approached in few courses and seminars. Th e 
two Political Sciences and Public Administration faculties in Bucharest conﬁ rmed 
that the topic of corruption and conﬂ ict of interest is approached only as part of a 
larger curriculum on public administration reform. Class discussions and student 
interactions are very much inﬂ uenced by the personality and vision of the teacher. 
In some cases that the coordinators of this study have researched in each of the two 
Bucharest faculties, it was clear that the teacher is instrumental in exploring the vari-
ous topics related to conﬂ ict of interest. Th ere are no courses that target the corruption 
phenomenon, although it often comes up in class presentations and seminar discussions 
according to one teacher.
Still, both public administration sections within the faculties in Bucharest admit 
that the topic needs further attention and careful preparation, along with their own 
teachers’ expertise, to educate students. Th e National School for Political and Admin-
istrative Studies have already made some progress: One course on the topic of public 
servants’ responsibility is only one of the ﬁ rst concrete steps, but other new courses 
have yet to emerge.
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Later on, in interviews with the Public Servants National Agency about their train-
ing curricula and on-going public servants’ preparation, we have noticed that there is 
a consultation mechanism in place (although not systematic) between this institution 
and the two faculties in Bucharest. Similar consultation mechanisms involved the facul-
ties in the country. Th ese consultation were frequent in the past, but they are presently 
suspended upon the inauguration of the Institute for Public Administration. Th e new 
institution’s role in the domain, as well as its training arrangements in relation with 
other state and private providers, is being redeveloped.
Th ere is no doubt that one of the most interesting entities in the public adminis-
tration training area is the Institute for Public Administration—National Institute of 
Administration. Its role is to improve the skills of public oﬃ  cials and civil servants and 
to oﬀ er specializations in their areas of interest. INA will train future members of the 
public administration at all levels, with this training becoming one important condition 
for being accepted in an executive position.
Legally established in the summer of 2002, IPA—NIA (INA—in Romanian) is 
presently going through a very complex consolidation stage, many of its challenges 
coming from the still emerging curriculum and instructors’ portfolio. Another very 
important task INA is currently dealing with involves clarifying the role among other 
former state training providers as well as suﬃ  ciently deﬁ ning ﬁ nal courses granting 
certiﬁ cates: a situation that has raised the concern of the state public universities (espe-
cially in regard to the two-year diploma that can be acquired with the public university’s 
master’s degree).
In general, the most important providers of training for civil servants in Romania 
so far have been the non-governmental organizations and the National Development 
Agencies, but very few topics discussed were directly related to conﬂ icts of interest and 
corruption. Finally, it is important to mention the role that the NGOs have been playing 
in recent years, since they are the only training providers for both elected oﬃ  cials and 
public servants. Apart from the traditional training curricula on project management, 
public relations, time management, etc., NGOs have recently started to oﬀ er training 
on other current and critical topics, such as the implementation of Law No. 544/2001 
on free access to public information. Th e new anti-corruption legislation is expected to 
further improve the NGOs’ training curricula.
Recommendations:
      1)   Elaborating the necessary framework to enforce the disclosure of personal 
ﬁ nancial resources and assets. Th is information should be public.
      2)   Designing more eﬃ  cient training curricula, to create a professional civil servant 
corps. Supporting better cooperation between the public administration and 
the education system. 
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      3)   Fostering institutional reform in the area of conﬂ ict of interest control by unify-
ing the competences of all authorties in charge.
      4)   Forbidding access to any civil servant position to people who have been previ-
ously dismissed on disciplinary grounds. Th is restriction should be imposed for 
a deﬁ nite period of time (e.g., ﬁ ve years). 
      5)   A more pronounced cooperation between public institutions with conﬂ ict of 
interest control responsibilities and the Trade Register Oﬃ  ce, in order to de-
termine more accurately economic activities that involve local public oﬃ  cials.
4.   CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL REMARKS
Researching the topic of conﬂ ict of interest in Romania in the last few months gave us 
the chance to learn that there was not one single remedy for such practices in Romania 
but many that needed to work together eﬀ ectively. Conﬂ ict of interest at the level of 
public administration in Romania has more and more become a critical aspect of the 
entire public administration reform process in the country. Its local public administra-
tion particularities are even more important in the context of the present accelerated 
decentralization. 
It is hard to say which factor aﬀ ects the current situation the most. Absence of a 
unique, comprehensive law on conﬂ ict of interest and, consequently, the perpetuation of 
the current sequential regulations, is one factor generating confusion, misinterpretation 
and, ultimately, superﬁ cial application of the law. Because of insuﬃ  cient understanding 
of the terminology and the implications, regulations are at risk of remaining superﬁ cial. 
At present, there is no general law regarding conﬂ ict of interest, and it remains an issue 
that is vaguely and incompletely regulated by several pieces of legislation (Emergency 
Ordinance No. 5/2002 on the Introduction of Prohibitions for Local Elected Oﬃ  cials 
and Civil Servants, Law No. 215/2001 on the Local Public Administration, Law No. 
188/1999 on the Status of Civil Servants, Law No. 78/2000 on Preventing and Com-
bating Corruption). Moreover, the concept of “conﬂ ict of interest” itself is a recent 
acquisition of the legal, political and administrative vocabulary, its being predominantly 
used in the private corporate sector. As a result, the only kind of conﬂ ict of interest 
recognized in the Romanian legislation is the most evident and non-problematic one, 
namely simultaneously holding a public oﬃ  ce with other private or public jobs or 
positions (“incompatibilities”). Th erefore, regulation to prevent economic conﬂ ict of 
interest is still in its infant stage.  
Only after establishing all principles in one unique law, should sectorial regulations 
be drafted in order to address all sectors’ speciﬁ cs and requirements. Stating the rules and 
obligations clearly should be the top priority of the leaders of public institutions at all 
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levels. In Romania, the content of procedures and internal rules are highly dependant on 
the provisions of the speciﬁ c laws. As a general rule, there is a reluctance by high public 
oﬃ  cials and managers to impose internal regulations that exceed the legally binding 
provisions.  Th is is what makes the general legal framework regarding conﬂ ict of interest 
extremely important, but it also gives little room for expectations that local institutional 
initiatives could outweigh the failures of the legal framework.  Following the legislation 
spirit and principles, institutions in diﬀ erent domains need internal codes of conduct 
applicable to their members’ speciﬁ c activity. Equally important, if not more so, are the 
recent intentions of the local elected oﬃ  cials to establish their own codes of conduct 
(Codul aleşilor locali), which suit their particular needs and help create a professional 
body of elected local oﬃ  cials. 
Th e inexistence of unique legislation is deﬁ nitely an obstacle for the institutions’ 
leaders in their eﬀ orts to build a professional staﬀ , but the most eﬃ  cient tool for them 
would be good internal management. For that, each institution leader needs to know 
his staﬀ  and the organization’s culture, providing it with an internal code of conduct 
which helps consolidate the institution’s ability to respond to the community’s needs in 
the most professional way possible. Th e internal code needs to be complemented with 
other internal regulations, such as a human resources management strategy, in order to 
professionalize the public institution’s performance.
Managing conﬂ icts of interest, both in terms of development and implementation, 
cannot be dissociated from the rest of public administration reform and, some people 
say, from the rest of Romanian society’s transformation. Th ere are other very important 
areas, such as transparency at public institutions (starting with the transparency of 
the decision-making process), that need to evolve following a similar timing. A com-
prehensive law on conﬂ ict of interest should be accompanied by revision of other 
sectors, such as of the electoral system, in order to empower the voters to sanction 
politicians’ misconduct. New regulations of political parties’ on funding are expected 
to bring more transparency in the area of political sources of ﬁ nances. Equally impor-
tant is the enactment and adequate implementation of a draft law on transparency 
in the decision-making process, to increase public scrutiny and the capacity of local 
interest groups to transparently inﬂ uence the decision-making process. Another general 
regulation that could have a high potential for preventing conﬂ ict of interest in the 
area of public procurements is Government Ordinance 20/2002 on Electronic Public 
Procurement, presently concerning only the central government agencies. Enlarging its 
area of applicability will certainly bring more accountability at the level of local public 
administration.
In short, because there is no single ideal solution to regulate conﬂ icts of interest in 
Romania, the report has identiﬁ ed several options that policy makers could take into 
account before reaching decisions. 
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Th ree possible types of legislation have been identiﬁ ed and their respective advantages 
and shortcomings emphasized.
      A)  Enacting a general law applicable to all (elected and appointed) holders of public 
oﬃ  ces and to all branches and levels of the state (MPs, public oﬃ  cials and civil 
servants in central and local public administration, magistrates, etc.).
                  Th e beneﬁ ts of such a solution would be uniform regulation of conﬂ ict of 
interest and the possibility to rule out the risk of omitting speciﬁ c categories or 
delaying the adoption of regulations pertaining to speciﬁ c categories. Its obvious 
shortcomings come from the higher probability of neglecting the speciﬁ cities 
of certain categories, which can bring about poor enforcement and ineﬃ  ciency 
in particular cases.
      B)  Enacting special laws for each category of public oﬃ  ce holders. Th e exact nature of 
such special laws can vary according to each professional category: Th ere can be 
special laws, or sections of special laws, regulating the organization (in the case 
of magistrates, Court of Audit oﬃ  cials, Constitutional Court, Government and 
ministries, etc.) or status of other categories (Members of Parliament, elected 
local oﬃ  cials, civil servants, etc.).
                  Th e advantages of this solution come from the possibility of taking into 
consideration the speciﬁ cs of all particular categories. At the same time, its 
shortcomings consist in the likely omission of certain categories (especially 
when they are not numerically signiﬁ cant or they are able to push a strong lobby 
against conﬂ ict of interest regulation), on the one hand, and in the high risk of 
providing inconsistent solutions to similar situations across diﬀ erent categories, 
on the other.
      C)  Enacting a general law, which provides principles and provisions common to all 
categories and which can be supplemented by subsequent special regulations whenever 
the particular categories require it.
                  Th is solution combines the advantages and rules out the shortcomings of the 
previous two solutions. Th at is the reason why it is our main recommendation 
in terms of legislative technique regarding the forthcoming regulation of conﬂ ict 
of interest.14
Insuﬃ  cient political commitment could be another reason for the present high 
incidence of conﬂ ict of interest in Romania. Drafting the legislation is very important, it 
creates the basis for future actions to be developed, but enforcement is crucial as well. Th e 
more complex reform is, the more important the political will becomes. Development 
of successful public policies to prevent conﬂ ict of interest in the Romanian public sector 
continues to be a diﬃ  cult task. Th e fundamental obstacle that has to be overcome is the 
still insuﬃ  cient political will to build a fully professional civil service corps, protected 
from abusive political control. A more deﬁ nite separation of the political decision-making 
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process from the regular administration still needs to be achieved, through change at 
both the constitutional and special legislation level.
As far as the political commitment to enforce the necessary reforms, Romania is so far 
no exception. Political will is interconnected with the ﬁ rm and consistent application of 
the necessary decisions and, obviously, with a consistent political capacity to implement 
such reforms. Th e two diﬀ erent approaches, the one of the 1996-2000 administration 
and the current one, as regards the conﬂ ict of interest and corruption, are diﬀ erent and, 
for that matter, very interesting to emphasize in this context. Also, it is important to 
mention that some of the legislative initiatives of today were ﬁ rst raised before 2000, 
which makes it possible to underline the importance of political continuity that such 
complex reforms need in order to succeed. 
Some other legislative initiatives were of course new, in response to the developments 
of the phenomenon. Continuity is one important element for a successful reform in 
all domains, and in the ones directly concerning political interests in particular. Still, 
there are also fundamental diﬀ erences in the approach between the two administrations. 
A short description of these diﬀ erences will explain better the role of political commitment. 
Th e 1996–2000 administration stated that corruption was one very important priority. 
On the belief that ﬁ ghting corruption should ﬁ rst involve all actors in a community 
(policy makers and civil society), former President Emil Constantinescu personally led 
the anti-corruption campaign. Committees were formed both at the national and local 
levels. As ambitious as this eﬀ ort was, the distance between discussion and delivering 
concrete results remained signiﬁ cant. 
Th e less politically complicated government elected in 2000 has also made it a 
high priority to deal with corruption at all levels. Drafting the legislation was the 
ﬁ rst step to address it: Th e government recently stated that a document of about 150 
pages on corruption (and many other domains included) was created in March of 
2003. Since the public was only given ﬁ ve days to review the document, analysis and 
to make recommendations (we will later explain the procedure and the reasons), the 
interested independent parties found it impossible to deliver any analysis. Opposition 
parties were also concerned with conﬂ ict of interest and corruption issues, and they 
released their own bills. Th e National Liberal Party had its own bill (its approach being 
very comprehensive, drafting one single law to regulate the conﬂ ict of interest), so did 
the Democratic Party (with a more narrow approach, proposing diﬀ erent regulations 
for the central government than for local administration). Either way, the opposition 
has complained that their legislative initiatives were practically ignored by the current 
parliamentary majority.
Th ere are two main involves regarding the current government approach of adopting 
this legislation.
Th e ﬁ rst one concerns the government’s approach since initiating such a law. 
Although civil society and the opposition parties have requested an open public 
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debate of the bill, the government’s decision was to take full responsibility (this is a 
so called “conﬁ dence vote” for a government bill or a program, and it allows no time 
for in-depth parliamentary debates; under such circumstances, the Parliament has two 
options: approve or reject it based on the majority of votes; rejection meaning that the 
government is dismissed). Th is procedure does not leave any room for debates on the 
content, and it precludes the opportunity to issue amendments. 
Th e second concern is the question of whether the present government’s procedure 
is constitutional or not. Despite the government’s interpretation, the opposition 
parties have several times underlined that the Romanian Constitution does not allow 
a government to assume full responsibility for more than one single law (or one single 
program). Unifying 15 separate legislative acts under one single title: the “Law Regarding 
Some Measures for Ensuring the Transparency in the Exercise of Public Dignities, Civil 
Service and Business, on Corruption Prevention and Sanctions,” was perceived as an 
intentional misinterpretation of the Constitution by the government.
Five new laws (Transparency of Budgetary Debts, Transparency in the Administration 
and Promotion of Information and Public Services through Electronic Means, Preventing 
and Fighting Crimes using Information Technology, Conﬂ ict of Interest and Incom-
patibility Status in the Exercise of Public Dignities and Civil Service and Economic 
Interest Groups) and 10 already existing ones are targeted to be amended through one 
huge government legislative act. In an eﬀ ort to target all implications of corruption, 
the government also included laws that do not ﬁ t the same category. Many critics voice 
opposition to this legislative package because of inconsistencies between chapters and 
provisions and vague deﬁ nitions. One strong critique concerns the unconstitutional 
adoption procedure. 
When looking at the government’s recent anti-corruption legislative approach, one 
separate and important observation is that the bill on the civil servant code of conduct 
was not included. Th ere has been continuous debate on whether to include it or not. 
At one point, it was decided to include the code of conduct to regulate all dimensions 
of the public administration representatives but, all of a sudden, it was taken out. As 
for civil servants, the secondary legislation related to Law No. 188/1999 on the Status 
of Civil Servants needs to become an urgent priority.
Predictions about whether the package will ﬁ nally be submitted to Parliament and 
about the future implementation course are hard to predict. Eﬀ ective implementation 
of the legal framework has always been a major problem for Romanian public admin-
istration, due to a generalized lack of administrative capacity, especially in smaller local 
governments. Given that strengthening administrative capacity is a priority of Romania’s 
EU accession process, any recommendations should take into account, and conform 
with, EU-driven programs in this ﬁ eld, as these programs are a major source of funds 
and technical assistance.
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As far as political commitment is concerned, we need to underline that political 
commitment that really moves reform should not be interpreted as political interference 
with the administrative decision-making process. It is important to stress this, especially 
in the current political environment in Romania, where legislators are often suspected 
of politicization of administrative acts. It is a matter of jurisdiction to take the necessary 
actions whenever conﬂ ict of interest and/or corruption occurs. Jurisdiction needs to be 
independent and to act independently. 
Because the laws’ application is still an important weakness in Romanian public 
reform, and in Romanian society in general, the recent adoption of anti-corruption 
legislation is a very important challenge both for those in charge of implementing it and 
for civil society, whose help in monitoring the implementation is crucial. Developing 
legislation and implementing it are sometimes not enough. Young democracies like 
Romania’s need to revitalize civil society to consolidate its skills to constantly monitor 
the application of legislation at all levels and under all circumstances. Along with legal 
and implementation procedures reform, society as a whole needs to change; the public 
servant-citizen relationship has to be transformed, among other things, in order to really 
achieve the consolidation of a transparent, corruption free democracy in Romania.
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1.   INTRODUCTION
In Russia there is a consensus that “Russian local self-government has come of age.” 
Its roots lie in the Soviet era, when there was a concentration of central state power at 
all levels of government, and local self-governance wasn’t even considered. Once the 
single-party system came to an end and diﬀ erent forms of property appeared in the 
early 1990s, the question of decentralization of power arose naturally. Th e legislative 
institution of local self-government emerged at the higher level of government, as a re-
sponse to challenges related to the drastic changes in the political and economic system 
in Russia. Th e appearance of local self-governments is one of the major aspects of the 
transition to a democratic culture based on a plurality of interests. A natural attribute 
of this process is the appearance of circumstances favoring conﬂ icts of interest in all 
areas of public life and social institutions.
Events of recent years in Russia show numerous examples of a struggle for author-
ity, power, and resources between the federal government and regions, regional leaders 
and institutions of local government, parties and social movements, and administrative 
agencies and citizens. According to polls, most of the conﬂ icts arise in the division of 
power between diﬀ erent public bodies. Th e reason for such sharp conﬂ icts in this area 
is the direct link between the distribution of power and budget allocations and ﬁ nancial 
security. In other words, issues of authority are issues of power.
As the purpose of this project is the analysis of legislative acts regulating conﬂ icts of 
interest at the local level in Russia, we will limit ourselves to the consideration of such 
conﬂ icts when the subjects of conﬂ ict are oﬃ  cials of local self-government (the heads 
of local administrations and divisions of executive authority, deputies of the local legis-
lature, and municipal employees) and the objects of the conﬂ ict are the competencies 
in the sphere of municipal management and resources (material, intellectual, etc.). A 
substantial part of such conﬂ icts is due to a clash of political, legal, organizational and 
administrative interests. Factors inﬂ uencing the emergence of conﬂ icts of interest at 
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the local level include local mass-media, public opinion, and the degree to which local 
civil society has developed.
 Any conﬂ ict is essentially subjective, as it arises when a person or entity recog-
nizes their interests and objectives. Consequently, conﬂ icts can be resolved only by 
a conscious eﬀ ort of the concerned parties. At the same time, conﬂ icts in the area of 
government—both local and state—have a particularity. Th ey begin and conclude in 
legal form and are tied to the legal relations of the parties. Th erefore, both the subjects 
and objects of conﬂ icts in this area have legal attributes, and the conﬂ icts entail legal 
consequences.
Figure 6.1
Levels of Public Authority in Russia (as of 1999)
Federal level
Th e President of the 
Russian Federation
Th e Government 
of the Russian 
Federation
Th e Federal 
Assembly 
(State Duma and 
State Council)
Th e Federal Court
Regional level (89 subjects of the Russian Federation, SF)
Th e Legislature of the 
subjects of the SF
Branches of the Executive 
Power of the SF
Th e Judiciary of the SF
Local level
Local self-government 
(not included in the hierarchy of state power)
Cities
(1,098)
Towns/
urban 
settlements 
(1,850)
Rayons Rural 
settlements
Local self-governing bodies 
(council, executive governing bodies, other)
Local Administrations
Rayons
(in the subjects of the 
Russian Federation 
that didn’t accept local 
government on their 
territories, e.g., Republic 
of Bashkortostan, 
Tatarstan, etc.)
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2.   SURVEY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION LEGISLATION 
      REGULATING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ON THE LOCAL LEVEL
2.1 The Evolution of Modern Legislation 
      on Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation
Th e establishment of a legal framework to develop and operate local self-governments 
in Russia belongs to the joint competence of federal and regional authorities. Th e law 
on establishing local self-governments on the territory of the Russian Federation ﬁ rst 
appeared in the new Constitution of the Russian Federation in 1993. In Chapter 12, 
local self-government was deﬁ ned as an independent institution that is not included in 
the system of government. Chapter 8 of the Constitution determines the basic functions 
and competences of local self-governments. 
At the same time, separate elements of a legislative framework for local self-govern-
ment were commissioned in 1991—soon after the formation of the Russian Federation 
as an independent state. Th e ﬁ rst basic law in this area was Law 1550-I of the Russian 
Federation published on July 6, 1991 “On local self-government in the Russian Fed-
eration.” Th is law deﬁ ned the primary responsibilities and competencies of the local 
government, as well as its structuring in accordance with the constitutional standards 
eﬀ ective in Russia at the time. In October 1993, many regulations of the relevant law 
were limited to the standards incorporated in the Decree of the President of the Rus-
sian Federation, No. 1760, “On the reform of local self-government in the Russian 
Federation.” Th e new basic law on local self-government took eﬀ ect in August 1995; 
the legislative regulation of the municipal level of public authority was based on the 
1991 law, which was harmonized with decrees issued in 1993.
Th e basic legislation on local self-government in Russia was established in federal 
Law FZ-154 “On the general principles of the organization of local self-government” of 
August 28, 1995 (from here on FZ-154). In the last seven years, the law has undergone 
six amendments, the ﬁ rst one was passed half a year after the law’s adoption, and the 
last was proposed on July 1, 2002.
Currently, the basic principles of the organization of local self-government in Russia 
are determined by Chapter 8 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal 
Law FZ-154. According to some estimates, the number of federal laws regulating local 
self-governments in Russia, one way or another, is around 400. 
Th e adoption of basic Law FZ-154 has not ended the process of developing 
legislation for local self-government in Russia. Moreover, soon after the acceptance of 
this law, Decision of the Government of the Russian Federation, No. 266, “On some 
measures on the implementation of the federal law,” and “On the general principles 
of the organization of local self-government in the Russian Federation” was issued. 
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Th is law established requirements and hierarchies in the Russian legislation on local 
self-government.
Th e following major legislation on questions of local self-government was federal 
Law No. 138-FZ, dated November 26, 1996, “On the constitutional laws of citizens 
of the Russian Federation concerning elections of institutions of local governments.” 
Th e law has established the implementation of constitutional laws on elections of local 
authorities when there are any infringements and obstacles to the implementation of 
these rights (e.g., when the charter of the municipal body has not been adopted; when 
there is no elected representative body in the municipality; during abolition, associa-
tion or transformation of the municipal agency violating eﬀ ective legislation, etc.). Th e 
relevant federal law aims to preserve a balance of interests between government and 
society at large at the local level, and to ensure the constitutional right of citizens to be 
organized to decide issues of local importance.
Th e year 1997 marked the acceptance of major pieces of legislation, on the scope of 
municipal authority and on the activities of local self-government as a whole. In May 
1997, the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, No. 484, “On disclosure 
of income and property by oﬃ  cials at the state and local government level” adopted 
standards on eﬀ ective mechanisms to prevent corruption and the abuse of administrative 
power at the state and local level. Even more signiﬁ cant was the adoption, in September 
1997, of federal Law No. 126-FZ “On the ﬁ nancial system of local self-government in 
the Russian Federation.” Th at law established the basic guidelines for the ﬁ nancial system 
of municipalities in Russia, sources and allocation of funds of local self-government, 
principles of the budgetary process in municipal bodies, and ﬁ nancial links between 
institutions of local government and ﬁ nancial institutions. Furthermore, the law provided 
guarantees of ﬁ nancial rights for institutions at local governments.
At the beginning of 1998, federal Law No. 8-FZ “On bases of municipal service 
in the Russian Federation,” regulating the activity of unelected oﬃ  cials of local self-
governments, was adopted. Th e law establishes the legal status of municipal employees 
in labor contracts with the municipalities. Th e law also determined the general prin-
ciples of municipal service, which is interpreted as professional work performed by an 
unelected, professional staﬀ . Nevertheless, the status of the elected oﬃ  cial, the deputy 
of the local legislative assembly in the given federal law, has not been regulated. It is 
not regulated in Russia currently—neither at the level of state government nor local 
self-government—and it creates serious issues of authority.
As a sign of maturity of the legislative system on local self-government in Russia, 
the Russian Federation ratiﬁ ed the European charter on local self-government in April 
1998.1
Th e period between 1998 and 2000 was characterized by some calm in the ﬁ eld 
of developing legislation on local self-government. In this period, only one amend-
ment to federal Law FZ-154 (in summer, 2000) was adopted. Among the elements 
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of the legislation concerning questions of local self-government that were adopted in 
this period, only the law of 1999 “On social help by the state” deserves attention. It 
contains guidelines according to which local budgets can be the source of government 
social assistance, contradicting the Constitution by blurring the distinction of authority 
between municipalities and state.
Th e big break in the legislative regulation of ﬁ nancial systems in local self-govern-
ment came with the acceptance of the new law “On the privatization of the state and 
municipal property,” No.178-FZ, at the end of 2001. Th is cancelled the old law, No. 
123-FZ “On the privatization of state property and bases of privatization of municipal 
property.” Th e new law regulated privatization of municipal property in greater detail. 
Th e law determines the principal guidelines of handling municipal property; it regulates 
conditions for the sale of municipal property; it deﬁ nes the competence of institutions of 
local government in the area of privatization; it outlines handling of information related 
to the privatization of municipal property; it covers diﬀ erent kinds of property, such as 
real estate, commercial enterprises, and cultural property; and it sets the conditions and 
limitations for the privatization of municipal property. Furthermore, the law regulates 
the allocation of revenues derived from the sale of municipal property, including the 
state’s share in the privatization of municipal or state property.
Th e last major amendment in the legislation on local self-government was passed in 
November 2002 in the federal Law “On state and municipal enterprises.” In this law, in 
accordance with the last changes of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, the legal 
status of the state and municipal enterprises as commercial organizations is established, 
and the allocation of revenues deriving from enterprises owned by municipal and state 
property authorities is regulated. Also, the law determines the rights and responsibilities 
of the authorities owning commercial enterprises, and it regulates the establishment of 
such enterprises, their management, and liquidation.
In 2003, the President of the Russian Federation submitted to the State Duma the 
new version of federal Law No. 154-FZ “On the general principles of the organization 
of local self-governments in the Russian Federation,” outlining a radical reform of the 
system of local self-government. Th e draft encountered mixed reactions, both from oﬃ  -
cials in local self-governments, and experts in the ﬁ eld, causing heated public debates.
Along with positive, innovative proposals, the bill contains a number of basic 
provisions that are worrisome for the future of local self-governments in Russia as in-
dependent institutions. Th e main source of concern is a plan to alter the authority of 
local self-governments with the introduction of a two-tier system. Th e provisions for 
the changes are formulated rather vaguely, and their actual implementation is assigned 
to authorities accountable to the Federation, so that local authorities are put in direct 
dependence on regional administrations.
Nevertheless, the bill was passed by the Duma in the ﬁ rst vote, and it will be enacted 
with some minor amendments. Under present circumstances, the law will take eﬀ ect 
in 2005 the earliest.
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2.2 Legislative Description of Confl ict of Interest 
Th e term “conﬂ ict of interest” is a concept rarely appearing in modern Russian legisla-
tion.1 According to the provision in the appendix to the Decree of the President of the 
Russian Federation “On the statement of the general principles of oﬃ  cial conduct of 
civil servants,”2 conﬂ ict of interest is a situation when personal interests inﬂ uence oﬃ  cials 
at the state level of the Russian Federation, oﬃ  cials directly accountable to the Russian 
Federation, or elected municipal oﬃ  cials in the performance of their oﬃ  cial duties.
Legislative regulation of conﬂ icts of interest at the local level is to some extent 
determined by the following Federal laws: 
      •     “On the general (common) principles of the organization of local self-govern-
ment in the Russian Federation”;
      •     “On maintenance of constitutional laws of citizens of the Russian Federation 
to elect and be elected in institutions of local government”;
      •     “On the ﬁ nancial system of local self-government in the Russian Federation”; 
      •     “On municipal service in the Russian Federation”; 
      •     “On public service in the Russian Federation”;
      •     “On mass media”;
      •     “On political parties”;
      •     “On state and municipal enterprises.”
Regulation of conﬂ icts of interest is based on municipal legislation of the Russian 
Federation at the local level, the charters of municipal bodies, and the statutory acts 
of institutions of local government that cover the rights, responsibilities, author-
ity and accountability of elected oﬃ  cials of local self-government and municipal 
employees.
Direct regulation of conﬂ icts of interest is contained in the above-mentioned 
Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, applicable to oﬃ  cials of the Rus-
sian Federation, regional oﬃ  cials accountable to the Federation, and elected municipal 
oﬃ  cials.
One of the most fundamental problems of the Russian legislation on conﬂ icts of 
interest in local self-governments is the absence of provisions applying to elected of-
ﬁ cials in local self-governments. Although a draft law to close this administrative gap 
was developed in 1998, and passed by both chambers of the Russian parliament, it was 
vetoed by the president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin in 2000.
One more disputed area of legislation on local self-government is the absence of 
regulation on competitive bidding for municipal contracts. In spite of the fact that the 
law “On ﬁ nancial and economic bases of local self-government in the Russian Federa-
tion” contains mandatory guidelines on procurement procedures based on competitive 
bidding, there are no regulations on implementation of these provisions.
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Furthermore, there are serious problems due to the absence of detailed anticorruption 
legislation. In Russia, there is no legal framework for the implementation of regulations 
on anticorruption at the local level, despite some initiatives in this area. Th e majority of 
experts hold the opinion that ﬁ ghting corruption at the legislative level does not require 
tougher criminal legislation but rather detailed legal regulation of the decision-making 
process of municipal authorities on economic activity. Th ere should be precise provi-
sions on the competence of authorities and individual oﬃ  cials.
Within the framework of the Soros Foundation’s project titled “Preventive mainte-
nance of corruption in institutions of local government in the Russian Federation,” the 
Russian experts have developed “Th e code of ethics for oﬃ  cials of local self-government,” 
which is a policy recommendation, but not legislation. Th ere is also an international 
law, “Th e European code of behavior of local and regional elected representatives.” 
A political party, “Th e Union of the Right Forces,” distributed the European code of 
ethics among the branches of government in Russian cities and among oﬃ  cials of other 
local self-governments. In a number of cities (Izhevsk, Gatchina, Kaluga, Obninsk, etc.) 
representative bodies of local self-government, having accepted the recommendations of 
the party, initiated the signing of the code by representatives of municipal authority.
As a whole, despite some progress in local self-governments and other areas of govern-
ment in Russia, it is necessary to further investigate the extensive presence of conﬂ ict of 
interest at the local level. In the following sections, we will discuss in detail the reasons 
for conﬂ icts of interest, and we will oﬀ er practical proposals for their prevention.
3.   REGULATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
      AND STRUCTURAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
3.1 Confl icts Related to the Structure 
      of Local Self-Governmental Authorities
In current municipal legislation, the division of competencies is vaguely regulated. Th e 
federal Law 154-FZ, regarding the division of power between branches of local authori-
ties, does not establish clear guidelines between the institutions of local government, 
giving regions the right to adopt their own regulations in regional laws. Consequently, 
the overwhelming majority of regions in the Federation do not have any restrictions on 
overlapping competencies in local self-governments.
Currently, in 75 percent  of local self-governments of the Russian Federation, there
is a prevalence of overlapping authorities at the highest levels of local self-government 
(see Appendix). Frequently the authority of the head of an administrative body is not 
clearly separated from that of the head of the legislature. As a result, elected 
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representatives of local self-governments are subordinated to the executive branch. 
Under these circumstances, the control function of a representative body is essentially 
weakened; control of top oﬃ  cials in local governmental institutions is absent. Th is can 
encourage the abuse of power. Th e fact that legislative activity in such conditions is 
not subject to the approval of elected oﬃ  cials (and thereby to the local constituency) 
but rather to an executive who is not necessarily elected can form a powerful basis for 
conﬂ icts at the local level.
Th e problem of concentration of executive power in the hand of one oﬃ  cial is 
fraught with the most serious consequences in large cities, where an executive with 
signiﬁ cant control over ﬁ nancial resources combines the posts of the head of the local 
executive branch and of the representative authority. Examples of large municipalities 
where the mayor (chief executive body) is also the chairman of the legislative assembly 
include Izhevsk (Udmurtiya), Orenburg and Orsk (the Orenburg area), Irkutsk and 
Bratsk (Irkutsk area), Astrakhan, Belgorod, Kostroma, Kurgan, Rostov-on-Don, Samara, 
Stavropol, Khabarovsk, and Chelyabinsk. (see Table 6.1) Th e selected analysis of charters 
on municipal bodies at the level of regional centers and large cities in the Federation 
shows that clear separation of the representative and executive branches of local self-
government occurs in less than 50 percent of municipalities (see Table 6.1).
Table 6.1
Power Allocated to the Mayor (Th e Head of Municipal Government)
Mayor
(The Head of Municipal Formation)
Heading Authority
Elected by 
Population
Assigned by 
Representative 
Body
Executive Both: 
Executive and 
Representative
Number of cities 
(out of 73 surveyed) 
8 65 35 38
It is obvious that the demonstrated overlap of posts can result in conﬂ icts of interest 
in the local and regional authorities. Th e conﬂ ict, and the main source of discontent, 
is rooted in the concentration of executive powers in the hand of the mayor at the 
regional level, and of large cities controlling vast ﬁ nancial resources. Th ere have been 
cases when issues of dividing executive and legislative powers at municipalities were 
brought to court.
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Th e latest and most reported-on lawsuits include the one between the Administration of 
the Kursk region and the mayor of the city of Kursk, concerning the right to preside over 
the legislative assembly of the city. At the end of October 2002, the court of Lenin of Kursk 
upheld the claim of the regional administration against the mayor, Mr. Maltsev. Th e lawsuit 
took eight months. Regional authorities reaﬃ  rmed their adherence to the oﬃ  cial guidelines 
and demanded not only the removal of Mr. Maltsev from the sessions of the city assembly, 
but also a change in the city charter to separate the oﬃ  ce of the mayor as the head of the 
executive branch and the head of the administrative (legislative) authority. Th e regional 
administration claimed that the city of Kursk violated the provisions on the organization of 
local self-government stipulated by federal Law FZ-154 “On the general principles of local 
self-government.” In this law it is stated, that “the popularly elected head of the municipality 
has the right to participate in the legislation of the local self-government and preside over the 
sessions.” In the charter of the city of Kursk, eﬀ ective regulations state that the mayor “can 
head a representative body,” which, the plaintiﬀ s claimed, asserts a much wider authority 
than mere participation or “presiding over the sessions.” As was noted during the legal 
procedure, the concept of “presiding and supervising” has no clear deﬁ nition in the charter 
of Kursk. In the regional oﬃ  cials’ opinion, these infringements limit the legitimate rights and 
liberties of the representative body of local self-government. Consequently, regional oﬃ  cials 
maintained, all institutional powers of local government in Kursk are concentrated in Sergey 
Maltsev’s hands, and self-government by popularly elected representatives has been replaced 
by the government of one individual. Th is also violates constitutional principles. Th e court 
agreed with this conclusion, and, as a result, the charter of the city of Kursk and the rules 
of Kursk city assembly must be harmonized with federal legislation. 
To avoid similar situations, the new bill, 154-FZ, prescribes new provisions for the 
functioning of institutions of local governments to replace existing ones. Its key provision 
is the unequivocal ban on the overlap of the posts of the head of administration and 
the head of the local assembly. Th e new law stipulates that the head of the municipality 
can either head the representative body or the administration but cannot combine these 
two oﬃ  ces or be positioned above them.
Th e election of the head of a municipality can happen either by popular vote or 
by the vote of the representative body. If the mayor is elected by direct vote, he can 
occupy either of the two oﬃ  ces. If the head of municipality is appointed/elected by the 
representative body, he can only head the representative body. 
Furthermore, the new law stipulates that municipalities should be managed by a 
professional civil servant, while the regional (district) representative body is to be made 
up by heads and deputies of local municipalities. In cities that received the status of city 
districts, the system of mayors elected by direct vote will be kept. As for competencies 
at the top level of local self-government, the top executive will answer directly to the 
head of the region.
Reaction to guidelines for the division of power at local self-governments incorpo-
rated in the new law was not as controversial as the concept of territorial reorganization 
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contained in the same bill. In many respects it addresses the issue of overlapping posts, 
and there is a justiﬁ ed suspicion that those ﬁ ghting for the preservation of current laws 
beneﬁ t from the overlap of positions at the level of local self-government.
However, it is necessary to recognize that the question of overlap of oﬃ  ces was 
unequivocally and rather accurately resolved by the new law, which is one of the most 
important achievements of municipal reform in Russia.
3.2 Confl icts Connected to Regulation of the Status of 
      Offi cials in Local Self-Governments
In the legislation of the Russian Federation, the concepts “of elected persons of local self-
government” and “municipal employees” diﬀ er. Deputies, mayors of cities, heads of local 
administrations, members of elected institutions of local government, and other persons 
who have received executive power as a result of municipal elections are considered elected 
oﬃ  cials. Th e term “municipal employee” refers to individuals working in institutions of 
local government under labor contract, and municipal service is determined in federal 
Law FZ-154 as “professional work on a steady basis in institutions of local government 
with executive authority, including the authority of elected oﬃ  cials.”
Th e status of municipal employees, the conditions and procedures of municipal 
service, and management of service are determined by the federal law “On bases of 
municipal service in the Russian Federation,” incorporated by laws of the Russian 
Federation and charters of municipal bodies. Furthermore, federal labor and pension 
legislation applies to municipal employees.
3.2.1   Elected Oﬃ  cials
Regulation of the status of elected persons at local self-governments is not incorporated 
in federal legislation. Th e appropriate federal law “On bases of the status of the elected 
person of local self-government in the Russian Federation” was developed and passed 
by the State Duma and approved by the Council of Federation, but President Putin 
vetoed it due to a conﬂ ict with the federal legislation.
Meanwhile, the absence of federal guidelines for elected persons of local self-govern-
ments is an actual problem. Currently, it is extremely diﬃ  cult to prove if a city mayor, 
a head of local administration or his deputy is engaged in commercial activities or uses 
his oﬃ  ce or community property for purposes other than his oﬃ  cial mandate, and it 
is diﬃ  cult to implement measures of prevention.
Th is situation is aggravated by the fact that, in Russia, the institution of response 
by elected oﬃ  cials in local self-governments is still in development—we shall see that 
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the institution of accountability to voters by elected oﬃ  cials at the federal and regional 
levels does not even exist. Federal Law FZ-154 mandates a response of elected oﬃ  cials 
to constituents. Th e same law establishes the forms of response that should comply 
with laws of the Russian Federation, and its speciﬁ c mechanisms should be regulated 
by the charters of municipal bodies. In practice, many local governments are in viola-
tion of federal legislation and have not developed or adopted a mechanism of oﬃ  cial 
responses to requests. Even though there are federal laws to recall an oﬃ  cial before the 
end of his/her elected term due to loss of trust by their constituents, it’s highly unlikely 
that such regulations would be adopted by the charter of a local self-government. Th is 
means that adoption of such regulations depends chieﬂ y on the same elected oﬃ  cials 
to whom the regulation is supposed to apply.
Th e absence of guidelines regulating the rights and responsibilities of elected oﬃ  cials 
in local self-governments creates opportunities for conﬂ icts of interest and various forms 
of corruption. In Russia, there are several examples of citizens trying to recall an elected 
oﬃ  cial unsuccessfully, due to the lack of adequate legislation.
 
In the Seversk District of Krasnodarsky kray, inhabitants wanted to recall the head of the 
local government, who was elected by violating legal regulations. He was not really concerned 
with municipal aﬀ airs; instead, he pursued his own agenda, damaging the social and 
economic infrastructure of the area. Many suspected him of personal misconduct. But the 
charter of the Seversk District contained no regulations on the conduct and ethics of elected 
oﬃ  cials in the local self-government. As a result, the citizens were helpless; their appeals to 
the head  of the region remained unanswered, since he used to work in the regional oﬃ  ce 
of the public prosecutor.
3.2.2   Municipal Employees
Th e federal law “On the basics of municipal service in the Russian Federation” (item 
11) established restrictions applying to municipal oﬃ  cials. A municipal employee is 
not eligible to:
      •     get hired for any other paid position except for employment in education, 
science and arts activities;  
      •     be a member of the State Duma of the Russian Federation (the House of Rep-
resentatives of the Russian Federation), on a member of Regional Parliament, 
a member of the Municipal Council; he/she is also discouraged from holding 
the position of elected municipal oﬃ  cial;
      •     run his/her own business, or run it by proxy;
      •     be a member of the board of directors of commercial enterprises, except for a 
special appointment determined in the Statute of Municipality on the basis of 
federal and regional legislation;
262
C O M B AT I N G  C O N F L I C T  O F  I N T E R E S T  I N  LO C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  T H E  C E E  C O U N T R I E S  • •  PA R T  I I
D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
      •     be a lobbyist or an attorney of third parties in the local self-government where 
he/she is employed; 
      •     utilize property, ﬁ nancial and informational resources of local self-government 
for purposes other than municipal service;
      •     receive author and speaker fees for regular oﬃ  cial duties;
      •     receive any kinds of gifts and favors from individuals or organizations (both 
commercial and nonproﬁ t) as a form of compensation for municipal service;
      •     go on business trips funded by individuals or legal entities, except when such 
funding is made by a mutual agreement with other governmental agencies or 
nonproﬁ t institutions; 
      •     go on strike;
      •     get involved in political parties and use local self-government authorities for 
lobbying for political parties; the formation of political, religious, or any other 
kinds of public organizations in local self-government bodies is strongly discour-
aged, with the exception of trade unions.
Th ere is a special article2 devoted to regulation of municipal employees owning 
shares in commercial enterprises. Once he has assumed oﬃ  ce at a local self-government, 
a municipal employee should transfer all his shares in business enterprises into trust 
management under a guarantee issued by the municipality to comply with federal and 
regional legislation.
In the federal Law “On the basics of municipal service,” and in the special Order of 
the President of the Russian Federation issued in 1997, it is stipulated that municipal 
employees, along with local self-government oﬃ  cials (both elected and appointed), 
have to provide information on their income and property, but this information is for 
oﬃ  cial use only and is not available publicly. Th e procedure of income and property 
declaration should be set by a special federal law. Not all local governments have adopted 
guidelines for disclosure of income and property by municipal employees, even though 
federal legislation makes it mandatory.
3.2.3   Judges
Regulations on conﬂ ict of interest situations at the local level is incomplete without 
guidelines applying to the judicial system of local self-governments. Under circum-
stances when administrations and oﬃ  cials of public authority are accountable to the 
law, instead of higher oﬃ  cials, the signiﬁ cance of the judicial system is much greater. 
In Russia, administrative and technical issues of the courts, as well as personnel security 
and ﬁ nancial independence of state structures, especially at the regional level, are still 
to be resolved.
263
C O N F L I C T  O F  I N T E R E S T  I N  R U S S I A N  LO C A L  G O V E R N M E N T:  C H A L L E N G E S  F O R  N E W  L E G I S L AT I O N
According to the ﬁ rst vice-president of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federa-
tion, V. Radchenko, Russian courts need to hire about 45,000 judges, and the current 
total of judges in Russia doesn’t exceed 15,000. Most of the court buildings are poorly 
equipped: some of them even lack personal computers. Judicial documentation is done 
manually; therefore there are no reliable records of judicial proceedings. Nevertheless, 
since 1991, the number of civil cases in the country has increased from one million up 
to 5 million annually.
Moreover, there is an urgent need to create training programs for judges, since the 
majority of them graduated in the Soviet period, which had very diﬀ erent legal concepts 
of private and public law. In V. Radchenko’s opinion, “the introduction of new concepts 
would contribute to a more eﬀ ective judicial system in a time of  ongoing reforms and 
not fall behind current legislation.” In the last ﬁ ve to seven years, many Russian experts 
have raised questions of re-organizing the system of administrative courts, i.e., the courts 
specializing in disputes between bodies of public authority—and also between citizens 
and public authorities or their oﬃ  cials. A new organization for administrative justice 
could become an eﬀ ective tool to prevent conﬂ ict of interest situations in Russian local 
self-governments. 
Recommendations:
      1)   Within the framework of uniform and detailed legislation regulating questions 
of local self-governments at the federal level, a new federal law on elected oﬃ  -
cials has to be adopted. Th is law should resolve issues of the increased authority 
of local self-government representative bodies and deﬁ ne their relationship to 
executive powers.
      2)   In order to prevent conﬂ icts and misinterpretations at the federal level, the 
problem of the division of power must be resolved between the representative 
and executive bodies, as well as between municipal authority and federal law, 
by requiring regional and municipal authorities to incorporate in their charters 
the principle of division of competencies. 
      3)   It is recommended that Parliament adopt a federal law “On the status of elected 
oﬃ  cials at local self-governments,” to place a prohibition on overlapping high 
executive oﬃ  ces. Th e same law should contain regulations on the authority of 
the top elected oﬃ  cial at the local self-government and sanctions for misconduct 
or abuse of power.  
      4)   Since property to provide social services was transferred from the central gov-
ernment to the municipalities, it is necessary to develop federal guidelines for 
the management of municipal property and for the municipalities’ rights and 
responsibilities. 
      5)   Th e responsibility concerning issues of local importance and public account-
ability of agencies and oﬃ  cials of local self-governments, should be established, 
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and procedures should be adopted to handle applications and complaints by 
local citizens. 
4.   INSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
      PROVISION OF SERVICES BY PUBLICLY OWNED ENTERPRISES
One of the important questions demanding legislative regulation is that of institu-
tional conﬂ icts among public bodies. Economic conﬂ ict of interest in Russian local 
self-government management is often understood as a situation in which the interests 
of a municipality, as the entity responsible for social services, conﬂ ict with its interests 
in economic eﬃ  ciency at property management. 
In compliance with eﬀ ective regulations, municipalities are obliged to stay as 
independent as possible from the conditions of the market economy. Nevertheless, 
municipalities frequently favor one participant of the market economy over others, a 
situation that results in unfair competition. Th is is another opportunity for economic 
conﬂ ict of interest.
It is important to note that some decisions of the local government can directly or 
indirectly put certain players in the market economy at a disadvantage. Th erefore, it 
is vital that decisions by the municipality be transparent and that all interested parties 
have equal access to information on the decision-making process and its results. Th ere 
is suﬃ  cient regulation of these issues in federal legislation.
In the following, we will discuss three areas of potential conﬂ ict of interest: the pri-
vatization of state and municipal property, the creation of municipal unitary enterprises 
(municipal corporations), and municipal procurement procedures.
4.1 Privatization of Municipal and State Property
Issues of privatization of state and municipal property are regulated by federal Law 
No. 178-FZ  “On the privatization of state and municipal property” (from here on: 
FZ-178) issued on December 21, 2001. It contains precise regulations on procedures 
of privatization and their implementation, as well as guidelines for evaluation. Th e law 
oﬀ ers a schedule for the privatization of municipal property for the current year. Th e 
actual organization of privatization of a given property is determined  independently 
by institutions of local governments.3 
Th e asking price for a property under privatization is based on its accounting 
balance and established in compliance with federal laws on appraisal.4 
According to federal Law No. 135-FZ “On appraisal activity,” a preliminary estimate 
of the municipal property’s value oﬀ ered for privatization is required (art. 8). According 
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to the same law (art. 16), the appraiser should be independent, i.e., he/she can not own 
a share or have other interest in the property to be appraised, and the civil liability of 
the appraiser should be established (art. 17). 
Th e potential for conﬂ icts of interest lies in implementation. In the list of 10 types 
of privatization determined by FZ-178 (art. 13), the most sensitive areas include: 
      •     sale of property on auction (competition); 
      •     sale of property by public oﬀ er; 
      •     municipal property as the contribution in authorized investment in open joint-
stock companies.
4.1.1   Sale of Property by Auction (Competition) and Public Oﬀ ers
In articles 18 and 20 of FZ-178, it is determined that municipal property can be sold 
by auction (competitive bidding). Auctions can be open or closed. Th e bidder oﬀ ering 
the highest purchase price is the winner. An auction with only one bidder is not valid. 
If an auction is cancelled, the municipal property can be oﬀ ered publicly.5
In the case of a public oﬀ er, the following guidelines apply: Th e size of the discount 
from the initial asking price must be established, and the municipality must also set the 
period of time for which the reduced price applies, and the lowest price at which the 
property can be sold. Th e winner in this case is the bidder who ﬁ rst oﬀ ers the asking 
price.
As it is regulated in FZ-178, the process of privatization of municipal property is 
determined independently by a municipality (art. 10.1), and any issues concerning 
the sale must be resolved by the committee in charge of the property’s management. 
Th e law doesn’t mandate an explanation from the representative authority (Duma) for 
its decisions. Th erefore, there is a conﬂ ict between the interest of a city that wants to 
increase its revenues from privatization, and possible individual interests of members 
of the committee. Consequently, there exists a likelihood of favoring one participant 
over others in the auction process.
Th ere are several ways oﬃ  cials responsible for conducting the competition can beneﬁ t 
from the process. One example is when one participant’s oﬀ er becomes known to an-
other participant before the end of the auction. Th e basic problem of prevention of such 
situations lies in the fact that no guidelines have been established for the responsibility 
of municipal authorities to handle conﬁ dential information at auctions.
Another scenario is when oﬃ  cials in charge of the sale of municipal property use 
their position to switch from competitive bidding to a public oﬀ er that beneﬁ ts only 
one bidder, at a designated date. In compliance with articles 18 and 20 of the law, the 
property is put on public oﬀ er at a discount from the initial price, and a privileged 
participant will be the ﬁ rst to oﬀ er the discounted price.
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Although appeals against such procedures can be ﬁ led in court, the result of the 
privatization procedure (auction, public oﬀ er) will almost never be cancelled.
An example of eliminating participants from the auction process at the state level is the case 
of the petroleum company “Slavneft.” Seventy-ﬁ ve percent of its state-owned shares were to 
be privatized. Initially seven companies planned to take part in the auction, but ﬁ ve of them 
were disqualiﬁ ed by the auction committee on various grounds, less than 24 hours before the 
auction. As a result, there were two participants. Th e auction was considered valid, and since 
the two bidders were not motivated to compete with one another, the amount oﬀ ered for the 
state package was much lower than expected. Th e starting price was 1.7 billion dollars and 
the ﬁ nal price was ﬁ xed at 1.86 billion dollars. Th e decision to disqualify “Rosneft” from 
the bidding process is now under court appeal, however, any court decision will likely leave 
the outcome of the auction process unchanged.
4.1.2   Participation of Municipalities in Open Joint-Stock Companies
A possible means of privatization of municipal property, as stated in FZ-178, is the 
transfer of property as an authorized capital investment in joint-stock companies (articles 
13 and 25 of FZ-178). In our opinion, such handling of municipal property directly 
contradicts the primary mission of a municipality, which should seek the most eﬀ ective 
utilization of property to provide social services of the highest quality to the general pub-
lic. Investing municipal property in commercial enterprises removes municipal property 
from the social sphere. In addition, poor business management carries the risk of loss 
of municipal property through bankruptcy. Th us, there is an obvious conﬂ ict between 
the interest of the municipality as a shareholder in an open joint-stock enterprise (OJSE 
hereafter) and its mission as the provider of social services.
In Russia, where there are no well-developed market traditions, the capital investment 
of a municipality in an OJSE gives the commercial company a competitive advantage. 
Such an enterprise will be more attractive to investors, due to the fact that their invest-
ment is protected by municipal activities that are not subject to market conditions.
Th is is a case of protectionism, where the municipality doesn’t have a vested interest 
in protecting fair market competition because of its investment in an OJSE.
Another potential for serious conﬂ ict of interest can occur when an enterprise in 
which the municipality holds interest participates in public procurement of goods and 
services—this is not forbidden by current laws. In this scenario, the interests of the mu-
nicipality, as the body allocating limited budgetary funds to acquire the highest quality 
of goods and services at the most favorable price, conﬂ ict with the interests of the 
commercial company, in which the municipality holds ownership and which wants to 
maximize its proﬁ tability. Evidently, municipal ownership gives great security to a com-
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mercial enterprise. Such a company can be considered as a more reliable supplier, and this 
can result in discrimination against other companies participating in open tenders.
Yet another area of potential conﬂ ict of interest is when the joint-stock company 
that shares ownership with the municipality decides to raise capitalization and attract 
investment. According to Article 25 of FZ-178, the share of a municipality in a com-
mercial company must not be less than 255 + 1 shares (the so-called “blocking package”). 
In order to keep the blocking package after raising additional capital, and to not harm 
other owners, the institutions of local government must invest additional municipal 
property. Th us the cost of privatized property (based on independent estimates and 
accounting reports) can appear lower than the amount the municipality could earn as 
a result of auction (competitive bidding).
Here a direct conﬂ ict of interest appears, as the municipality as shareholder is 
interested in the cost of privatized property that simply “covers” the required increase 
of additional capitalization, and not in receiving the highest possible price for the pri-
vatized property.
Moreover, such privatization contradicts common sense, since, instead of putting the 
revenue deriving from the sale of property into the municipal budget, the municipality 
simply shifts funds in the same pocket. In the budget, this will be accounted for as rev-
enue from privatization—increasing ownership in a joint-stock company is considered 
income, even though no actual inﬂ ow of funds has taken place.
Th e disqualiﬁ cation of “Rosneft” from the auction process to privatize state shares in “Slavneft” 
(Case 3) was described above. In our opinion, disqualifying “Rosneft” from the process was 
ultimately fair: even though “Rosneft” was willing to pay 2.3 billion dollars for “Slavneft” 
shares, due to the signiﬁ cant state ownership in “Rosneft,” the eventual sale would have 
netted less than the 1.86 billion dollars in real terms, as the Russian Federal Ministry of 
Economic Development determined.
4.1.3   Transparency of Information 
Law FZ-178 (art. 15), concerning procedures of privatization of state and municipal 
property, speciﬁ es that the following information has to be published annually in the 
media: 
      •     planned privatization for the current year; 
      •     a report on privatization in the previous year; 
      •     decisions on future privatization of property. 
Th e law regulates the structure of the report on planned privatization, and the 
deadline for the submission of the report is determined as at least 30 days prior to 
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planned date of the privatization. All conditions for the auctions are to be included in 
the report. Article 15 mandates the publication of auction results in a given format and 
by a deadline of not more than 30 days after the close of the tender.
4.2 Formation of Municipal Unitary Enterprises
Th e municipal unitary enterprise (MUE) is a speciﬁ c form of economic activity. On the 
one hand, an MUE is a legal company with all attributes of an independent company, 
including a seal, controls, authorized capital and so forth. MUE activity is regulated by 
federal Law No. 161-FZ issued on November 14, 2002 “On state and municipal unitary 
enterprises” (hereafter: FZ-161). According to Article 8 of the law, the municipality is 
the 100 percent shareholder of the MUE. 
Th e mission of an MUE includes:6
      •     management of property that is excluded from privatization, including property 
required for the security of the Russian Federation; 
      •     performance of community functions, such as the procurement of certain goods 
and services at basic prices; the organization and execution of procurement of 
commodities to ensure the food supply of the state;
      •     activities that federal laws stipulate can only to be performed by state unitary 
enterprises;
      •     scientiﬁ c and technical activities in ﬁ elds related to the security of the Russian 
Federation;
      •     development and production in the ﬁ eld of state security of the Russian Federa-
tion.
Another feature of an MUE is that it can not share ownership and is the only entity 
to manage municipal property.
4.2.1   Rental of Municipal Property 
As a rule, an MUE is established by municipalities to perform functions that are not 
commercial activities, such as supplying utilities, cleaning, and transportation. Th e 
municipality makes a decision on the creation of an MUE, it approves its charter, con-
cludes the contract with its head, and transfers municipal property to its ownership. 
Th e functions and objectives of an MUE, and the structure of its transferred property, 
are also determined by the municipality (art. 8.5 of FZ-161). Th e value of the property 
transferred to the MUE is determined by an independent appraiser.
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As neither the decision on establishing an MUE, nor the distribution of proﬁ t from 
the use of the transferred property, are subject to approval by a representative authority, 
there is a potential for conﬂ ict of interest.
An MUE renders social services to the population and should have a source of 
income for covering losses. Th erefore the right to lease the property transferred to it is 
given to the MUE by the actual proprietor (the committee on property management on 
behalf of the municipality). Accordingly, the MUE as a managing agent is motivated to 
manage as much municipal property as possible, and lease it under market conditions 
with the purpose of maximizing its revenues.
However, the property was transferred to the municipality to render social services 
to the general public and to perform activities for the good of the community, and it 
is not for commercial use. Th us, it turns out, the interests of the municipality conﬂ ict 
with the interests of the MUE. Formally, the MUE is under municipal control, and, as 
a rule, it prefers not to get into direct conﬂ ict with the municipality. Th ere are frequent 
tensions, nevertheless, between the objectives of the MUE and the municipality.
In the majority of Russian cities, it is extremely diﬃ  cult for private individuals to ﬁ nd 
acceptable real estate under municipal authority (usually rented at below market rates) to 
set up a small business. In the best case, the committee managing municipal property will 
oﬀ er a small unequipped space on the outskirts of the city. Th e reason for that is that for 
the most part the municipal property is transferred to MUE management. Moreover, MUE 
appetites are expanded even to social objects.
An example is Izhevsk, where in the last 10 years, ownership of more than 80 kindergartens 
has been transferred from the committee on education to municipal property, which was 
immediately transferred for ownership by MUEs. Due to a decline in the birth rate there 
was a decrease in the number of young children and consequently it was economically 
expedient to integrate kindergartens. Th e real estate left after the integration was transferred 
to municipal property. However, subsequently, the birth rate in the city went up, and the 
number of children in need of preschool education increased. Th e majority of buildings 
that used to be kindergartens remained under the management of the MUEs that rented 
them for commercial use. Th ere is a clear conﬂ ict here between the interests of the city as the 
provider of social services (including preschool education) and as a proprietor of real estate 
generating revenues for the city budget.
4.2.2   Distribution of Proﬁ t from the Use of Property
Another source of conﬂ icts of interest involving MUEs is connected to article 17 of 
FZ-161, according to which the proprietor has the right to receive a part of the proﬁ t 
from the use of property transferred to MUE management. 
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Th e distribution of revenue between the owner of the property (i.e., the municipal-
ity) and the MUE is not regulated by federal law. Th e issue is regulated by institutions 
of the local government independently.
Th us, as the MUE is entitled to a share of the proﬁ t from the use of public property, 
it is motivated to maximize this revenue. Due to an absence of regulation on this issue, 
proﬁ t is distributed at the discretion of the director of the MUE, and so it can be dis-
tributed, for example, among MUE workers as bonuses. Actually, from the organization 
that is in charge of rendering social services, the MUE turns to a commercial company 
whose ﬁ nancial matters are not controlled by the municipality.
Th e municipality has no discretion over the distribution of additional income, 
since all its revenues and expenditures are determined by the budget and supervised by 
deputies. Th at is the reason why municipal employees favor the alternative of creating 
an MUE. Th is explains the proliferation of municipal and state unitary enterprises.
As of January 1, 2003, ownership of federal property was ﬁ xed for 9,846 federal state 
unitary enterprises (FSUE) and 37,081 federal enterprises (in whose ownership the state 
has a share). In all of Russia, they owned more than 1 million buildings, structures and 
sites. Most of them are commercial entities and operate as an FSUE (e.g., FSUE “Gostiny 
Dvor” operating the trade center, as well as FSUE “Trade Center Manezh”). While there 
are statistical data and mission statements for state enterprises, no surveys are available for 
MUEs, and this allows for their proliferation. As a rule, a majority of service enterprises are 
registered as MUEs, even though their activity is completely commercial.
4.2.3   Th e Head of the Municipal Unitary Enterprise
Th e head of the MUE is not a municipal employee, and works under contract. Th erefore, 
many restrictions applicable to municipal employees do not apply to him/her. Th ese 
restrictions are outlined in FZ-161 (art. 21). According to the law, the head of a unitary 
enterprise has no right to:
      •     be the founder (participant) of a legal company; 
      •     occupy an administrative oﬃ  ce or be engaged in other paid activity in the state 
bodies, institutions of local government, commercial, and noncommercial or-
ganizations, except for teaching, scientiﬁ c, or artistic activities;
      •     to be engaged in business;
      •     be a privately-owned agency or a member of the board of directors of a com-
mercial enterprise (except when it is mandatory as part of his duties as head of 
the MUE).
At the same time, the given law does not require the head of an MUE to make a 
disclosure on income and property.
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Th e potential conﬂ ict of the private interest of the head of the MUE and the 
public interests of the property’s owner (the municipality) is regulated by federal Law 
FZ-161. While the head of an MUE is considered representing the interests of the 
MUE, he might enter into contract with an enterprise of which he or a close relative 
(parent, spouse, siblings) is an owner. In such a case, the head of the MUE should be 
sanctioned by the proprietor (i.e., the municipality).
For this reason the head of the MUE must report to the owner of the property (the 
municipality) information on commercial entities in which he or his close relatives 
participate as shareholders, as well as on planned commercial agreements in which he 
might be considered a party with a vested interest. Any agreement in which the director 
of the MUE can be recognized as having a vested personal interest must be annulled.
4.2.4   Transparency of Information
Th e issue of transparency of MUE activity, and equal rights in accessing information on 
its planned actions, is regulated, from the legislative point of view, rather poorly.
FZ-161 (art. 27) speciﬁ es that an MUE must publish reports on its activities as 
stipulated by the legislation of the Russian Federation. However, relevant provisions 
are vague; for example, the regularity of reporting and the format of the reports are 
not speciﬁ ed.
Th us MUE activity is removed from the area of public control, and there is no 
supervision of the MUE’s eﬃ  ciency, its management of property, and the allocation of 
its revenues, a situation which creates opportunities to utilize municipal property for 
personal gain (as is described in section 3.2.2.).
4.3  Competitive Procedures for Municipal Procurement
It is necessary to understand correctly the concept of procurement of goods and services 
for the municipality. Many municipalities regard the system of competitive bidding for 
procurement as an “alternative,” only one of several ways for the municipality to award 
procurement contracts. However, Russian legislation unequivocally requires municipali-
ties to place municipal orders on a competitive basis. Th e federal Law (art. 12.2) “On 
ﬁ nancial bases of local self-government” states: “Contracts to render services to the 
municipality using funds from the local budget must be awarded based open competi-
tion whose conditions are established by a representative body of local self-government.” 
Th e law is clear in this area, and therefore non-competitive municipal procurement 
procedures violate the law.
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4.3.1   Areas of Conﬂ ict
Issues related to competitive bidding in municipal procurement procedures are regulated 
insuﬃ  ciently. It is obvious that, to prevent corruption, there is a need for clear restric-
tions that say more than the general rules on the subject of certain oﬃ  cials awarding 
contracts to selected suppliers without competition. Th e federal Law “On guidelines 
for municipal procurement procedures” was discussed for several years, but ultimately 
it wasn’t adopted.
Before the above-mentioned law, municipalities were guided by legislation concern-
ing procurement for the state: Th e decree of the president of the Russian Federation 
dated April, 8, 1997, “On primary guidelines to prevent corruption and reduce budgetary 
expenditures in procurement procedures for the state”; federal Law No. FZ-97 issued 
May 6, 1999 “On competitions to award procurement contracts for goods and services 
to the  state”; as well as their own regulatory guidelines.
Heads of municipalities are not covered in regulations concerning competitive 
procurement procedures and, due to the lack of regulation in this respect, the munici-
pal leader is not held accountable. So, the Oﬃ  ce of Public Prosecutor, whose duties 
include monitoring legality in the activities of institutions of local government, does 
not concern itself with procurement matters by the municipality. Opponents of com-
petitive bidding for municipal orders use the argument that their business relationship 
with the municipality rests on “mutual satisfaction” based on a supply-on-demand 
system in which transactions are not conducted using “actual money.” In this system, 
the administration can ostensibly place municipal orders only with enterprises that have 
ﬁ nancial obligations (debts) to the municipality, and their compensation can be written 
oﬀ  in the municipal budget.
Th is system has serious negative consequences: Th e price for rendering an essen-
tial service is unreasonably overestimated, while other companies are excluded from 
competitive bidding. Th us, an administration supports enterprises that are frequently 
unproﬁ table and ineﬀ ective instead of oﬀ ering a real opportunity to other prospective 
contractors.
In the city of Chelyabinsk, the Department for Housing and Communal Services organizes 
public procurements for housing maintenance and repair. Technically, companies with 
diﬀ erent forms of ownership may apply for the competition. But this competition turns 
out to be just a redistribution of tasks between many municipal unitary enterprises while 
private companies like the trust management company “Doverie” are often discouraged by 
the department from applying for contracts. Th e oﬃ  cials at the department claim that, unless 
they oﬀ er contracts to municipal unitary enterprises, the latter would go bankrupt due to a 
lack of revenues. And since private companies have more money, the Department of Housing 
and Repair advises them to look for contracts outside the realm of public procurement. 
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In the example of Chelyabinsk, as well as in many other cases, the preference is 
given to MUEs, which enjoy a monopoly in their respective ﬁ elds. Similar actions by 
municipalities are in direct violation of the federal law “On competition and restrictions 
on monopolistic activities in the commodity market.” Economic theory and practice 
persistently conﬁ rm that any restrictions on competition contribute to the emergence 
of monopolies and price ﬁ xing and hamper the development and introduction of new 
technologies. All this is accompanied by a reduction in the quality of goods and services 
provided to the municipality.
4.3.2   Transparency of Information 
Th e transparency of information on decisions and access to conditions of procurement 
is regulated by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 395 “On meas-
ures on the prevention of corruption and reduction of budgetary expenditures in state 
procurement procedures.”
Federal law No. FZ-97, dated May 6, 1999, “On competition on procurement of 
goods and services for state needs” (hereafter FZ-97) was subsequently adopted.
Articles 11 and 12 mandate that information on competitions for government con-
tracts must be published in the media, and these articles also determine the structure 
of the report. Th e same articles ensure that any interested party has the right to receive 
application documents. Participants of the competition have the right to be present at 
the opening of sealed envelopes and at the conclusion of the competition (art. 19).
Article 21 mandates publication of competition results and the format of the report 
within 20 days after conclusion of the competition.
It is possible to identify the following principal causes of weak transparency in 
procurement procedures in local governments in Russia:
      •     absence of traditions of a market economy and inadequate understanding of 
the value of competitive bidding procedures; 
      •     strong lobbying at all governmental levels for personal interests, as well as large-
scale merging of departments with managing agents, primarily MUEs; 
      •     insuﬃ  cient legislation on municipal procurement procedures; 
      •     absence of an eﬀ ective system to monitor municipal procurement procedures 
or to sanction violations of relevant guidelines concerning procurement; 
      •     unwillingness of public authorities to consider violations of procurement guide-
lines as a violation of civil law (and not just administrative regulations); 
      •     heavy budget deﬁ cits and big shortfalls by municipal enterprises against the 
budget. 
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All this creates a vicious circle: Municipal authorities tend to increase their orders 
with municipal enterprises, to recoup the ever increasing debts owed to them by MUEs, 
instead of using available budget resources for procurement under fair market condi-
tions.
Recommendations:
      1)   It is necessary to develop a federal law “On the use of conﬁ dential internal 
information by state and municipal employees,” which would regulate the 
responsibility of municipal employees in using conﬁ dential information on 
behalf of the municipality. To develop such a law, it is expedient to study the 
experience of foreign countries and the experience of the Federal Commission 
on Securities in controlling and regulating the use of conﬁ dential information 
in the securities trade.
      2)   As was shown before, participation of the municipality in open joint-stock 
companies can result in conﬂ icts of interest and discrimination against both 
the competing companies and the joint-stock company (see Case 4). Th erefore, 
legislation should be adopted to ban municipalities from owning shares in joint-
stock companies.
      3)   As a municipal unitary enterprise (MUE) uses municipal property and is created 
with the purpose of rendering services to the community (or to the municipal-
ity), the responsibilities of the head of a unitary enterprise are fundamentally the 
same as those of a municipal employee. Hence, it is necessary that all require-
ments and restrictions applied to a municipal employee should be applied to 
the head of a municipal unitary enterprise, including the obligation of annual 
disclosure of personal income and property and the obligation to report on the 
status of property entrusted to his organization.
      4)   With a view toward strengthening public control of MUE activity and the 
proper use of municipal property, it is necessary to develop legislative amend-
ments calling for annual reports on MUE activity. Th e information in the report 
should include, at a minimum:
            •     MUE name;
            •     the address of the MUE;
            •     the list of the property entrusted to it for management;
            •     proﬁ t earned the previous year; distribution of revenues between the munici-
pal budget and MUE; and allocation of proﬁ t remaining at the MUE. 
 
Legislation must mandate an inventory of all MEU property, including guidelines 
for its use. As a result of the inventory, it is necessary to adopt one of the following 
decisions:
            •     closing the MUE through full privatization;
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            •     transfer of part of MUE property to perform social services;
            •     preservation of current status. 
            
Th e law has to provide federal guidelines for procurement of goods and services as 
well as sanctions for violations. Regulations covering implementation of procurement 
procedures can be provided by institutions of local government that are obliged to abide 
by the appropriate statutory acts in allocating ﬁ nancial resources.
5.   INCENTIVES FOR GOOD PERFORMANCE 
      AND FIGHTING CORRUPTION7 
5.1 Corruption and Decentralization of Power in Russia
Th e modern, democratic federal state of Russia is a hierarchical, multilevel formation. Th e 
structure rests on four pillars. First, the top level is the federal level, which is somewhat 
independent from the lower levels, such as the regional and local levels. Second, inside 
each level, there are independent agencies with special competencies. Furthermore, 
inside each agency, there are hierarchical structures of departments. It is obvious that 
the degree of corruption within the state apparatus varies; it depends on an agency’s or 
department’s level of authority and its position within the system.
Proceeding from the top down, from the federal to the local level, local municipali-
ties are not only in a position to resolve problems of their constituency, but they can 
be better monitored by the citizens, thereby reducing the potential for corruption. It 
is believed that activities and decisions about local problems are more transparent and 
less tainted by corruption for the following reasons:
First, at the local level, people can more easily link oﬃ  cial decisions to a particular 
authority and judge its result. Accordingly, it is easier to identify an oﬃ  cial whose decision 
conﬂ icts with the public interest. Second, within the framework of a local municipality 
it is much easier to exert pressure on the authorities and hence, to reduce corruption: 
what is called by Albert Hirshman “protest” and “voting by legs.” It is much easier for 
citizens to protest a decision by the local authority as opposed to decisions brought on 
the federal level, and since many jurisdictions oﬀ er identical services, one can always 
switch agencies. Th e question is whether this logic in the application of the Russian 
federal relations justiﬁ es itself.
Figure 6.2 shows that citizens and businessmen consider the legislature the most 
corrupt at the federal level, or at least at the level directly subordinate to it. Th us citizens, 
in comparison with businessmen, are inclined to judge the federal level more harshly.
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Figure 6.2
Public Perception of Corruption at Diﬀ erent Levels of Legislative Authority
As for executive authority, the answers reﬂ ect a diﬀ erent order: Th e lower the level, 
the more corruption. Th is order is established on the basis of answers by citizens and 
businessmen (Figure 6.3). 
Figure 6.3
Public Perceptions of Corruption at Diﬀ erent Levels of Government 
(Executive Authority)
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According to the research results, bodies of government that are considered most 
corrupt:
      •     constantly included in direct contact with the population; 
      •     allocated the greatest discretionary powers; 
      •     were the least accountable to citizens (through election);
      •     occupied a monopoly position in a certain sector of management.
5.2 Stimulus for Municipal Offi cials
5.2.1   General Characteristics of the Compensation System
According to FZ-8 (art. 16), the ﬁ nancial compensation of municipal employees, as well 
as bonuses and other payments complementing the salary of the municipal employee, 
are determined independently by local self-government institutions.
However, in practice, the compensation system of municipal employees in most 
cases is similar to that of federal civil servants. Components of compensation include: 
      •     oﬃ  cial salary; 
      •     supplement to salary in the qualifying category; 
      •     supplement to salary for special conditions of civil service; 
      •     supplement to oﬃ  cial salary for long service; 
      •     bonus. 
Table 6.2 shows the average oﬃ  cial salary of civil servants. Based on our research to 
estimate the level of compensation for municipal employees, it is possible to state that 
the compensation of municipal and civil servants is approximately identical. 
Table 6.2
Th e Average Oﬃ  cial Salary of Civil Servants 
Level of Management Offi cial Salary [rbls.]
Top manager 17,000
Medium level 2,520
Lower level 1,320
Executor 1,180
Source:     “Information for Democracy” Foundation, 2000.
Russian oﬃ  cials (including municipal oﬃ  cials) receive a considerable part of their 
income as wage supplements and indirect payments (Table 6.4). Supplements are paid 
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monthly. Supplements can amount to 200 percent of base salary for top positions, 150 
percent for top experts, 120 percent for lower level professionals, and 60 percent for 
others. 
Table 6.3
Th e Average Extra Charges for Length of Service Depending 
on the Experience of Work of a Civil Servant
Length of State Service Extra Charges [% of Offi cial Salary]
1 to 5 years 10
5 to 10 years 15
10 to 15 years 20
More than 15 years 30
Compensation for state employees in the Russian Federation, irrespective of gen-
der, age and position, is much below compensation in the private sector. However, the 
higher the position, the greater the diﬀ erence between the administrative and private 
sectors. So, a top-level manager in state service receives a compensation that is 10–15 
times less than the same position at a private company; it’s 7–10 times lower for 
middle managers, 5–7 times for low-level managers and 1.5–3 times lower at the base 
level. Th is scale corresponds to the general practice worldwide. Th e degree of diﬀ erence 
testiﬁ es to the extreme non-competitiveness of public sector employment and estab-
lishes a contra-selection of entrants into state bureaucracy. Consequently, there is great 
turnover of staﬀ  in Russian government agencies. 
According to research, there is little incentive in monetary terms for Moscow oﬃ  cials to perform 
well in their oﬃ  ce. Only 12.5 percent of respondents regarded their wages as incentives for 
good performance. It is interesting that wage incentives ranked the same as discounted use 
of public transportation (13.6 percent). Probably, oﬃ  cials perceive this privilege as essential 
corresponding to the level of their compensation. Approximately at the same level is the 
incentive of pay (11.6 percent). Bonuses carry a little more weight as incentive: 16 percent 
of respondents regard them as a strong incentive. 
The opportunity to use departmental medicine stimulates officials far above other 
opportunities: 23.7 percent have answered that this is an eﬀ ective incentive. Approximately 
the same importance is given to the size of pension to be received (23.6 percent). 
Non-material incentives are no less important than monetary ones. Th e most essential non-
material incentives include: a position with more challenges or more responsibility than a 
current post, 13.5 percent; opportunity for promotion, 15.7 percent; and also the opportunity 
to get employment in private sector after leaving state service, 16.4 percent.
Th us, warnings, censure and similar sanctions are poor incentives for improvement of 
work performance. Oﬃ  cials are much better stimulated by state awards, 10.9 percent, and 
expression of gratitude, 9.9 percent.
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It is possible to conclude that incentives for Moscow oﬃ  cials today are based not 
only on wages. Major incentives include opportunities for career advancement, good 
employment in private business after termination of oﬃ  ce, retirement beneﬁ ts, awards, 
certiﬁ cates for good job performance, and departmental medicine. 
5.2.2   Satisfaction of Oﬃ  cials According to their Level of Compensation 
           and Social Privileges
Th e majority of respondents are not satisﬁ ed with the level of their compensation, 
social privileges, and employment guarantees, as demonstrated in Table 6.4. Th e level 
of satisfaction in the table corresponds to the following:
      •     not satisﬁ ed; 
      •     not satisﬁ ed faster; 
      •     somewhat satisﬁ ed, and somewhat unsatisﬁ ed, average satisfaction;
      •     fairly satisﬁ ed;
      •     completely satisﬁ ed.
Table 6.4
Degree of Satisfaction with the Present Level of Wages, 
Social Privileges, and Guarantees 
No. List of Privileges and Guarantees
Level of Satisfaction
1 2 3 4 5
1 Wages, including all extra charges. 62.4 21.3 12.6 3.1 0.6 
2 Bonuses. 54.3 22.9 16.2 4.7 1.8 
3 Payment of holidays. 46.1 24.8 18.9 8.4 1.8 
4 Indirect expenses for public service, 
providing a meal at a low price, 
departmental medical services etc.
58.9 17.6 15.4 6.7 1.4 
5 Privileges for public service, providing reception of 
habitation, permits on rest, discount travel on public 
transportation, etc.
64.4 14.8 14.3 4.9 1.5 
6 Pension upon termination of public service. 40.1 21.0 24.7 10.7 3.5 
7 Guarantee of career in public service. 49.9 16.8 22.5 8.7 2.1 
8 Level of legal security. 44.3 17.8 25.4 10.7 1.9 
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Th e level of satisfaction with oﬃ  cials’ wages is lowest among the parameters included 
in Table 6.4: only 0.6 percent are completely satisﬁ ed. Such a high level of dissatisfac-
tion of oﬃ  cials with their compensation corresponds with the statement that wages are 
a weak stimulus for good job performance. Th e opportunity for career advancement 
or promotion in a post is signiﬁ cant enough for many oﬃ  cials, but as a rule they are 
not satisﬁ ed with guarantees of employment. Th erefore, guarantees of a career would 
be an important resource to increase the importance of public service and the level of 
motivation to work. Th e same concerns the level of legal security for oﬃ  cials: Its increase 
would increase the importance of public service.
5.2.3   Wages and Corruption: How to Pay Russian Oﬃ  cials
Successful reform of public service demands not only the development of guidelines 
but a whole set of practical solutions for implementation. It is not enough to declare 
that wages should be raised. It is not enough to say that it is  necessary to adopt oﬃ  cial 
guidelines, etc. It is necessary to adopt concrete provisions on whose compensation 
should be increased, and to what extent. It is necessary to clarify the objectives to be 
achieved before reforms are implemented. One such objective is, certainly, the mini-
mization of corruption.
Th e question of who should beneﬁ t from salary increases has split the scientiﬁ c 
community. Some researchers believe that wage increases are necessary only for oﬃ  cials 
involved in decision-making; others disagree with this categorically and suggest that the 
salary levels should be preserved at the current level; while yet other researchers suggest 
a salary increase only for oﬃ  cials who occupy senior and lower state posts of public 
service. Not less tricky is the question of the “optimum” size of payment.
Results of statistical analyses on the ratio between the level of wages and corruption 
allow us to make only the following, limited conclusions: 
      •     the ﬁ xed level of interrelation between wages and corruption does not guarantee 
reduction of corruption through wage increases; 
      •     the level of wages aﬀ ect corruption only in combination with other measures; 
      •     however, low salaries do invite corruption.
To establish an eﬀ ective relationship between salary increases and the reduction 
of corruption, it is necessary to adopt sanctions, such as ﬁ nes, reduction of retirement 
beneﬁ ts, etc. Moreover, in the framework of “hypotheses on fair compensation,” it is 
necessary to adopt special measures that could alter the widespread belief that corruption 
under conditions of low compensation is a fair response from bureaucrats to unreason-
able wages from the state. 
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Both theoretical and experimental works conﬁ rm the opinion stated by anticor-
ruption experts that salary increases do not have an essential inﬂ uence on the reduction 
of corruption, though low salaries as a rule are accompanied by signiﬁ cant corruption 
activity.
Th e statistical analysis leads to the following conclusions:
      •     A connection between low wages and the level of corruption exists. However, 
this does not mean that wage increases result in a decrease in corruption.
      •     Countries with low corruption, and, hence, with eﬀ ective bureaucracy, spend 
relatively less.
Clearly, a prosperous economy has a well paid but not too burdensome bureaucracy. 
However, this is also the result of eﬀ ective management of administrations. Corruption 
is reduced simultaneously with the adoption of eﬀ ective political and legal regulation 
in public life. 
Sociological research has shown that employees of ministries in our sample earn an 
average of 5,000 rubles per month. Adequate work performance for oﬃ  cials is dem-
onstrated at a salary of 18,000 rubles per month, plus supplementary compensation, 
and a 25,000 monthly salary without supplements. Th is means that, for civil servants, 
a signiﬁ cant wage increase means a 300–500 percent raise.
It is impossible to compare compensation expected by Russian top oﬃ  cials to that 
of their foreign counterparts. But the above-mentioned rate of increase would strain 
the limited budget resources available in Russia.
An eﬀ ective system of compensation of state and local employees is based on: 
      •     Diﬀ erentiation in compensation.
      •     Conversion to a contract system, based on job performance.
      •     Legislative provisions on annual pay increases for civil servants, and establishing 
compensation based on a ratio between the state and municipal level and the 
private sector and changes in economic conditions. 
      •     Establishing ﬁ xed levels tied to performance by individual oﬃ  cials or on a col-
lective basis.
Recommendations:
One possible way to increase the appeal of municipal service has been developed by the 
“Information for Democracy Fund.”8 In a summary, the plan includes the following 
steps:
      1)   Essential payment increases, as allowed by the budget. 
      2)   Payment increases in conjunction with the reform of public service, including 
change in compensation guidelines (merit-based compensation). 
      3)   Th e system of wage increases in ministries and departments should be regulated. 
Reform of a control system should be implemented simultaneously with the 
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establishment of anticorruption programs. Th e order of reforms in departments 
can be determined by establishing a  connection between their work and ac-
commodating a proﬁ table part of the budget (for example, customs and tax 
bodies can be reformed ﬁ rst).
      4)   Reform is accompanied by an active propaganda campaign that explains to 
citizens that taxes will be used to increase management eﬃ  ciency, that oﬃ  cials 
perform their duty for the beneﬁ t of citizens and are paid from tax revenues, 
that oﬃ  cials are adequately compensated, and that citizens can expect proper 
service without paying extra money as bribes.
Th e listed conditions are formulated in a general framework. In practice, serious 
thinking should go into selecting the right components of administrative reform, to 
increase compensation for civil servants while ensuring adequate service to citizens.
6.   CONCLUSION
Th e various survey and poll results show that the personal factor plays a signiﬁ cant 
role in the Russian system of government, including local self-government. Th is might 
be explained by the traditional Russian mentality. Nevertheless, a high dependence of 
the municipal administrative systems on personal and professional qualities of their 
top executives makes these systems vulnerable and generates negative tendencies of 
authoritarianism and criminalization of municipal administrations. So, for example, if 
an elected mayor (the head of administration) of a city or rural district is a dishonorable, 
incompetent, unmotivated person, with a low level of administrative culture and sense 
of justice, or if he is simply a criminal, the whole idea of local self-government can be 
discredited among people living in a given municipality, or even in an entire region, 
thereby alienating the  population from local authorities.
Strong representative bodies (more numerous and with a higher legal status) and 
public civil organizations should become mechanisms of counteraction to these tenden-
cies. Today, local government oﬃ  cials do not pay much attention to initiatives coming 
from citizens, rating them as last on scale of priorities in the decision-making process. 
Civil consciousness of the majority about municipal authority, as well as public aware-
ness as such, is very low. While in theory municipal employees oﬀ er the right to each 
citizen to obtain information on local government aﬀ airs and the necessity to engage 
citizens in policy decisions at the municipal level, in practice they show a very low level 
of readiness for cooperation, not undertaking real actions to establish a system that 
engages citizens in the aﬀ airs of the local community. Th us, the municipal authority 
loses its basic social function.
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Besides limiting involvement in the process of local self-government, this situation 
becomes a source of additional negative tendencies. First, it can lead to a scenario where 
local bodies of the state government assume the powers of local self-government. Second, 
mayors accumulate undue authority, through which they can pursue their own private or 
business interests instead of meeting the needs of local citizens. Th ird, some social groups 
with access to the decision-making process in local self-government may pursue their 
own objectives that conﬂ ict with the interests of the rest of the local community.
Th e general view on the development of legislation on conﬂ ict of interest issues in 
Russian local self-government is that it is vague and not balanced. Most regulations on 
areas of potential conﬂ ict are covered in various legislative acts, and there are almost 
no speciﬁ c laws providing solutions for conﬂ icts of interest in public policy institu-
tions—nothing like the Latvian Law On Prevention of Conﬂ ict of Interest in Local 
Self-Government. Various federal and regional legislative acts may contain prohibitions 
and restrictions concerning the prevention of conﬂ ict situations in particular local govern-
ment activities. Having said that, one must admit that there are some eﬀ ective conﬂ ict 
of interest regulations, but they mostly apply to municipal employees working under 
labor contract, while the activities of elected oﬃ  cials are still unregulated by a legislative 
framework, and are subject to various, often contradicting interpretations. 
For instance, the issue of involvement of local government oﬃ  cials in business ac-
tivities is subject to strict regulations that apply to municipal employees. But since the 
Law “On the status of elected oﬃ  cials in local self government” has not been passed, 
currently there is no discussion of any regulations concerning involvement in business 
activities by councilors and elected mayors.
Institutional conﬂ ict of interest as conﬂ ict of competencies is quite frequent and 
poorly regulated in Russia. Right now it is obvious that the way to regulate the confu-
sion regarding competencies in Russia is not to create new regulations to replace current 
ones, but to amend existing regulations in order to eliminate overlap of competences.
Th ere are no special laws or normative guidelines devoted to regulating the misuse 
of municipal property. Th e list of restrictions on municipal employees contains an article 
on the misuse of inventory and technical equipment in municipal property, but there is 
no detailed regulation on property misuse for councilors and mayors, though they are 
still subject to general articles of the penal code dealing with theft and robbery.
An acute problem in Russian local self-government practice is a use of oﬃ  cial 
information by local self-government oﬃ  cials for personal gain. Th is issue is poorly 
regulated. Even in the area of public procurement, the penal code includes no sanctions 
on the misuse of conﬁ dential information. Th ere is a general understanding among 
diﬀ erent policy stakeholders that regulation on the use of oﬃ  cial information should 
be developed as soon as possible.
Conﬂ icts of interest in local self-governments in Russia remain signiﬁ cant obsta-
cles to social and economic reforms. In recent years, demands to modify the Russian 
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legislative system, to reduce the scale of conﬂ icts of interest in local self-governments, 
are growing, along with the need for guidance on ethical requirements and professional 
background of local self-government oﬃ  cials (both elected and appointed). It is no 
wonder that one of the major directions of the ongoing legislative reform of local gov-
ernance is the development of local government regulations that would help to create 
a more balanced and well designed conﬂ ict of interest prevention mechanism in the 
framework of Russian legislation.
NOTES
1 See federal Law No. 55-FZ.
2 Item 3 article #11 of federal Law No. 8-FZ “On the basis of municipal service...”
3 Art. 10.1 FZ-178.
4 Art. 12 FZ-178.
5 Art. 3 FZ-178.
6 Art. 8.4 FZ-161.
7 Th is chapter is based on the research of the regional “Information for Democracy Fund” (Fund 
INDEM, www.indem.ru, 2000).
8 www.indem.ru.
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Jaroslav Pilat
1.   INTRODUCTION
Th e Slovak Republic is a unitary state that was established in 1993 by dividing the Czech 
and Slovak Federal Republic. Since 1990, a so-called dual public administration has 
existed in Slovakia. Public administration is performed in a system of state administration 
and self-government. Local government was renewed in Slovakia in 1990, when the 
Slovak National Council1 approved Law No. 369/1990 Coll. Th rough that law, municipal 
government was created at the local level, and state administration was separated from 
self-government. 
Local state government is based on law No. 222/1996 Coll., which pertains to 
districts and regions. It creates a so-called integrated public administration implemented 
by district oﬃ  ces in the area of the competent districts (79) and regional oﬃ  ces in the 
area of the competent regions (eight). Besides this, local state administration is also 
exercised by the network of specialized agencies, e.g., tax oﬃ  ces, military service oﬃ  ces, 
etc. Special laws established these specialized agencies of local and state administration. 
Th e ministries are the central bodies of state administration, under whose authority the 
Antimonopoly Oﬃ  ce, Statistics Oﬃ  ce of the Slovak Republic, Civil Service Oﬃ  ce, and 
others belong. 
Local government2 has existed since 1991 at the municipal level, based on law No. 
369/1990 Coll. on the establishment of municipalities. By the year 2001, the system 
of local government was still incomplete, even though, since 1992, the Constitution 
of the Slovak Republic had anticipated in its articles that the second level of local 
government would be established. In the summer of 2001, Law No. 302/2001 Coll. 
was approved on the self-government of higher regional units (law on regional self-
governments). Th is created the second level of elected self-government. Th e law 
deﬁ nes eight self-governmental regions, following regional divisions, in which state 
administration is carried out. In December 2001, elections took place for the regional 
bodies of self-governments, and the process of creation of second-level institutions of 
local government in Slovakia was completed. Th e collective elected body at the state 
level is the National Council of the Slovak Republic, i.e., the Parliament. Th e head of 
the state is the president, who is elected by direct vote by the citizens. 
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Table 7.1
System of Public Bodies in the Slovak Republic
State Administration Local Self-Government
•  Ministers, other central administration bodies
•  Regional offices (8)
•  District offices (79)
•  Specialized agencies of state administration at the local level
•  Self governmental regions (8)
•  Municipalities/cities (2,891)
In the current system of local public administration, its representatives are also 
divided according to which self-government they represent. Accordingly, if they are 
representatives of local governments, they are elected or, in the case of representatives 
of state administration, they are appointed. 
Th e municipal/town council and the mayor function at the level of self-government. 
Th e citizens, under the respective self-governments, elect their own councilors, as well 
as mayors, by direct vote. At the level of regional self-governments the same applies; 
citizens living in the area of the self-government elect representatives (councilors) and 
the heads of regional self-governments by direct vote. 
In addition, there is a chief auditor at the self-government level. It is a signiﬁ cant 
position from the point of view of conﬂ icts of interest. Th e municipal council establishes 
the position of the chief auditor. Th e chief auditor is elected by the municipal council 
for a period of six years, and when the term is up, his employment relationship with the 
municipality ends. Th e chief auditor is a municipal employee and is accountable to the 
municipal council. Th e law determines some appointments that are incompatible with 
the post of municipal chief auditor, to prevent possible conﬂ icts of interest. 
Th e chief auditor is the employee of the regional self-government who supervises 
the fulﬁ llment of the regional self-government’s tasks. He supervises the revenues and 
expenditures of the self-government, along with property management and disposal.
We can consider the elected representatives of local self-governments and chief 
auditors as key players in possible conﬂ icts of interest. 
Legislation is diﬀ erent for employees of local public administrations and state 
administration oﬃ  cials. Employment in state administration is regulated by Law No. 
312/2001 Coll. on civil service. Th e subject of this law is to establish legal relations 
in civil service. Stipulations of this law on compensation, vacation days, and health 
insurance apply to senior political positions and to professionals assisting members of 
government, unless special laws specify otherwise. Th e law has also established the Civil 
Service Oﬃ  ce, which executes tasks in the area of civil service and publishes the Ethics 
Code, the rules of which civil servants are obliged to follow. 
President GovernmentParliament
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Law No. 313/2001 Coll. on public service regulates legal relations of self-govern-
ment employees. Th is law regulates public service and employment relations in public 
oﬃ  ce for employers that are legal entities, such as municipalities and regional self-gov-
ernments. Th is law covers public service activities and activities by employees in local 
self-governments. 
1.1 Recent History of Preventing Confl ict of Interest 
      in the Slovak Republic
Th e problem of conﬂ ict of interest in Slovakia was recognized for the ﬁ rst time in 
1992. At that time, the Slovak National Council adopted Law No. 314/1992 Coll. on 
some measures related to the protection of public interest. Th e law did not regulate 
adequately the problem of possible conﬂ icts of interest nor did it provide a solution. In 
addition, the law applied to conﬂ icts of interest only at the state level, but not at the 
level of local government. 
Th e Slovak Parliament tried to address the problem of conﬂ ict of interest for the 
second time in 1995, when constitutional Law No. 119/1995 Coll., on the prohibition 
of conﬂ ict of interest in positions for constitutional oﬃ  cials and higher state oﬃ  cials, 
was adopted. It is signiﬁ cant that this law was adopted in the form of a constitutional 
law that requires a 3/5 majority (90 votes), in compliance with the Constitution of the 
Slovak Republic. Th e MPs of Vladimir Meciar’s party (HZDS—movement for demo-
cratic Slovakia) in cooperation with MPs of post-communist Democratic Left Party 
(SDL) drafted this constitutional law. It seems that no one wanted to deal exhaustively 
with the problem of conﬂ ict of interest. 
Th e law applies only to 230 positions—a very low ﬁ gure. Th e law does not contain 
any sanctions, so a conﬂ ict of interest is not sanctioned in any way. Also, the law does 
not cover conﬂ ict of interest at the local level. Th e fact that no legal proceeding related to 
conﬂ ict of interest, or even the appearance of it, has been ﬁ led against any constitutional 
oﬃ  cial or higher state oﬃ  cial tells a lot about the eﬀ ectiveness of the law. 
In the last legislative attempt, a draft proposal for a new constitutional law on conﬂ ict 
of interest was submitted to Parliament in May 2002. Two other drafts for legislation, 
outlining amendments to this constitutional law have been submitted to Parliament. 
Th e proposals have been developed by two MPs, constitutional lawyers, in cooperation 
with a number of non-governmental experts. Th e proposals were more stringent and 
covered a wider circle of people (such as family members of oﬃ  cials), and, for the ﬁ rst 
time, they were applicable at the local level as well. Also for the ﬁ rst time, restrictions 
of post-employment activities were incorporated into the law. Th e law was to be in 
force before the elections in September 2002. MPs rejected the draft in the ﬁ rst round, 
perhaps due to its relative strictness, and consequently, Parliament has not dealt with 
the issue since. 
292
C O M B AT I N G  C O N F L I C T  O F  I N T E R E S T  I N  LO C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  T H E  C E E  C O U N T R I E S  • •  PA R T  I I
D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
Th e problem of conﬂ ict of interest in Slovakia is regulated by this law even more 
comprehensively than was proposed before. Th e government elected in 2002 included 
in its Program Declaration of the Government of the Slovak Republic the adoption 
of new legal regulations on conﬂ ict of interest. Th e minister of justice has created a 
working commission of representatives of constitutional oﬃ  cials, state administration, 
self-government and NGOs. Drafts for a new constitutional law were to be submitted 
to Parliament in 2003.
At present, legal provisions regulate conﬂ ict of interest at the level of local public 
administration through the institution of incompatibility of positions/appointments. 
Th ese provisions include the following laws: 
      •     No. 369/1990 Coll.—municipal law (applies to mayors, deputies of municipal 
council, and chief supervisors);
      •     No. 302/2001 Coll. on regional self-governments (applies to heads of regional 
self-governments, members of councils of regional self-governments, and chief 
auditors of self-governmental regions);
      •     No. 312/2001 Coll. on civil service (applies to district oﬃ  ce principals, regional 
oﬃ  ce principals, their deputies, and other employees of local state administration);
      •     No. 313/2001 Coll. on public service (applies to employees of municipal and 
regional self-governments).
Other laws that deal with the regulation of possible conﬂ ict of interest, and that 
could prevent or monitor conﬂ icts of interest and thereby contribute to a more open 
and transparent public administration, include: 
      •     No. 39/1993 Coll. on the Supreme Audit Oﬃ  ce; 
      •     No. 263/1999 Coll. on public procurement; 
      •     No. 411/2002 Coll. on the ombudsman;
      •     No. 291/2002 Coll. on the state treasury; 
      •     No. 211/2000 on a freedom of information act. 
1.2 General Regulation of Confl ict of Interest that Concerns 
      Civil Servants and Local Government Employees
Legal regulation adopted in 2001 has essentially speciﬁ ed the conditions of state and 
public service. More detailed legal regulations leave less space for non-transparent and 
illegal conduct that can result in conﬂ ict of interest. Article 53 of the law on civil service 
deﬁ nes the general duties of civil servants. Th ey include:
      1)   respect for the Constitution of Slovak Republic, constitutional laws, laws and 
other generally binding legal regulations that cover civil service, code of ethics 
and other regulations in civil service;
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      2)   impartial and politically neutral execution of civil service;
      3)   increasing requirements for qualiﬁ cation;
      4)   abstention from conduct and action leading to a conﬂ ict between public and 
private interests, primarily abstention from use of information acquired in public 
service for one’s own personal beneﬁ t or for another individual’s personal beneﬁ t; 
this obligation remains in eﬀ ect even after termination of oﬃ  ce;
      5)   ensuring that a civil servant’s political activity does not endanger public conﬁ -
dence in his/her ability to perform a public service impartially and eﬀ ectively; 
      6)   drawing oﬃ  cial attention to any real or possible conﬂ icts of interest;
      7)   abstention from any activities or conduct that could threaten a public oﬃ  cial’s 
integrity or that could threaten the public’s conﬁ dence in a civil servant’s im-
partiality in the decision-making process.
1.2.1   Civil Service Oﬃ  ce—Code of Ethics
Besides the duties assigned by law to civil servants, they are bound by the ethics code,3 
issued by the Civil Service Oﬃ  ce of the Slovak Republic based on the civil service law. 
Th e ethics code speciﬁ es some of the regulations of the law. Th e general duties of civil 
servants, according to the ethics code are the following:
      •     Civil servants are obliged to abstain from duties that could interfere with the 
integrity of the civil service.
      •     Civil servants must act professionally in performing their duties. Th eir decisions 
must be based on factual justiﬁ cation and must ensure equal treatment. Th ey 
must maintain the public’s conﬁ dence in their integrity. Th ey must carry out 
their duties at the highest professional level possible, and commit themselves 
to continuous professional study.
      •     In their interactions with the public, as well as with their co-workers or employees 
of other public service oﬃ  ces, civil servants have to display honesty, fairness, 
and proper conduct.
      •     Civil servants must always act in the public interest and are obliged to abstain 
from actions that could lead to conﬂ icts of interest between them and other civil 
servants, family relations, or other physical or legal entities. Th ey are obliged to 
announce any real or possible conﬂ ict of interest to their supervisor.
      •     Civil servants must not participate in any activity that could be in conﬂ ict with 
the proper execution of their oﬃ  cial duties.
      •     Civil servants must act in a politically neutral way and ensure competent per-
formance of public service.
      •     Civil servants must avoid activities that could shake public conﬁ dence in their 
abilities to execute their oﬃ  cial duties impartially.
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1.2.2   Public Service Law
Unlike the civil service law, public service law sets the general guidelines for local gov-
ernment employees. Th is law does not empower any institution to publish a document 
similar to the ethics code of the local self-government. Some of the general duties of 
public service employees include (article 9):
      •     act and make decisions impartially and avoid any actions in performing public 
service that could damage public conﬁ dence in one’s impartiality and objectivity 
in decision-making;
      •     avoid actions that could lead to a conﬂ ict between public and personal interests, 
namely the misuse of information acquired in oﬃ  ce for personal beneﬁ t or for 
the beneﬁ t of an individual related to the oﬃ  cial.
Besides this, the law deﬁ nes (in article 10) other duties related only to senior local 
government employees. It mostly covers concrete issues of an economic nature that we 
discuss below. 
1.3 Some Statistical Data about Corruption in Slovakia
According to oﬃ  cial criminal statistics, corruption is almost non-existent in Slovakia: 
Table 7.2
Number of People Prosecuted for, or Suspected of, Corruption in Slovakia4
Criminal offence 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
 P I P I P I P I* P I*
§ 160 Accepting bribes 23 13 35 16 28 13 44 63 18 27
§ 161 Giving/offering bribes 0 0 4 4 21 7 62 52 29 37
§ 162 Indirect corruption 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 5 3
P = number of people prosecuted
I = number of people indicted
I*= number of people indicted plus number of people convicted
 
Th is seems contradicted by numbers showing the percentage of respondents (i.e., 
the general public) who admitted having oﬀ ered bribes in the past years.5 According 
to the Institute for Public Opinion Research, Slovak Statistical Oﬃ  ce in 1997, 31.98 
percent of respondents admitted oﬀ ering money or gifts; in 1998—33.03 percent, 
1999—29.07 percent, in 2000—27.46 percent, in 2001—25.73 percent. 
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As we can see, the numbers are in decline, however slowly, as we see some progress. 
No doubt, this can also be attributed to new legal institutions established after 1998. 
Many of them are also connected to conﬂ ict of interest.
2.   POTENTIAL SOURCES OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
      IN THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
2.1 Duplication of Power, Confl ict of Roles, 
      Incompatibility of Positions
Th e Constitution of the Slovak Republic deﬁ nes incompatibility of positions for the 
president of the republic, MPs, members of the government, judges, and prosecutors; 
Th e issue is also addressed in the law on monitoring government activities in the central 
state administration, the laws on ombudsmen, the police corps, the Slovak Intelligence 
Service, etc. But all these legal regulations concern the incompatibility of positions only 
at the central level (e.g., president, MPs, the government), as well as conﬂ icts between 
independent agencies established by special laws (judges, prosecutors, etc.).
Th e Slovak Republic is now in the process of decentralizing public administration, 
but the country still has a predominance of central administrative agencies over self-
governmental bodies. Th is is manifest in the number of bodies and the range of com-
petencies, but also in the number of employees. Th at is the reason we discuss local state 
administration ﬁ rst.
Rules on the incompatibility of positions are contained in acts that regulate conditions 
for local self-government. Based on article 11, paragraph 2 of the municipal law, the 
position of a councilor of the municipal council is incompatible with the position of 
mayor, employment by the municipality where he/she was elected, or membership in 
the statutory body of a budgetary organization or a subodinate agency created by the 
same municipality.
Based on article 13, paragraph 3 of the municipal law, the position of municipal/city 
mayor is incompatible with the position of representative in the municipal council, 
employment by the same municipality, the statutory body of a budgetary organization 
or of a subordinate organization created by the same municipality, head of a self-
governmental region, or executive of a state administration body. 
Th e law states incompatibility between the position of a municipal mayor and 
the position of a senior employee of state administration body. Th is is not an absolute 
incompatibility, it is only based on the provisions of this law. Civil service law has 
extended this incompatibility. 
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In this case (and also in case of councilors) the legal principle lex priori derogat lex 
posteriori applies, so a later law modiﬁ ed a previously adopted one. As of now, the civil 
service law has been in eﬀ ect since 2001, and the municipal law since 1990, both stating 
that the position of mayor is incompatible with any positions in civil service. 
Based on article 13, paragraph 1, the position of a regional council representative 
is incompatible with the position of head of a self-government region, member of a 
legal entity created or established by the regional self-government, employee of regional 
self-government a judge, prosecutor, etc. Th is law does not regulate the incompatibility 
of positions of a representative of a regional self-governmental council with a position 
in the civil service; it only states that the issue is regulated by the rulings of the civil 
service law. 
Based on the same law on regional self-governments, and other laws, the position 
of the head of the regional self-government is incompatible with the position of a 
representative of a municipal council, a member of a legal entity created and established 
by the regional self-government, statutory representative of a legal entity with property 
interest of the regional self-government, an employee of regional self-government, 
municipal mayor or city mayor. Since incompatibility with positions in civil service is 
not regulated, the rulings of the civil service law apply here. 
In this issue, the general rule explained above applies. Slovakia is still in the process 
of decentralization of public administration, consequently, the dominance of civil 
service is prevalent. Th is is one of the reasons why, years ago, lawmakers did not consider 
it necessary to regulate the issue of incompatibility between positions in self-government 
and in the central government. Th e intervention of the government in a centralized 
state is considered normal and necessary. As the process of decentralization moves 
forward, these legal relations become regulated speciﬁ cally and in detail. 
           
                              
2.2 Economic Confl ict of Interest
2.2.1   Th e Acceptance of Gifts
“Gifts” can be (and often are) the motivation behind non-transparent actions. Th ey are 
given to receive special treatment, advantages, or permits, or to hide or give incomplete 
information, etc. Th ese issues were not regulated until April 2001, when civil service 
and public service laws brought detailed regulation of this set of problems. 
Public service law regulates the problem of acceptance/non-acceptance of gifts by 
employees in local self-government. In our case, the ruling applies not only to “ordinary” 
employees of local self-government, but also to the municipal chief auditor and chief 
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auditors in regional self-governments. Th e law applies to oﬃ  cials in municipalities and 
regional self-government.
Article 9 contains the following ruling: 
“the employee is obliged to refuse any gifts and other advantages except 
for gifts and advantages oﬀ ered by the employer.” 
No document similar to a code of ethics has been issued for public service adminis-
tration and no authority exists to issue one. However, based on art. 11, the employer can 
adopt working procedures in which it can further specify rulings of the relevant law (with-
in the framework of the legal system). Based on the law, these working procedures have 
to be implemented with the approval of  the labor force, otherwise it is not valid. 
As far as mayors, respective heads of regional self-governments, and councilors of 
local self-government councils are concerned, neither the municipal law, nor the law 
on regional self-government, contain any rulings on the acceptance or refusal of gifts by 
persons in these positions. Th e laws only contain a vow for people to take when assum-
ing oﬃ  ce. Oﬃ  cials have to pledge that they will carry out their duties in the interest of 
the municipality or regional self-government. Th ey pledge to follow the Constitution 
of the Slovak Republic, its laws, etc., but since these laws do not expressly forbid the 
acceptance of gifts, oﬃ  cials are constrained only by the interest of the municipality or 
regional self-government. 
2.2.2   Th e Possibility to Run a Business 
Another area where conﬂ ict of interest can and does appear is the possibility of running 
a business while being an employee of an administration, or an elected member in local 
self-government.
Th e rights and responsibilities of local self-government employees are regulated 
by public service law. Th is law outlines the duties of a public service employee only in 
general terms, in the rulings of article 9. Among others they include: 
      •     keeping conﬁ dential information acquired in public service; conﬁ dential infor-
mation cannot be shared with persons related to a supervisor, even after oﬃ  ce 
term has ended, unless special rulings allow it;
      •     use of information acquired in public service for one’s own personal beneﬁ t, or 
for the beneﬁ t of anybody connected to the oﬃ  cial. 
From the content of these rulings we could draw these conclusions: employees in 
senior positions in public service should not run a business or be involved in someone 
else’s business enterprise. Such behavior can lead to conﬂ ict of interest, e.g., to the use 
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of conﬁ dential information. Th e law allows administrative organizations to adopt their 
own procedures that regulate involvement in private enterprises. In article 10, the law 
contains special rulings for senior employees:
 “Senior employees in the position of statutory deputy of employer 
listed in article 1 paragraph 1, and other senior employees assigned 
by working procedure, cannot run a business or perform any income 
generating and simultaneously be a member of the executive, control 
and supervising bodies of legal entities involved in business activities. 
Prohibition of membership in executive, controlling and supervising 
bodies of legal entities managing an enterprise does not apply to senior 
employees in the position of statutory representative of public high 
school (or university). Th e restriction to perform any other earning 
activity does not apply to providing health care in state and regional 
health institutions established by the municipality; to scientiﬁ c activities, 
teaching, holding lectures, public speaking, PR activities, literary and 
artistic activities, activities of intermediary and arbitrator and collective 
negotiations, the administration of own estate or the estate of one’s own 
underage children.” 
Working as a professional interpreter is allowed for civil servants only when it is 
performed for the court or another state body or municipality. Th is is similar to the 
regulation applying to civil service employees. Rulings concerning executive positions 
at municipalities and regional self-governments also apply to chief auditors. 
Th e government of the Slovak Republic appoints principals to regional state admin-
istration bodies and district state administration oﬃ  ces based on the law on local state 
administration management (No. 222/1996 Coll.). Based on article 5, paragraph 4 of 
the civil service law, oﬃ  cials can also be appointed to these positions by the national 
government. Other rulings of the civil service law apply to principals of regional or district 
oﬃ  ces. And ﬁ nally, article 5, paragraph 5 of the civil service law regulates compensation, 
vacation, and health insurance for political appointees. It is clear that any prohibitions 
and restrictions listed in the civil service law do not apply to the highest oﬃ  ce holders 
of local state administration at the regional or district level! 
For example, the principal of a district oﬃ  ce, who is the primary representative of the central 
government in a small region, has been appointed by the government based on political 
considerations. He has access to reliable, important and timely information, yet he can run a 
business without any restrictions, and he can be a member of the board of several enterprises. 
Th is is fertile ground for conﬂ ict of interest. 
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2.2.3   Running a Business as an Elected Oﬃ  cial
Th e municipal law and the law on regional self-governments regulate business activities 
by councilors of municipal and regional self-government councils, mayors, and heads 
of regional self-governments. 
Municipal law regulates incompatibility issues for councilors and mayors. Anyone 
who meets the requirements described in the law can be a candidate for the position of 
mayor and council representative. Th e prohibition on owning or managing a business 
is not among those requirements. In addition, the law does not even prohibit owning 
or managing a business for those who have been elected and have taken oﬃ  ce. 
Th e position of municipal council representative is incompatible with the position of:
      •     mayor;
      •     employee of municipality in which he was elected;
      •     employee of statutory body of budgetary or tax authority established by the 
municipality in which he was elected;
      •     employee of an organization based on the special law. 
It is noticeable that the law only forbids councilors to participate in bodies of munici-
pal budgetary or tax authorities. Running a business or the membership or employment 
in legal entities engaged in business management (excluding the municipal budgetary 
or tax authorities) are allowed by the law. In Slovakia, this situation could impede self-
governmental activity. Slovakia has 2,883 municipalities, and only 138 of them have city 
status. If businessmen were prohibited by law to participate in self-government admin-
istrations in small municipalities, i.e., villages (the majority of settlements in Slovakia), 
self-governments may be paralyzed in many places. Representatives can receive their 
mandate only after pledging to perform their duties in the interest of the municipality. 
Th is could cover the problem of public service and running a business simultaneously, 
even though it is clear, that regulations in this respect are too vague. 
Restrictions on post-employment activities are not covered explicitly by Slovakia’s 
legal system. Th ere was an eﬀ ort to get this issue incorporated into the draft law on 
conﬂ ict of interest in May 2002, but the draft was not passed by the Parliament.
2.2.4   Other Provisions Preventing Economic Conﬂ ict of Interest
Public service law sets some restrictions for local self-government employees, which one 
can interpret as post-employment restrictions. Th ese restrictions are outlined in article 
9, paragraph 2 letter b): 
“Th e employee is obliged to keep conﬁ dential information acquired 
in his oﬃ  cial duties. He has to keep the information conﬁ dential even 
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after employment has ended. Th is rule does not apply if the employee 
was relieved of his duty by statutory body or delegated executive unless 
special instruction states otherwise.”
Th is is the only regulation that sets some restrictions on oﬃ  cials whose employ-
ment has ended.
Th is ruling applies to the chief auditor of the municipality, the chief auditor of 
regional self-government and also to other employees of the local self-government (e.g., 
directors of oﬃ  ces, etc.) based on the law covering their employment. But none of these 
restrictions apply to executives of district and regional state administrations. 
2.3 Confl ict of Interest of Personal Relations
Th e principle guiding elected oﬃ  cials (councilors of self-government councils, mayors 
and heads of regional self-governments) is clear. If the candidate for an oﬃ  ce fulﬁ lls 
the conditions required by law, he/she can run in the election. Once elected, the 
oﬃ  cial assumes the mandate by ﬁ rst making an oﬃ  cial pledge regulated by several laws 
on local self-government. 
Th e mandate of an oﬃ  cial ﬁ nishes when a newly elected oﬃ  cial of local self-govern-
ment takes the pledge. 
Th e regulations of public service law cover working relations of other employees of 
local self-government. Furthermore, the regulations of the Labor Code apply to work-
ing relations of employees of local self-governments unless civil service law regulations 
have diﬀ erent stipulations. 
Based on this law, the employee could be a physical entity who:
      •     has the competence to perform legal activities in his ﬁ eld;
      •     has no criminal record; this is not required if the employee is to perform manual 
work or his responsibilities will be dominated by physical work;
      •     meets the qualiﬁ cations required for the position, unless it is stated diﬀ erently 
(see below);
      •     is of sound health to perform the work required;
      •     was elected or appointed, if special instruction sets the election or appointment 
as a pre-condition of public service; 
      •     makes a required pledge of conduct, unless speciﬁ c rules pertaining to the posi-
tion state otherwise (see below);
      •     has a canonical mission set by the bishop of the respective diocese to perform 
pedagogic activities.
Having no criminal record means that the person has not been convicted for any 
willful act, proof of which is a police statement.
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Levels of education qualiﬁ cation for the purpose of this law are:
      •     basic (elementary) education;
      •     secondary education or secondary expert education (“secondary education”);
      •     complete secondary education or complete secondary expert education (“sec-
ondary education”);
      •     higher, professional education;
      •     university education with a bachelor degree (“university education of ﬁ rst level”),
      •     university education with a master’s degree or a PhD or doctoral diploma.
In the catalogue, the qualifying pre-conditions are listed for several working activi-
ties, which are elaborated in accordance with the pertinent income bracket.
Th e positions of executive employees are ﬁ lled based on the results of a selection 
process, unless special instructions state diﬀ erently. Th e required qualiﬁ cations and 
professional experience of a candidate for the position of executive employee is veriﬁ ed 
by this selection process. Th e selection process disregards the candidate’s sex, race, skin 
color, faith, religion, political aﬃ  liation, or views, their national or social background, 
or citizenship. 
Th e selection process is announced by the employer in print and other generally 
accessible mass media at least three weeks in advance. 
A selection committee is established by the employer. Th e committee has ﬁ ve 
members, one of them is appointed by the employees. If an appointed member of the 
selection committee is biased, he must make an announcement of this fact to other 
members of the commission. 
Th e selection committee invites suitable candidates to participate at least seven 
days before it starts the proceedings. Th e selection committee evaluates the results and 
rates the candidates. Awarding of positions is based on this committee’s rating. Th e 
selection committee publishes the results of the selection process, as well as the pre-
conditions, criteria and other requirements fulﬁ lled by the candidates. Th e selection 
committee will notify the candidates in written form of the result no later than 10 days 
after completing the selection process. If the selection committee has not chosen any 
of the candidates for the announced executive position, the employer will announce a 
new selection proceeding. 
Based on this law, it is possible to appoint a substitute executive for up to six months. 
Th e executive is obliged to make an oﬃ  cial commitment in writing at the time of sign-
ing the contract of employment. 
Th e law determines restrictions related to so-called close ties. Close ties are deﬁ ned 
in article 116 of the Civil Code: 
“Close tie is a relative in the ﬁ rst degree, brother or sister, a spouse; 
other persons in family or of similar status are considered as close 
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relations if damage caused to one of them will be perceived by the other 
as his/her own damage.”
According to the special instructions, employees that are closely related cannot work 
in a hierarchy when one depends ﬁ nancially or in any accounting sense on the other, 
except for employees of embassies of the Slovak Republic abroad. Th ese regulations are 
designed to prevent the potential for non-transparent management of funds. 
2.4 Using Offi cial Information for Personal Benefi t
In laws regulating the establishment and position of elected bodies, there is no mention 
of the use of oﬃ  cial information. Th e laws concerning mayors, heads of regional self-gov-
ernments, and councilors of the self-government council do not cover conﬁ dentiality or 
guidelines for the management of classiﬁ ed information. Th e basic principle mentioned 
in the law is an obligation to perform one’s duties to the beneﬁ t of the municipality, 
city, or regional self-government. 
In addition, special law No. 241/2002 Coll. deﬁ nes the management of certain kinds 
of information. Th is law names the National Security Oﬃ  ce as the highest authority 
for classiﬁ ed information management. Th e law distinguishes four categories of special 
information: top secret, secret, conﬁ dential, and prohibited. Th e law also regulates who 
has access to special information. Th is applies to mayors, heads of regional self-govern-
ments, and representatives of local self-government councils. Anyone in the possession 
of classiﬁ ed information has to submit the list to the National Security Oﬃ  ce. Th e Of-
ﬁ ce evaluates this list and classiﬁ es it appropriately. Depending on the classiﬁ cation, the 
oﬃ  ce sets the relevant procedure for management of the information. Th e relevant 
guidelines also assign a person who is allowed to handle that particular kind of classiﬁ ed 
information: on the state level the assigned executive, in a municipality the mayor, in 
other legal entities its statutory body. 
Th e law determines sanctions for the misuse of classiﬁ ed information. Persons 
violating the law can be ﬁ ned up to 50,000 SKK (approx. USD1,333), other related 
activity can be stopped; minor mishandling of classiﬁ ed information can be ﬁ ned up to 
15,000 SKK (approx. USD400) for smaller misdemeanors; more serious misconduct, 
such as photographing classiﬁ ed documents, can be ﬁ ned up to 50,000 SKK (approx. 
USD1,333). Th ere is also a related criminal oﬀ ence, deﬁ ned by the Criminal Code, 
that covers breaching state, military or other types of conﬁ dentiality.
Th ere is also a sanction deﬁ ned by the Criminal Code in article 128 concerning the 
use of oﬃ  cial classiﬁ ed information for commercial reasons: 
“A person commits a criminal oﬀ ence if he intentionally uses informa-
tion not available to the general public for one’s own beneﬁ t or someone 
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else’s related to him, and he obtained [this information] through his 
employment, profession, position, or function. If he publishes or uses 
this information to inﬂ uence a decision in a commercial transaction, 
or to obtain a contract or inﬂ uence the trading of shares of goods and 
services, he commits a crime.”
Public service law applies primarily to persons who are in a working relationship 
with the local self-governmental authority. Th e law regulating the duties of employees 
in public oﬃ  ce contains general principles that could also be applied to the issue of 
conﬁ dentiality. Of course, in their oﬃ  cial duties, public servants have access to people’s 
private data, which they need to perform their work (law No. 428/2002 Coll. on per-
sonal data security). Due to this circumstance, this law binds them to keep information 
conﬁ dential. Article 9, paragraph 2, letter b) deﬁ nes the obligation to keep conﬁ dential 
information acquired in the performance of oﬃ  cial duties. Th e law also covers conﬁ -
dentiality after the termination of employment. 
Th e reasons for the obligation of conﬁ dentiality in local public service are mostly the 
same as in state service. Th e rules described in connection with conﬁ dential information 
are applicable in the area of state administration as well.
On the other hand, the Slovak legal system contains Law No. 211/2002 Coll. on free 
access to information (FOIA—Freedom Of Information Act).6 Th at law allows all physi-
cal persons and legal entities to access information managed by authorized oﬃ  cials. 
Th e authorized entities include all state agencies, administrations of regional self-
governments, municipalities, legal entities established by law, or state agencies and 
bodies of regional and municipal self-government and physical entities. In essence it is 
possible to ask information from anybody who is in any way connected to public funds. 
Of course, the basic principle of this law is “what is not classiﬁ ed is public.” 
On one hand, the law provides for authorized persons to make all information at 
their disposal accessible, but on the other hand, classiﬁ ed information, personal data, 
banking, tax data, and commercial secrets have to be protected, so keeping information 
classiﬁ ed in the interest of society (but based on law) surpasses the public’s “right to 
know.” From this point of view, the obligation of conﬁ dentiality mandated by the civil 
service and public service law is not absolute, because several state and self-governmental 
bodies, and their authorized employees, are obliged to provide the information based 
on the FOIA. 
2.5 Using Local Government Property
Th e municipal law and the law on regional self-governments only contain a general 
framework on property belonging to local self-governments. Detailed regulations con-
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cerning, among other things, the use of automobiles and technical equipment owned 
by municipalities and regional self-governments, are contained in several statutes or 
ordinances with a lower status than laws approved by self-government councils. 
Besides laws already mentioned, there are special laws that regulate municipal prop-
erty (law No. 138/1991 Coll. on municipal property) and regional self-government 
property (law No. 446/2001 Coll. on regional property of self-governments).
Th e municipal law states the following on property issues: 
“Municipal properties are things in ownership of a municipality and 
property rights belong to the municipality. Th e property of a munici-
pality serves to fulﬁ ll municipal activities. Th e municipal property has 
to increase and revalue and in general stay unreduced in its total value. 
It is not allowed to give municipal real estate as a gift, unless special 
instructions state otherwise. Municipal property can be used for public 
purposes only, to serve the municipal self-government. Th e municipal 
property (mostly local communications and public places) must be 
publicly accessible and available to be used in common ways, if the 
municipality has not restricted its use.” 
From this it is clear that the law does not contain details, for example, on how to 
run a business with municipal property, conditions for the use of municipal property for 
municipal self-government purposes, etc. Th ese issues are handled by individual munici-
palities, which are legal entities with full ownership rights, at their own discretion.
Th e law on municipal property determines conditions on municipal property and the 
transfer of state property to municipal ownership—an issue that was important during 
the time this law was adopted, when municipal ownership was renewed and property of 
relatively great value was shifted from state ownership to municipal ownership. Th e law 
also sets basic guidelines for the management of municipal property, and the standards 
approved by municipal councils have to be in accordance with these guidelines. 
Municipal bodies and organizations are obliged to manage municipal property and 
state property entrusted to them for the beneﬁ t of municipal development and in the 
interest of citizens. Th eir primary obligations include:
      •     maintenance and use of property;
      •     protection of property from harm, damage, loss, and abuse;
      •     the use of all legal measures to protect the property, including representing its 
rights and legal interests;
      •     accounting for the property based on special instructions.
Th e basic property management principles are outlined in article 9. Th e municipal 
property management principles include:
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      •     rights and duties of organizations established or created by the municipality in 
the management of municipal property;
      •     conditions for conﬁ scation of property of organizations established or created 
by the municipality;
      •     the guidelines for use of property;
      •     management of stocks;
      •     identifying activities of organizations to be approved by municipal bodies. 
Th e following activities are always subject to approval of the municipal council:
      •     contractual transfer of real estate ownership;
      •     contractual transfer of moveable property valued over the limit deﬁ ned by the 
municipal council;
      •     property rights management of a determined value;
      •     auction of issues based on special instructions;
      •     real estate ownership in new or existing commercial companies;
      •     ownership of any other property not covered by a previous clause, of value 
determined by the municipal council.
Th e municipality can abandon the enforcement of municipal property rights only 
in cases outlined in the guidelines for municipal property management. It is clear that 
the elected representatives of municipalities are obliged to follow the regulations of this 
law and regulations of their own municipal guidelines approved in this area.
Th e public service law, which determines the rights and responsibilities of local self-
government employees, contains regulations for the liability of employees. Th e liable 
employee is obliged to compensate the employer for the damage ﬁ nancially, unless he 
restores the property to its previous status. Th e employee who is responsible for missing 
funds entrusted to him is liable to pay full compensation for the loss or shortfall. 
Th e employer is obliged to require of the employee to make compensation for 
the harm he is responsible for. Th is obligation follows directly from the law, and the 
employee cannot be pardoned by the employer without giving due compensation for 
damage caused. Th e duties listed in this section apply to municipal self-government 
employees, as well as to employees of regional self-governments. 
A law on regional self-governments, involvement in property ownership and man-
agement is very brief:
“Regional self-government property serves to fulﬁ ll the mission of the 
regional self-governments. Th e special law regulates regional self-govern-
ment property and its management.”
Act No. 446/2001 Coll. on regional self-government property is essentially a law 
similar to the one on municipal property. But since regional self-governments were 
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established 11 years after municipalities, state property transferred to regional self-gov-
ernments was signiﬁ cantly smaller. In essence, it is property that is connected to the 
transfer of functions from state authority to the authority of regional self-governments, 
in the process of  decentralization. Of course, what interested us in this ﬁ eld was the 
basic principles of property management by regional self-governments.
Th e property of regional self-governments consists of real estate and moveable prop-
erty, including ﬁ nancial funds, as well as claims and other property rights and obligations 
in the ownership of higher regional units. Regional self-governments and their executives 
are obliged to manage the estate of regional self-governments in the best interest of the 
administration and its citizens, as well as to protect the environment. 
Regional self-governments and their executives are in charge of:
      •     maintenance and use of property;
      •     protecting the property from harm, damage, loss, and misuse;
      •     using all legal measures to protect the property, including representing its in-
terests before the relevant authorities;
      •     accounting for the property based on special instructions.
Th e regional self-government and its leader are obliged to manage the property based 
on this law and in accordance with management guidelines approved by its council. 
Th e guidelines primarily regulate:
      •     rights and duties of administrators;
      •     the conditions for conﬁ scation of self-government property;
      •     the guidelines and conditions of the use of property by a third party;
      •     areas of activities of the administrator to be approved by the council;
      •     setting the property value with the approval of the council. 
Th e following activities are always subject to approval by the council:
      •     contractual transfer of real estate owned by the regional self-government;
      •     contractual transfer of movable property of acertain value determined by relevant 
guidelines;
      •     sharing real estate owned by self-governments in new or existing commercial 
enterprises;
      •     property of regional self-governments, in new or existing commercial enterprises, 
of a certain value determined by relevant guidelines;
      •     management of property rights of certain value determined by relevant guidelines 
by regional self-governments.
We can consider the basic rules for using local government property as satisfactory. 
Furthermore, there are a number of sub-legal regulations that set detailed rules for, 
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among others, use of property such as cars. Th e municipal/regional self-government 
council can authorize the use of a car, in some cases a chauﬀ eured car, for the mayor/head 
of regional self-governments. Th is depends on individual needs and, of course, on the 
responsible conduct of the councilors. Since information on these measures is open to 
the public, we can say that, with some exceptions, these regulations have become more 
detailed and more resistant to misconduct.7 
2.6 Government Employee Involvement in Political Party Activities
Th ere are several important constitutional rulings in this ﬁ eld. Engaging in any politi-
cal party’s activities is among the basic human and citizen rights and liberties, so we 
must start with the constitutional ruling on this area. According to article 54 of the 
Constitution of the Slovak Republic:8
Th e law can restrict the right of judges and prosecutors to run a busi-
ness and any other economic activity, as well as the right listed in article 
29, paragraph 2 (right to found political parties and to be a member in 
them), and the right listed in article 37, paragraph 4 on civil servants 
and local self-government employees in appointed positions (...) (article 
37, paragraph 4 guarantees the right to strike).
Article 54 makes it clear that the Constitution of the Slovak Republic provides 
the possibility to restrict by law the right guaranteed primarily in article 29, such as 
the right to establish and join political parties. Th is does not pertain to elected self-
government oﬃ  cials, since their election is the result of their political activities and 
aﬃ  liation. Of course, this is not a required condition for occupying a position. Th e 
Constitution of the Slovak Republic covers employees of the state administration and 
local self-governments, while elected self-governmental oﬃ  cials (except for chief auditors 
of municipality/regional self-governments) are not paid employees of the municipality/
regional self-government. Th e law on public service regulates the rights and duties of 
employees in this area.
We have already quoted provisions of article 9 that regulate the duties of public 
service employees. As for political involvement of public service employees, this article 
does not provide more speciﬁ c regulation. Paragraph 2 letter a) says the following:
“…Th e employee is obliged to act and decide impartially and avoid 
in public service everything that could threaten the conﬁ dence in the 
impartiality and objectivity of his actions and decidions.”
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Th is provision also states that the political aﬃ  liation of an employee or other per-
sons he comes in touch with during his activities cannot be an obstacle of impartial and 
correct fulﬁ llment of his duties. 
Th is is very similar to the position of principals of district and regional oﬃ  ces. Since 
they are appointed by government based on the results of parliamentary elections, their 
political activity for a concrete political subject is indirectly expected. In practice, the 
number of places occupied in this way is based on the election results and government 
coalition composition. Th e occupation of speciﬁ c regional/district oﬃ  ces is then a ques-
tion of political agreements and negotiations in the national government coalition. Th e 
people in these positions are civil servants in accordance with the civil service law. But 
this law obliges them only in matters of remuneration (salaries), holidays, and health 
insurance.9
3.   INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES TO PREVENT 
      AND DETECT CONFLICT OF INTEREST
3.1 Declaration of Private Property
Th e problem of declaration of private property by “publicly active” persons is handled 
insuﬃ  ciently in Slovakia’s legal environment. Constitutional act No. 119/1995 Coll. 
on conﬂ ict of interest sets this duty for state administration oﬃ  cials and constitutional 
oﬃ  cials. Th e hidden ﬂ aw of this law is that there are no sanctions for persons who do 
not fulﬁ ll their duty to ﬁ le the declaration on private property to the Commission of 
National Council of the Slovak Republic.
Th ere is no obligation to ﬁ le a declaration on private property mandated by any law 
for councillors of self-government councils, mayors, or the heads of regional self-govern-
ments. Only the draft of the new constitutional act on conﬂ ict of interest contains this 
obligation, but it was not approved in May 2002. Should anybody in an elected position 
decide to publicly ﬁ le a property declaration, it would be due to his/her good will. 
Not every employee in public service is obliged to submit a property declaration. 
Public service covers a wider range of professions, and often it would be unreasonable to 
ask employees to ﬁ le a property declaration. Th erefore, the public service law prescribes 
this obligation only for executive employees in article 10, paragraph 2. Th e executive 
employee is obliged to ﬁ le a declaration on his/her property within 30 days after tak-
ing oﬃ  ce, and then by March 31 of every calendar year while in oﬃ  ce. Th e executive 
employees occupying positions of statutory deputy declare their property relationships 
in accordance with the applicable law (which is in this case the civil service law) to 
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the appointing agency. If this body ﬁ nds that the statutory deputy ﬁ led incomplete or 
untruthful data, the agency must relieve the deputy of their oﬃ  ce.
Other executive employees submit their property declarations, in accordance with 
the applicable law (once again the civil service law), to the statutory deputy. Submitting 
incomplete or untruthful data may be reason for termination of oﬃ  ce, based on the 
applicable law (in this case the law No. 311/2001 Coll. Labor Code).
According to related provisions of the Civil Service Law applying to executive em-
ployees of local self-governments, the obligation to declare private property states:
“…all property declarations of civil servants must contain data on real 
estate, movable property, and property rights and other property values. 
Th e real estate is not subject to evaluation. Th e civil servant evalu-
ates his/her movable estate, property rights and other property values 
according to the commonly accepted price. Th is property will be listed in 
the property declaration only when its total value is over 500,000 SKK 
(approximately USD12,085). Community property is, according to 
this law, divided in the same parts, unless special instruction determine 
otherwise. Part of civil servant property declaration is also a declaration 
by the civil servant that he/she does not have any knowledge of income 
of persons living with him/her in common household that could be 
considered as pre-tax income or income stemming from illegal resources. 
Purposeful declaration of incomplete or false data is considered a serious 
oﬀ ense, which could entail the termination of employment. 
   If there are reasonable doubts as to the truthfulness of declared data, 
the civil servant is obliged to submit the data on legal reasons, date 
and cost of acquisition of real estate; the expenditures on the property 
acquisition; and data on movable property, property rights and other 
property values whose total value is less than 500,000 SKK (approxi-
mately USD12,085)...”
As mentioned before, provisions on the procedure for property declaration are 
provided by the civil service law and the public service law. 
It must be noted here that the constitutional act regulating conﬂ ict of interest at 
the level of higher state oﬃ  cials is extremely weak and diﬃ  cult to onforce. On the one 
hand, the law determines the obligation to submit a property declaration within a 
certain period of time or by a certain date, on the other hand, it does not contain any 
sanctions for non-ﬁ ling. 
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In Slovakia we have a very recent case of non-declaration by Vladimir Meciar, a member 
of parliament and former three-time Prime Minister. Th is MP did not submit his property 
declaration, despite the fact that he publicly vowed to respect the Constitution and the laws 
of the Slovak Republic. He did not fulﬁ ll this duty in spite of several appeals. Th e chairman 
of the parliamentary committee to whom property declarations are submitted extended the 
deadline for Meciar. Meciar has ﬁ nally submitted it, but he was the last constitutional of-
ﬁ cial who did so. It was impossible to compel him through any legal sanction to fulﬁ ll his 
obligation. And in his case the suspicion has arisen that he has undeclared income related to 
his expensively renovated house that he did not declare. Th e law does not say anything about 
veriﬁ cation of submitted data. It is necessary to add that the law is the product of Meciar’s 
MPs, along with MPs of post-communist Democratic Left Party (SDĽ). In 1995, during 
the worst period of Meciar’s governance, “they demonstrated the possibility of cooperation 
between coalition and opposition” through cooperation on this law.
Author’s note: March 31, 2003 was the last day for the constitutional and high-ranking 
oﬃ  cials to submit their property declaration again (annual submission). Th e only oﬃ  cial who 
did not do it was Meciar. He announced through the mass media that he requested guarantees 
that no one gets access to his property declaration. Th e head of the relevant Committee of 
National Council of the Slovak Republic compared that to submitting tax declaration only 
after having such a guarantee; the only diﬀ erence between these two cases are that common 
citizens, who do not submit a tax declaration, will be arrested, but there is no sanction for 
an oﬃ  cial not submitting the property declaration.
Th e proposed constitutional law on conﬂ ict of interest regulated all these issues. 
Th e obligation to submit a property declaration would also relate to persons of close 
relationship. Th e proposal imposed post-employment restrictions (limitations) and was 
stricter than the adopted version. Th is was the main reason why the proposal was not 
adopted. 
Furthermore, the Slovak legal procedure does not contain any provisions that protect 
those members/employees of local governments who call attention to illegal actions 
and other misbehavior. In general, Slovak law provides for the institution of protected 
witnesses used in important cases, but it is mostly used in cases such as organized 
crime activities, extortion, murders, and similarly serious crimes. No court has applied 
the witness protection program in cases such as corruption, bribery, or other property 
crimes. Th ere have been attempts to establish a “whistleblower act.” A few discussions 
have been organized but nothing more has happened.
3.2 Regulations of the Criminal Code
Slovak criminal law recognizes some criminal oﬀ ences related to public service, and 
these laws are used more and more. In all cases, the following provisions of the Criminal 
Code are applied:
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      •     Th e criminal oﬀ ence of abuse of public authority (§ 158). 
            Th e public oﬃ  cial commits a criminal oﬀ ence if he purposefully causes harm 
to somebody; draws improper beneﬁ ts for himself or a person related to him 
while performing oﬃ  cial duties; violates regulations; or does not fulﬁ ll his 
obligations. 
      •     Th e criminal oﬀ ence of fraud (§ 250). 
            Any oﬃ  cial who enriches himself or somebody else related to him by causing 
damage to foreign property, or by misleading or misinforming others and thereby 
causing damage to foreign property, commits this criminal oﬀ ence.
      •     Th e criminal oﬀ ence of misuse of information in commercial activities (§ 128). 
            Any oﬃ  cial who uses conﬁ dential information not available to the general public 
for his own beneﬁ t or the beneﬁ t of someone related to him, whether using it to 
inﬂ uence a decision on contract negotiations with a commercial enterprise, or 
to inﬂ uence awarding a contract to a commercial enterprise or to assist others 
to do so, or to inﬂ uence the trading of stocks commits this criminal oﬀ ence. 
      •     Th e criminal oﬀ ence of accepting bribes or other unfair advantage (§ 160). 
            Any oﬃ  cial who directly or through a middleman asks for or accepts for himself 
or someone related to him a bribe or other unfair advantage to abuse his oﬃ  ce, 
or to secure a position or to give preference to a candidate for a position over 
others commits this criminal oﬀ ence. 
      •     Th e criminal oﬀ ence of illegal use of personal data (§ 178). 
            Any oﬃ  cial who publishes or makes available conﬁ dential information acquired 
through his oﬃ  ce on personal data of a citizen commits this criminal oﬀ ence. 
Every provision of the Criminal Code relates to a certain form of illegal activity by 
public service employees as well. Even if some provisions apply indirectly to conﬂ ict of 
interest, they can be used in cases of suspicion of conﬂ ict of interest, despite the fact 
that explicit legal provisions do not exist. Otherwise it is possible to apply some of the 
above-mentioned provisions of the Criminal Code. 
3.3 Other Measures Assisting Prevention of Confl ict of Interest
Slovak legal procedure regulates administrative activity and provides legal instructions in 
the area of public administration. Th e basis of this legal regulation is law No. 71/1967 
on administrative procedure. Besides this law, other laws contain provisions that impact 
on administrative procedures, such as the law on construction (No. 50/1976 Coll.), 
misdemeanor law, law on taxes and fee administration (No. 511/1992 Coll.), freedom 
of information act (No. 211/2000 Coll.), etc. 
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3.3.1   Right to Appeal Against a Decision of the Administrative Body
Each of these legal instructions provides for appeal against any decision issued by a public 
service body. For the purpose of this study, it is not important to deal with details of 
the individual provisions of the above-mentioned laws, however, one should describe 
at least the basic principles and provisions regulating public service. 
Th e administrative body, on its own initiative or based on a proposal (presentment), 
can initiate an administrative action. Generally, a decision is announced in 30 days (for 
FOIA it takes 10 days). 
Th e appellant can submit an appeal against the administrative body’s decision within 
15 days. Th e body overseeing the issuing administrative body considers the appeal on 
the ﬁ rst level. If the body is suitable in every respect to bring a decision, it can make a 
decision on its own. If the appeal is against a decision by a district oﬃ  ce, the authority 
of appeal is the regional oﬃ  ce, in the case of municipalities and regional self-govern-
ments, the next level is the state administration. 
In the ﬁ rst case, the court decides since the self-government is directly elected by 
the citizens, thus it has no supervising authority. In the second case, the district/regional 
oﬃ  ce decides since it is a state administration. Th ere is no correct legal remedy for ap-
pealing their decision. 
Th e administrative law also recognizes the institution of extraordinary legal remedy, 
such as retrial. Th e extraordinary legal remedy can be used when new evidence has 
emerged that might change deliberations and that has not been submitted previously. 
Slovak legal procedures also recognize the institution of so-called administrative 
judiciary. Th is institution is not properly developed and needs to be reformed. It is 
established in the Code of Civil Procedure, in article 244, among others. It is possible 
to ﬁ le for retrial within two months from the time the authority of appeal issued its 
decision. However, in such cases the court only considers whether the legal procedure 
conformed to the law, and it won’t consider the issues of the case itself. 
If the authority of appeal limits or refuses access to information requested by the 
claimant, and the court ﬁ nds the request reasonable, the case will be returned to a 
competent administrative body for a new decision. Of course, the administrative body 
is obliged by the decision of the court (by its legal opinion). No further legal remedy is 
available against the court’s decision in such cases.
3.3.2   Rules of Withdrawal
If an acting participant or a deputy of the administrative body thinks he may show bias 
in the decision-making process (including having a personal interest in the issue under 
consideration), he can request to be withdrawn from the process and be replaced by 
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someone else. Th e employee in question is excluded from hearings and from the decision-
making process if his objectivity is in doubt. Similarly, anybody who has participated 
in deciding on the same issue at a diﬀ erent level is to be excluded from hearings and 
the decision-making process. 
Th is provision can eliminate, or at least avoid the potential for, conﬂ ict of interest 
if it is applied to concrete cases at the local government level. Th e provisions concern-
ing the exclusion of biased persons from administrative actions have to be assessed in 
connection with the provisions of civil and public service laws that have been quoted 
here before. It is the obligation of civil servants and employees of self-governments to 
perform their duties impartially, and to announce a potential conﬂ ict of interest. Th e 
provisions of article 9 of the administrative law applies this obligation to the activities 
of public service employees as well. 
3.3.3   Rules for Public Procurement 
Public procurement is a very important area in the discussion of conﬂ ict of interest. In 
the framework of Slovak legal procedures, Law No. 263/1999 Coll. on public procure-
ment regulates it. Simply said, the rules on public procurement are very complex. Th is 
law regulates the following:
      •     the procedure of obtaining products, facilities and other material objects of-
fered for sale commercially; labor and transportation needed for construction 
projects; ﬁ nancial services, legal services, labor services and other services;
      •     methods and procedures for public procurement and contracting;
      •     establishment and competence of the Public Procurement Oﬃ  ce (from here 
on: “Oﬃ  ce”).
Th e principles of transparency, equal treatment of all applicants and interested par-
ties, fair competition, and responsible fund management are applied. 
Th e law also regulates the procurers, the persons who are obliged to comply with this 
law. Besides bodies of state administration, the oﬃ  ces of a regional self-government, a 
municipality, or a budgetary organization of a regional self-governments or municipality 
are included in this category.
Th e law recognizes several methods of public procurement:
      a)   public competition;
      b)   limited competition;
      c)   open, negotiated procedure;
      d)   closed, negotiated procedure.
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Methods a) and b) are used for contracts, while methods c) and d) are used only 
under special circumstances speciﬁ ed by law (see below). Th ese four methods are di-
vided into categories depending on the expected expense of procurement: over-limited, 
under-limited, limited with higher price and limited with lower price.
Th e law sets some restrictions that essentially prevent the manipulation of the 
public procurement process. Th e law is constructed so that the higher the price of a 
public procurement the stricter the conditions. So it is expected that the procurer will 
make an eﬀ ort to split the expected price for the acquisition in order to avoid the more 
complicated public procurement method, or even to avoid public competition at all. 
Th e law says:
“Th e procurer cannot split the expense for the same kind of goods or 
services into several parts if the parts cannot function independently, 
or if the goods are delivered to the same destination.” 
Th is provision should prevent unauthorized manipulation, the elimination of com-
petition, and therefore potentially corrupt or illegal behavior.
Public procurement is announced by publishing conditions for bidding and the 
type of procurement procedure used. Th e procurer announces an over-limited public 
procurement in the public procurement bulletin and in the foreign press; an under-
limited method of public procurement is published in the Bulletin only. 
Anyone involved in the preparation of procurement competitions is obliged to 
keep details of the competition secret until the day the competition is announced. Th is 
provision is very important, since public procurement competitions are used mostly 
(but not only) at the local level, where local companies are the bidders, and oﬃ  cials 
involved in the procurement procedures and businessmen applying for public contracts 
often know each other. 
Another very important provision of the law regulates communication between the 
procuring oﬃ  cials and interested parties. Th e announcement, pertinent documents and 
any other forms of communication between procurer and applicant is conducted to 
ensure that there is a record of all communication that is available to all parties. If the 
communication is conducted through equipment that is not able to record its content 
permanently, e.g., by telephone, the content has to be recorded and delivered in written 
form, and by the deadline determined by the terms of the announcement. 
Th e procurer is obliged to provide for at least three bids to evaluate the oﬀ ers. Th e 
law contains another provision for the evaluation of bids, to avoid possible conﬂ ict of 
interest. 
“Th e commission member must have a clean record, and cannot be the 
applicant himself, nor can he be biased in relationship to the applicants. 
Th e commission member or a person closely related to him cannot be 
the statutory body or the member of statutory body of the applicant or 
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the partner of the applicant in a legal entity. Th e commission member 
cannot be an employee of the applicant, the employee of an association 
of businessmen whose membership includes the applicant or a person 
who is the employee of the company. Th e commission member famil-
iar with the list of applicants who submitted bids must conﬁ rm to the 
procurer in a declaration that no circumstances are present that make 
his membership in the commission unacceptable, or he must explain 
the reasons why he cannot be a member.”
Th e procurer is obliged to allow all applicants who submitted bids by the oﬃ  cial 
deadline to be present at the opening of sealed bids. Th e evaluation of the bids by the 
commission is not public, and the applicants cannot participate at commission meetings. 
Th e commission can ask for further explanation of their oﬀ er in written form. But the 
commission must not ask for or accept modiﬁ cations in the oﬀ er. Th e commission will 
provide the procurer, without any delay, the list of rejected oﬀ ers, with the explanation 
for the refusal. 
Th e procurer is obliged to notify the submitters of rejected oﬀ ers, along with an 
explanation for rejection. Based on the results of evaluation by individual commission 
members, the procurer will arrange contracting with the winner of the bidding process. 
If only one oﬀ er has been received and evaluated, then no contract will be closed. Th e 
procurer is obliged to accept a contract proposal from the winning applicant at least 
ﬁ ve days before the deadline, unless objections have been raised by the procurer. Th e 
procurer delivers the accepted contract without any delay to the applicant. If the ap-
plicant has submitted an objection against the procedure of the procurer, the procurer 
can accept the contract proposal only after deciding about the objection. Th e procurer 
cannot use the oﬀ ers or their parts without the applicant’s approval. 
Public procurement procedures diﬀ er in some details (such as the duration of terms) 
based on the selected public procurement method. Namely, the public competition 
and limited competition are similar, depending on the subject of procurement, and 
an unlimited number of applicants can submit oﬀ ers. In some cases, the procurer can 
limit the number of applicants, but he must strictly follow legal provisions in doing 
that. Th ere is a slight diﬀ erence between the open, negotiated procurement procedure 
and the closed, negotiated procedure.
Public procurement means the acquisition of goods and services using public funds. 
Th erefore, it should bedone by the most transparent method. Th e law on public procure-
ment provides for transparency, but the question is how far the law is willing to go in its 
requirements. Th e public procurement law is (should be) the legal norm to restrict not 
only conﬂ ict of interest, but also other kinds of corruptive, illegal behavior in this sensi-
tive area where public funds are concerned and where illegal proﬁ ts can be reaped. 
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Th e problems with public procurement appeared in connection with the project of State 
Treasury. Th e procurer, the Ministry of Finance, needed to purchase computer systems for use  
by the State Treasury. A competition was announced, three companies submitted acceptable 
bids, and their oﬀ ers were very competitive. Th e winner was selected under not very clear 
circumstances. Th e decision of the commission of the Ministry of Finance was disapproved 
by the Public Procurement Oﬃ  ce. Th e decision was revoked and the ministry was obliged 
to announce a new competition. Th e new competition yielded the same winner, and the 
Public Procurement Oﬃ  ce’s dismissal was the same, too. After an unduly long period of 
time, the ministry announced that it is under time pressure and picked a winner without 
any competition—a legal possibility under special circumstances. Certain circumstances 
and decisions still seem suspicious, and they have never been credibly cleared up. A criminal 
procedure was initiated, which has not been closed yet. 
3.4 External and Internal Control Supporting the Prevention 
      of Confl ict of Interest in Local Governments
Th e audit system in Slovak public administration is divided into external and internal 
audit. Th e external audit is carried out primarily by the Supreme Audit Oﬃ  ce, an in-
dependent body regulated by the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, and also by the 
special law on the Supreme Audit Oﬃ  ce (No. 39/1993 Coll.). External audit includes 
monitoring by journalists, whose ﬁ ndings are published in the media, or by private 
citizens, based on the freedom of information act (No. 211/2000 Coll.), which provides 
extensive rights to make inquiries on many issues related to public administration. 
Internal audit is performed within the framework of state administration, regulated 
mostly by the law on audit in state administration (No. 10/1996 Coll.) and by the chief 
auditor of municipality/regional self-governments.
3.4.1   Th e Supreme Audit Oﬃ  ce
Th e Constitution of the Slovak Republic regulates the position of the Supreme Audit 
Oﬃ  ce in articles 60–63. Th e Supreme Audit Oﬃ  ce is an independent audit body 
managing:
      •     budgetary funds that are approved by the National Council of the Slovak 
Republic or by the central government;
      •     property, commitments, funds, property rights and outstanding debts of the 
state, public–legal institutions and of the National Property Fund of the Slovak 
Republic;
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      •     property, monetary funds and property rights of municipalities and higher re-
gional units, obtained as cost reimbursement to converted state administration 
property; 
      •     property, commitments, monetary funds, property rights and outstanding debts 
for which the Slovak Republic has assumed guarantees;
      •     property, monetary funds, property rights and outstanding debts to the Slovak 
Republic, legal entities or physical persons managing state budget funds and state 
property related to development projects or from similar foreign projects. 
Th e auditing authority of the Supreme Audit Oﬃ  ce includes:
      •     the Government of the Slovak Republic, ministries, and other central state ad-
ministration bodies of the Slovak Republic and bodies subordinated to them;
      •     state bodies, and legal entities established by the central state administration or 
other state bodies;
      •     municipalities and higher regional units, legal entities established by municipali-
ties and by higher regional units;
      •     state speciﬁ c funds, public-legal institutions established by law, legal entities 
with equity participation of public-legal institutions or of state; 
      •     the National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic,  and legal entities with ﬁ xed 
equity participation of the National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic;
      •     physical persons and legal entities.
At least once a year, the Supreme Audit Oﬃ  ce submits a report on the result of its 
auditing activities to the National Council of the Slovak Republic. It also submits a 
report when one is requested by the National Council of the Slovak Republic.
It follows from the above that the Supreme Audit does not have the absolute author-
ity to audit any organization or individual it chooses. Local self-government bodies can 
perform audits only when state funds are involved, so only in cases when the body acts 
in the state’s interest is it accountable to an external audit.
We can say that this is not suﬃ  cient, especially during the current process of decen-
tralization when more authority and funds are transferred to municipalities and regional 
self-governments. Th e Supreme Audit Oﬃ  ce must have wider authority to audit the 
management of self-governments’ funds, since a major part of them come from the 
central budget, and consequently from the common tax pool of all citizens. Municipali-
ties are mostly opposed to the control of the Supreme Audit Oﬃ  ce. Th ey claim that 
executives of the Oﬃ  ce are political appointees, so they would have an opportunity to 
interfere politically with the activities of those municipalities, where the mayor or the 
council majority belongs to the opposition. Th is is a weak argument, and we have several 
examples of the misuse of public funds creating major problems in some cities.
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A good example is the city of Kosice, where public funds were used for expensive reconstruction 
of the city centre, creating major debts that are owed to several commercial banks. Kosice is 
now trying to secure state subsidies and sell forests to the state. Ownership of these forests was 
transferred from the state to the  city of Kosice in 1991, in accordance with the municipal 
property law. However, the sale would not be possible under central government supervision. 
Currently, every tax paying citizen contributes to Kosice’s reﬁ nancing of its debts.
Law No. 39/1993 on the Supreme Audit Oﬃ  ce of the Slovak Republic sets the 
responsibilities of the Supreme Audit Oﬃ  ce in compliance with the Constitution of 
the Slovak Republic. In accordance with generally adopted legal provisions, the Oﬃ  ce 
performs auditing of management, eﬃ  ciency, and legality. Th e Supreme Audit Oﬃ  ce’s 
chief executives are its chairman and vice-chairmen. Th ey are elected by Parliament. 
Th e auditors carry out the duties of the Supreme Audit Oﬃ  ce. Th e auditors must have 
an immaculate track record, the necessary training, and work experience in the area of 
auditing. Th e auditors, as well as the chairman and vice-chairmen of the Supreme Audit 
Oﬃ  ce, are obliged to keep secret any information acquired in the course of their audit-
ing activities, unless the chairman or vice-chairmen decide to publish the information 
in writing to inform the general public. Th e duty of secrecy applies after the termina-
tion of oﬃ  ce or the end of employment. Th e auditors also have the position of public 
oﬃ  cials, related to their auditing activities. Th e subject of the audit must provide all 
the information and circumstances, so that the audit can be carried out unobstructed. 
Th e Supreme Audit Oﬃ  ce is authorized to levy ﬁ nes up to 10,000 SKK, and, in cases 
of obstruction, the ﬁ ne can be repeatedly meted out. Based on article 4 of this law, the 
subject of the audit is obliged to provide the Oﬃ  ce with all requested information, 
documents and explanations related to the audit. 
Th e audit cannot be performed by auditors whose fairness and independence from 
the subject of the audit can be questioned. Th e audited subject can raise written objec-
tions about the auditor’s fairness. 
Th e Oﬃ  ce notiﬁ es the relevant state agency under whose authority the subject 
belongs about the audit’s ﬁ ndings. Th e Oﬃ  ce notiﬁ es the state administration bod-
ies of the ﬁ ndings related to its activities. Shortcomings in the activity of central state 
administration body will be reported to the government. Th e body to which the Oﬃ  ce 
sends its report on the shortcomings discovered by the audit is obliged to rectify them 
in its authority and provide feedback in written form to the Oﬃ  ce.
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3.4.2   Th e Chief Auditor
i)      Th e chief auditor of the municipality 
Based on article 18, paragraph 2 of Law No. 39/1993, the chief auditor of the munici-
pality primarily:
      •     performs the audit of revenues and expenditures of the municipal budget and 
the management of municipal property, as well as management of budgetary 
or compensatory organizations of the municipality;
      •     drafts professional statements on the proposed municipal budget and provides the 
ﬁ nal accounting before it is submitted for approval to the municipal council;
      •     submits the results of the audit directly to the municipal council;
      •     at least once a year this auditor submits a report on the results of his auditing 
activity to the municipal council;
      •     cooperates with relevant state bodies in auditing the management of state funds 
by the municipality.
Beside this, he/she participates at the sessions of the municipal council and at the 
sessions of municipal board and has an advisory vote. Th e chief auditor has access to 
all accounting and treasury documents, as well as any documents related to treasury 
operations, accounting administration, management of municipal property, and any 
other documents required for auditing. 
Th e municipal council will recall the chief auditor if:
      •     he is convicted of the intent to commit a crime, or is convicted of committing 
a crime, unless the sentence is suspended;
      •     he ﬁ lls a position that is incompatible with the oﬃ  ce of chief auditor;
      •     he fails to perform his duties responsibly and with due integrity;
      •     he is barred from or restricted in performing legal actions. 
Th e statutes of cities/municipalities approved by city/municipal councils can provide 
the chief auditor with more concrete or speciﬁ c tasks. However, these statutes have to 
be in compliance with provisions of the law. Th ere is space to extend the authority of 
chief auditor, since the law only talks about “the chief auditor’s primary responsibilities,” 
and does not exclude the possibility of extending his authority. It is the municipal/city 
council that regulates the chief auditor’s activity.
ii)     Th e chief auditor of regional self-governments
Th e chief auditor of regional self-governments, based on article 19, audits the task 
fulﬁ llment of regions, mostly auditing of revenues and expenditures of a regional self-
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government’s budget and auditing property management by regional self-governments. 
At least once a year this oﬃ  cial submits a report on the results of his auditing activity 
to the council of the regional self-government. Th e regional self-government is obliged 
to ensure the chief auditor’s independence. 
Th e diﬀ erence can be easily seen between the ways the activities of the chief audi-
tor are treated at the regional self-governmental and municipal levels. In my opinion, 
the law does not provide enough space for the extension of the auditor’s authority on 
some speciﬁ c issues. Th e council can recall the chief auditor on the grounds that the 
chief auditor:
      •     is convicted of the intent to commit a crime, or is convicted of committing a 
crime, unless the sentence is suspended;
      •     ﬁ lls a  position that is incompatible with the oﬃ  ce of chief auditor;
      •     fails to perform his duties responsibly and with due integrity;
      •     is barred or restricted in performing legal actions. 
Several controlling mechanisms at diﬀ erent levels of public administration contrib-
ute not only to the prevention of conﬂ ict of interest, but also to transparency and the 
prevention of corrupt behavior and other forms of misconduct.
In the current process of decentralization, there is also a plan to create and adopt a 
law on auditing at local self-governments. Th is law should deﬁ ne the status and respon-
sibility of auditors more precisely, since, currently, their real authority greatly depends 
on the good or bad will of the councils. Th e majority of Slovak municipalities do not 
have their own chief auditor. 
3.4.3   Th e Ombudsman
In the summer of 2002 the institution of ombudsman, the public defender of civil 
rights, was established in the Slovak legal system. Th is happened by the approval of law 
No. 411/2002 Coll. and the provisions of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. Th is 
law has been in eﬀ ect since August 6, 2002, because it took time within the National 
Council of the Slovak Republic to elect an ombudsman. Th e law prescribes that the 
ombudsman take oﬃ  ce not later than six months after swearing in. Th is period is used 
to ﬁ nd the suitable domicile, etc. So in reality, this institution has been functioning for 
a very short time. Th erefore we do not have any experience with the activities of the 
ombudsman in Slovakia. 
His basic task is to participate in the protection of basic rights and freedoms of 
physical and legal entities relating to actions, decisions or malfunction of public ad-
ministration bodies that are in conﬂ ict with eﬀ ective laws or with the principles of a 
democratic state. 
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If a physical or legal entity believes their rights have been violated, they can turn to 
the ombudsman. In our case, this primarily concerns the decisions of public adminis-
tration bodies. If the ombudsman comes to the conclusion that a decision is in conﬂ ict 
with eﬀ ective legal provisions, he will refer the case to a prosecutor. He is to inform the 
applicant of this procedure. Th e prosecutor is obliged by law to report to the ombuds-
man what measures he adopted to handle the case. 
3.4.4   Civic Audit, FOIA
Civic audit has been provided for several years by journalists, who have acted tradition-
ally as the “watchdogs of democracy.” Th ey monitor the management of public funds 
and the activities of public administration bodies, and they call attention to short-
comings in the activities of public administration bodies. At times it can eﬀ ect the 
replacement of incompetent or corrupt  public oﬃ  cials. 
Law No. 211/2000 Coll., called the freedom of information act (FOIA), has con-
tributed to the extension of opportunities and tools of civic audit because this law has 
extended the possibilities of external control of public administration bodies. Th e law 
provides private citizens, and not only journalists, with several eﬀ ective tools to make 
inquiries on public issues and exert pressure on public administrations to be more 
transparent, productive and eﬃ  cient. 
Th e law marks in its provisions so-called obliged entities. Th ey are state bodies, 
municipalities, and legal entities and individuals to which the law entrusts the author-
ity to decide on the rights and duties of physical persons or legal entities in public 
admin-istration, but only within their area of authority. Regional self-governments also 
belong in this group, as do legal entities established by law and by the state body or 
municipality, based on the special law. Th e law primarily concerns such organizations 
as the Slovak State Television Network, the Slovak Radio Network, the State Welfare 
Agency, etc., as well as state foundations and organizations established by the state, 
municipality or regional self-governments. Also, legal entities that are charged with the 
management of property of the state, municipalities, or regional self-governments are 
included here. 
Access to information is provided to everyone, though the law does not deﬁ ne who 
is meant by “everyone”; it refers to all physical persons or legal entities. It does not make 
distinctions as to the physical person’s citizenship or age, for example. Th e law guarantees 
access to information in the most extensive way. Access to conﬁ dential information by 
authorized persons is speciﬁ ed in this law. Th e law protects bank secrets, commercial 
secrets, tax information, all classiﬁ ed data based on the law on classiﬁ ed materials, and 
personal data. Th e basic principle is: “What is not secret is public.” Information can 
only be classiﬁ ed by the National Security Oﬃ  ce and the Oﬃ  ce publishes the lists in 
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announcements. Th is applies to state administration bodies as well as to local self-gov-
ernments.
Some problems have arisen concerning public access to information that certain 
oﬃ  cials are not accustomed to providing and that they often try to withhold.
One example of this is the public listing of mobile telephone numbers of oﬃ  cials in local 
self-governments. Access was denied on the grounds that the numbers belong in the province 
of personal data, based on the freedom of information act requiring consent of concerned 
individuals. Th e appeal against this decision was rejected. But the court had a diﬀ erent 
opinion in cases where the mobile phone is the property of the municipality and is paid for 
by public funds. Citizens have the right to audit public funds management, and since the 
mobile phones are the property of the municipality and are ﬁ nanced from public resources, 
citizens have the right to know the numbers. In any case, the issue is not about personal data, 
since the phone is related to a certain oﬃ  ce or position, not to a certain individual. 
Th e law distinguishes mandatory publishing of certain types of information by the 
obliged persons automatically, without anyone requesting access to it. Th is includes 
general information about oﬃ  ce organization, phone numbers of employees, the general 
functions of the oﬃ  ce, and other relevant information. It also includes information 
on the activities of the self-government’s council, oﬃ  cial documents, etc. All public 
information should be provided on request.
Th e applicant has to submit a request for the information, and the law sets minimal 
requirements for the application. Th e application has to be clear, it has to contain the 
applicant’s name, the subject of his request, the person or the authority the applicant 
wants to receive the information from, and what format the information should be in. 
Th e law allows for written or oral communication, by phone, fax, email, or in any way 
or format possible. Th e parties can agree on what format information is provided, such 
as email, paper copies, etc. 
Th e information must be provided free of charge. Obliged persons who have access 
to the information must assemble it based on the application. Th e deadline to provide 
the requested information is between 10–30 days from the time of application. Only 
information requested has to be provided. 
3.4.5   Political Responsibility
Elected representatives of self-governments have a political responsibility. Th ey are 
appointed based on elections, i.e., the public’s decision on who should administer 
public issues at the level of municipality or regional self-government. Elections also 
provide an opportunity for the citizens to express their judgment of the performance 
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of the municipality or regional self-government. Th ey contribute to the administration 
through taxation, and so they should take an interest in the quality of services they 
receive in return. Political responsibility is more important in decentralized systems 
(or in post-communist states that are in the process of decentralization), since elected 
representatives and not state appointed oﬃ  cials have the major inﬂ uence on public 
policy issues. So a mayor, for example, is a statutory body in labor relations, and he/she 
is politically responsible for the actions of his/her staﬀ . 
Disciplinary responsibility of government employees is regulated mostly by civil 
service law or by public service law. Th e relevant legal provisions contain regulations 
on rights and responsibilities, including disciplinary responsibility through “non-legal” 
(but not illegal) documents. Th e law applies to each individual employee. Th e civil 
service law states explicitly that, except for the generally adopted legal instructions, 
the civil servant is also bound by the ethics code10 issued by the Civil Service Oﬃ  ce of 
the Slovak Republic. Th e public service law empowers individual institutions to issue 
labor regulations that bind employees in public service; the labor procedure has to be 
approved by labor organizations, otherwise it is not valid. 
Criminal responsibility, and individual criminal acts have been discussed above; 
criminal law applies to everybody.
3.4.6   Education and Training
Th e system of education could play a major role with an emphasis on anti-corruption 
behavior and proper performance of oﬃ  cial duties. Th is education is realized system-
atically more at the level of local state administration; mostly it is the heritage of the 
centralized system of public administration from the communist era. Th e training of 
self-government employees is also organized, but not with the same scope and regularity. 
More often, training is done at the initiative of the self-government or non-governmental 
organizations, which can be a disadvantage, especially for small municipalities.
Along with the process of decentralization, when more and more authority is 
transferred to the self-government, it is necessary to focus attention on education about 
anti-corruption activities as well as the closely related issue of conﬂ ict of interest. 
4.   CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL REMARKS
Th e problem of conﬂ ict of interest at the local level is only partially regulated. Th e legal 
provisions regulate conﬂ ict of interest mostly in the area of civil service. Th e provisions 
of the law on the exclusion of business activities, conﬂ ict of interest and its prevention, 
and some other issues, generally apply to state employees who have the status of civil 
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servants. Even though state employees can have easy access to oﬃ  cial information, no 
provisions cover the abuse of such information for personal gain. In my opinion, this 
is a signiﬁ cant shortcoming of current legislation.
Th e issue is not satisfactorily regulated in local self-governments. It is signiﬁ cant that 
the regulations of public service apply not only to employees of local self-government 
but also to doctors, nurses in state hospitals, teachers, employees of museums, galleries, 
etc. Strict, binding regulation is not as suitable and necessary for public employees as 
for oﬃ  cials in state administration. 
Special regulations related to representatives of self-government councils, mayors, 
and heads of regional self-governments are needed. Th e laws that established these 
positions provide insuﬃ  cient regulations on incompatibility of positions, or the problem 
of conﬂ ict of interest. An obligation to submit a property declaration, or a ban on 
simultaneously running a business, does not exist at the local level. 
Th e draft of a constitutional law on conﬂ ict of interest submitted to Parliament in 
May 2002 covered all these areas but was rejected. Th e law applied to a wider circle of 
constitutional, as well as public oﬃ  cials. Besides the “incompatibility of wages,” as it is 
incorrectly interpreted in the present law, the proposal also regulated the incompatibility 
of positions and real (and possible) incompatibility of interests. 
Th e proposal banned the incompatibility of positions that is allowed in eﬀ ective laws 
today in Slovakia for members of Parliament, mayors, representatives of regional self-
governments, etc. Th e proposal explicitly regulated the incompatibility of positions for 
state employees, members of statutory bodies of state companies, municipal companies or 
companies of regional self-governments. Th e proposal set an absolute ban on running a 
business for everyone to whom the proposed law was supposed to apply. In the proposal, 
oﬃ  cials were obliged to declare the possibility of conﬂ ict of interest, even including 
relatives or other related persons. All persons to whom the law applied were obligated 
to submit property disclosures. Th is obligation would apply not only to concerned 
individuals but to everyone living in the same household. 
The proposal included explicit regulations on post-employment restrictions 
(limitations). Data listed in property disclosures could have been veriﬁ ed by the ﬁ nancial 
police or with other units of public administration—this is not possible in the current 
system. In cases of non-compliance, with duties set by the proposal of constitutional 
law, sanctions were determined, such as loss of mandate, dismissal from employment, 
ﬁ nes of relatively high amounts, etc.
Th ere were two “supplementary” laws attached to the proposal of the constitutional 
law that provided individual speciﬁ cations concerning local self-governments. Since the 
proposal of constitutional law did not pass the parliament, it was completely useless to 
act on these proposals. 
Th e new coalition elected in 2002 declared in its program the approval of a new 
constitutional law on conﬂ ict of interest. Th e minister of justice has created a working 
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group of MPs, representatives of government, self-governments and non-governmental 
organizations. Th e proposal should be submitted to the National Council of the Slovak 
Republic in 2003. Th e new legal regulations should be quite similar to those proposed 
in the spring of 2002. In general, they should improve the legal environment in this 
area. 
Th e ﬁ rst draft was already presented. Th e proposed constitutional act is more 
detailed than the previous one and also covers representatives of self-governments. 
Self-government representatives are strongly opposed to the draft. No supplementary 
laws have been submitted, so relevant laws will have to be amended. Th is process is 
still ongoing.
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levels. 
3 Th e legal form of ethics code is a regulation with “under-act legal power.” It is issued by the Civil 
Service Oﬃ  ce, signed by its director, upon the concrete delegation set in the Civil service law.
4 Source: “Oﬃ  ce of the General Prosecution of the Slovak Republic” In: Monitoring the EU Accession 
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6 For a detailed explanation, see also the sub-chapter on civic audit, FOIA.
7 See also the case on using the municipal mobile phones.
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Local Government 
and Public Service Reform Initiative
Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI), as one of the programs 
of the Open Society Institute (OSI), is an international development and grant-giving 
organization dedicated to the support of good governance in the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Newly Independent States (NIS). LGI seeks to 
fulﬁ ll its mission through the initiation of research and support of development and 
operational activities in the ﬁ elds of decentralization, public policy formation and the 
reform of public administration.
With projects running in countries covering the region between the Czech Republic 
and Mongolia, LGI seeks to achieve its objectives through:
      •     development of sustainable regional networks of institutions and professionals 
engaged in policy analysis, reform oriented training, and advocacy;
      •     support and dissemination of in-depth comparative and regionally applicable 
policy studies tackling local government issues;
      •     support of country speciﬁ c projects and delivery of technical assistance to the 
implementation agencies;
      •     assistance to Soros foundations with the development of local government, 
public administration and/or public policy programs in their countries of the 
region;
      •     publishing of books, studies and discussion papers dealing with the issues of 
decentralization, public administration, good governance, public policy, and 
lessons learnt from the process of transition in these areas;
      •     development of curricula and organization of training programs dealing with 
speciﬁ c local government issues;
      •     support of policy centers and think-tanks in the region.
Apart from its own projects, LGI works closely with a number of other interna-
tional organizations (Council of Europe, Department for International Development, 
USAID, UNDP, and World Bank) and co-funds larger regional initiatives aimed at the 
support of reforms on the sub-national level. Local Government Information Network 
(LOGIN) and Fiscal Decentralization Initiatives (FDI) are two main examples of this 
cooperation.
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